Immigration Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Keir Starmer Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 230, in schedule 8, page 114, line 9, leave out “elsewhere” and insert “, at port or as conveniently as possible thereafter”

To limit powers of search to the ship, the port and as conveniently as possible thereafter, not anywhere in the country.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 233, in schedule 8, page 114, line 22, leave out “elsewhere” and insert “, at port or as conveniently as possible thereafter”

See explanatory note for Amendment 230.

Amendment 239, in schedule 8, page 116, leave out lines 4 to 6

To prevent persons accompanying immigration officers carrying out searches in accordance with this part of the Bill.

Amendment 242, in schedule 8, page 116, leave out lines 13 to 18

To remove the immunity from prosecution and civil suit for constables and enforcement officers exercising powers under the Bill.

Amendment 231, in schedule 8, page 118, line 32, leave out “elsewhere” and insert “, at port or as conveniently as possible thereafter”

See explanatory note for Amendment 230.

Amendment 234, in schedule 8, page 118, line 45, leave out “elsewhere” and insert “, at port or as conveniently as possible thereafter”

See explanatory note for Amendment 230.

Amendment 240, in schedule 8, page 120, leave out lines 26 to 28

See explanatory note for Amendment 239.

Amendment 243, in schedule 8, page 120, leave out lines 35 to 40

See explanatory note for Amendment 242.

Amendment 232, in schedule 8, page 123, line 9, leave out “elsewhere” and insert “, at port or as conveniently as possible thereafter”

See explanatory note for Amendment 230.

Amendment 235, in schedule 8, page 123, line 22, leave out “elsewhere” and insert “, at port or as conveniently as possible thereafter”

See explanatory note for Amendment 230.

Amendment 241, in schedule 8, page 125, leave out lines 4 to 6

See explanatory note for Amendment 239.

Amendment 244, in schedule 8, page 125, leave out lines 13 to 18

See explanatory note for Amendment 242.

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[The Chair]

I am grateful to the Minister.

[Keir Starmer]

This is a daunting number of amendments, but most relate to extensions with respect to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.

There are three substantive points. First, as the background to amendment 230, schedule 8 inserts new schedule 4A into the Immigration Act 1971. It covers enforcement powers

“exercisable by immigration officers, English and Welsh constables and enforcement officers”

in relation to ships. We spoke this morning about the power to stop, board, divert and detain a ship, and about the power to search and obtain information under new paragraph 3. Under new paragraph 3(2) the “relevant officer” may search

“the ship; anyone on the ship; and anything on the ship”.

The provision to which amendment 230 relates is new paragraph 3(8), which states:

“A power conferred by this paragraph may be exercised on the ship or elsewhere.”

“Elsewhere” is obviously widely defined. There is a power to search the ship and anyone or anything on it, which suggests that it is ship-focused, but sub-paragraph (8) is open-ended and provides for a power to search on the ship or anywhere. To some extent the amendment may have a probing function to enable us to understand the reasoning behind the provision, but our concern is that the power is very broad and we seek assurance that it is not intended that the power under the schedule could be exercised literally anywhere, at any time.

Secondly, to give the context to amendment 239, new paragraph 4 deals with the power of arrest and seizure; new paragraph 5 is on protective searches of persons—searches that can be made of individuals to seize and retain items; and new paragraph 6 deals with searches for nationality documents.

Then comes new paragraph 7, which is odd. The “relevant officer” appears pretty well through the Bill and is the officer with the relevant powers, training, duties and so on. New paragraph 7(1) provides for assistants:

“A relevant officer may…be accompanied by other persons”.

Then sub-paragraph (2) creates a very broad power:

“A person accompanying a relevant officer under sub-paragraph (1) may perform any of the officer’s functions under this Part of this Schedule, but only under the officer’s supervision.”

If that means what it says, anybody can exercise powers of search, including searches of people, and other powers without the need for any of the normal training and safeguards around the exercise of that power. On the face of it, simply anybody with the officer who is deemed to be an assistant can carry out all of these functions. That is an extraordinarily wide power. I do not think that exists in other areas of the law. Designating someone as an assistant in that way certainly does not exist in relation to police officers or other enforcement officers. That is a very broad power.

Thirdly, on amendment 242, we turn again to page 116 and the same set of provisions:

“A relevant officer is not liable in any criminal or civil proceedings for anything done in the purported performance of functions under this Part of this Schedule if the court is satisfied that—

(a) the act was done in good faith, and

(b) there were reasonable grounds for doing it.”

That is a very wide-ranging immunity which is as broad as anything I have ever seen. If, heaven forbid, there were a fatality when someone was being held or searched or force was used—as has tragically happened in immigration cases—this would exempt from any criminal or civil proceedings anyone acting in good faith with reasonable grounds, notwithstanding the other common law and statutory defences that would be available. On the face of it, that would prevent a court looking into the exercise of these powers. That is obviously a deep cause for concern. Although there are many amendments, those are the three core issues that run through the set.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

We can all agree that we do not want to see anyone attempt to gain illegal entry into the UK by means of being smuggled in an overcrowded boat or vessel. Ensuring that immigration officials have the proper power to carry out their important duties is important not only in terms of enforcing our immigration control but with regards to increasing safety at sea.

That said, part 6 and, in particular, schedule 8 introduce a raft of new powers for immigration and maritime officers. It is only right and proper that we scrutinise those powers appropriately to ensure that the proper powers are being introduced to the correct officers and that they balance appropriately with the liberties that people are entitled to. I am not convinced that these provisions in their current form meet that aim and balance the equipping of immigration officers with the power that they need with ensuring that they treat international citizens with the respect that they deserve. Therefore, the aim of the amendments is to strike that balance between protecting an individual’s liberty and human rights and giving Home Office officers sufficient, important powers to carry out their duties. I accept that this is a difficult balance for the Home Office to strike.

We should be concerned about the regular use of the word “elsewhere” throughout this section of the Bill and what that implies. This in particular relates to the searches that will be conducted into the personal lives of individuals. In earlier sittings of the Committee, we have spoken about the dangers of speculative searches and the Home Office’s poor track record on completing them. I will not repeat the arguments already made but I will stress that these searches could have a significant and deteriorating impact on community relations and social cohesion.

Amendments 239, 240 and 241 make the point that, regardless of what happens with the Bill and the form it ends up taking, regardless of what law is finally passed, we all need to be sure that we have fully trained, capable and appropriate individuals carrying out the checks and enforcement that the law will demand. They will have powers of arrest without warrant, search, arrest and seizure. The Bill proposes that persons wholly unspecified may be able to carry out all these powers without limitation, under supervision of an immigration officer. Any powers under these provisions should be exercised by immigration officers alone. The amendments will ensure that the Home Office has the appropriate immigration officers carrying out the proper checks. The power and functions relating to this section of the Bill are wide and varied, including arresting without warrant, seizing property and conducting searches. The implications for the individuals concerned are so severe that these functions must be exercised by fully trained immigration officers. There is no excuse for them not to be.

The responsibilities of immigration officers who are operating at sea are arguably more demanding than those who are operating on land. Not only do they have to be qualified in immigration law, but they have to be experienced at dealing with ships at sea. This is an extremely important point. Safety concerns are at stake and I again make the point that we cannot make a half-hearted attempt on who we delegate these powers to. Schedule 8 may not have been one of the most widely discussed provisions in the Bill, but that should not distract our attention from it. Events over the summer have highlighted the danger that exists in trying to gain asylum through a vessel of some sort. Schedule 8 grants officers the

“Power to stop, board, divert and detain”

ships for immigration offences. Safety concerns arise in that regard and therefore careful consideration should be given to the schedule and the amendments that have subsequently been proposed.

[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

I hope that, with our clarifications and assurances, hon. Members will realise our purpose and intentions. We are taking the power because of a gap in the law. Until now, there has been a small number of relatively isolated incidents involving suspected facilitation in UK territorial waters. However, those incidents illustrate a gap in the legislation. Border Force officers currently have no powers to act unless the vessel is also of customs interest. In those circumstances, they have to pass the information to immigration officers on land and monitor the vessel’s movements while it remains at sea.

We judge that that gap in the law needs to be addressed to reflect the difference between powers that could be exercised for customs purposes and powers that could be exercised for immigration purposes. It is an issue if the powers cannot be exercised in the context of a vessel that is considered to be smuggling people rather than contraband, given the risk that organised crime groups, as we are seeing elsewhere, may over time seek to smuggle in a different way. The purpose of the schedule is to be prepared and to have the right legislative framework in place to be able to respond to any such risk in UK territorial waters.

Amendments 230 to 235 seek

“To limit the maritime search powers under the Bill to the ship, the port and as conveniently as possible thereafter”.

The amendments raise concerns, as the hon. and learned Gentleman, the shadow Minister, and the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North have highlighted, about whether the powers could be exercised anywhere on land. For ease, I will simply refer to the part of the schedule that deals with England and Wales, but I assure hon. Members that the same provisions equally apply, in certain other aspects of the schedule, in respect of waters adjacent to the coasts of Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The power to search in paragraph 3 of new schedule 4A only applies to a search of the ship, anyone on the ship and anything on the ship, as the hon. and learned Gentleman highlighted. The Bill does not limit where the power may be exercised in order to ensure that there are no gaps in the power. He was rightly probing and testing as to the intent of the term “elsewhere”. In part, it ensures that there is provision to arrest a person should they jump overboard to evade enforcement officers. Given the nature of the powers that we are seeking to provide, that could be entirely possible, whether they jump into the water or, if the vessel is in more inland waters, on to land. We need to be able to ensure that the provisions are operable in those circumstances. That will not be possible if the provision is limited to a ship or a port. I reassure the Committee that the test in paragraph 3(1) of new schedule 4A to the Immigration Act 1971 connects the exercise of the powers with suspicion regarding the ship. I hope that that connection may be helpful in giving an understanding of what we are trying to get at here.

[Keir Starmer]

This is in the nature of a probing intervention to ensure that I understand the Minister. The search is constrained by new paragraph 3(2) and I understand the reasoning, but there is no power of arrest in the paragraph; there is only a power of search. So sub-paragraph (8) would not help in the circumstance where someone jumps overboard and needs to be arrested. If someone jumped overboard, they could only be searched. I am probing because I do not quite understand the logic, but it may be that I am not quick enough.

[James Brokenshire]

That is connected to sub-paragraph (3), which states:

“The relevant officer may require the master of the ship, or any member of its crew, to take such action as is necessary for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(c).”

Obviously, the officer would require the ship to be taken to a port. That is connected to the ability to search, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has highlighted. There may be circumstances, for example, in which someone jumps off a ship and is rescued by officers where a search may be appropriate under the exercise of that power. We are trying to cover such circumstances. I recognise that he is fairly seeking to probe on that, and I hope my answer is helpful.

Amendments 239 to 244 would ensure that only the officers specified in the Bill can use the powers, and would remove the protection of officers from personal, criminal and civil liability. I will address those two points separately. The provision permitting powers to be exercised by accompanying officers reflects existing powers under other legislation—most notably, the powers recently considered by the House in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The extension of powers to assistants also exists in general for those working alongside customs officers under section 8 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.

In my opening comments I sought to explain the arrangement that Border Force officers have responsibility for revenue protection, as well as for the border, and they utilise those powers when they are on board cutters. We have therefore sought to ensure that there is no mismatch between customs powers and immigration powers. Other examples in the maritime context include paragraph 5 of schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, concerning powers to combat drug smuggling.

The reason why such powers may be given to assistants is not to permit untrained individuals to exercise those powers, but to ensure effective joint working with partner agencies that have at least a basic level of law enforcement training. The measure permits officers from partner organisations who may be working alongside enforcement officers, such as fisheries inspection officers, to assist immigration officers. It is important to emphasise the requirement that such persons must still be supervised.

On the protection of officers against civil and criminal liability, the measure extends only to personal liability; it does not prevent a claim for which an employer may be vicariously liable. When a court considers that officers have acted in good faith and that there were reasonable grounds for their actions, we think it is right from a public policy perspective that they are not held personally liable for carrying out their duties and acting in good faith. There are many other examples of where law enforcement officers are given equivalent protection. I understand that the principle has long been part of English law—prior to this sitting, the Solicitor General and I were discussing that it can be traced back to section 6 of the Constables Protection Act 1750, which I am assured remains in force today. Members may not have anticipated that they would be referring back to certain legislation in Committee, but the Solicitor General has come across the 1750 Act, which I underline.

With those reassurances, I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras will recognise that the measure is not an extension of the law but builds on existing legislative practices and principles. I therefore ask him to reflect on what he fairly said are probing amendments to gain a better sense of our intent and the purpose and nature of schedule 8. I hope that he is minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister for those assurances. I wonder aloud how long that immunity provision, however long-standing it is, can survive. The idea that people are immune from criminal law in that way is hard to reconcile with later legislation, but that is a much bigger argument than the one we are having now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 109, in schedule 8, page 114, line 17, leave out “detain” and insert “retain”.

This amendment and amendments 110 and 112 are minor drafting changes for consistency with language used elsewhere in the Schedule and have no substantive effect.

Amendment 110, in schedule 8, page 118, line 40, leave out “detain” and insert “retain”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 109.

Amendment 111, in schedule 8, page 122, line 6, leave out “(in England and Wales or elsewhere)” and insert “in the United Kingdom”.

This amendment is a minor drafting change for consistency with the language used in the equivalent provisions for England, Wales and Scotland.

Amendment 112, in schedule 8, page 123, line 17, leave out “detain” and insert “retain”.—(James Brokenshire.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 109.

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

English language requirements for public sector workers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Solicitor General]

Clauses 38 to 45 deal with the question of English language requirements for public sector workers.

I will deal with the subsections of clause 38 in turn. Subsection (1) sets out the requirement for public authorities to ensure that each of their workers in customer-facing roles speak fluent English. I know you will have an interest in this, Mr Owen: clause 43 provides specifically that where there are statutory duties in Wales, the requirement includes fluency in English and in the language of heaven. All members of the public who access public services need to be able to understand the information provided and be confident that their needs are thoroughly understood. Ensuring that that is the case will not only create better and more efficient services for taxpayers but will contribute to meeting our manifesto commitments to promote British values, in a positive and appropriate way.

Subsection (2) will require all public authorities to have regard to a code of practice when deciding how to comply with the duty set out in subsection (1). Of course, public authorities will have an opportunity to help shape that code of practice by responding to the open consultation that has been live since 13 October and will run until early December. Copies of the consultation documents have been placed in the Library of the House.

Subsections (3) and (4) will require each public authority to operate a complaints procedure. Citizens must, of course, be able to report their experience of a customer-facing worker not speaking fluent English. Public bodies must consider and respond to those complaints.

Subsections (5), (6) and (7) explain that a worker in the scope of the duty will be someone working under a contract of employment or of apprenticeship with a public authority, as a contractor to do work personally for a public authority, as an agency worker or as a police officer, civil servant or member of the armed forces. Speaking with members of the public must be a “regular and intrinsic part” of their role.

[Keir Starmer]

There is some concern that such a clause could operate in a discriminatory manner, with complaints and assumptions being made about what is fluent English and who is able to speak fluent English. Will the Solicitor General give an assurance that effective measures will be put in the code or elsewhere to ensure that any potential discriminatory effects and consequences are mitigated or eliminated?

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[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for sharing her anecdotal experiences, but the Home Office has done pre-consultation modelling, based on the proportion of over-16s in employment in the public administration, education and healthcare sectors according to 2011 census data—those are important, objective, statutory data obtained from the British population. According to that modelling, about 3.6 million employees are within the scope of the proposed duty and about 1.5 million employees in Great Britain, excluding Northern Ireland, are subject to English language standards, so an extra 2.1 million employees will be newly affected by the duty. We anticipate that between a low of 8,500 workers and a high of 25,000 workers may not have the required standards of English fluency. There is objective evidence upon which we can base this policy.

The policy is not designed suddenly to change the game or somehow create a wholly new structure that will alter the balance and change societal attitudes towards people who have a heavy accent. I include myself in that—I know the hon. Lady is as proud of her accent as I am proud of mine. We are seeking to standardise and enhance the position of people who have come to this country to work and who might have a different ethnicity or background. They will be employed under the same objective criteria that will be applied to everybody else in the public sector.

[Keir Starmer]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Solicitor General]

I will give way in a moment, but first I want to read a highlighted extract from the draft code of practice consultation relating to complaints. I hope that it will help the hon. Lady. Paragraph 4.5 says:

“Public authorities are not obliged by this Code of Practice to respond to complaints that are vexatious, oppressive, threatening or abusive. These should be given their usual dictionary meaning and could be defined as those complaints that are without foundation and/or which are intended to result in harsh or wrongful treatment of the person referred to in the complaint. In these types of circumstances a complaint should not be allowed to continue.”

I commend that paragraph to the House.

[Keir Starmer]

In so far as the measures extend the existing duties on public authorities to consider the requirement in the first place, they do not go much further than the existing position, but I think that the hon. Lady is pointing at the complaints procedure, which the Minister just touched on. Will he assure the Committee that the only complaints that the provision is intended to open up are complaints against the public authority for failing to carry out its duties, and not complaints made about an individual? That would give a considerable degree of assurance that there is no intention for the measures to allow anyone to say, “I am complaining about X,” when what they are really complaining about is public authority Y, which has not done its job properly. There is a big difference in terms of how the complaints procedure would then be used.

[The Solicitor General]

I can confirm that paragraph 4.1 of the draft code says:

“This section of the Code is about the procedure a public authority should take should there be a complaint regarding a breach of the fluency duty.”

That means a complaint against the public authority for having breached that duty. There are no sanctions in part 7 that could be applied directly to staff. As I said, it is a duty for the public authority.

[Keir Starmer]

This is an important point. Can the Minister write to us on that specific issue? It also arises from clause 41(2)(c), according to my reading; I think that he would provide assurance if he wrote to the Committee—to me and other hon. Members—to say that that is the intention of the complaints procedure. One can see the scope otherwise for concern about complaints.

[The Solicitor General]

I understand entirely, and I am happy to do so. I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman and any Committee members concerned about consequences for staff that dismissal would be a matter extremely far down the line in these procedures. We are talking about improving systems. That does not entail an ad hominem attack on individuals; it is about the public authority and any perceived failure on its part.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for the assurance about frivolous and other vexatious complaints. I know from having 9,000 staff of my own that what causes great anxiety is the fact that a complaint has been made to the individual, even if some weeks or months down the line it might be ruled out. If a number of complaints are made about a particular member of staff, that will increase anxiety hugely. The greater the clarity that the Minister can give here, the better. For a member of staff, simply knowing that a complaint might be knocked out in three months does not affect the anxiety that they feel when doing in their job.

[The Solicitor General]

I take point made by the hon. and learned Gentleman, and that made by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East. I will write to the Committee, as I have indicated.

On the question of bureaucracy, the measures take a minimalist approach. The code of practice will guide public authorities to align their actions regarding the new duty with existing practice. We expect a minimal expansion to existing procedures to suffice. Our open consultation will allow any concerns about bureaucracy to be raised and taken into account.

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[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Lady has mentioned a body that operates its own minimum standards. I envisage that where organisations are already doing that work, it will be a fairly easy task for them to satisfy a code of practice, but again, I would be interested to hear what they have to say as part of the consultation. I am sure that the intention is for dovetailing in any expansion of the duty, so that we standardise it across the whole public sector, thanking those particular outliers for being proactive in the area.

[Keir Starmer]

Again, this is by way of seeking assurance. This discussion is in the context of an Immigration Bill, but the measures will cover all individuals. Can the Minister give an assurance that careful consideration will be given to how the measures apply to individuals with any kind of learning or speech difficulty, regardless of background, ethnicity and so on? There is the potential for impact on people who fall into those categories. I know that that is not the intention, but we would gratefully receive a high level of assurance.

[The Solicitor General]

I am happy to give that. From my own understanding and experience of such issues, I am extremely keen to ensure that people who are fluent but who might, due to disability, express themselves slightly differently, are not discriminated against in any way.

On the question of setting a single standard, again, to enlarge the point that I was making, because the public sector has such a broad range of customer-facing roles, whether they be heart surgeons or parking enforcement officers, different particular standards will be appropriate. Therefore, the code will guide public authorities to set a standard that is proportionate to the nature of the spoken interaction that is an integral part of each role. To reinforce the point that I just made to the hon. and learned Gentleman about discrimination, public authorities, like all employers, are prohibited from discriminating against members of staff and job applicants by the terms of the Equality Act 2010, under which disability is a protected characteristic. Of course that will be relevant to individuals with a speech impediment.

[The Solicitor General]

I hear the hon. Lady, but I must remind her that we are talking about public authorities, which have had to, quite rightly, adapt their practices to take into account legislation such as the Equality Act 2010, which consolidated and enhanced a number of other statutes passed over a generation or more, which in turn dealt with racism, disability discrimination and so on. They were Acts of Parliament passed by all parties in this House. I would be as distressed as she if a public authority misused in any way what I would submit are the benign duties in the clause to reverse the progress that we have made. It is not about whether somebody looks or sounds different; it is about basic standards of proficiency and fluency that will improve public services.

[Keir Starmer]

I apologise for adding to the shopping list of assurances, but it is done, I hope, in the right spirit and with concern that is shared across the House. This problem might have been addressed, but there must be some public authorities that use sign language for some of those deemed to be customers or service users. Those fluent in sign language may not in fact be able to speak fluent English. Perhaps there is an obvious answer to this—if there is, I apologise—but the words “speaks fluent English” in clause 38(8) cause me some concern. There may be an easy reassurance. If there is, I will be assured.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising an issue in which I take a personal interest—the use of British sign language and other means for deaf people to participate in all aspects of our mainstream life. To parenthesise for a moment, I am sure that he would be interested in the work that I am doing to explore why deaf people cannot serve on juries, for example. It seems to me wholly ridiculous, but that is the position at the moment. Perhaps we can talk about that offline.

A British sign language interpreter is of course arguably a reasonable adjustment that is provided under an employer’s duty towards staff with a disability under the Equality Act 2010. That would be part and parcel of a person’s work; so to use it as a basis for suggesting lack of fluency would be wholly wrong and self-defeating. It is important to remember that people with disabilities, with reasonable adjustments, increasingly form part of the mainstream workforce. The provision is not designed to cut across that.

I think we all benefit from the fact that people with different ethnic origins work in our public services. Whatever they sound like and wherever they are from we welcome them all; but it is important—and they would agree—that we make sure there is a basic standard, to ensure that all sections of society have the fullest confidence in our public services. The measure goes a long way to protect our public servants.

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[Gavin Newlands]

They say that a country should be judged based on how it treats the most vulnerable, but the way that we have treated people who are attempting to gain asylum into the UK has been, at times, shocking.

The UK is the only country in Europe that uses detention with no official end date and that should shame us all. I am sure that I am not the only one who has been appalled at some of the detention stories that we have read about or seen on television. In particular, “The Glasgow Girls” served as a harrowing reminder of the cruelty that the UK’s detention policy brings about. Even though the policy of detaining children was ended in 2010, the Scottish Refugee Council has highlighted that children are wrongly assessed as being of adult age and therefore are still being detained. The council says:

“A small number of children are still detained at the end of the asylum process, after their case is heard by an independent panel, in Cedar’s Pre-Departure Accommodation. It is run by private companies…with welfare services provided by Children’s Charity Barnardo’s. This ‘open’ facility is designed as a last resort, before families are removed to their countries of origin. But there are still concerns about the affect its use has on children—many of whom are sent from Scotland on their way to their countries of origin.

In addition, some children who have been wrongly age assessed as adults find themselves detained, often for long periods of time.”

I hope that the new clause serves as a catalyst for further investigation, so that these young people/children are treated with dignity and respect, and are not detained full-stop. Westminster might still favour the policy of detention, but I think that we all agree that detaining young people is cruel and inhumane, and I ask the Immigration Minister to look further at this issue.

The case of Souleymane, who was detained for three and a half years, was highlighted in the detention inquiry report, and it serves as another cruel reminder of the policy of detention. There is no excuse for such a long period of detention. The case highlighted that detainees were being transported from one detention centre to another. The length of time that Souleymane spent in detention had an obvious and significant impact on his mental health, and I must ask, is that something that we are proud of?

New clause 3 does not go far enough, in that it has a caveat that I do not agree with. Nevertheless, it is a massive step in the right direction. Again, I want to see the ending of the policy of detention, as it is not a sign of the caring and compassionate country that I recognise the UK to be. The new clause will leave the provision for the Home Secretary to detain someone beyond 28 days by varying the time limit by category of person. In and of itself, it does not prevent cases such as that of Souleymane from happening again, as it hands the Home Secretary a wide discretionary power to overcome the 28-day obstacle.

Also, the parliamentary inquiry report suggested that the longer an individual is detained, the less likely it is that they will be removed from the UK. For example, the report found that, of the 178 people who have been detained for 12 months or more, 57% of them were ultimately released.

In talking about detention, I must use this opportunity to praise the work of the Scottish Refugee Council and other community-based organisations and groups that support asylum seekers on the frontline. Regardless of our political views, we should extend a debt of gratitude to those groups for the fantastic and at times difficult work that they do. The Bill and this provision in particular will have a significant impact on their work, and it is important that we support them when the Bill becomes law. Therefore, I ask the Immigration Minister to take time to meet groups such as the Scottish Refugee Council to learn more about the issues that they face, and to find out what support they need to perform their important jobs.

Detaining someone for any period of time is not something that we should be proud of. These detention centres are a symbol of the cruel approach that successive UK Governments have adopted with regard to asylum seekers. That is why we in the SNP do not think that the new clause goes far enough. The SNP policy on asylum seekers is more progressive. We want asylum seekers to have the chance to work, earn a living, pay tax and contribute to the community while they are waiting for a decision to be made on their application. Economically that makes sense but, more importantly, it is the right and moral thing to do.

[Keir Starmer]

I support my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central’s new clause and I pay tribute to the part he played in the report to which he referred. As he said, the report was powerful and strong recommendations were made. The key recommendations from the report were, first, that there should a limit of 28 days on the length of time anyone can held in immigration detention. Secondly, detention is currently used disproportionately frequently, resulting in too many instances of detention. The presumption, in theory and practice, should be in favour of community-based resolutions and against detention. Thirdly, decisions to detain should be very rare and detention should be for the shortest possible time and only to effect removal. Fourthly, the Government should learn from international best practice and introduce a much wider range of alternatives to detention than are currently used in the UK.

This is a real concern, a growing concern and a cross-party concern. I know that the Stephen Shaw work has been done and there is a report. I think that that mainly touches on welfare, but I will be corrected by the Minister if I am wrong. The new clause is important because it goes well beyond welfare issues; it is a point of real principle. In that spirit I support it.

[Anne McLaughlin]

In the immigration debate that took place in the Chamber, I spoke about a child who had been in detention. I know that the policy, notwithstanding what my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North said, is no longer to detain children, but I want to repeat what I said about that child, and I will explain why.

I talked about a 10-year-old boy who was detained with his mother in Dungavel in Scotland and was then moved to Yarl’s Wood. He lost 10 lb in three weeks and lost so much hope that he turned to his mother one day and whispered, “It would be easier if we died. Mummy, please can we die?” I appreciate that there is not a person in this room—I have absolutely no doubt—who, if that child were standing in front of them, would not do whatever they could to help that child. This was somebody I knew pretty well.

Okay, so we only detain adults now, but I am not willing to believe that there is any Member here who, if they had a woman standing in front of them who had been through so much trouble to get here, who was a victim of sexual violence, and they could make the decision about that one person standing there, having heard her story, would not help her. I do not believe that any of us would not use the key that we have to free her from detention if we were able to do it. They are not standing in front of us now, but we are the ones who hold the key to whether those people suffer in the way that many hon. Members have described. That mother wanted to comfort her child. She wanted to reassure her child that it would be over soon, that “this will be happening” in two weeks or one week, three days or three months or whatever, but she could not. She could not reassure herself because she had no idea how long they were going to be there.

I think that the worst thing for people is not having a clue when or where it is going to end. I visited a family in Dungavel a number of years ago, as an elected Member of the Scottish Parliament and I felt intimidated. I felt intimidated by the surroundings and the uniforms, by the big jangle of the keys, by the prison-like atmosphere and the fact that I was fingerprinted. I was a Member of the Scottish Parliament and they fingerprinted me as I went in. If I felt intimidated, what must it feel like to somebody who has absolutely no control over their life, and has not had any for a long time because they have had to flee their country and ask for help in a foreign country? I cannot imagine it.

I pay tribute, as my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North has done, to the organisations that support people in detention. I particularly encourage the organisations that demonstrate outside such facilities to continue to do so, because it makes a big difference to the people inside. There was a demonstration at Dungavel a couple of weeks ago. I know people who went, although I was unable to attend.

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There is also a practical disadvantage in an arbitrary time limit. People in a non-compliant removal case could simply disrupt their removal for 28 days in the knowledge that they would be released from detention. Sadly, there are people who play the system in that way.

[Keir Starmer]

On the question of “indefinite”, surely the detention is indefinite in the sense that there is no definite limit to it. The detention might not be unending, but it is indefinite in the way that we all understand “indefinite”.

[James Brokenshire]

Indefinite detention implies detention that cannot be brought to an end. For reasons of bail and the relevant principles in common law, the detention has to be linked to the ability to remove.

If we look at the cohort likely to be in detention for longer, the vast majority are foreign national offenders. That is the reality we are dealing with. There might be challenges that we are working through on identification, so that they may get the relevant travel documentation, or they might take other measures to prevent their removal. There are a number of challenging policy issues in this area, but I underline the policy principles that exist in respect of why detention is there and why it is linked to removal. Equally, I underline the relevant safeguards.

Hon. Members might say that non-compliant cases could be added to the regulation that sets out cases where the 28-day limit does not apply, but the use of the detention power is increasingly focused on non-compliant individuals to ensure their removal. In reality, even if the clause was founded in that way, there would be little impact if non-compliant cases were added to the list.

I recognise what hon. Members have said about ending the detention of children for immigration purposes. I am proud that the Government have introduced measures to ensure that the routine detention of children under immigration powers is used only in very, very limited circumstances. Equally, we do not detain individuals for age-assessment purposes. In cases in which an individual is held in an immigration removal centre and doubts arise as to whether they are an adult, we aim to release them immediately into local authority care, pending an age assessment.

I recognise that we are discussing a controversial policy area, but I underline the fact that we are dealing with the details. There are a range of public policy views and objectives that need to be advanced, but ultimately there are clear safeguards in the system. We will continue to reflect carefully on the issues of vulnerability, but I hope that, given those assurances, the hon. Member for Sheffield Central is minded to withdraw the new clause.

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[James Brokenshire]

On a point of order, Mr Owen. As this may be our last opportunity as a Committee to recognise your contribution to the Bill in ensuring that our consideration is in order and in adding to the good-natured spirit of our proceedings, may I, on behalf of the Committee, thank you for your chairmanship? We have very much appreciated your guidance and assistance, which has added to our consideration of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

On a point of order, Mr Owen. I endorse that point of order. Not only for the group the Minister spoke of but for those of us who have gone round this track for the first time, your help and assistance and that of the Clerks has been invaluable to each and all of us.

[Gavin Newlands]

Further to that point of order, Mr Owen. May I point out that I was 6 feet behind Anne when the doors were locked for the earlier vote?