Financial Services and Markets Bill

Debate between Richard Fuller and Mark Garnier

2nd reading
Wednesday 7th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Richard Fuller]

As the hon. Gentleman will know, there will be plenty of opportunities for him to review each of the 200 measures in Committee, should he so wish, and to make recommendations. He will also be aware that the Government have already undertaken significant consultations with industry and others, and that there are ongoing reviews of a number of measures that are in place, some of which are contained in schedule 2. I do not feel that what he fears will actually be the case. There will be a process of consultation on a number of these measures, and there will be ample time for questions to be asked in the House as those consultation proceed.

As I have said, we have already undertaken fundamental reviews in some areas to ensure that we are seizing the opportunities of leaving the European Union, and this Bill delivers their outcomes. Let me touch on these briefly.

The Bill gives the Treasury the powers to implement reforms to Solvency II, the legislation governing prudential regulation for insurance. The Government are carefully considering all responses to their recent consultation and will set out their next steps shortly. The Bill also allows the Government to deliver on the outcomes of the UK’s prospectus regime review, taking forward key recommendations from Lord Hill’s UK listings review. These reforms will ensure that investors receive the best possible information, help to widen participation in the ownership of public companies and simplify the capital raising process for companies on UK markets. This can help to boost the UK as a destination for initial public offerings and optimise its capital raising processes.

The Bill also delivers, through schedule 2, the most urgent reforms to the markets in financial instruments directive—MIFID—framework, as identified through the wholesale markets review. It will do away with poorly designed and burdensome rules, such as the double volume cap and the share trading obligation, which will allow firms to access the most liquid markets and reduce costs for end investors. We intend to bring this into effect shortly after Royal Assent.

In reforming our regulatory framework, it is right to think about the regulators’ objectives so that they reflect the sector’s critical role in supporting the UK economy. For the first time, the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority will be given new secondary objectives, as set out in clause 24, to facilitate growth and international competitiveness. The FCA and the PRA will do this within an unambiguous hierarchy that does not detract from their existing objectives.

It is critical that these new responsibilities for regulators are balanced with clear accountability both to the Government and to Parliament. This is addressed in clauses 27 to 42, alongside clause 46 and schedule 7. The Bill includes new requirements for the regulators to notify the relevant parliamentary Committee of a consultation and to respond in writing to formal responses to statutory consultations from parliamentary Committees. The regulators are ultimately accountable to Parliament for how they further their statutory objectives, so these measures recognise the importance of the Committee structure for holding the regulators to account. While I welcome the new Treasury Select Committee Sub-Committee, it is ultimately for Parliament to determine the best structure for its ongoing scrutiny of the financial services regulators.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

I was on the Treasury Committee a number of years ago when we were looking at the Financial Services Act 2012, when competitiveness was not properly addressed. Is my hon. Friend convinced that the Treasury Committee will be able to instil a sense of urgency in the regulators and convince them that competitiveness is incredibly important? It is one thing to hold the regulators to account, but another to be able to drive them to implement the will of Parliament.

[Richard Fuller]

My hon. Friend opens up what was an area of particular personal interest to me when I was a Back Bencher, and I therefore feel tempted to stray, during what might be my rather temporary position on the Front Bench—[Hon. Members: “No!”] That was a cheap attempt for a laugh, but if I may just say this without straying too far, I think it is recognised across the House that the role of Parliament in holding regulators to account needs further investigation. The Bill is quite remarkable because we are building on a structure from the year 2000 that put tremendous power in the hands of the regulators. We think that is right. We do not think that we should have the same prescriptive statute-based approach as the European Union, because we feel that is too rigid, does not promote competition and does not help growth. But we must recognise, as we take the Bill through the House, that we have a responsibility carefully to ensure that those structures of parliamentary oversight are appropriate.

Interest Rate Swap Derivatives

Debate between Richard Fuller and Mark Garnier

Thursday 24th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier]

I will try to explain the issue as simply as I can now.

Imagine a second-hand-car dealer. He may buy a dodgy motor on his own books and try to make as big a turn as he can, but he risks not getting his money back. Now imagine a car dealer with a valuable vintage car who aligns a seller and buyer at exactly the same time. He takes a turn with no risk at all, and that is how a swap behaves. Now imagine that, having lined up that trade, he takes the money from the buyer, so has a contractual agreement with them, and agrees a sale with the seller. However, on the way to deliver the car, he writes it off in a crash and is not insured. He still has liabilities on both sides—he still has to deliver a car to the buyer and has to pay the seller. That is the mess that the banks are in. They have caused themselves a massive car crash and have to look after the other side of the trade.

We are fully aware of the losses to the banks on the financial redress scheme—plus, obviously, the consequential loss scheme as well. We have heard about how much has been put aside, and there will be debate about whether that is the right amount or not. However, we have heard nothing yet about the value of the liability on the other side of the swap—the liability to institutions, most likely to be pension funds, that still needs to be honoured. That has implications for the stability of the banks and shows why it is important for banks to keep the redress scheme running for as long as possible.

[Richard Fuller]

rose—

[Mark Garnier]

I see that my hon. Friend wants to intervene, but may I develop my point?

The financial redress scheme has a specific value, based on a number of factors—including, crucially, interest rates and time. Similarly, time to run is a key component of the value of the other side of the swap. With interest rates so low, the longer the time to run, the higher its value to the customer and the higher the liability to the bank. As a result, we get a built in incentive for the banks to delay settlement for as long as possible. With each day that goes by, the liability on the other side of the swap is reducing.

Harry Wilson, of The Daily Telegraph, has put in freedom of information requests to the Financial Conduct Authority to find out exactly what the loss on the other side of the trade will be. Amazingly, nobody seems to have the answer. It seems inconceivable that the banks would not have the information. Any derivatives trading room team, especially on a swaps desk, will have detailed information on the extent of the liabilities; they have to know that. Even if the swaps team does not, the risk or treasury department should know it—loads of people should know it. It is extraordinary that nobody is coming forward with the information.

The issue has been dragging on for far too long. Too many businesses have failed as a result of it and it is likely that too many more have fallen into that twilight zone of bad forbearance by banks, which sometimes keep otherwise dead institutions alive simply because it is in their interests.

I spent the best part of the last year on the Banking Commission considering the matter. It is worth noting that this crisis happened before the Banking Commission, the financial crisis and the rest of it. However, today the banks have to prove that they have moved on, that they should now be allowed to come into polite society and will do the right thing by the consumer.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Richard Fuller and Mark Garnier

Monday 8th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Richard Fuller]

I am grateful for that intervention. A lot in the commission’s recommendations reflects the seriousness with which it considered that point, and rightly so. In the intervening 12 months, I have dealt with constituents whose businesses have been put at risk because of the fraud of interest rate swap mis-selling and whose lives have been rent asunder by payment protection insurance mis-selling, and the Government have also taken action on the fiddling and fixing of LIBOR. Beyond that, some of us have been dealing with regulatory failures on Equitable Life. My view is that jail for such bankers and for those responsible is the only fair outcome for the victims of those scams. Despite the intervention from the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love), I must still ask where justice is to be found for the victims of those crimes in the recommendations and in the amendments tabled today.

Banking is full of honest and decent men and women. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) said, one of the attractions of new clause 2 is that it focuses like a laser beam on the individuals who are responsible and culpable. If we fail to do that and those people do not go to jail, where is the justice for all the other people who work in financial services honestly on behalf of their clients every day?

It is not a habit of this House to consider retrospective legislation, but I want to mention that in a minute. First, let me ask the Minister a couple of questions. In the senior persons regime and the actions that would be covered by new clause 11, the focus is on named individuals at the top. As we saw in the interest rate swaps, a lot of the decisions made by the senior ranks at the banks were translated into budgets and business plans and transferred down through the hierarchy of the banks. Perhaps the Minister, when he considers the issue of conduct, could answer the question of how those extensions beyond the senior persons regime will be handled.

[Mark Garnier]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments about my contribution to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. He raises a number of points and as the chairman of the sub-panel that considered below board level corporate governance I can say to him that the management structures of banks are so fiendishly complex that there is little way that the senior managers of banks can translate their wishes all the way down to the bottom. Other evidence gave reasons why the senior management in banks can effectively set up what amounts to an accountability firewall, thereby putting wilful ignorance between them and the activities that go on in the front line and absolving themselves from any responsibility for any misconduct at the bottom end of the bank. That is a very serious issue.

[Richard Fuller]

I am grateful for that intervention, but I do not want to attempt to get into the debate that the commission has considered thoroughly and much more knowledgably than I would be able to do.

The House does not frequently indulge in passing retrospective legislation, but if the senior persons regime is appropriate, is there merit in applying it retrospectively, if only in the form of an exercise through which to judge the conduct of those involved in financial services—in the banks and elsewhere? Whether that took the form of a self-audit conducted by the financial institutions themselves, or further work for the banking commission, to the extent to which that would be feasible, it would be welcome.