Mark Garnier
Main Page: Mark Garnier (Conservative - Wyre Forest)Department Debates - View all Mark Garnier's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I start by adding my congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberconwy (Guto Bebb), who has not only been brave in what he has done on this matter, but has shown outstanding leadership in a technical, complex issue?
I wish to develop a couple of points, the first of which has started to resolve itself. I am talking about the big question of the linking of consequential loss to the technical redress. Clearly, the technical redress is people’s money—that is an agreed thing, and it is only right that it should be paid as soon as possible. The consequential loss was always a separate issue, and to have linked it was completely the wrong thing to have done. HSBC has broken ranks and RBS is following suit, and Martin Wheatley is now coming on board, saying that there should be no conditionality between the technical redress and the consequential losses claims. That is a good thing; it is excellent progress, and we can thank my hon. Friend for his work on that.
May I add my thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) for the leadership that he, too, is showing on this issue? Is it his experience, as a fellow Worcestershire MP, that this scandal, although apparently technical, is affecting well run, long-established and deeply respected real businesses across a wide range of sectors, and that the delay is going to kill businesses that our constituents value very deeply indeed?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right in what he says. The banks made an incredibly cynical effort to persuade people to enter into these contracts where, in many instances, they should not have done so. Sometimes it was the right thing to do, and I think that many businesses will agree that they just got it wrong, but we need to look after the smaller businesses that were simply mis-sold these products.
Do not the banks, or at least some of them, also have to be much more proactive in identifying the people who been the business victims of this practice? As we all know, whenever we have a debate such as this, more people come forward who were frightened to come forward before or who did not even realise that they were victims of these schemes. It is up to the banks to be much more proactive in identifying the cases and then trying to resolve them.
That is absolutely right. Part of the problem, however, is that the banks have an incentive not to get in touch with people, for obvious reasons. That relates to the second point I wish to develop. It is a technical point, but it is incredibly important in terms of why it is incentivising banks to delay technical redress for as long as they can, and it has implications for the financial stability of the banks.
We should not think of these things as stand-alone products, but should recognise them for what they are. They are not stand-alone products; there is another side of this trade. They are swaps for a reason, and it is important to understand what a swap is. Any one of our victims will have been persuaded to take out a contract with the bank that has the beneficial effect of capping interest rate payments at a certain level. That is a virtuous thing and we are all familiar with the financial planning behind the thought process, through things such as fixed-rate mortgages. But these are not fixed-rate mortgages; they are stand-alone products that relate to a loan, but are not part of that loan. Importantly, many people have paid off the loan but still have the outstanding liability on the swap. The quid pro quo of having a fixed cap on interest payments is the collar that has caused so many problems for our victims, whereby they have to pay a relatively high rate of interest in today’s terms. What is not fully understood is that this is not a simple contract with the bank, as it first appears. The bank is not taking a naked bet with its customers that, in the environment of falling interest rates, it has won. It is not receiving as profit the penalty in the increased premiums being paid in interest rates by the victim, because for a swap to actually be a swap, there is a matching trade with a third party on the other side. What the banks receive in higher interest rate payments they are paying to an opposing and third-party counterpart on the other side.
I shall now go into a bit more detail. Businesses may want to make sure that they do not pay too high an interest rate; that is why they are persuaded, rightly or wrongly, to take the swaps. However, an organisation such as a pension fund needs to guarantee its income should a severe drop in interest rates, such as we have seen, occur. It would want to take a position opposite that of the businesses, which are the victims.
The pension fund will forgo a rise in rates while winning the guaranteed floor rate that it will receive. For a business to have a rate cap at, say, 7%, it will guarantee to pay no less than 5%. For a pension fund to be guaranteed to receive a minimum payment of 5%, it would agree to receive no more than 7%. In that way, the business’s and pension fund’s interests are perfectly aligned in opposition.
As both the pension fund and business are clients of the bank, the bank does two simultaneous trades—one with the business, to cap and collar the rate payments, and the other with the pension fund, to collar and cap the interest rate receipts. The bank makes a small margin, but essentially its liability, if everything stands up, is perfectly and oppositely aligned. That is the symmetry of liability and the basis of the swap market.
I thank my hon. Friend for his understandable explanation of the product. I will be honest—I am new to this issue, which constituents have brought to my attention. Is it possible to explain the issue to an individual in a phone call lasting one minute and 20 seconds? That, apparently, constitutes the contract between the bank and the client.
I will try to explain the issue as simply as I can now.
Imagine a second-hand-car dealer. He may buy a dodgy motor on his own books and try to make as big a turn as he can, but he risks not getting his money back. Now imagine a car dealer with a valuable vintage car who aligns a seller and buyer at exactly the same time. He takes a turn with no risk at all, and that is how a swap behaves. Now imagine that, having lined up that trade, he takes the money from the buyer, so has a contractual agreement with them, and agrees a sale with the seller. However, on the way to deliver the car, he writes it off in a crash and is not insured. He still has liabilities on both sides—he still has to deliver a car to the buyer and has to pay the seller. That is the mess that the banks are in. They have caused themselves a massive car crash and have to look after the other side of the trade.
We are fully aware of the losses to the banks on the financial redress scheme—plus, obviously, the consequential loss scheme as well. We have heard about how much has been put aside, and there will be debate about whether that is the right amount or not. However, we have heard nothing yet about the value of the liability on the other side of the swap—the liability to institutions, most likely to be pension funds, that still needs to be honoured. That has implications for the stability of the banks and shows why it is important for banks to keep the redress scheme running for as long as possible.
I see that my hon. Friend wants to intervene, but may I develop my point?
The financial redress scheme has a specific value, based on a number of factors—including, crucially, interest rates and time. Similarly, time to run is a key component of the value of the other side of the swap. With interest rates so low, the longer the time to run, the higher its value to the customer and the higher the liability to the bank. As a result, we get a built in incentive for the banks to delay settlement for as long as possible. With each day that goes by, the liability on the other side of the swap is reducing.
Harry Wilson, of The Daily Telegraph, has put in freedom of information requests to the Financial Conduct Authority to find out exactly what the loss on the other side of the trade will be. Amazingly, nobody seems to have the answer. It seems inconceivable that the banks would not have the information. Any derivatives trading room team, especially on a swaps desk, will have detailed information on the extent of the liabilities; they have to know that. Even if the swaps team does not, the risk or treasury department should know it—loads of people should know it. It is extraordinary that nobody is coming forward with the information.
The issue has been dragging on for far too long. Too many businesses have failed as a result of it and it is likely that too many more have fallen into that twilight zone of bad forbearance by banks, which sometimes keep otherwise dead institutions alive simply because it is in their interests.
I spent the best part of the last year on the Banking Commission considering the matter. It is worth noting that this crisis happened before the Banking Commission, the financial crisis and the rest of it. However, today the banks have to prove that they have moved on, that they should now be allowed to come into polite society and will do the right thing by the consumer.