(11 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI want to explain why I cannot support the motion. The House is predicated on procedure and rules—we seek fairness in things—but the very first sentence of the motion states that the House:
“Deplores the use of chemical weapons in Syria on 21 August 2013 by the Assad regime, which caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries of Syrian civilians”.
We have gone from an assumption to a declaration that we know that Assad did that. I could not support that under any circumstances, because I believe in some form of due process that identifies the perpetrator. We have the opportunity to do so. The Labour party amendment would take out the possibility of doing the thing that most offends most other people around the world—power determining the outcome irrespective of the facts.
I am also a victim—if I can put it that way—of past judgments, dossiers and information. In the Prime Minister’s speech, he used only the words “highly likely”—taken from the JIC’s observations. I can see no other reason, but we normally seek to ask, “Cui bono?” No one has given a plausible explanation of why, with UN investigators in Damascus, the Assad regime would want to let off these weapons there and then. I cannot give an explanation for the actions of the most odious and horrible regime. Two generations of Assad have been prepared to slaughter. We are now faced with an empty land of hope, to which we contribute little if anything, because of our lack of knowledge of lands beyond our understanding. It was a French colony; we are British.
We ought to reject the concept that we have already tried the regime and therefore should push to war. I want my constituents to know why I cannot support a motion predicated on such a thought.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. and learned Friend has come against the rock of the special advocates. They have looked at this business and rejected it universally. They are the ones who are supposed to carry these court cases through and they do not like the proposal. I do not like it and, as this debate progresses, I think we will find that many more Members of this House do not like it either.
I thought we were doing all right with this Bill until the special advocates came out with their remarkable evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I agree that that got me into a lot of trouble. I do not understand why they take that ferocious view. As I have demonstrated before with plenty of quotations, they do win cases. One would think that they are powerless, but they do succeed. The judges accord to special advocates much more power of persuasion than they seem to accord to themselves, because judges want to have a special advocate to help them test the evidence when they are reaching their conclusion.
Of course, special advocates act on behalf of the claimants, as do most of the people who make these objections. I am not accusing them, because their motives are the highest and most honourable, but they have got into a frame of mind where they think that anything that is not advantageous to the claimant must be bad. Even at the height of my enthusiasm for human rights and the rule of law, I cannot get myself into that position. Claimants should be obliged to prove their case and I believe that special advocates are the most effective means that we have of testing the Government’s case on behalf of claimants.
As ever, my colleague on the Intelligence and Security Committee makes the point in straightforward, direct and proper terms. My understanding is that the Opposition accept that in a small number of cases it will be necessary to have closed material proceedings and that PII does not meet the case in every set of circumstances.
On the point that the right hon. Lady was making in respect of balance, there is another element that is not often discussed but which is surely central to our system of justice—the openness of it and the confidence, therefore, that the general public can have in due process. That is what this debate obscures. I grew up with Matrix Churchill, and I think the right hon. Lady’s time in Parliament coincided with that. Those are the worries that inform part of the anxiety about the Bill.
The hon. Gentleman, as ever, speaks with passion on these issues and I respect his point of view. I was a lawyer a long time ago and I understand how important it is to have open justice, but it is also important to get the balance right.
Amendment 30 is about the Wiley balance. I have some difficulty with the amendment because I feel that the Wiley balance is perfectly appropriate for PII, because it is used to decide whether to include or exclude material and whether or not there should be an open hearing. It strikes me that in relation to closed material proceedings there is a more complex and nuanced decision to make which contains different factors. I am keen that we get a balance and that we get the balance right, but I am convinced that the Wiley balance is one that we can simply transpose into the new legislation and that it will be effective.
Amendments 34 and 37 are about whether every other method has to be exhausted before we can get to a closed material proceeding. I am disappointed that there is not more agreement across the House on this. We all want to see whether cases can be dealt with in another way, because closed material proceedings should be the absolute minimum—an irreducible core, as I put it, of cases. I wonder whether the determination could be made by the Secretary of State, having considered whether PII would be suitable, and whether there could be some mechanism for the court to exercise a scrutiny function on whether the Secretary of State’s consideration had been more than cursory.
There will be concerns if the Secretary of State just ticks a box and says, “I’ve considered PII, in my bath”—as the hon. Member for Chichester said—rather than going through a proper process. I would like to see, whether or not we end up in ping-pong with the Lords, something in the Bill that says that the court has to take a proper look at the Secretary of State’s consideration of PII. That would not be exhaustive, but would have some substance to it. I ask the Minister to consider taking that into account.
I want to make one other point, if I may.
The other element that critics of the Bill do not take into account is that much of the information we are talking about can relate to misunderstandings on the part of the terrorists or criminals, who sometimes do not realise when their conversations are being listened to or when their property has been entered under lawful warrants and information obtained. They do not realise how stupid some of the precautions are that they take to protect their evil plans. That kind of information cannot be released in court. The plaintiff might be an innocent person, but if the information is released in court, it becomes available to the whole world, including the terrorist organisations and criminals themselves.
I am moved by the impassioned nature of my right hon. and learned Friend’s response to this matter. He is quite right; this is a serious matter and no one doubts that. Is it not strange, however, that some of the information that we are accused of passing on comes from the American court system? We have been held accountable by American intelligence for that as though it were a fault on our part. If the Americans are able to maintain their tradition of an open court system, why should we not do so?
I know the case that my hon. Friend is referring to, but that is not really the point at issue. The point is that when intelligence agencies, including the British ones, share information with their friends and allies from other countries, they do so on the strict condition that that information will not enter the public domain without their permission. This is not so much a question of whether the information in a particular document might be harmful; it is a principle, and that principle must not be breached.
I am conscious of the time, and I want to make a few more points, if my hon. Friend will forgive me.
This point goes to the heart of what Lord Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice, has said. The plaintiffs themselves will sometimes benefit from the arrangements, as well as the Government who are defending the case. I can think of current cases, some of which are controversial, in which information given to the judge about the activities of the intelligence agencies some years ago could well help the plaintiff as well as the Government.
Furthermore, if it was suggested that a particular closed material procedure had been drawn too widely to include information that did not need to be protected, the benefit of the special advocate system is that if the advocate was doing their job properly, they would raise the matter with the judge. If the judge was satisfied that the breadth of the closed material procedure needed to be reduced, the evidence in question could be heard in open court.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI agree with the hon. Gentleman that one of the virtues of a reformed House of Lords would have been a voice in the second Chamber for the Scottish people as well as for the English and Welsh people and for all the nations and regions of the United Kingdom; we have spoken about that before. At the moment, that second Chamber has a very high preponderance of people from the south-east of England. There is chronic under-representation, not only from Scotland but from Wales and the north of England. That would all have been balanced by reform. I do not think that that point argues in favour of ripping up the United Kingdom altogether, but it does argue in favour of pushing for reform once again in the future.
The Deputy Prime Minister refers to his proposals as a simple matter of democracy. I wonder how he reconciles that with the greater principle of how it can be democratic to have a once-elected person who is never held accountable by an electorate.
We had extensive debates, in which the hon. Gentleman participated, when the Government set out our ideas in the draft Bill about the concept of a non-renewable term. I totally accept that there is an issue about legitimacy versus accountability. A non-renewable term improves legitimacy, but not standing for election again raises question marks about accountability. I would say two things. First, a 15-year term is better than an illegitimate life membership of the House of Lords. Secondly, we did not draw on something that this Government have suddenly invented; we drew on the work of countless cross-party committees in the past—the Cunningham work, the Wakeham work, and so on. Those all came up with the same conclusion—that if we were going to create a clear distinction between this House and a reformed upper House, and to make it absolutely clear that the legitimacy and accountability of this place was supreme, then the best way of doing that was, yes, to introduce democracy, but to do so on the basis of long, non-renewable terms.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberWill the right hon. Gentleman give way?
I should like to make a little progress.
The House of Lords is an institution that offers its Members a job for life; an institution that serves the whole of the United Kingdom, yet draws around half its members from London and the south-east; an institution in which there are eight times as many people over 90 as there are people under 40; an institution that has no democratic mandate—none whatsoever—but that exercises real power. The House of Lords initiates Bills, it shapes legislation and, as Governments of all persuasions know, it can block Government proposals, too. These reforms seek to create a democratic House of Lords, matching power with legitimacy.
All legislation, whether it originates here or in the other place, of course requires the support of the Government of the day to make its way on to the statute book.
The second reason that the reforms will lead to better laws—this may help to answer the right hon. Gentleman—is that the Bill is not just about who legislates, but about how we legislate. Right now in our political system, power is still over-concentrated in the Executive. Governments, quite simply, can be too powerful. During their political lifetime, many Members have seen landslide Administrations able to railroad whichever Bills they like through the Commons, and we have all heard colleagues complain about different Governments trying to ram Bills through the other place when they should have been trying to win the argument in both Houses. Despite its assertiveness, too often Governments believe they can disregard the Lords.
My intervention was prompted by the Deputy Prime Minister’s statement of the principle that those who make the law should be elected by those who bear it. Of course, the older and greater principle is that those who make the laws should be accountable to those who bear the laws, and there is no accountability in the process that he is introducing.
In answer to the hon. Gentleman, I would say that there is neither accountability nor legitimacy in the status quo. These are jobs for life, which are entirely discharged without any reference to the British people. Surely, it is simply time to trust the British people.
It is a great pleasure to follow the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough (Mr Blunkett), and to hear his views. Many interesting views have been expressed; clearly the House is well divided.
A former colleague in this House, the right hon. Tony Benn, would remind us of the story of when Mr Gandhi came to England and was asked by British reporters what he thought of democracy in England and he replied that he thought it would be a jolly good idea. That shows our conceit about ourselves and elsewhere, as we are not entirely democratic. Tony Benn also used to point out that the Crown resides not at the end of the Mall, but in Downing street. This House is an appointed House, in one way. The occupant of the Chair might not be directly chosen by Her Majesty, but is approved by her.
We have all sort of tangles in an ancient constitution and they are often difficult to reconcile, but my whole parliamentary career—although “career” is a rather grand word that might imply some sort of distinction—has been based on the quest for us to become a democratic nation in which everyone elected here speaks on behalf of someone. That is what causes me the difficulty with the Bill, and the Deputy Prime Minister did not answer my concern. I do not think that he feels democracy, and my disappointment is that, over the years, the Liberal Democrats have stood for democratic issues and have stood against guillotines—in fact, I voted many times with them—but since they went into coalition, that has all been tipped out. That is at the heart of my disillusionment about the intent of fine men who stand up and make bold promises.
I genuinely believe that people should just read the Bill. It is unconscionable to say that someone must stand for election, an idea on which the Deputy Prime Minister has based his Bill, but can never be accountable. We are reverting to the aristocracy of the 19th century, who were all Members of the House of Lords but could conduct their business from the south of France. Indeed, as I look towards my own possible retirement, I think I probably should go to the Lords. I do not know whether I have 15 years left—[Hon. Members: “Of course you have.”] No, I am not sure about that; we may be running out of time. It is an unconscionable idea, but how agreeable. Perhaps our bankers should all become Members of the House of Lords. They would not have to be here at all.
There are many flaws in the Bill. However much I might believe in the necessity of the affirmation and consent, rather than the casually given acquiescence, of the people, I cannot support it. As for the very idea that we can put everything to a referendum, I tried and struggled to get a referendum on Maastricht, which was absolutely impossible, but we can have referendums on whether I tie my laces or on whether to have an elected mayor for wherever. That is the contradiction in this whole farrago.
I say to my Liberal Democrat colleagues, those good souls sitting on the Benches in front of me who have been led to contradicting everything that they have stood for as long as I have been in this House, that they do not want elections to be held after people have been effectively shoo’d into the House of Lords. I cannot go for that. The constituencies are bigger than countries, so we will have 11 Members of Parliament, but who will they be representing? I do not know, and I do not think that it will work.
The Liberal Democrats cannot trust the Government or the people on this one and they want to introduce a voting system that is alien to the British people and that has been repudiated comprehensively. This process makes the House look ridiculous. We have crises facing us and this guillotine motion—we are back to them, despite the Leader of the House’s attestation otherwise—must be defeated. I urge Members, however they feel, to allow the proposals to be debated properly.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman seems to be having his cake and eating it. On the one hand, he says that the treaty is tough in terms of fiscal discipline and consolidation, while on the other hand he is worried about the fact that we have not signed it and are not subject to it. I think it is right for this country to take measures to consolidate our fiscal position. These are difficult measures, but we can at least look the British people in the eye and say we are doing it for our own benefit and our own good. We are not doing it because we are instructed by some foreign body to get our budget under control; we are doing it in our own national interest.
The Prime Minister will well remember that nearly 20 years ago, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and the Irish Republic left the exchange rate mechanism—the precursor of the euro. There was an exit strategy. Now the crisis facing Europe seems to be one of solvency in some of these countries, there is no exit strategy and it appears that there is no money. Will the Prime Minister reassure the British public that no funds will be given to the IMF and that we will give no more money to the European Union?
I obviously remember very well the exchange rate mechanism experience. Indeed, it is that experience that makes me so passionate about not joining the single currency or the euro—because it is so difficult to exit from it if it does suit our needs or our arrangements. I believe that Britain is a big enough economy to have its own interest rates and its own monetary policy to suit our needs. My hon. Friend asks for guarantees. What we have done is already to have got out of the bail-out mechanism to which the last Government signed us up and, as I clarified a few moments ago, we have set out very clearly our conditions to the IMF.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am afraid that my hon. Friend is simply not right. That is not the current constitutional position. The current position is that for a period of time during which a Government have the confidence of this House, the only person who decides whether there should be a general election—assuming that we have not reached the end of the Parliament—is the Prime Minister, who seeks a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. Members of Parliament, unless they vote down the Government on a vote of confidence, do not have that power. The general public certainly do not have that power.
The Minister’s proposition was a much disputed one. It was thought at one stage that Mr Major, when Prime Minister, was prepared to call a general election during the difficulties surrounding Maastricht. The argument put by people such as Robert Rhodes James was that it was a matter for the Cabinet as a whole to give the Prime Minister the authority to go to the Queen—a more collective approach. The coarse person, the Back Bencher on the streets—or rather the Benches here—would argue that the Cabinet at the time would have thrown themselves in front of John Major’s car if he went to Buckingham palace, as the last thing the Conservative party could bear at that juncture was a general election. It is a process; that is what my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) is talking about. The Prime Minister is not the only person who can determine a general election. That is the ebb and flow of real politics, which is what this House is about. That is why, as I am sure the Minister will understand, there is opposition to some of the propositions in the Bill.
I am not sure that I want to conjure up visions of Cabinet Ministers throwing themselves in front of prime ministerial cars, which is not a happy thought—[Interruption.] Some of the comments from Opposition Members are unworthy of them. Let me explain what I do not understand about my hon. Friend’s point. He is arguing, I think, for decisions about the timing of general elections to be a more collegiate effort, rather than just the choice of the Prime Minister—but that is exactly what the Bill does. It takes away from the Prime Minister the power to call a general election by asking the Queen for a Dissolution and gives that power to Members. Two thirds of them can choose to have an early election for any reason, including general concerns about the state of the country, which deals with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. Having this Bill in place would allow that to happen, which cannot be done today. The other way of bringing about an election is the Government losing a vote of confidence. That is why the Government believe that the Bill should be in place; it should not be up to each individual Parliament to decide whether the Bill should remain in force. That is why we oppose these sunset clauses.
We think that the real threat presented by the amendments is that they could create a scenario in which political parties, and specifically the Government party, could choose in each Parliament, even at its beginning, whether that Parliament should be a fixed-term one. As the Bill is currently drafted, both Houses would have to vote in favour of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill kicking into place at any time during the Parliament. I simply do not think that that is a very sensible proposition. It would mean that Governments would have a way of manipulating the timetable. We should think it through. If both Houses have to vote in favour of a motion for a fixed-term Parliament to be in place, a Government with a majority could simply refuse to pass that motion—and we would effectively have given back to the Prime Minister the ability to call an election. That would not be a positive step forward.
It is important to note that when this House and the other place were legislating for the fixed terms of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, it was not thought appropriate to have sunset clauses. We did not give those legislatures the opportunity to pick and choose each time how long their terms of office should be. I do not believe that doing so makes sense now.
The hon. Gentleman sets me up very nicely for my final quotation. In this Bill’s Second Reading debate—which took place a long time ago, on 13 September 2010, which goes to show that the Bill has enjoyed leisurely progress through both Houses with proper scrutiny in both Chambers—the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said:
“I have long been in favour of fixed terms. I could dig out correspondence I had with Margaret Thatcher in 1983 about fixed terms. The Labour party committed itself to fixed terms in the 1992 election. What typically happens—this is why I welcome the measure and why I wanted that commitment in our manifesto—is that parties in opposition that are in favour of fixed terms go off the boil on them when they come into government.”—[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 645.]
Interestingly, we have done the opposite. We were not very keen on them in opposition, but we have become keener on them in government, and this was in our coalition agreement.
I am startled by my hon. Friend’s line of argument. I did toil through our election manifesto, and I saw no pledge or undertaking at all to have a fixed-term Parliament, and least of all a fixed-term Parliament for five years, so what is his line of argument?
My hon. Friend rightly says that we did not have a commitment to do this, but equally we had not promised not to do it. The case was made to us that there was a good case for fixed-term Parliaments, provision was made for them in the coalition agreement and we brought the measure before the House. When good arguments are made, wise Governments listen to them and introduce these very sensible measures. They do not contradict anything that we had in our manifesto. It is usual for Governments to introduce proposals that were not in their manifesto when sensible arguments are made for them. That is a perfectly sensible proposition.
I am delighted to be able to agree with the thrust of the remarks of the hon. Member for Poole (Mr Syms) in relation to the key effect of the Lords amendments, which would extend the power of the House of Lords as it now stands and in whatever future shape it takes, by making sure that the upper House was in a position of dual control with this House on whether there was a fixed-term Parliament. We know from sentiments already expressed in that House—echoed many times in this House—that there is opposition to serious proposals on Lords reform, and in those circumstances I would certainly not indulge any extension of their powers or ability to trespass on the primacy of this House, which is exactly what the amendments would do.
A number of weeks ago the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) rightly lampooned the democratic credentials of the other Chamber, and yet now he wants to extend its control over the democratic proprieties of this Chamber and over whether there is certainty on when there will be a general election. I fully agree with him that those of us who believe in fixed-term Parliaments face a predicament with the Bill, because many of us believe that four years is the natural term for a Parliament. It was the natural term that this Parliament chose for the devolved Assemblies and Parliaments, and it was right that they were comfortable with it, but because Parliament is opting for five years, those assemblies will also have to shift to five years, which I do not believe is the natural rhythm for fixed terms.
Nevertheless, it would be a bit much for someone like me to use the fact that I believe in four-year terms, in addition to believing in fixed-term Parliaments, to vote for rupturing the nature of the Bill. As someone who is proudly in the Irish Labour tradition, I have great regard for Jim Larkin, who once said that the purpose of politics was to keep narrowing the gap between what is and what ought to be. I believe in fixed-term Parliaments. Unfortunately, the only choice we now have is five-year terms. In future, I hope that other parties will be elected with a mandate to alter that fixed term to four years and that future Parliaments will do that, but I believe that we will reach that stage quicker by voting for fixed-term Parliaments now and amending the length of the term in future. If instead we get to the meaningless point of having a Bill that is a fixed-term Parliaments Bill only in name, rather like the two-hour dry cleaners that tells customers to come back next Tuesday because “two-hour dry cleaners” is just the name of the shop, that Bill will not fulfil its purpose in any real way.
In relation to the amendments, there is a curious idea that both Chambers would decide on whether there would be a fixed term, but there is uncertainty on when those resolutions would be laid and who would lay them. The references to the Prime Minister in some of the amendments relate only to moving the date of an election back by up to two months, and I think that some people have misread that and think that it means that the resolution would have to come from the Prime Minister, but it would not. It seems that we would be left with a curious situation in which anyone could seek at any time to move such a resolution in either Chamber and create various difficulties that would simply add to the political mess and to the uncertainty on whether we have fixed terms.
I also agree with the hon. Member for Rhondda in his criticism of the Bill’s provenance and the fact that it came about not to fix the term of Parliament, but to fix this Government. It was intended to create a fixed-term Government and a fix for this Parliament. For that reason it is wrong and it is bad. However, the amendments would have the effect of prescribing legislation that would have every Parliament begin with a Government using their majority to fix the term in a way that suited them. He said that any Government worth their salt would do that early on in the term, and presuming that an Opposition worth their salt would oppose it, we are left asking what the point would be and what such legislation would achieve, other than an unedifying procedure each time a recently elected Government appear to fix the terms on which they will govern which the Opposition resist. The whole idea of a fixed-term Parliament Bill is to ensure that there is no political speculation or contention on those issues. Looking at the nature of some of the other clauses and amendments, I do not believe that the Prime Minister is ceding as much power as some hon. Members have said.
This is an unusual and uncomfortable experience for me, but I concur with the Government on these Lords amendments. Unfortunately, on this occasion I have to disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda while fully agreeing with his basic, continuing underlying criticism of some of the background to the Bill.
I agree with a lot of the points made by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan). I am conscious that this a Bill to fix a Parliament: that is the purpose behind it, plain and simple. The difficulty that the House of Lords faced and that we face in this House—it is the reason I voted against the Bill on Second Reading and otherwise—is the incoherence of the constitutional change that these amendments, to some extent, address.
We are embarked on almost reckless constitutional change with no overall coherent view of what we want. I know what I want, and I rather suspect that the hon. Member for Foyle knows what he wants—a democratically elected, accountable House of Lords. That raises all sorts of subsidiary questions as to which has primacy and which does not. We have here a fix, without any view as to what the constitution is going to be, that has involved nothing other than the coalition partners bringing forward a Bill that contains certain propositions that do not relate. I appreciate that we have had all the debates about four years as opposed to five years and the rhythm of the process. We have had the AV referendum, which was again unrelated to how the constitution was going to look.
That is why the Lords tabled these amendments. In a sense, they are not serious amendments—serious in the sense of how they prick this process and bring in a wider consideration of what the constitution should be, to whom is it accountable, and how we make these changes. Essentially, this fixed-term Parliament proposal is “back of the envelope”. Do we really want a five-year fixed term when we might have had only four years? I think that that was the position of the Labour party in its manifesto, and the position of the Liberal Democrats. The joyous thing about it is that we did not have a view, other than against, in our election manifesto.
Yes, forgive me—it was the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) who said it was a fag packet. This Bill was introduced in July last year. It was fully debated in this House and in the other place, and it is now almost a year later. One cannot in any sense agree with my hon. Friend’s proposition that the parliamentary debate on and scrutiny of this Bill has not been thorough and well thought through.
I am sorry, but my point was not as the Minister so kindly describes it. My point was that we are talking about a constitution. The problem for everyone, not only in this Chamber but out there too—the people—is what are the forms and proper norms by which we should conduct our business, electorally or otherwise.
Now these piecemeal bits are coming forward whereby the Lords make the absurd proposition that it should have a role, as an unelected House, in determining when an election should be. That is clearly absurd, and to that extent I am sympathetic to the Government. However, I am very opposed to a five-year Parliament. There has been no testing on that. A parliamentary majority in this House will now determine that we have a new form of constitution that the hon. Member for Foyle is apparently happy about on the basis that it is only temporary and we might have a different, and therefore proper and better, version at a later stage. We have to deal with where we are here and now. We want a proper constitution, I would argue. I think that that is the position of the Labour party. I know that a good many Government Members also want a constitution that stands the test of time. No one from outside has really been invited into the supposed consultation.
The Deputy Prime Minister has not even come to argue for his position. That truly trivialises the whole process. I have gone on about that before. However much I am thrilled with the presence of the Minister, it is absurd that those who make these propositions cannot come here and argue for them.
Order. I know that the hon. Gentleman feels strongly about this matter, but he is drifting from the point of the Lords amendments. I know that he is setting the context, but that context is getting a little too wide. I would like him to narrow his speech back to the amendments.
I am trying to use the amendments to explain and understand what the Lords are doing. I appreciate that I may be going too wide, and I am sorry if that is so, but that is the purpose behind what I am doing. It is in that context that I am going to vote for the Lords amendments. They are absurd; there is no question about that in my mind. It is absolutely absurd that the Lords, who are not democratically elected, should be setting out such amendments. The very writing of the amendments is extraordinary for a place that we are told is full of very intellectual and clever complacents. It is extraordinary that they should even be looking into this. However, I did not open this discussion; the coalition opened it, and it did not do so in a rational or reasonable way. I am trying to find an argument to support the amendment so that I can vote against what is an improper process. It is as simple as that, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I want those on the Government Front Bench to understand my point. They are careering on. They held an AV referendum, but apropos of what—whether one was for it or agin it? I know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that AV is not on the amendment paper.
Order. The hon. Gentleman knows that he is out of order. He is making points directly to his party. I would appreciate it if he kept to the amendments before us and did not range far and wide. There are other Members still to speak and other amendments still to cover. I know that he knows he is out of order because he keeps telling me that he is. I have been very generous to him, but it stops now. Please come back to the amendments.
I am obliged for the courteous and pleasant way in which that was said. Mirror, mirror on the wall, I know that I am—[Laughter.]
I apologise for missing the beginning of the hon. Gentleman’s speech. I wonder whether I may risk leading him astray. How does he think a fixed five-year term for this House stands alongside the proposals for a 15-year term for some peers in the other place?
Order. The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) and I can both guess whether he should go down that line. I think the answer is that he should not. Can he please come back to the amendments?
Of course, Madam Deputy Speaker. There was no way that I was going to rise to that fly. We will get back to the substance of the matter.
These are ridiculous proposals from the House of Lords—on that I agree. To that extent I am with the body of the House, which, I hope, feels that this is almost an impertinence. That impertinence is qualified, of course, by the fact that the Lords are the second Chamber, and that as it stands—other than in matters of money, as I understand it—they have all the rights of a second Chamber to make or change legislation. They are wrong to table the amendment, but they are right in the spirit of it. I hope that it is in order to suggest such a thing. My proposition is that they are right in the spirit of it because it is the only way in which they can attack this matter.
I hope that this cheerful Chamber will look askance at the Minister and his colleague, the Deputy Leader of the House, who are sitting on the Front Bench and trying to seduce us into thinking that there is some immaculate constitutional conception behind the Bill. There is not. It is the raw politics of “We want to be there for five years, in the hope that something turns up at the end of the fifth year”. That is what it is about, and we know it. I urge the House to vote for the Lords amendment, and damn them.
This was not in our manifesto. The people who voted for us certainly did not vote for fixed-term Parliaments.
In 1940, as I have said, the Government won the vote in May, but the public would not countenance that Government remaining in power for another day. That was what got rid of Neville Chamberlain, and Leo Amery said:
“In the name of God, go.”—[Official Report, 7 May 1940; Vol. 360, c. 1150.]
There was a similar example in the Cromwellian period. There are great events taking place in the world today, and the whole question of the sustainability of government ultimately depends on the continuing will of the people as a whole. The idea of fixed-term Parliaments is intrinsically wrong, because it defies the gravity of the views of the public at large. If the public were to turn against fixed-term Parliaments, under the Bill they could not succeed because fixed-term Parliaments would have been entrenched by statute, which would be upheld by the judiciary. That is fundamentally an attack on our sovereignty and the sovereignty of the people of this country. That is why I object so strongly to the whole idea of fixed-term Parliaments, whether of five years or four. It is unconstitutional, wrong and prevents the people from being able to demand a general election irrespective of the views of a Prime Minister or a coalition that is cobbled together despite the views expressed in the respective manifestos.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am not going to beat about the bush. I am not in favour of the change. I am not going to pretend I am and put forward various reasons why the Lords amendment should be accepted. If I had any doubts at the beginning—I must confess that at times I did consider the possibility of a change in the electoral system—the way this Government have gone about their business has certainly persuaded me to support the no campaign.
An article in today’s Evening Standard by a former editor of The Spectator makes a valid point about how little interest there is in changing the electoral system; there is very little enthusiasm for that. As I asked yesterday, where is the pressure? Where are the letters and e-mails? Where are the people coming to our surgeries and saying, “This is the most crucial issue of all”? It is important to bear in mind the fact that there would have been no possibility of such a referendum if the Conservatives had a working majority; indeed, they would be arguing the opposite of what the Minister was saying.
I do not want to eat my words. On many occasions, when I was sitting on the Government Benches, I said that the view of the elected Chamber should prevail. I do not deny that I said it, and I cannot say that I have drastically changed my mind. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has made the point that the Conservatives were only too willing to allow the unelected Chamber to overturn the decision of the Commons when there was a Labour Government.
I have no desire to eat my words, but on a major constitutional issue the Government should be willing to listen, even more so when we are talking about a voting system that has been in operation for a long time and there is so little evidence of a desire for change. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) said, the only reason why the measure is being introduced is the coalition. There is no other reason whatever. There is certainly no enthusiasm for it in the Conservative party, either on the Back or Front Benches.
When the Lords last voted on the proposal the majority was only one, but today it was 62—including 27 Conservative Back Benchers and, in many respects more important, Cross Benchers. They do not have a particular party view, but it is understandable that they should be concerned that if there is to be a vote on a change to the electoral system there should be credibility in the turnout. The provision is not binding. The point has been made on a number of occasions: if turnout is less than 40%, it does not mean that there will not be another referendum. The Government and Parliament can reconsider the position. What if turnout is less than 30%? Will we really work on the assumption that that gives sufficient credibility and is sufficient justification for changing the electoral system?
The Minister said that if there was a threshold, it would be an incentive for the no campaign. Surely it would be an incentive for the yes campaign. If the yes people are so keen on change, it is up to them to campaign as hard as possible to persuade the electorate of their case. The Government have put through most of the measures in the Bill. They should show some generosity and consideration for the strength of feeling. They should not be so obstinate. [Hon. Members: “Be nice.”] There would be no harm at all in the Government showing a less obstinate spirit and recognising the strength of feeling both in this place and next door.
If there was a free vote in the House of Commons, this measure would be overwhelmingly rejected.
The Government give as their reason for disagreeing:
“Because the outcome of the referendum should be determined by those who vote in it and should not depend on how many do not vote.”
I challenge that. I do not accept it. One of the reasons why I challenge the process is that we are under a guillotine. During the whole passage of the Bill we have been guillotined. Their lordships are part of Parliament and therefore used to be considered custodians of the constitution, so that we in our party passion might not force through something that altered the balance of the constitution. I oppose the motion for that reason.
The Bill is a major constitutional change. No one has argued otherwise. It will change the voting system. We have almost universal suffrage. Everyone is entitled to vote. If they choose not to exercise—
I shall not, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me. We have so little time and others want to speak.
We have universal suffrage so if a proposition is put to us, I shall take the older course of action, which the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) hinted at. Those who seek change from a settled position have the right to advocate it in a referendum, but those who are not convinced about change are not negligible. They are part of the equation and their very reluctance to vote was normally taken, in an older tradition, as acquiescence in the existing arrangements—that is, they did not step forward and seek change by the exercise of their vote. That was a profound and reasonable position to adopt.
Those who want change have the opportunity in a referendum to vote for it. Those who do not vote have not indicated consent, so the level of consent can be very low indeed in the context of the universal suffrage of our country. Dismissively, the Government say that the outcome is not to be determined by those who do not vote.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI support the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), but I shall talk about the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg). The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) invoked Homer. In the case of my hon. Friend’s new clause, I would invoke Cicero:
“Those who know nothing of the time before they were born shall forever remain children.”
That is what I feel is happening to this Chamber. We forget our past, our history and the continuity of our constitution. There was an affirmation there that was important and required addressing.
I understand the hon. Member for Rhondda being concerned about the increased politicisation of the House of Lords, and the “gridlock”, or however he described it. I grew up in an age when the Standing Orders of the House of Lords—this was before my time in the House of Commons—were not so dissimilar from the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. They dealt with, among other things, delay. Very important it is, too. If there is such a thing as gridlock, there comes a point, as we sometimes see in the United States, when the people whom we are elected to represent grow increasingly angered that the business of government comes to a halt because horns are locked. That becomes the grounds for compromise and discussion as the route forward.
As I understand it, in the Lords a proposition has been offered to the Government to separate the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill into two parts, with one part going forward. So there were grounds for compromise. At the moment that is not acceptable to the Government and there is therefore gridlock, but there will come a time when that is unacceptable to a wider public, who want Parliament and the Government to move on.
I hoped that my words supported the very argument that the hon. Gentleman is making. I would, in addition, invoke Cato the Younger, who by speaking until dusk, made sure that Caesar did not always get his way. [Interruption.] The Deputy Leader of the House says that that was a filibuster. Cato was right to use every tactic that he had, but the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) is right, too. The Standing Orders of the House of Lords were the same as they were in this place. The fact that now the Government always have precedence over the order and the timing of debates is one of the reasons why there is no check on the Executive at all.
I am always encouraged when a political opponent, in the sense of someone from the other side of the House, adopts arguments that I advanced against him when he was sitting on the Front Bench on behalf of the Labour party. It is true. Now we see the conversion of the defeated. That is why we should always be mindful that our hold on government is a temporary experience, and that one day we will be sitting on the Benches on the other side of the Chamber and hoping to be able to make the reasoned arguments that can convince a wider public out there.
The sheer disengagement of some of our arguments from those by whom we are elected, and from why we are elected, is to me the most worrying development of Parliament in recent years. We have scorned the historic balance of where the people lie in this matter; that is why I support both new clauses. I have asked the whole way through our consideration of the Bill how it will strengthen the people’s hold over the House of Commons, which is their representative instrument for ensuring that public policy bears some relationship to the desires, hopes and aspirations of our society. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset for the informed, reasoned and reasonable way in which he presented his new clause. If it is put to a vote, I will vote for it, because I would like to show that there is some support in this House for the arguments it advances about temperance in respect of the House of Lords and its doings.
I am a democrat and truly believe in the representation of the people in this House, which is what I want to see. However, the basis of the argument that I have made the whole way through proceedings on the Bill is that we know that it is about the entrenchment of a temporary coalition, and we are trying to examine, and amend, the aspiration that things can somehow be rejigged. We have heard the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), who is sitting on the Front Bench, advance the startling proposition that the Queen could dismiss a Prime Minister for acting “improperly”. No constitutional documents in the past two centuries, and certainly not since 1867, have stated that that was a practical reality.
In that case, perhaps the hon. Gentleman could explain why Her Majesty was able to dismiss the Government of Australia, which is part of the Commonwealth, by using the powers that she has.
The constitutional arrangements of Australia are a matter of written statute there, and I understand that the Governor-General exercised the prerogative power in the case to which the hon. Gentleman refers. However, that is not what I am concerned about; I am concerned about our own constitutional processes. I think that the statement by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary was misjudged, but he has never withdrawn it. He is a representative of the Government, and of the Crown itself, but as a Member of Parliament he has never withdrawn that statement.
My nervousness about the Bill is clear. I am nervous about the idea that two parties can mandate that their existence as a coalition should last for a term of five years. I have expressed that view before, and I think that it is shared by a number of Members. I have no doubt that the Lords will think that measure trivial in some ways, because it is a presumption; how can one mandate something that is formed by human beings with their own policies and parties? They can work together to a certain extent, but the coalition will last as long as the coalition lasts. I am not damning it; I am just saying that I do not think that they should have reached forward with a Bill of this nature. If they want to work in harness they will have the support of a great many Members of this House. We know that the nation is confronted with an economic crisis and difficult decisions have to be made. The people of this country are having to make difficult decisions on how to restore economic competence, balance budgets and all the rest of it.
We have spent a lot of time on the first matter, so I will now come to the real new clause, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, which I will undoubtedly vote for. His brevity today was extraordinary. [Laughter.] I do not laugh at it, for I think that the expression of great ideas is all the more effective for being expressed in a concentrated and condensed way. I appreciate that there is a drinks party at Downing street for Members from my party who want to attend, so I will bring my remarks to a close, as the great business of the Government must not be delayed by the musings of the House of Commons on such matters as constitutional reform.
I am standing up to support the limitations that are being expressed and the hesitations about the nature of the Bill. If there were one thing that I could argue for and effect, it would be that the Government themselves realise that they have a job. We salute them for that, but, when they fiddle with the constitution in ways that suit only their own purpose and stifle the natural functioning flow of politics, we lose something, and we lose the attention of our constituents. My argument is that we cannot march to a drumbeat like that. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving us the opportunity at least to raise our caveats, and I am grateful to the Labour party for indicating that it will support the new clause. It is important, and I commend it.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) for his generous opening remarks and, as usual, largely excellent speech. I say “largely”, because I do not entirely agree with his characterisation of the other place, given the behaviour not, I hasten to add, of their lordships’ House, but of a small number of former Labour MPs, who are filibustering and abusing every procedure of that House to try to frustrate the will of this elected House of Commons, which passed the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill by a considerable majority. Apart from that, I very much enjoyed my hon. Friend’s speech.
(14 years ago)
Commons Chamber Being in this position almost persuaded me of the merits of knives, which at least enable us to conclude debates at approximately the point at which everyone else has spoken.
I remind the Committee that the amendments deal with the mechanism providing for an early general election following a vote of no confidence, as set out in clause 2(2). Last week, on the second day of this Committee stage, we engaged in a wide-ranging discussion both of the merits of the various amendments and of the Bill. Before I deal with the amendments, let me respond to some of the questions raised by Members last week.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), who is present and who speaks for the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, asked a number of questions relating to the constitutional consequences of a vote of no confidence under the Bill. She was particularly concerned about the possibility of a Government’s forcing a general election by refusing to act both in accordance with conventions and in the spirit of the Act. She gave the example of a Government who engineered a vote of no confidence in themselves, or who sought to trigger a series of elections close to one another by refusing to resign after an election result.
If a Prime Minister who would presumably be seeking to be re-elected in a subsequent election engaged in such constitutional shenanigans, he or she would first suffer a political penalty at that election. If a Prime Minister behaved in an absolutely unconstitutional fashion, there would always be the ultimate long stop: Her Majesty the Queen could dismiss the said Prime Minister. That is the ultimate check and balance in our system. Clearly it would require an extraordinary set of circumstances, but it is the position that would obtain if our unwritten or other conventions were breached in a really appalling fashion.
By what constitutional authority does the Minister cite the extraordinary proposition that the long stop of the constitution is that the Queen may dismiss a Prime Minister?
So that is the Minister’s new interpretation of a constitution, or of defined practice over the years.
I shall not attempt to rush forward to the certification procedure, because we will debate it when we discuss the next group of amendments.
Let me turn to the specific amendment before the Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”, so it is not clear whether the motion would have to consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added to a Government motion by amendment.
The Opposition’s amendment tries to specify the text of the no confidence motion, but does not try to achieve equivalent clarity as regards the motion of confidence that would have to be passed within 14 days by an alternative Government in order to avoid a general election. The amendment is trying to achieve some certainty—that was what the hon. Member for Rhondda said—but I do not think it does. I also do not think it is desirable or appropriate to try to set out the text of the motions in the Bill.
The Government think that clause 2(2) provides a clear and practical mechanism that gives statutory effect to a vote of no confidence. I have set out the Government’s concerns about the amendments and I hope that hon. Members will not seek to press them to a vote.
I should like to press amendment 5 to a vote, with the consent of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash).
I need to hear you pressing the amendment, Mr Shepherd. I need you to shout louder for me. I am happy to do it again, but I need to hear the vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I am a little puzzled as to why the hon. Gentleman comes to the conclusion that this needs to be codified in any way. Our history demonstrates quite openly that this House comes to such a resolution by the processes of the House. When Mr Chamberlain won the famous Norway debate, he recognised that there was no confidence in him personally. These matters are eventually decided by the House and by the judgment of individuals. Surely that is the better way of doing it.
In a sense, that is an argument against the whole Bill which I understand. I know that the hon. Gentleman is not saying that this is a conspiracy, but I think that the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex feels that a bit of a cosy consensus has developed around the fact that there should be a codification of fixed-term Parliaments. We agree with that codification. However, once one starts to codify one element, one has to codify rather a lot of them. That is why I have wanted to codify what counts as a motion of no confidence and what should be a motion of confidence. Perhaps we should have tried to codify it in a slightly different way so that, for instance, a motion to amend the Loyal Address could also be considered as such, as in 1924.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman and with the fundamental basis of his analysis, which is that the constitutional reform programme is driven by the immediate necessities of the Government in the context of this Parliament. We are making major decisions that will have wide ramifications in the functioning of the constitution of the United Kingdom, based on a political programme and timetable. That is never the best way in which to develop deep consensus thinking about the constitution.
I would finally raise a point that the Clerk of the House has also raised. As he put it in a note to the Committee in the other place,
“given that a draft Parliamentary Privileges Bill has now been announced, why deal in advance and separately with a matter affecting the proceedings of the House of Commons in legislation”,
if it is not for the specific political purposes of the current Government?
I am more and more puzzled about the Bill as we go on, but there are two propositions in this group of amendments. I support amendment 6, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), and I am grateful for the important contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman). Indeed, I was elated at the time of the election to hear that Jesse Norman had been elected to the House. I spent six months seeking out that fantastic opera singer—I got the wrong individual, as you will appreciate, Ms Primarolo, and I am very grateful to have encountered my hon. Friend on the Floor of the Committee.
No. Hon. Members will be pleased to hear that I do not propose to sing, but I am pleased to report that I have managed to overcome the quadruple handicaps of being tall, white, English and male.
And formidable handicaps they often are.
The endeavour of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and those who support the amendment was to provide some form of belt-and-braces approach. None of us is confident that it can work, because the aspirations and ambitions of several of our lords justices have given one an uncertainty as to where they are heading in the rewriting of the constitution. I am also mindful of the European Court of Human Rights. We have an inferior court that we call a Supreme Court and a superior court that we call a court of human rights, and on top of all that we have another court called the European Court of Justice. Somewhere in there I can see a demented Prime Minister making an application for unfair dismissal as a result of a vote to every one of those courts in turn, while we watch on, as though it were a Gilbert and Sullivan pantomime. I shall support the amendment.
Similarly, I will support amendment 23. The matter has to be determined quickly and appropriately, so I shall not waste the House’s time having indicated the actions that I will take.
Like the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd), I shall speak in support of amendments 6 and 23, which are both attempts to earth the Bill against some of the dangerous shocks that could be created for the House in the future. To make some of my points, I will have to refer to what the Minister said about the previous group of amendments.
In the debate on the previous group, the Minister said that he could think of no circumstances in which a debate on a motion of no confidence would take place without the House knowing that it was a motion of no confidence, even though the Bill requires the Speaker to issue a certificate only after a period of 14 days has elapsed—it does not specify how long after. That creates a situation that we all have to consider before we even go into the danger of what will happen when the matter goes to the courts. Let us first look at the difficulties and controversies that will be created in this House.
If a motion of no confidence can be played like a wild joker, and any motion can be converted into one, then whenever there is a controversial issue or one involving Opposition or rebel tactics, the Speaker will be asked early in a debate, “Will you signal whether you would be minded to say that this debate is certifiable? Will you declare that we are going through a potentially certifiable chain of political and constitutional events?” Of course, the Speaker might wish to say, “You are trying to draw me into a matter of controversy”, because he might not be privy to what Whips are saying to Members about the significance of a particular motion.
My hon. Friend cited in the letter from Robert Rogers a reference to existing Standing Orders, which require a particular majority for an event to take place. I think he mentioned the requirement for 100 Members to vote for a closure motion. There is no precedent for a Standing Order, passed by a simple majority, to entrench itself and require that it cannot be changed, other than by a vote of this House on a different majority. The Government know of no precedent for that, and no Member has given an example of one. If a Standing Order provided that an early general election could be held only after a vote with the specified majority, and if that Standing Order could be changed by a simple majority vote in the House, it would be open to the governing party, at the behest of the Prime Minister, to change the Standing Order and to trigger an early election based on the whim of the Executive. That is exactly what we are trying to remove under the Bill. The Government believe that if the policy objective is to be achieved, the procedure must be specified in statute.
If that is so—and I accept it as such—why does it not apply to the statute itself?
I think we have touched on that before. Once the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament, it cannot be changed purely by a majority vote in the House of Commons. The decision would have to be made by Parliament, which would also engage the other place, in which the Government do not have a majority. Even after—[Interruption.] I anticipated that reaction. Even after the appointment of the new list of working peers, the governing parties together will have only 40% of the peers in the upper House; 60% will be Labour peers, Cross Benchers or Lords Spiritual. The fact that this will be an Act of Parliament makes it impossible for a majority vote of a governing party to bring about an early general election, which is our policy objective.
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberOnce again, I bring to the Chamber the apologies of the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, for his absence. He is, unfortunately, unable to be here, but I assure hon. Members that he is probably watching proceedings and that he will be better soon. He is still carrying out his duties as Chairman, but it is difficult for him to be here in the Chamber.
I am pleased to move the amendment tabled by the Select Committee, or at least some members of it. It concerns the House’s procedure for determining the way in which an early election can be called. I, personally, do not support its wording and I shall not insist on putting it to a vote, and if others do so, I shall not vote for it. There is nothing wrong with that, as I am merely moving it. It forms an important part of the Select Committee’s pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill and, as such, it should be put before the Committee so that it can be properly discussed.
The amendment reflects some of the arguments that were heard during the Select Committee’s inquiry into the Bill. I simply wish to ensure that hon. Members have the chance to examine these important issues. The amendment proposes an alternative way of bringing about what the Government seek to achieve in clause 2. It does not oppose the Bill’s aims in any way, but simply proposes an alternative that hon. Members should consider.
As an alternative form, the amendment would have three advantages. First, it would avoid the risks involved in implementing the Government’s proposal that a two thirds majority should be required for a vote to have effect. Secondly, it would avoid what the Committee described as the “uncertain” consequences of the provisions in the Bill on motions of no consequence—[Laughter.] That was a visual rather than a grammatical problem, and if the Committee will forgive me, I shall try again. I meant to say motions of no confidence, which would include the possibility of a Government
“subverting the purpose of the Bill by tabling and voting for a motion of no confidence in itself in order to trigger an early general election without the need for a super-majority.”
Thirdly, the amendment would largely deal with the concern of the Clerk of the House, articulated to the Select Committee, that this part of the Bill would infringe the House’s “exclusive cognisance” over its own proceedings—its right to decide for itself how its business should be done, and the concomitant principle that the courts will not interfere. When the Clerk told us of his concerns, we shared them, so tabling the amendment allows us to consider those real and well-founded concerns. I am aware that other amendments that we shall discuss this afternoon would deal with the situation in different ways, but amendment 33 proposes a simpler way of getting around those concerns. It would ensure that an early general election could take place only with cross-party support.
I am sorry to intervene at such an early stage of my hon. Friend’s comments, but I notice that proposed new subsection (2)(b) states that
“each member of the House of Commons who at the time of the motion being made is the registered leader of a registered party that received more than 20 per cent. of the total votes cast at the previous parliamentary general election.”
Those are the people who are supposed to decide whether there will be a confidence motion. What does my hon. Friend feel about the fact that the proposal will disfranchise the representatives of between 3.5 million and 4 million people?
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s point, and I find myself in some difficulty. I am happy to respond to it, but of course I agree with it. I am proposing the amendment not because I am passionate about it, but simply so that the Committee can discuss it. He is right to raise one of the issues that should be discussed. I take it that he means people who are represented by parties such as the nationalist parties. In that respect, if the amendment were accepted by the Committee and by the Government and if it became part of the Bill, I would find myself wishing further to amend it, to the effect that the parties concerned should be those that received more than 20% of the vote in the nation in the United Kingdom where their candidates stood for election. I hope that answers my hon. Friend’s question. However, I do not think we need to go into that in much greater detail.
The amendment provides that an early general election would take place only when the House agreed by a simple majority to a motion in the name of the Prime Minister, tabled with the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of any political party that had received more than 20% of the national vote at the previous general election, with the extra proviso that I have just added in response to my hon. Friend’s well-made point.
Indeed. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. Once again, the details of proposed new subsection (2)(b)—that is not
“To be, or not to be”
—we are going back in again! I do not think we need any more Shakespeare, and I will be called to order if I go any further down that road.
The matters identified by the right hon. Gentleman would have to be considered in more detail if the amendment were to become part of the Bill. I predict that the Minister will not accept it. As I said, I hope not, because I would have to vote against it and as the Committee knows, I am uncomfortable voting against my Government and the Minister. The amendment does not have to become part of the Bill, but the points made to the Select Committee by the Clerk of the House are serious and important, and the Committee will wish to be reassured that the Minister has considered them.
Is not the difficulty for my hon. Friend and those on behalf of whom she is promoting the amendment that they have put it in a statutory form, whereas the Clerk’s solution was that it should be in the form of Standing Orders of the House? To read across is not possible. On the face of it, the amendment looks absurd, so I am puzzled why it is even before the Committee.
Let me explain further. The Select Committee rushed through its pre-legislative scrutiny process, because of the timetable for the publication of the Bill, Second Reading and Committee. Inevitably, the Select Committee had to take evidence and consider matters quickly and briefly. It is important that the issues considered by the Select Committee are put before the Committee. I have every confidence that the Minister will assure the Committee in due course that he and his colleagues have considered all the points made in the pre-legislative scrutiny report by the Select Committee.
I will now move on to the very question that is being discussed, which is motions of no confidence and what they really mean. There are various permutations, which are well described in the Library note, but the issue for me is basically this. In my belief—and according to the House’s tradition and its conventions, which are now to be overtaken by statute—a majority of one should remain. However, in that 14-day period, with shenanigans worthy of Lord Voldemort and the servants of the Dark Lord, an attempt would be made to keep in power a Government who had lost the confidence of the House of Commons—that is, the representatives of the electorate. That attempt would keep the Government on their feet, while the public would be left watching the spectacle of streams of members of the Cabinet and prospective members of the Cabinet from the Opposition parties striding up and down Whitehall, in and out of offices, all under the baleful influence of the Cabinet Secretary, as they tried to hatch yet another coalition agreement, no doubt based on very different principles from those for which the electorate had voted, in accordance with the parties’ respective manifestos or—dare I use the words?—their promises.
As to the question of what confidence motions actually are, they are various. In 1945 it was Churchill versus Attlee, and the Government won. Then there was Attlee against Churchill in 1952, and Gaitskell against Eden in 1956, when the Government won again. There was also Wilson against Heath in 1972, on the European Communities Act, when there was thought to be quite a lot of manoeuvring on the question of whether there had been a free vote or not. I will not go down that route now, but examples of where the Government have lost confidence motions include the Liberal Government of 1895, the Baldwin minority Conservative Government —note: minority Conservative Government—in 1924, the MacDonald Government in 1924, when there was again a Dissolution, and, of course, the famous Callaghan defeat by Thatcher, by 311 votes to 310.
I am getting increasingly impatient in one sense, but on the distinction between what is a confidence motion and what is not, I put this proposition to the Committee. If the Government lose the Budget, that is it. My understanding of our constitution is that that would be the end of the Government.
Well, Governments have resigned on the loss of such votes. Therefore, what constitutes a motion that arrives at that result? What my hon. Friend has been quoting were dates, not motions.
Indeed, but that was about the sense of outrage over what had been done. That could apply to a Budget, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) said, or to any other situation. It could have applied to Suez or, for example, the Iraq war. For all those reasons, the confidence motion, in whatever terms it is expressed, is just that: do those voting in the House of Commons at the time, by a majority of one, have a sufficient degree of confidence in the behaviour and policies of the Government?
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s tolerance in giving way again, but the outcome of the vote in 1940 was the resignation of the Prime Minister, not the Government as a whole. Although the Government went with him, they reformed themselves, so what happened was not an electoral matter; it was the outcome of a confidence motion in the individual who headed the Government.
I agree with my hon. Friend on that, but there was also the sense of outrage that was being expressed. As that occasion has been raised three times already, let me mention in passing that, as it happens, it took place on the day that I was born, but there we are.
What does such innovation say about the coalition? It certainly demonstrates its determination to stack the cards firmly in favour of the coalition and the Whips. There may well be one third whom the coalition cannot take for granted or persuade, but I fear that that attitude is taking power away from Parliament—which, after all, is made up of the representatives of the people—and not giving it back. If the same principle were followed for any other motion, Parliament would simply not be able to carry out its business. I fear that what is proposed is not modernising, but is a reactionary measure. It is not progress, but a step backwards, along the primrose path, undermining the constitutional principles that have governed our conventions and been tested over many centuries. The proposal has been conjured out of thin air, for the ruthless purpose of maintaining power irrespective of the consequences. In my opinion, it is a great shame that it has been put forward on the proposition that—as was said in the general election and at the conference that took place recently—we are supposed to be “Working together in the national interest”. I fear that on this Bill, on this matter, we are working together against the national interest.
Might that lack of clarity be a mark of the wisdom of past generations? They knew when it had happened that a Government were not sustainable, and they knew when it had not happened. The mood of the House in relation to that of the country was an open question.
I am not sure that that is true. It depended on the Crown—that is, the Government or Executive—retaining the power to dissolve Parliament. I do not think that a measure that was considered to be a motion of no confidence in 1866—namely,
“to leave out the words ‘clear yearly’ and put ‘rateable’ instead thereof”—
would be considered to be one today, and I therefore think that it would be inappropriate for that power to remain.
Or she. I thought I just heard my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) speaking in my ear.
If that Prime Minister felt that it was essential in the interests of the nation that there should be an early general election, the Government would be prepared to bypass and use every trick in the book to secure an early election. They might well have this Bill in their back pocket as a means of achieving that. So although this Government were supposedly trying to release the grip of the Executive, they would have enhanced it.
I want to reaffirm our commitment to fixed-term Parliaments. That means that we have to lay down in statute that it is for the House, not the Prime Minister, to dissolve Parliament. It should also be for the House to decide the precise date of the general election, which should be in statute, and we should have only one process of calling an early general election. We must be clear that the Government need always retain the confidence of the House of Commons and that should be written in statute now.
For most of the 20th century, we have had very few hung Parliaments, but I suspect that there might well be more in future. We need to ensure that our provisions will stand the test of time rather than simply being drawn up to appease the coalition agreement.
Mr Hoyle, I have a point of inquiry following your response to the Opposition’s Front-Bench spokesman, which is about the stand part debate. As the amendments are theories in concatenation, it is difficult to address an amendment in isolation without reference to a wider context.
It is unlikely, not ruled out. The other point is that I am not sure that we will even get there. At the rate at which we are going, we have quite a while to go yet.
Thank you, Mr Hoyle. I shall start with my first observation, which is that the test of each clause in both of the constitutional Bills is to ask in what way it enhances the role of the people in relation to Parliament. The answer, again, is that this does not. The measures are meant to be an internal reorganisation of the rules and regulations of the House of Commons effected through statute. We have had advice from the Clerk of the House that, if challenged, it will be open to judicial interest and the views of the courts. Historically, this matter has always been determined within these precincts and so the question of what we call parliamentary privilege is particularly germane to the Bill. I am very concerned about that. I make the perhaps minor observation that in a struggle between a new Government without a mandate and the House of Commons authorities, who are appointed by the House, I would back the advice of the House rather than that of the politically motivated and interested Government of the day. I do not dismiss the Clerk’s memorandum or accept the response to it, which is effectively like that television sketch “Computer says no.” That is an extraordinary and very undignified response to the Clerk’s advice on something that is of the greatest importance to Members of the House, and through them, citizens’ rights, activities and freedoms.
My next point concerns the accumulation in clause 2 and the proposed amendments to it of purposes, or distinctions between ways of dissolving Parliament. These measures have shifted my position from benign acceptance of the concept of a fixed Parliament to one of questioning whether there was not greater wisdom in the proceedings and processes that we had before. These measures worry me enormously. My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) generously moved an amendment in which she has no confidence in order to test a proposition, and she did test it—to destruction. On examination, the amendment is too threadbare and offends the very conscience of why we are here. It suggests that some Members’ views on whether a Parliament should stand or not should be disregarded because they do not have a party leader who represents a certain number of votes. I do not know how such an amendment got through the Select Committee but I think it was to form the basis of some sort of standing order that could be cooked up to meet the point about judicial inquiry into the purposes or nature of the Bill.
Let me make another point about motions for an early election or of no confidence. We have tickled, argued and considered across the Chamber the way in which Mr Callaghan accepted that there had to be a general election, but that was nearly at the end of a five-year Parliament. There was very little scope beyond going the few months left, but he stood up immediately and said, “There will have to be a general election.” I remember the perfervid moments of the Maastricht debates and the subsequent consequences of a Government who had a very small majority wanting to increase the rate of VAT on domestic fuel. The motion was to be vehemently opposed by people such as myself, who had lost the Whip, but not just because of that—it was an opposed measure. It could not have fallen but for the support of Conservative Members who took a broader view on it, and it did fall.
The argument that was put by the bastion of the 1922 Committee and the Whips, of course, for they have an argument for all seasons, was that if it fell, the Government would fall, and that the solemnest duty of any Conservative Member was to support the measure because the confidence of the House stood in the Budget. I shall always have a soft spot for the Justice Secretary—then the Chancellor—because when he lost the vote, he said, with that famous giggle, “Oh, we’ll have to have a corrigendum Budget.” We duly had one on the following Thursday. I am really talking about the pressure that was put on Back Benchers, because we were told that the Government would fall.
If I had stood in front of my constituents at the general election and said, “I’ve got two little measures. The short title of one of them is the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but the long title seems to contradict that concept,” they would have been bemused. If I had then started talking to them about the nature of confidence votes and motions for an early election, they would have been struggling. We were entering an election and they knew what it was about; there was a crisis. There was a huge public deficit and anxiety about jobs, yet here was Shepherd of Aldridge-Brownhills troubling them with the notion that
“each member of the House of Commons who at the time of the motion being made is the registered leader of a registered party”
and so on. If I had done that, my constituents would have thought, “Well, he’s been with us a long time,” and they might have made a different judgment in the election.
The measure has no mandate. I have opposed other constitutional measures, but however wrong I thought the balance of the argument was for the detail of the Scotland Bill proposed by Labour, no one could say that there had not been a national convention on it. There was no political party in Scotland that had not long resourced such a measure. I recall John Smith’s role and that of a whole series of people. They were alert and alive to the issue. No one could claim that there was no mandate for the reforms and changes that took place under the sovereignty of this Parliament to create a Scottish legislative structure and to pass powers to Scotland. The constitutional developments in Wales and Northern Ireland were similar.
Those measures could claim a mandate. The 19th century is often cited, but these are long struggles. I was a little riled by the Labour spokesman because he referred to the 18th century. It is proclaimed that the glory of the House is reflected in our coming to the democratic age—it is rather like dividing up what happened in a great empire—but the democratic age is fairly fresh and young and new. It did not really start until the 1860s. That was when political parties were formed and there was a more regimented approach to the management of the House—not easy to do. There was a glorious extract from the London Illustrated News next to the office of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash)—I now know where Pericles found the stones to get over his lack of confidence. The extract was from the Queen’s Speech—then Her Majesty Queen Victoria. The burden of it was to say, “This parliamentary Session”—well, this particular parliamentary Session will last for ever, but apart from that—“Her Majesty’s Government will concentrate on foreign affairs. It will leave domestic legislation to the House.” Just like that. That is a world away from where we are now—where the Government have to fiddle and twiddle, and do everything at the behest of a very informed—
Order. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) also gave us a history lesson and had to be reminded to come back to the amendment. I am sure that the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) would prefer to stick to the amendment. I realise that we can broaden things out, but we are going a little bit too far from the measure.
Of course, I joyously do that. Implicit in every line of the measure is the management of the House. That is the only reason why I diverted slightly to recall the London Illustrated News.
The hon. Gentleman is making another fine speech, which I am always glad to hear. He spoke about the mandate for constitutional change and the previous mandates that previous changes have enjoyed. Does he agree that it is important to have a mandate not only to introduce a change in the constitution such as that proposed, but to entrench it? Without such a mandate, is there not a danger that future Governments may feel that they have the authority to introduce such constitutional changes to their own benefit, much as the present Government are seeking to bring in a constitutional change through the measures in the Bill for their own benefit?
I like the young new Member vigorously advancing an argument that I find so convincing.
The measure is not appropriate for a serious democracy. Clause 2, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone said, is an endeavour to entrench. It is as simple as that. We cannot ignore a wider picture of what is going on. At this moment, loyal and good dinner guests of those who run my party are marching into the Lords to take their place. Their doing so means that when the Bill comes to be voted on—remember, the other House that has to deal with that is the Lords—the numbers able to vote on it in the Lords in the Conservative and Liberal Democrat interest will have increased exponentially.
Overall, the Bill—clause 2, the other clauses, the Speaker’s certificate, the idea of a registered leader of a registered party and so on—is, if not humbug, then designed to defeat the very purposes that most of us in the House want: an open, democratic House. I know that this is difficult in politics, but my Conservative colleagues should listen, understand and think about the 200 very new Members in the House who are going to change a constitution without any reference point other than party loyalty. Party loyalty to what? No mandate? They are going to march blindly through the Lobby at the behest of the concept of party, when in a coalition that is a very different matter.
I shall certainly vote for amendment 4, and I hope there will be many who take that course.
Many valid arguments have been made about this group of amendments by a number of right hon. and hon. Members. I have total sympathy with the cynicism that has been expressed about some of the devices in the Bill and the motives for them.
However, I believe totally in the idea of a fixed-term Parliament and have supported amendments that clearly stated “fixed term”, although I believe that the term should be four years, rather than five. I have to ask myself, as all of us as legislators and members of the Committee must ask ourselves, if we do not like the present provisions, what is our alternative that would mean that we have credibly passed a Bill for fixed-term Parliaments? That is where I part company and cease to be persuaded by some of the arguments that I hear in respect of some of the amendments.
With reference to cynicism about the motives, a number of hon. Members have articulated the basic nature of the Bill. It is the means by which the two coalition parties have created a statutory harness to keep them together for this Parliament. It is, in essence, a fixed this-Parliament Bill, rather than a Fixed-term Parliament Bill. It is designed to solve the conundrum of either party collapsing the coalition. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill is for fixing future elections. This Bill is about fixing this Parliament.
If I want the Bill to be a Fixed-term Parliament Bill, I have to be judicious about its content and any amendments that I might support. That is why I have some questions about some of the amendments that have been so articulately presented today.
The hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) presented amendment 33 with a white flag and in a very novel way, which just goes to show that it is entirely possible for people to present themselves in all sorts of ways in the House. People say that a Government would not use or exploit in any way a no confidence motion against themselves, but any available device will be used in any particular circumstances. That is the nature of politics.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) spoke to amendment 21 and made a strong case for an “immediate” as opposed to an “early” general election. The only problem is that if “immediate” can mean only six weeks, as he said to the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), what happens if, for example, we are close to Christmas—perhaps the middle of November—notwithstanding that allowances will be made for holidays? If we are truly to take account of media coverage and other activities during that time, is it credible to confine ourselves to six weeks and six weeks only? Clause 2 as it stands allows for consensus in the House on the need to bring forward considerably the due date for an election, and people might do so conscious of current and pending events.
Another hon. Member mentioned the situation in Dublin at the minute, and many people would say that, although confirmation of an early election there has helped to clear the political air, going for an immediate election might cause more market turmoil not just for Ireland, but for others. There are times when we need to leave ourselves and this House the room to make a distinction between “early” and “immediate”.
I could not agree more with the hon. Gentleman, and I will come to the Supreme Court in a moment. I do not want to interfere with his amendments on the Speaker’s certificate, which are absolutely correct. My hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) referred to the Digital Economy Act 2010, and the Hunting Act 2004 was also reviewed in court. Yes, the court ruled that it could not interfere with the Act, but it had to go to the Law Lords for that supposedly self-evident truth to be confirmed. Even there, the judgment was hardly a ringing endorsement of parliamentary sovereignty, which is what amendment 33 seeks to retain.
The process of getting to the courts takes time, and obviates the timetables in the Bill.
The hon. Gentleman is of course correct. There will be extra layers and extra opportunities for lawyers to intervene. It was no wonder that Lord Steyn commented in the light of the Hunting Act 2004 that it
“is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism”.
I think that in plain English that means they would be interested to get their teeth into the proceedings in this place.