Investigatory Powers Bill (Twelfth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 26th April 2016
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 April 2016 - (26 Apr 2016)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 1 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 2 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
I, too, welcome you back to the chair, Mr Owen. This bulk power is, like the others, very wide. Equipment interference includes what is commonly known as hacking, which can be done remotely or by attaching monitoring devices to computers or communications equipment. As has been mentioned, equipment is defined very broadly, covering anything that produces electromagnetic or other emissions. The power is therefore very wide.
It is unsurprising that the ISC was initially sceptical and that David Anderson has raised a number of concerns. I will not repeat the points made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, who spoke for the SNP, but I want to draw attention to the relationship between this bulk power and thematic warrants, which was one of the concerns raised by David Anderson.
If one looks at the structure of clause 154(1), skipping for the moment subsections (2) and (3), and lays it alongside clause 88, the similarities in the description of the warrant are apparent. Part 5 deals with equipment interference and targeted warrants; chapter 3 of part 6 deals with bulk equipment interference warrants. Clauses 154 and 88 are very similar in structure and scope—the difference is that clause 90 qualifies clause 88. The difference we are discussing is that we have, in essence, the same power for equipment interference, but we do not have the qualification of the subject matter that is clause 90. We have already discussed clause 90 at some length and, for a targeted power, it is itself extremely wide.
The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)
On the specific point made by the hon. and learned Gentleman in relation to the connection between clauses 90 and 88, in contrast with the matters we are now discussing, the whole point about clause 90 is that it deals with the particularity associated with warrants that are by their nature targeted, whether individually or thematically as a group some of which are known to the intelligence services. Bulk matters are by their nature less particular, so could not be subject to the same qualification.
Keir Starmer
I am not making the argument that those warrants should be subject to the same qualification. I am drawing attention to the fact that clause 90 is what, in essence, turns clause 88 into a targeted or thematic warrant, rather than a bulk warrant. The qualification is left out in connection with clause 154, which deals with a bulk power. I am not suggesting that one borrows clause 90 into this chapter, because otherwise we would simply be rewriting the same provision.
The point I am making is that the concern about clause 90 in relation to themed warrants was that it was a very wide provision in its own right. I think David Anderson went as far as to say that it was hard to see what could not, in truth, be caught within a thematic warrant under clause 90. We have a very wide power there, drawing attention to the breadth of the power under clause 154, which is everything over and above what is already a thematic warrant power under clause 90. That indicates why an operational case is so important in relation to the bulk power. One has a very wide bulk power that is distinguished from what is already a very wide thematic power. That reinforces the need for an independent evaluation of an operational purpose that makes the case for this even wider power.
As far as the safeguards are concerned, clause 156 is, in familiar terms, referencing necessity and proportionality, but to the wide national security grounds falling under subsection (2)—the familiar phrasing. It is the same scheme for these warrants. Then, skipping forward to clause 161, there are the same limits on operational cases, so one has a very wide necessity and proportionality test for the warrant in the first place, then a reference back, in essence, to the same test when getting to the requirements that must be met by warrants. I have made this case this morning and, I think, last Thursday, so I will not repeat it further.
I want to draw attention to the breadth of the power and to underscore why a better and evaluated operational case is needed when one is going on beyond what is already a very wide thematic warrant.
Mr Hayes
We had a lengthy debate on these matters this morning, but it is worth repeating. It was Proust who said:
“A powerful idea communicates some of its strength to him who challenges it.”
On that basis, I am hoping to communicate still more of the strength of my argument as a result of amplifying it, but with appropriate brevity, I hope. Let us be clear: bulk powers matter. They matter for the reasons I set out earlier, and that case is made—convincingly, in my judgment—in “Operational Case for Bulk Powers”, which was published by the Government in response to the criticisms of those who considered these matters early on and felt there was a need for greater explanation of the case for them.
Bulk equipment interference is particularly addressed on page 6 of that document. It says:
“This involves the acquisition of communications and equipment data directly from computer equipment overseas. Historically, this data may have been available during its transmission through bulk interception”.
This is the key point:
“The growing use of encryption has made this more difficult and, in some cases, equipment interference may be the only option for obtaining crucial intelligence. As with bulk interception this is an overseas collection capability.”
We are here talking about a power that is used at present, and is of growing significance to our agencies in combating the threat that they face.
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, has made clear that
“the requirement for a balance to be drawn between the urgent need of the Intelligence Agencies to safeguard the public and the protection of an individual’s privacy and/or freedom of expression”
matters. It also stated:
“We are satisfied that with the new E I Code, and whatever the outcome of Parliamentary consideration of the IP Bill, a proper balance is being struck in regard to the matters we have been asked to consider.”
The evidence that we have before us suggests, and I use that judgment as an example, that those who oversee these matters gauge what is already happening, and what is proposed, to be appropriate. Having said that, it is important that we test those arguments closely in this Committee—that is part of the Committee’s purpose, after all.
The hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. and learned Lady drew attention to David Anderson’s remarks. David Anderson asked why equipment interference warrants were required, given the possible breadth of targeted thematic warrants of the kind that have been discussed. I say this: clear and important distinctions between bulk equipment interference and targeted thematic operations are set out in paragraph 4.38 of the draft equipment interference of the code of practice.
Members will be able to study that code in detail, but for their convenience, bulk equipment interference includes the additional safeguards of the bulk regime and is an important capability in its own right. Both bulk equipment interference and targeted thematic equipment interference operations can take place at scale if the relevant criteria are met. However, targeted equipment interference warrants are limited by the need to assess proportionality at the outset. A bulk equipment interference warrant is likely to be required in circumstances where the Secretary of State is not able to assess the extent of every interference to a sufficient degree at the time of issuing the warrant. The additional access controls at the examination stage are required to ensure the necessity and proportionality of any interferences that cannot be assessed fully at the outset.
It seems to me that that is the essence of this argument. Both have their place, and both are subject to checks and balances, and to safeguards and protections. In terms of the effect of those safeguards, I think we can all conclude, based on the evidence before us and what we know is already happening and is proposed in the Bill, not only that what is happening now is proportionate and reasonable, but that the Bill goes even further in adding to those safeguards.
In essence, my argument is pentadactyl—it has five fingers. First, this power is necessary; secondly, it is already in existence; thirdly, those who oversee these things have gauged it to be necessary and proportionate; fourthly, the Government have responded to early scrutiny by tightening safeguards through the codes of practice and explaining them more fully; and fifthly, the Bill goes still further than all the existing good practice. That seems to me to be a persuasive argument.
Keir Starmer
My purpose is not to explain why it is not. That is not always the purpose of these interventions. We are probing the adequacy of the safeguards, which is the proper role of the Committee.
I had marked up that paragraph in the operational case, because, as the Minister has said, it makes the case that, at the outset, certain assessments of necessity and proportionality cannot be made. It says in terms:
“The additional access controls at the examination stage are required to ensure the necessity and proportionality of any interference that cannot be assessed fully at the outset.”
I know that I have said this before, but I really want to make it clear. At the outset, the test of necessity and proportionality is against the operational case and the operational case is specified in the terms in clause 161(5), which takes a familiar form: the operational case cannot be so general that it is merely national security, but it can be general. We have been around that circle, but that is the test at the outset and I have made my comments about that.
The problem is that the test is the same when it comes to examination. Under clause 170, which deals with the safeguards in relation to examination, selection is defined as proportional and necessary so far as it is in accordance with the test in clause 161. This point is central to what is said in the operational case. If the test were different at each stage, I would accept that the argument was logically right, but the test is in fact the same. I see that as a deficiency and I am probing for clarity.
Mr Hayes
I acknowledge that it is certainly true that much rests on the operational case. In all our sermocinations, it has been clear to me that the hon. and learned Gentleman has identified that as crucial in advancing his argument that we need to provide still more transparency. He has done so in a reasonable way, because he acknowledges that there is a line to be drawn between the explanation of that case and revealing what cannot reasonably be said publicly because it would compromise the work of the agencies. I acknowledge that.
Of course, what the hon. and learned Gentleman did not say, although he knows it—perhaps he felt that there was no need to say it—is that the warrant must be deemed to be necessary for one of the core reasons: national security, serious crime or, where it is linked to national security, economic wellbeing. Access to the data must be deemed to be necessary on the grounds of the operational purposes. There is a test at each stage of the process and, in my judgment, that test is robust, but I again acknowledge that there may be a virtue in being clearer about the operational case. I was making a point about existing power—that power is currently available through the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Therefore, it is not new, but the safeguards are. Drawing those together in a single place, and therefore allowing the more straightforward exploration of both their purpose and their effect, is certainly new.
Above and beyond that, the oversight that is given additional strength in the later part of the Bill is there to ensure that all that is done meets the test that we have set, in terms of protecting private interests and so on. I acknowledge the argument about the operational case being a powerful one, but I think the structure of what we have put together stands scrutiny.
There is another argument that has not been used much in the Committee. In a sense, I hesitate to explore it now because in doing so I may be opening a hornets’ nest, but I am not a timid Minister, so why would I not want to face the stings that I might unleash? It is necessary to make the language future-proof, as far as one reasonably can. One of the criticisms of what we are doing—bringing the powers together in a single Bill, creating safeguards of the type we are building, trying to be as comprehensive as we can in this legislation—is that, because of the rapidly changing character of technology and the resultant effect that that has on both the threat and our ability to counter it, this legislation may be relatively short-lived.
If we look, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, at what has happened previously, we see that the legislation that the Bill replaces has, for the most part, been iterative—it has been a response to that dynamism. The language in the Bill is designed to be as carefully constructed as possible to allow the Bill to stand the test of time. Central to that is the advent of the double-lock mechanism, which should ensure that the powers are not misused by a future Government. That relates to something the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West said in a previous sitting of the Committee. I think she argued that I cannot bind the future, and I said, with some reluctance, that that was true.
Joanna Cherry
Jo Cavan from IOCCO—the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office—told us on 24 March that the double lock and warrantry applies to only 2% of authorisations under the Bill. Does the Minister agree that he should be very cautious praying in aid the double lock as a safeguard when it applies only to such a small percentage of authorisations?
Mr Hayes
Yes, but the hon. and learned Lady knows well that the double lock applies to some of the most contentious parts of the process and, at the end of the day, is the involvement of the judiciary in a process that has been exercised at the sole discretion of the Executive up until now. The significance of that marriage between Executive authority and judicial involvement is considerable. All but the most mean-spirited of critics would want to warmly acknowledge that, and I see the warmth emanating from the hon. and learned Lady as she rises.
Joanna Cherry
I am not going to be mean-spirited. I acknowledge that the Government have made a significant step in the right direction by introducing judges into the warrantry process. I have my reservations about the degree of the introduction—I would like to see full-blown judicial warrantry—but my point is about how far that double-lock process can be seen as a safeguard when it applies to only 2% of the authorisations under the Bill. My point is not that it is not a safeguard but that it applies to only 2% of authorisations.
Mr Hayes
The double lock applies to all the most intrusive powers. We can have a debate about whether—I do not want to put words into the hon. and learned Lady’s mouth—she wanted to rob the Executive, rob the people’s representatives, of all their authority. She may have felt that it was unnecessary for those accountable to the people—the personification, as I hope I am, of the people’s will—to have any involvement in these matters, but I do not take that view. I believe in representative government and I think we have got absolutely right the marriage between Parliament and the judiciary—but we stray, I sense, from the precise detail of this part of the Bill.
My judgment is that we have reached the place that we need to get to in order to get the marriage between safeguard and effectiveness right, with the caveat that I have already introduced on the operational case, and in the knowledge that a bulk equipment interference warrant can be used to authorise the selection and examination of material obtained by the warrant and does not require a separate examination warrant and permits the disclosure of material acquired in the manner described in the warrant. I think that this is an important additional power and on that basis I hope that the Committee will agree to this part of the Bill.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
These amendments are intended to tighten up clause 156. I will not take up a great deal of time on them. These amendments go to the intervention that I was making which was too lengthy to do justice to the point, but it was such an important point that I want to go through it one more time. If I am right about it, I hope that others will listen and take this away. If I am wrong about it, I will not repeat the argument. The proposition about which I am concerned is as follows. If one looks at subsection 156(1) then, as set out in the “Operational Case for Bulk Powers”, the test that the Secretary of State is applying at the outset will be applied in some,
“circumstances where the Secretary of State or Judicial Commissioner is not able to assess the necessity and proportionality to a sufficient degree at the time of issuing the warrant.”
So that is the test. To issue a bulk equipment interference warrant, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that it is to “obtain overseas-related communications”, as set out in clause 156(1)(a); that it is necessary on the broad grounds—of which the Minister just reminded me—of national security, preventing crime and promoting economic wellbeing, as set out in paragraph (b); and, as paragraph (c) sets out, that it is proportionate. Clause 156(1)(d) continues the stages that the Secretary of State must carry out, and requires that the Secretary of State considers that,
“(i) each of the specified operational purposes (see section 161) is a purpose for which the examination of material obtained under the warrant is or may be necessary, and
(ii) the examination of such material for each such purpose is necessary on any of the grounds on which the Secretary of State considers the warrant to be necessary”.
So at the outset the Secretary of State is considering necessity against the broad canvas of national security. She is also considering the operational purposes and asking herself whether such a warrant is necessary against those operational purposes, and going on to the examination of whether it is necessary on any of the grounds on which the Secretary of State considers the warrants to be necessary. The Secretary of State is taking into account the operational purposes and applying a necessity test to this. That is the test applied at the outset, and that is the test that the operational case understandably says may be difficult to apply in certain circumstances. I do not quarrel with that, and I understand why that might be the case.
Going on to clause 161, what are the operational purposes which the Secretary of State is to take into account and test necessity against? There the operational purposes are requirements of the warrant, and they go beyond the provisions in clause 156(1)(b) or (2) and may be general. So the Secretary of State has in mind a very broad national security issue, and then the operational purposes, and asks herself whether it comes under both of those heads. The second head can be a general one. We have quarrelled about that—or argued about it or made points about it—but those points remain as good or as bad as they were the last time they were made. The point I am seeking to make is that the “Operational Case” suggests—and this may indeed be the case in practice—that at the examination stage some higher or different test is applied, and that that adds a safeguard. Again, if there is something in that then I hope that somebody will take this away and think about it, and if there is not then I will not repeat it. My concern is that clause 170(1), on the safeguards relating to examination of materials, states:
“For the purposes of section 168, the requirements of this section are met in relation to the material obtained under a warrant if—”
which is followed by a number of requirements, including:
“(b) the selection of any of the material for examination is necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances”.
Clause 170(2) states:
“The selection of material obtained under the warrant is carried out only for the specified purposes if the material is selected for examination only so far as is necessary for the operational purposes specified in the warrant in accordance with section 161”.
So the test for selection for examination is curtailed by the provision in sub-paragraph (ii) that it is only so far as is necessary for the operational purposes specified in the warrant, as set out in clause 161. I accept that “specified” means the warrant at the time of selection of material, as set out underneath. For the record, I therefore acknowledge the possibility that the operational case may be differently described at the time of the second test. However, on the face of it, the same test is being applied at the examination stage as was applied by the Secretary of State. That is the cause of my concern and the reason why, in my argument, some further thought must be given to strengthening the threshold when it comes to the access provision. Because the only way that the operational case can be different at the point of selection of material from the point at which the Secretary of State is involved, is if it has been modified, which means it has not gone through the same procedure as the warrant in the first place. That is the real cause of concern. I have labelled it that but I do not think that on the intervention I made it as clear as I should have done.
If there is a material difference in the test, that ought to be spelled out in the Bill and it is not. The amendments are intended to tighten up the specifics in clause 156. I will not press them to a vote but I have read this into the record because it is a matter of concern. There is either an answer, which means I am wrong about this and should stop repeating my submission, or it is something that others need to take away and have a serious look at in terms of the test.
Mr Hayes
I am not sure that we need to rehearse the general arguments in respect of bulk again—they have been well covered in earlier considerations—except to say this. It is critically important that the agencies maintain the ability to use these powers for economic wellbeing, where, according to the Bill, these are tied to national security. That was a point that was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire at a very early stage on Second Reading.
On that basis alone, one would want to resist the proposed amendment. However, the hon. and learned Gentleman has made some more tailored arguments that deserve an answer. Let us just deal with the tests. There are two tests. There is the test contained in clause 158, where the Secretary of State and the commissioner must be satisfied that it is necessary for data required under the warrant to be examined for specific and specified operational purposes.
In clause 170, the analyst examining the data must be satisfied that the examination of a particular piece of data is necessary for a particular operational purpose. So there are two tests that are designed to be appropriate at different points in the process. That is why the list is written as it is. Does that satisfy the hon and learned Gentleman?
Keir Starmer
I hear what the Minister says and I will be brief. The only reference to operational purposes in clause 170 is to the operational purposes on the warrant. Therefore, they will be the same operational purposes as were before the Secretary of State, unless the warrant has been modified. Maybe I should just have said that in the first place and made it a lot shorter, but that is the nub of the problem as I see it.
Mr Hayes
Yes, the point of that further analysis is that the analyst must be confident that the particular work relates to those specified operational purposes. The reason that that further work is done down the line, as it were, is to ensure that there is no digression from the stated operational purposes, and that in that sense this is an important further safeguard.
Let me give an example to illustrate. The Secretary of State may consider that it is necessary for the data required under the warrant to be examined for two or three purposes. The analyst needs to say which particular purposes relate to a particular search. Therefore this is a refinement of the work of the analyst to ensure that it is true to the intention of the Secretary of State in authorising the process. This is an illustration of Committees of this House at their best: we are digging deep down, in very fine-grained detail. With those assurances, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be convinced by what we are trying to achieve.
Keir Starmer
Having tested the patience of the Committee on the point I was labouring on the last amendment—which I think is important, even if I am alone in that—I can indicate that these and the other amendments following in this chapter are all similar to previous amendments. I will deal with them quickly.
Amendments 698 and 699 deal with the test for the judicial commissioner. If it is helpful, I can indicate to the Solicitor General in advance that, having been round the track on this issue, I am not going to repeat the arguments or press them to a vote, because of the discussions we have been having.
Keir Starmer
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Solicitor General
I beg to move amendment 620, in clause 163, page 126, line 6, at end insert—
This drafting amendment is for consistency with clauses 127 and 143.
The Solicitor General
Briefly, these are minor drafting amendments that mirror drafting in an equivalent interception provision in clause 127. The amendment makes no changes to the bulk equipment interference regime itself. It is a minor discrepancy and we want to try to ensure drafting consistency as much as possible. We are mindful that the Committee has attached particular importance to that issue. Here is an instance of the Government making sure that in this example we are doing just as encouraged.
Amendment 620 agreed to.
Amendment made: 621, in clause 163, page 126, line 31, at end insert—
“This is subject to subsection (5).”—(The Solicitor General.)
This drafting amendment is for consistency with clauses 127 and 143
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Mr Hayes
These minor drafting amendments are self-explanatory.
Amendment 624 agreed to.
Amendment made: 625, in clause 170, page 132, line 14, after “warrant”, insert “for examination”—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment makes a minor drafting correction.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful for that intervention. I am concerned about that issue; that is why we need to give particular care and attention to the operation of these bulk powers in relation to sensitive personal data—and mental health data are among the most sensitive. In a sense, the second set of modifications that we will come to later is aimed at putting in the Bill what is in fact current practice. Therefore it would not inhibit what the security and intelligence services are doing, but would make it clear to citizens that a safeguard is in place and reduce their anxiety about the extent of the use of these bulk powers.
I will say more about that when I get to the amendments, but they are issues that go to the breadth of the bulk personal datasets that we are now dealing with.
Mr Hayes
On the issue of medical records and the very sensitive data associated with them, and mindful of the remarks of the hon. and learned Lady and the hon. and learned Gentleman, we will be dealing with that issue when we discuss amendment 715. I do not want to spend too much time on it now, except to say that I, too, am aware of the obvious and profound issues associated with intrusion in that area. We will discuss them at greater length when we discuss the amendment, but I hear what is said. It is important that we study those matters with appropriate care, given that they are of such profound sensitivity.
Moving to the thrust of the argument and the content of the debate, the thrust of the argument is in two parts. First, why do we have this power and how is it used? Secondly, what are the safeguards—the measures in the Bill and those that already exist—that constrain the exercise of those powers, in the ways we all want, in the interests of good practice, privacy and so on? Let us deal with those in turn.
To deal with the first, it might be appropriate to start with the ISC, because it has been cited. It said in its privacy and security report that the powers in part 7 of the Bill are an
“increasingly important investigative tool for the Agencies”.
It is important to point out that this part of the Bill does not provide any powers to the security and intelligence agencies. Bulk personal datasets may be acquired through investigatory powers such as interception and they may be shared by Government Departments or industry. The only purpose of part 7 is to ensure that where agencies hold bulk personal datasets, the data are subject to robust privacy safeguards as information acquired under the bulk powers in the Bill. That is an important new step and an important safeguard.
It is probably fair to say that, in that sense, this is not a power at all but a process. The powers are about the safeguards. The Bill introduces important new requirements in that sense, but it would be more accurate to describe bulk personal datasets as a matter of process and a matter of practice rather than as a power.
The reason that that information is stored in such a way is pretty clear. It can help to identify individuals who threaten our national security or may be of other intelligence interest and, significantly, to eliminate suspicion of the innocent without using more intrusive techniques. As with so many of the bulk issues that we have debated, that is often about the use of techniques that are, by their nature, subject to stringent safeguards and that obviate the need to use more intrusive methods to reach the same destination. Of course, that can establish links between subjects of interest to better understand a subject of interest’s behaviour and, in the course of an investigation, we can verify facts that lead us to identify those who seek to do us harm.
It is simply the case that the security and intelligence agencies would not be able to keep pace with the scale of events that are occurring in an increasingly interconnected world if we did not have access to those datasets. It would take longer to exploit lead intelligence and increase the risk of something being missed or misunderstood. It would lead to intelligence failures and, in the worst cases, to the loss of life.
It is unquestionably the case that curbing the use of bulk personal datasets would hinder the agencies, but I would go further. I think it is fair to say that doing so would endanger this country and its people. I know that that is not the intention of anyone on this Committee or anyone considering the Bill, but it is important to emphasise that these are powers for a purpose, and that purpose is the safety of the British people through the effectiveness of those missioned to keep them secure.
Lucy Frazer
Does my right hon. Friend think that sometimes putting tests in very specific terms in primary legislation gives a certain rigidity, whereas greater flexibility would be possible if they were in a code of practice? As we heard—as the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras said—the test is already being carried out in practice. Does my right hon. Friend agree that to create additional rigidity by putting the test in primary legislation might hamper the security services in due course?
Mr Hayes
With a certain power of prophecy, I made it known at the beginning of our considerations that it was likely that there would be a continuing debate that would have at its heart, considerations about what should be on the face of the Bill and what should be in supporting documentation. I did so perhaps not so much as a prophet as an experienced Member of this House, because I have never served, either as a shadow Minister or as a Minister, on any Bill Committee where that has not been a matter of debate. How far one goes in putting specific matters on the face of legislation is always a matter of fine judgment. Hon. Members know the argument very well.
Sir Simon Burns (Chelmsford) (Con)
My right hon. Friend raises a very important point. All too often, too many people have a tendency to put things on the faces of Bills that are not altogether relevant and which could be done by secondary legislation. His point, therefore, is extremely valid.
Mr Hayes
My right hon. Friend, who is a distinguished Member of this House, a former Minister of note, a sagacious figure now on the Back Benches, bringing that experience and quality to our considerations—what a delight it is to have him join us on this Committee—is right.
I was responding to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire accordingly that the debate about whether material is put in the Bill or in supporting documentation comes down to this point: those who wish to place things in the Bill do so because they want to firm them up, to make them more sure and certain. Of course, for much of what we wish to do it is vital that we pursue that course. Those who argue for material in supporting documentation do so on the basis exactly as my right hon. Friend says: that it allows greater flexibility. In an area as dynamic as this—I hinted at this earlier, but will make the point once more—I would have thought the argument for flexibility holds a great deal of water.
The last thing I want is to pass the Bill into law and for it to become an Act of which we can all be justly proud—every member of the Committee will deserve a certain credit—only to find that events have moved on and we are stuck with an excessively rigid Act incapable of being changed easily as needed.
Keir Starmer
Just to put this in context, when we talk about legal professional privilege, journalistic material and MPs’ correspondence, it is absolutely clear the Government have thought this through and put it on the face of the Bill, where they think it is relevant. We cannot get away with it—nobody can backslide into an argument that, in other areas, it is more flexible to put the measures in statutory instruments. Things like legal professional privilege have been thought through. Moves have been made by the Government—and I have acknowledged them—and it should be on the face of the Bill. I think the Minister knows that, because he has put it in the Bill in other areas and that is the right way to deal with that sort of material. Of course, it is more flexible, but in the end we would have a very thin, short, one section Act if we really wanted full flexibility. That is not the way forward.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right. I do not want to be patronising in any way. I think for a beginner he has made a very promising start. That has been in part characterised by the consistency of his argument. One of the arguments he has used since we began this consideration is that the Bill needs, throughout its clauses, to be consistent. He is right in saying that, while we have made considerable progress in considering and dealing with the issue of the legal profession, there may be more work to do in respect of journalists and Members of Parliament.
With that thought—I do not want to exhaust the patience of the Committee any longer—I will sit down.
Question put, that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
I foreshadowed these amendments when we were discussing clause 174. The way we have sought to deal with records—“patient information”, as it is defined under the National Health Service Act 2006—is to take them out of consideration altogether, which would prevent a warrant that would cover those records being issued. Amendment 721 simply leaves out subsection (3)(a)(iii) and amendment 722 removes the corresponding subsection in clause 178. There is very little I can add to the argument that I put before in relation to those. I will say more when we get to the second group of amendments about the test that is to be applied.
Mr Hayes
The hon. and learned Gentleman may take it, in the spirit that I made my earlier remarks, that the Government are always happy to consider these matters carefully. All of this section of the Bill requires us to be mindful of the sensitivity of the material with which we are dealing, and I think the purpose of the amendment is to explore that sensitivity—I understand that. While I am not minded to accept the amendments, I am clear that in gauging all of those things, we are open to argument, willing to listen and determined to frame a Bill that reflects the considerations of the Committee, that is capable of uniting this House in a shared purpose, that is credible with the wider public, and that provides those missioned to keep us safe with the powers they need. With that reassurance, I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.
Keir Starmer
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Keir Starmer
These amendments are on material relating to patient information as defined in section 251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006 or to mental health, adult social care, child social care or health services as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. They would subject material in those categories to the higher test set out in amendment 718. We have had interventions on what the test should be, why people should be concerned and so on.
A number of Committee members will have had the opportunity—I have, in my work—to see mental health records, adult social care records, child social care records and health service records. Those records often contain highly confidential material and information. I will take an example from child social care. A child may be reporting and having recorded some of the most grotesque offences that have happened to them, in an environment where it is hoped that the right relationship will be built up through the process of child social care—in other circumstances, adult social care—so that they obtain the best care possible. Persuading people into that sort of relationship, so that they can get the support they need, is not easy, as anyone who has experience in this area will know.
Unless those who are most vulnerable see protection for them on the face of the Bill, there is a real likelihood that they will not feel sufficiently protected to even come forward. Getting children to engage with child social care is the devil’s own business in many difficult cases. There are many reasons why children do not engage. If children, vulnerable adults and those with mental health problems cannot see clear protection on the face of the Bill that applies to them—not in a flexible way—it would be a retrograde step in relation to all the good work going on in other parts of the forest on offences such as child sexual exploitation.
To be clear, the amendments are not intended to prevent the security and intelligence services from accessing those records if, in certain circumstances, they are needed. The amendments require that a higher threshold is applied and that a better case is made for the circumstances being exceptional and compelling. As I am sure the Minister for Security and Solicitor General have observed, the language in the amendments is borrowed from the protection in the Bill elsewhere for legally privileged material. I therefore hope the test is workable and applicable to this sensitive information.
I stress just how sensitive the material within some of these records will be and how important it is that people see on the face of the Bill protection for them. I have heard the way the Minister for Security and Solicitor General have dealt with this, and I will listen to what they say now, but I do not think that what is said about this protection in the code of practice is either in the right place or sufficient. Paragraph 4.11 is very general in its guidance, even in the code of practice. In my argument, the test should be set out in the Bill and then the code of practice would give guidance as to how the test is to be applied on a day-to-day basis as and when it arises.
Mr Hayes
The amendments relate to the question of whether warrants under this part of the Bill should ever allow the retention or examination of bulk personal datasets relating to various forms of medical information. The hon. and learned Gentleman qualified that to some degree by saying that he could see how there might be occasions on which health data were relevant to an investigation, but he rightly asked whether the safeguards were adequate and whether constraints on storage and use of that kind of information were in place.
Let us look first at the safeguards that are already contained in the Bill. These safeguards already ensure that no bulk personal datasets would be retained or examined unless it was appropriate to do so. Specifically, under the Bill, the security and intelligence agencies may retain and examine a bulk personal dataset only for the statutory purposes outlined in the Bill. Each warrant is subject to the double lock, and so must be approved by both a Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner. Each retention of a bulk personal dataset by the intelligence agencies is considered individually based on a strict consideration of necessity and proportionality. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner will also oversee the acquisition, retention, use or disclosure of bulk personal datasets by the agencies. The draft code of practice, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, makes clear that, when considering whether to retain and examine bulk personal datasets, the agencies will assess the degree or extent of the intrusiveness which retaining and examining the datasets would involve—that is to say, the degree or extent of interference with individuals’ right to privacy.
The draft code says more than that, though. It also makes clear that when considering whether to apply for a warrant in this class, agencies must consider factors such as whether the nature or the provenance of the dataset raises particularly novel or contentious issues, or whether it contains a significant component of intrusive data—I mentioned this in an earlier discussion. An agency would need to apply for a specific bulk personal dataset warrant if it sought to retain such a dataset comprised of medical records. None the less, notwithstanding those safeguards, which I felt it was important to outline, I can see why this matter warrants careful consideration. Before I go into that consideration, however, I want to say the following. I am prepared in this specific instance to confirm that the security and intelligence agencies do not hold a bulk personal dataset of medical records. Furthermore, I cannot currently conceive of a situation where, for example, obtaining all NHS records would be either necessary or proportionate.
That is where my note so far prepared ends, but I want to go further. Before I do, in order to build anticipation and excitement, I give way to the hon. and learned Lady.
Joanna Cherry
The Minister may be about to answer this question, but I am very interested, as I am sure all hon. members of the Committee and people outwith this room will be very interested, in what he has just said—that the security agencies do not currently hold a bulk personal dataset in relation to medical information. As the Bill stands, unamended, does he not agree that there is nothing in it to prevent them acquiring such a bulk personal dataset in future, if they were able to make a case for it?
Mr Hayes
I may fall foul of my officials, which I would never choose or seek to do, except where I felt that it was right in the national interest, with the benefit of the wisdom of the Committee—enhanced, as I have said it is, with the addition of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford—and where I feel that the public expect us to go further. The hon. and learned Lady is right that we need to go further. Let me rehearse some of the ways in which we might do that—I will commit to none today, but I offer them to the Committee for further thought.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Minister and glad he finds the amendment persuasive, although I suspect not persuasive enough to vote for it. I will therefore withdraw it, but I appreciate the spirit in which he makes his submissions in this important and sensitive area. I will withdraw it with a view to working with the Minister to see whether—
Mr Hayes
I think the hon. and learned Gentleman has said this, but just for the record, I think he agrees with me—I am delighted he is going to withdraw his amendment—that it is conceivable that there are circumstances in which access to some health data might be helpful to the agencies. We can agree that as a baseline against which we can chart the rest of this process.
Keir Starmer
From memory, the services could not at the moment envisage a circumstance in which they would need it, but they would not want to rule out the possibility that it might arise at a future date.
The Solicitor General
An example could be a group of terrorists who are involved in an explosion and sustain burns. Medical evidence about where they attended—the fact that they had attended a local A&E—could be relevant to that particular operation. That is the sort of category that we are thinking of.
Keir Starmer
That may well be. I listened carefully to the answer that was given—
Keir Starmer
It may well be that it could be dealt with in a more targeted way. As a general proposition, where targeted powers can be used they should be used. That is a theme that goes through the Bill and the code.
The Solicitor General
I can clarify: let us imagine a scenario where there is an unidentified individual or we do not know the identities of the people. We know that an atrocity has taken place, but we do not have names, so targeting is more difficult. It is an exceptional case, but there is that possibility.
Keir Starmer
These are all hypotheticals. I think the services themselves have said that they have not needed such powers yet, and we can speculate as to what the situation might be. However, I accept as a general proposition that the focus ought to be on the threshold test for accessing information. For the record, in relation to adult and child social care, there would be a concern not only for the vulnerable adult and child but among those providing the care, because they will be expressing their opinions in these reports and they would be concerned that that remained confidential. That highlights why we need to work on this position. However, for the time being, I look forward to that work and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Solicitor General
I beg to move amendment 629, in clause 186, page 143, line 9, leave out “(urgent cases)”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 630.
The Solicitor General
The amendments will make it possible for an instrument that makes a major modification to a bulk personal dataset warrant, to add or vary an operational purpose, to be signed by a senior official as a provision for situations in which it is not reasonably practicable for the Secretary of State to sign it. The amendments are very similar to others we have made. Obviously the Secretary of State will make the decision, but in his or her absence an official will be authorised to sign the instrument. I therefore commend the amendment to the Committee.
Amendment 629 agreed to.
Amendment made: 630, in clause 186, page 143, line 10, leave out from beginning to “the” in line 15 and insert—
“( ) If it is not reasonably practicable for an instrument making a major modification to be signed by the Secretary of State, the instrument may be signed by a senior official designated by the Secretary of State for that purpose.
( ) In such a case, the instrument making the modification must contain a statement that—
(a) it is not reasonably practicable for the instrument to be signed by the Secretary of State, and
(b) ”.—(The Solicitor General.)
This amendment enables an instrument making a major modification of a warrant under Part 7 to be signed by a senior official in any case where it is not reasonably practicable for the Secretary of State to sign it.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Solicitor General
I beg to move amendment 631, in clause 192, page 147, line 37, after “that”, insert “—
(a) ”
This amendment is consequential on amendment 632.
The Solicitor General
I will deal as succinctly as possible with the amendments, which I think will gain Members’ support. They will ensure that a direction by the Secretary of State that is approved by a judicial commissioner cannot disapply the prohibition on the disclosure of an intercept warrant or any intercepted material. The clause relates to bulk personal datasets obtained by a security and intelligence agency using a capability for which a warrant or other authorisation was issued or given up under another part of the Bill: for example, via the intercept provisions.
The clause provides that, in such cases, the intelligence agency can apply to the Secretary of State for a direction, which has the effect of applying this part—part 7—to the bulk personal dataset. For example, if an agency intercepts an email that has a bulk personal dataset attached and the agency wants to retain and examine that information as a bulk personal dataset, it can apply for a direction to that effect to the Secretary of State. The judicial commissioner must then approve that before it takes effect.
Subsection (6) as drafted states that it is not possible to disapply clause 48, which excludes material identifiable as intercept, from legal proceedings, unlike schedule 3, which provides exceptions to that exclusion. Therefore, a bulk personal dataset that is acquired by interception will always be subject to those provisions, even if a direction is given to apply the safeguards in part 7. The amendments make it explicit that it is not possible to disapply clauses 49 to 51 in such circumstances, either. The clauses together mean that it is an offence to make unauthorised disclosure of the existence of an intercept warrant or any intercepted material.
The clauses relating to the restrictions around the disclosure of material obtained under interception warrants have already been considered by the Committee. The amendments ensure that the restrictions continue to be mandatory, where applicable, to a bulk personal dataset that is subject to a clause 192 direction. Although without the amendments the Secretary of State could choose not to disapply the restrictions on a case-by-case basis, we believe that it is appropriate that that is mandatory, given that they relate to authorised disclosures and criminal liability for such a disclosure.
The clause also allows the Secretary of State the power to vary directions given under the clause, but as drafted it does not explicitly require judicial commissioner approval of such a variation. We are therefore tidying that up and making it explicit that a double lock of judicial commissioner approval will apply to the varying of a direction as well as the original direction. Therefore, once again we are paying close attention and ensuring that the safeguards on the Bill are robust in every possible respect.
Amendment 631 agreed to.
Amendments made: 632, in clause 192, page 147, line 40, at end insert—
“(b) where sections49 to51 applied in relation to the bulk personal dataset immediately before the giving of the direction, they continue to apply in relation to it with the modification that the reference in section50(6)(a) to the provisions of Part 2 is to be read as including a reference to the provisions of this Part.”
This amendment provides that, where the Secretary of State gives a direction under Clause 192(3) with the effect that Part 7 applies to a bulk personal dataset obtained under a warrant issued under Part 2 of the Bill, the direction must ensure that clauses 49 to 51 of that Part continue to apply in relation to the disclosure of the bulk personal dataset (with a modification to ensure that certain disclosures made in connection with the giving of legal advice about Part 7 are excepted disclosures for the purposes of Clause 49).
Amendment 633, in clause 192, page 148, line 8, at end insert—
‘(10A) Subsections (7) to (9) apply in relation to the variation of a direction under subsection (3) as they apply in relation to the giving of a direction under that subsection.” —(The Solicitor General.)
This amendment provides that a direction under Clause 192(3) may be varied by the Secretary of State only with the approval of a Judicial Commissioner.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.