Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) for making this debate happen. I have been to see his bookshelves and, trust me, the books on strategy and military affairs in his library are well thumbed. He knows what he is talking about, and he has done well to corral us all into talking about it today.

Let me begin by talking about defence spending. It is fair to say that others have covered it, but I will repeat the fact that we are not spending sufficiently on defence. I want to challenge the hon. Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman). He did a bold thing in challenging the prevailing consensus, the mood of the House, and views that are now quite mainstream in the House, but while it is compelling to think about all the welfare need that exists in this country—and I acknowledge that there is a great deal—he has a crude oil refinery in his constituency.

[Brian Leishman]

No, I do not.

[Richard Foord]

Forgive me, but I understood that Grangemouth was a crude oil refinery.

We need only look to Eurasia—we need only look at what has been happening in Ukraine and Russia—to see that war comes to those who do not really want it to come to them at all. Yes, that is a failure of diplomacy, but it is also a failure of preparedness. Today, I will focus my remarks on the business of readiness.

We are currently spending 2.5% of GDP on defence, and the target is 3.5% by 2035. We really ought to be getting midway between those two by 2030, yet we are projected to be at only 2.68% by then. Of course, the Prime Minister is currently at the NATO summit in Ankara. Nye Bevan said to the Labour conference in 1957 that his party members should not send him

“naked into the conference chamber”,

and I fear that the Prime Minister has been sent naked into the Ankara conference chamber. The defence investment plan is indeed a skinny dip.

The hon. Member for Stevenage (Kevin Bonavia) talked about the famous “King and country” debate at the Oxford Union in 1933. I completely agree with him that people who thought that they would not fight for King and country in 1933 found that, by 1939, they had no choice but to do so because of the circumstances. He knows a great deal about that from his time on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

[Mr Francois]

The university’s records do not show how every individual student voted, but we know that many of the students who were present at that famous debate in 1933 subsequently signed up in 1939 and 1940.

[Richard Foord]

The shadow Minister is exactly right. Of course, those people’s parents fought in the first world war. They were a generation who really did not want to meet war, but war came to them none the less.

Clausewitz, the philosopher of war, talked about government, military and people being the remarkable trinity concerned with war. A lot of today’s debate has centred on the military, on defence, on procurement, and perhaps a little on government as it pertains to policy. We have talked a bit less about people, although the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) did talk about our servicepeople. I want to add to that by talking about people in the country more broadly—the people we represent. We need to think about defence as a national endeavour that builds on everyone’s understanding of the threat and the need to defend the nation. When we discuss warfighting readiness, we are talking about not just platforms, ships, tanks and aircraft, but information.

The Foreign Affairs Committee published a report on disinformation. We talked about the use of military and non-military—overt and covert—methods to blur the lines between war and peace, to sow doubt in the minds of target populations, and to destabilise and undermine societies. Last year’s strategic defence review covers sub-threshold attacks, and it talks about how such attacks are difficult to attribute to a perpetrator with certainty due to the methods used and the frequent reliance on proxy actors. The focus has to be on countering Russia’s hostile activities in the information space, as well as thinking about preparing to fight a war and have war readiness, because that is the reality of modern conflict.

Conflict does not necessarily begin when a missile is fired or a border is crossed. It can begin when public trust is systemically eroded, when elections are manipulated, when information is weaponised or when hostile actors succeed in weakening a society’s confidence in its own institutions. The objective is often not mere propaganda or the spreading of false information, but to persuade societies that a particular lie is true. The aim is to persuade people that objective truth no longer exists. I want us to think about war readiness in the round, including in the information space.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

Much of the commentary on the defence investment plan is on the threat to the UK mainland, our interests and our assets. First, does the Secretary of State think that it is more useful to think about the Russian threat to NATO in general terms? Secondly, now we have the DIP, is the UK still 31st out of 32 NATO members, when it comes to our commitment to strengthen and modernise the armed forces?

[Dan Jarvis]

As I hope the hon. and gallant Member will acknowledge, we are the third-largest contributor in cash terms to NATO. This weekend, I visited our personnel deployed on NATO operations in the High North, and together with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, I am going to the NATO summit in Ankara. Our allies look to us for leadership. We have provided that in the past, and I guarantee that we will provide it in the future.

Defence Spending and Readiness

Richard Foord Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

So far, the debate has been about how much funding should be found for defence. We should also think about the resignation speech by the former Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), who said last week that the DIP, which he has seen, does not strike the right balance between high-end sophistication and low-end mass. He said that

“the defence investment plan does not strike that balance”.—[Official Report, 16 June 2026; Vol. 787, c. 732.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to think about the balance between sophistication and mass?

[Dr Pinkerton]

My hon. Friend speaks from a position of authority from his personal experience and his role in Committees in this House. I defer, as always, to his superior insights on the matter, and would not differ on anything he has suggested.

Britain’s European allies share our values and commitment to collective defence. We cannot be a spectator while Europe rebuilds its defences; instead, we should shape and lead that effort.

On the Conservatives’ watch, our Army fell to its smallest size since the Napoleonic wars, while the Navy’s surface fleet fell to its smallest size since the English civil war. We saw crises of recruitment, retention and morale and a failure to look after our service personnel and veterans properly, with shoddy housing and one of the worst privatisation deals in British political history.

Defence Readiness

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 20th May 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I will now turn to some of the contributions to the debate. As I said, 37 Back Benchers have spoken, and I am going to turn to some of their contributions now. I will start with the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), if I may. He urged us to reprovision our nuclear programme, and I would just say to him that, in this Parliament alone, we are putting £15 billion into the warhead programme and £6 billion into upgrading Barrow to produce the submarines that we need.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) rightly talked about the impact that defence skills have across the economy. She also talked about the skills gaps that need to be filled, which is a central part of the defence technical excellence colleges, the defence growth deals and the Defence Universities Alliance that we are putting in place.

My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne) spoke passionately about the work he is doing on the Right to Food UK Commission. The testimony that he gave us from workers and parents about the pressure they are under and the problems that creates was really moving. We look forward to the commission’s report. My hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd North (Gill German) also ranged more widely than defence, and mentioned the pressure on families and the action that the Government are now taking on rising costs. She talked about the importance of the legislation in the King’s Speech on railways and on housing for the future.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton West (Warinder Juss) talked about the importance of resilience that runs through every aspect of our defence programme. My hon. Friends the Members for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) and for Hemel Hempstead (David Taylor) both spoke movingly, and for the House, on the scourge of antisemitism and the need to stamp it out wherever it is, and about the threat of Iran and the edge of threat that the IRGC poses to this country, as well as to Iran’s own people.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) asked for comments on Cabrit and Estonia. I shall be out there in Estonia with our forward land force tomorrow, so if he will forgive me, I will probably be able to give him a more up to date and informed comment if he would like to wait until I come back, rather than commenting from the Dispatch Box today.

My hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Anna Gelderd) talked about the important fact that our armed forces depend on the strength of the innovators and the strength of the industry that stands behind them. This is a lesson that we can draw from Ukraine: when a country is under threat or forced to fight, it is its industry, its innovators and its wider society that must stand behind it to give it strength. She rightly paid tribute to and reminded us about the civilian workforce that supports our uniformed personnel.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

On the point about Ukraine, we learned today about the delay to a ban on jet fuel and diesel made from Russian crude oil and refined in places like India and Turkey. Does the Secretary of State accept that the British people do not want to contribute one more ruble to the Kremlin for use in its war machine against the Ukrainian people?

[John Healey]

I rather regret giving way to the hon. Member because he has not been in the debate, and clearly was not in for the urgent question either, when it was made very clear that there are new sanctions to clamp down on Russian oil revenues and that the licensing regime is a way of bringing those new sanctions in. I urge him to consult the record.

Strategic Defence Review: Funding

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 15th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I do not think Britain gets stronger by pushing kids into poverty. That is the fundamental difference, as I see it, between the welfare policies of our two parties. I am absolutely clear that we should address the high levels of child poverty that we inherited from the previous Government—that is exactly the right thing to do.

The hon. Gentleman will know, because I have said it a number of times, that we are working flat out to deliver the defence investment plan. It will be published when it is ready. I think he would, in hindsight, much prefer a plan that is ready to be published over one that is not. That is why we are working to deliver our defence investment plan, which will set out spending for the next 10 years, up to 2036 or so.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I entered this House months after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and I was struck at the time that the debates on Ukraine were solemn, dutiful and not party political. The contrast with the debate over defence spending is stark. The Leader of the Opposition has decided to use it as a foil for her party, while the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) was on the radio last night saying that the Labour party will not be helped electorally by an increase in defence spending. With Trump making threats about US commitment to NATO, does the Minister share my view that we need to link armed forces capabilities to the external threat, rather than indulge in this party political navel gazing?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question and for his service to the nation. He is absolutely right to say that NATO is the cornerstone of our defence. It benefits not just the United Kingdom but every NATO member state, including the United States, and we are stronger when we stand together. That is why we are delivering against the NATO target and delivering new NATO regional plans, and it is why a debate that looks at how we can develop the latest capabilities, and bring forward more skills into the sector and more private sector investment into our defence companies, is good for us. We do this because it is in the national interest to support our national security. I stand at the Dispatch Box not for party politics but for our national security. In darker times, I hope that is what we would all be doing.

North Atlantic Submarine Activity

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 13th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

We need to accept that Ireland in itself is exceptionally close to the mainland and we therefore have shared security interests. The Prime Minister has had constructive conversations with his Irish counterparts to ensure that, where applicable, we share those resources and protect both Ireland and, of course, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Minister talked about Government investment to deter adversaries in the north Atlantic, the Atlantic Bastion programme, extra money for P-8 aircraft and the additional service vessels on order, but unless I missed it, he did not say anything about plans for the AUKUS submarines that are in development with the United States. Will he comment on the future of the AUKUS programme?

[Al Carns]

The AUKUS programme is not in question; it continues at full strength. It is a fantastic trilateral partnership between us, the Australians and the Americans.

Middle East

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 23rd March 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I do indeed. My hon. Friend speaks with the authority of his service experience and his service on the Defence Committee. He reminds the House, as I did at the end of my statement, that with all eyes on the middle east, we cannot lift our focus and deflect our priority from stepping up support for Ukraine, and, as the strategic Defence review encourages us to do, learning the lessons from Ukraine. He is right to remind the Conservative party that during its 14 years in office it cut the number of frigates and destroyers by a quarter, and the number of minehunters by more than a half, and in its first five years the defence budget was cut by fully £12 billion.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Secretary of State talked a lot in his statement about British hardware, but coercing an adversary also requires us to understand their war aims and their beliefs. In Iraq, we learned late about the need to develop cultural awareness. Martyrdom is central to Shi’a Islam and viewed as redemptive suffering. Alongside all the kit that the Secretary of State talked about, will the Government also invest in cultural capability?

[John Healey]

I am a somewhat simple man, and I am not clear what cultural capability really means. If the hon. Gentleman would like to write to me with his proposition, I would be happy to have a look at it.

Middle East: Defence

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. Members will have noticed that there are still a lot of people on their feet. I am aiming to finish this statement at around 6.45 pm. I call Richard Foord.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Secretary of State made the distinction between permitting the use of British bases for offensive action and for defensive action. I understand the need to protect and defend British citizens in the middle east, but can the Secretary of State explain how he is seeking to maintain this distinction between offensive and defensive action, given that it would require a degree of control over US military activity that the British Government may not possess?

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman is a military man by experience. He will understand the nature of the requests that nations make of each other, the agreements that they put in place and how those work. Accessing, basing, overflights—that is exactly the request that we had when it was clear that the Iranian response to the first wave of attacks took us into a new phase. It was a request from the US that we allow US bombers to operate from Fairford and Diego Garcia for specific defensive purposes: to take out the Iranian missile positions. That is what they are doing.

NATO and the High Arctic

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

As ever, Dr Huq, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this geostrategically important debate and drawing this issue to the attention of the House.

At a moment when the world’s attention is understandably distracted and drawn to other parts of the world—whether to the brutal war in eastern Europe or the escalating tensions in the middle east—it would be all too easy to park an issue such as this and see it, perhaps, as something for the future rather than as something for immediate attention. I contend, however, that that would be an enormous strategic error; history, after all, has a terrible habit of punishing those who overlook the vital importance of geography.

The opening up of the Arctic is undoubtedly one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century. As we know, climate change is transforming the region at extraordinary speed. Retreating sea ice is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to energy resources and critical minerals, drawing renewed strategic interest from major powers.

At the same time, the co-operative governance structures that once defined the Arctic are under strain. For much of the post-cold war period, the region was described as “High North, low tension”. That description no longer holds. The era of Arctic exceptionalism seems to be over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fractured the Arctic Council and accelerated the wider geopolitical tensions that now shape the region. Strategic competition is returning to the High North—not as a distant possibility, but as a clear and present reality.

Although the United Kingdom is not an Arctic coastal state, we are undeniably a near-Arctic nation. We are geographically proximate, strategically exposed and directly affected by developments in the High North. Instability in the Arctic affects our maritime approaches, north Atlantic shipping lanes, subsea cables, offshore energy infrastructure, and ultimately the deterrent posture of the Royal Navy. For the United Kingdom, the Arctic is not a remote frontier; it is part of our immediate strategic environment.

A few weeks ago, I had the enormous privilege of visiting Greenland and Denmark, alongside my Liberal Democrat colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller). I can report that in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, life often appears outwardly calm. The harbour is busy and the cafés are full. The rhythms of daily life continue, despite the long Arctic winter and the limited daylight available in February, when I was there. However, anyone spending any time talking to Greenlanders will hear something quite different: a persistent and gnawing anxiety about what might be coming down the tracks from not Moscow or Beijing—nobody realistically thinks that either Russia or China pose an immediate threat to Greenland—but, extraordinarily, from Washington.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about this subject; I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate.

Yesterday, President Trump suggested that our current Prime Minister is no Churchill. Should we not add that the current President of the United States is no Franklin D. Roosevelt? FDR was a big supporter of the development of the United Nations and knew about the importance of sovereignty. Does my hon. Friend share my view—I think he will—that who governs their countries is a matter for the Danes and Greenlanders alone?

[Dr Pinkerton]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention; the President of the United States is perhaps more Teddy Roosevelt than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He seems to be living every day under the impression that his mission should be to expand US territory and to plant the US flag, no matter how loyal and allied the country in question has been in the past.

I clearly recall the deeply offensive remarks that the President of the United States made about both Britain and Denmark’s past military contributions to US international adventurism. I remember watching a film called “Armadillo” about the extraordinary work that Danish troops did on the frontline in Afghanistan. I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments wholeheartedly.

For Greenlanders, this is not a recent experience; they have been living with the threats of Donald Trump for the best part of 12 months. Over the past year, he has repeatedly suggested that the United States should “acquire” Greenland, presenting the idea as a matter of American national security. Sitting here in Westminster, it may be tempting to dismiss such remarks as rhetorical theatre, but in Nuuk they are experienced profoundly differently. Greenland is a self-governing Arctic society of 56,000 people. When the world’s most powerful country repeatedly discusses one’s homeland as though it were a strategic asset to be acquired, the effect is not abstract.

During my visit, we heard accounts of families stockpiling supplies. Some described moving savings abroad in case of financial disruption to their homeland and their lives. Others spoke of delaying vital, essential medical treatment in Denmark—treatment that many Greenlanders rely on—because they feared that further escalation would mean that they would not be able to return to their homeland afterwards.

Greenlandic commentators have described the psychological effect of the campaign from the United States as a form of “mental terror”. It is a striking phrase, but it captures an important truth: security in the Arctic is not solely about missiles, submarines and military installations; it is also about trust, stability and the ability of societies to live without fear.

There is also a profound strategic irony here. The United States already enjoys extensive rights in Greenland under the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, including the operation of the Pituffik space base—formerly, the Thule air base—and any other base that it may wish to re-establish in the present moment. Greenland sits inside NATO’s security architecture through Denmark and benefits from the protections of article 5. The idea that Greenland must somehow be owned to be defended simply does not withstand any scrutiny. What it challenges, however, is something far more fundamental: the principle that people are not property and that sovereignty cannot be negotiated away for strategic convenience.

Across Greenlandic politics, the response has therefore been consistent and unequivocal: Greenland is not for sale. For liberal democracies, that principle should not be negotiable. If western democracies cannot defend the idea that territories cannot be simply acquired by powerful states, then the rules-based order that we claim to uphold begins to look increasingly selective and fragile. Nowhere are those principles more important than in the wider strategic geography of the North Atlantic.

At the heart of that geography lies the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: the naval corridor between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. During the cold war, NATO prioritised that corridor to detect and constrain the submarines of the Soviet northern fleet departing the Kola peninsula into the Atlantic. Today, it has again become central to NATO’s strategy. Russia’s northern fleet must transit through or around the GIUK gap to reach the north Atlantic.

Monitoring the corridor remains essential to tracking submarine activity and protecting the integrity of the north Atlantic. The corridor also safeguards the sealines of communication between North America and Europe. In any NATO contingency, the transatlantic reinforcement route would pass directly through those waters. If the GIUK gap were compromised, the United Kingdom’s western maritime flank would be exposed. Control and surveillance of the space are therefore fundamental to preventing adversaries from projecting power into the north Atlantic or threatening western Europe and North America.

Within the strategic geography, Greenland’s importance cannot be overstated. Its location makes it pivotal for missile early-warning systems, Arctic sea routes, access to the north Atlantic, and space-based infrastructure. Destabilising Greenland or undermining Danish sovereignty would fracture NATO cohesion, complicate security in the GIUK gap and weaken Arctic governance structures at precisely the moment when unity is most needed.

The Liberal Democrats are therefore clear: sovereignty and international law are not negotiable principles. I am deeply concerned that the Prime Minister has yet to state unequivocally that British soil, British bases and British facilities would never be used to propel American troops on to Greenlandic territory by force. The Government must put that matter beyond doubt.

Any suggestion that one NATO ally could coerce another would erode alliance cohesion, weaken deterrence and play directly into the hands of President Putin. Fragmentation in the Arctic theatre would directly benefit Russia’s northern fleet posture and its wider Arctic military strategy. Again, this is not about abstract diplomacy; it is about the credibility of collective defence. The UK must therefore deepen its commitment to Arctic security and north Atlantic resilience. That means strengthening anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, investing further in north Atlantic patrol and surveillance capabilities, and reinforcing defence co-operation with our Nordic and Baltic partners.

Crucially, the Government should invest further in the Joint Expeditionary Force, and convene a summit of JEF leaders here in the United Kingdom to address the rapidly evolving security environment in the High North. The reality is simple: the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern; it is at the frontline of strategic competition, alliance solidarity and international law.

I leave the Minister with three questions. First, what concrete steps have the Government taken to ensure that the UK is prepared for the reality that I have just outlined? How is the UK strengthening defence co-operation with our Arctic allies, including considering enhanced diplomatic presence in Greenland and perhaps the establishment of a permanent consulate in Nuuk?

Finally, the strategic defence review mentions the High North as a space of geopolitical and geostrategic interest, but does not offer a defence strategy per se. Do the Government intend to bring one forward? How does the Government’s future procurement reflect that strategic concern?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Louise Sandher-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for initiating this debate on the high Arctic and its increasing importance to our security—an incredibly important topic.

As my hon. and gallant Friend knows well from his time as a Royal Marine, the UK has a long and storied history in the High North, and for some 50 years the Royal Marines have practised Arctic warfare alongside our Norwegian allies. Indeed, he may have taken part in the rite of passage of plunging into the ice, as I believe the First Sea Lord did again when he visited troops there only last week.

As the threat from Russia has cast an increasingly long shadow over Europe, our High North capabilities have grown only more important, and today High North deployments of Royal Marines are up 40%, with year-round cold-weather operations. The reality is that we have a frontline with Russia in the North Atlantic, and the Russian threat is higher than it has been for decades. We have seen from the activities of the spy ship Yantar that Russia is an increasing threat to our critical underwater infrastructure. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old cold war bases. Last year, Russia and China conducted their first joint air patrol into the Arctic circle. China has declared itself a near-Arctic state and expanded its icebreaker and research vessel presence.

The changing military picture is fuelled by the changing climate and rising temperatures, and a number of Members rightly raised how pivotal it is to understand climate change and recognise the huge threat it poses to our security. It is vital to consider it in that way. The Arctic is warming up four times faster than the global average, and the strategic defence review projects the region to be ice-free each summer by 2040, opening new routes, trade dynamics and flash points. Our responses to those challenges were set out in the SDR: we need increased investment, new technologies and stronger alliances. We are prepared to meet those challenges.

Spearheading our capabilities is our littoral response group north, which is our specialised Royal Navy task group that deploys across the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the High North, with dedicated personnel, ships and helicopters to project power and respond to crises. We have also launched Atlantic Bastion, which is our groundbreaking programme to protect the UK from Russian undersea threats using an AI-powered network of sensors.

We are working ever more closely with our nine partner nations that make up the joint expeditionary force. We established Operation Nordic Warden with JEF allies, working together to track threats to undersea infrastructure from Russia’s shadow fleet—a responsibility now assumed by NATO. Last autumn, we conducted Exercise Tarassis, which was JEF’s largest ever military exercise, involving more than 1,700 British personnel, alongside air, land and naval forces from Scandinavian and Baltic nations.

On a visit to Norway last month, the Secretary of State went further still, announcing that Arctic and High North security will be strengthened against rising Russian threats as Britain steps up its presence in the region. He also announced a major joint expeditionary force, Exercise Lion Protector, which will see air, land and naval forces from JEF nations deployed across Iceland, the Danish straits and Norway, and trained to protect critical national infrastructure against attacks and sabotage, and enhance their joint command and control capabilities. The Secretary of State confirmed that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years, from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.

Finland and Sweden’s accession has transformed NATO’s northern posture, meaning that seven of the eight Arctic states are now NATO allies. The whole alliance is consequently more focused on the threats and challenges to our north.

As can be expected from a Government who have put NATO first, NATO is at the heart of our response to growing threats and tensions in the region. The UK is playing a full part in NATO’s Arctic sentry mission, which is enhancing NATO’s posture in the Arctic and High North, and we currently have 1,500 commandos deployed across Norway, Finland and Sweden as part of Exercise Cold Response. Planning is at an advanced stage for Operation Firecrest, and the upcoming deployment will see our carrier strike group across the Atlantic and High North. Of course, we continually review threat levels and will change our policies accordingly. The thousands of personnel from the three services are spearheaded by HMS Prince of Wales, and parts of the deployment are under NATO command.

Our military co-operation in the Arctic is underpinned by key bilateral partnerships that have all been strengthened under this Government. Russia’s growing activity across the Arctic, High North and north Atlantic has changed the security picture for the region. The UK, with its 50-plus years of history operating in the Arctic, and through our deep partnerships with allies, including Norway, Sweden and Finland, will be at the centre of NATO’s northern response from day one.

In December, the Defence Secretary signed the historic Lunna House agreement with Norway, which will see the UK and Norway jointly operate a fleet of submarine-hunting Type 26 warships, expand joint Arctic training and pre-position British military equipment in Norway to be better prepared for future crises. We have stood resolutely with Denmark over Greenland, the future of which is for Greenlanders and Danes alone. I welcome the uplift in Danish Arctic defence spending, worth more than £10 billion.

We have also worked closely with the Finnish military, including through NATO’s Exercise Dynamic Front, with the British Army conducting its first live firing of our Archer mobile howitzer on Finnish soil—the Army is getting in on the High North joy. We currently have three P-8 Poseidon aircraft carrying out RAF NATO air policing from Keflavik in Iceland—the largest-ever P-8 overseas deployment.

Let me turn to a couple of questions that Members asked. We are working flat out to deliver the DIP. I am sure I do not need to stress to every Member here that it is important to get this hugely important piece of work right before we commit to it. We have ordered five Type 31 frigates, and HMS Venturer should be the first of those to deliver by the end of the decade.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about Ireland. the Prime Minister is due to meet with the Taoiseach at the bilateral in just a few days’ time, and I know that the Secretary of State will call his counterpart and have discussions around some of the points the hon. Gentleman raised.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her contribution. She has been to Norway; I have never made it there—I have only been as far as Denmark—but I am sure there is time to rectify that. She is a doughty campaigner for families, and as we say in the military, although personnel join the military, their families serve too. It is within my purview to do everything I can to support families through the very difficult challenges they face when their loved ones deploy. My hon. Friend rightly noted the importance of not only the larger pieces of shiny equipment that we must procure, but simple items such as gloves. Having worn military-issue gloves, I concur. We must make sure that we have a good standard of personal protective kit and equipment.

Real tribute has been paid to the mighty Royal Marines, who have been excellent guardians of our Arctic warfare capability. It is a very difficult operating environment, and I pay tribute to those who operate there on our behalf to keep us safe. The Royal Marines are a fantastic career choice for those considering starting their careers or who might be interested in joining the reserves. Other armed services are available, including the British Army, should anyone be interested.

Politically and environmentally, the Arctic is in flux. While the eyes of the world are currently focused on the middle east, we are clear that there can be no national or global security without security across the Arctic and northern Europe.

[Richard Foord]

In its negotiations with the United States, Denmark pledged to raise defence spending from 2.4% of GDP last year to 3% of GDP this year and next. Does the Minister think that the example Denmark is setting is a good one for the United Kingdom?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am very proud of the steps that the Government have taken to raise defence spending, which are very welcome off the back of many years of underspend. In fact, this is my very next line: defence spending will rise to 2.6% in 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 5% by 2035. Just as important as raising defence and security spending is making sure that we continue to pursue a NATO-first defence policy. We are a Government who are delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.

Defence Industry: Environmental, Social and Governance Requirements

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I genuinely thank the hon. Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin) for securing this debate and for his kind words. We can work cross-party to change the culture across financial services with our voices from this place. May I also say what a pleasure it is to be here with my hon. Friend the Minister? I thank her for all her work on Op Courage and Op Ascend, and on veterans’ homelessness.

I want to be clear: ESG does not need to get in the way of lending to SMEs. It is important to say from the outset that many conflate ESG rules with broader ethical and commercial decisions that firms make; I will perhaps come back to that. I speak from some professional experience: I was acting head of compliance for a fintech where day in, day out, I had to make calls on whether to do business with some of these customers. ESG can, in limited circumstances, be interpreted as blocking lending to SMEs, something that is inconsistent and increasingly at odds with our national security, industrial strategy and economic resilience.

I will touch on what I believe is an artificial distinction between so-called dual-use military technology and single-use military equipment. I come across so many main high street lenders that find this difficult. British high street lenders have every right to put up their hands and say, “We do not want to lend to any company that is involved in chemical weapons or cluster munitions.” They have every right to look at some of the United Nations weapons conventions and say, “We do not want anything to do with them.” However, many lenders are not lending to dual-use military equipment makers.

I will give some examples. I met a fantastic company, Needles and Pins Aerospace, at Defence and Security Equipment International. The company has found banking, insurance and finance very difficult. It produces the insulation that goes on military helicopters—helicopters, by the way, engaged in humanitarian aid missions around the world. The insulation that goes in those helicopters is not an ordnance or a bomb; it is there to protect our British armed forces. It is worth bearing in mind that these lenders and their compliance departments—and I was from that parish—should really get to know the products and services that their customers want to seek finance for.

Another example from my constituency is Edmund Optics, which produces prisms and lenses. There are medical, aerospace, commercial satellite and civilian aircraft applications for those. However, some of those products and services have a dual use—there is also a military use to them. Again, lenders get caught up in a very binary distinction; they should be spending more time understanding the products and services that companies provide.

I want to give another shout-out, this time to 4GD, a data-driven defence training SME with which I have worked extensively, along with ADS, the industry trade body. I saw 4GD’s founder Rob yesterday, and he has told me countless stories about being debanked. His business is about training British armed forces to do what they do better, so that they are more equipped against our adversaries, safer and more resilient. There is nothing more ethical than that. The fact that high street lenders have closed their doors to that commercial opportunity shows the inherent laziness among some people in compliance departments, who refuse to understand the products and services for which their prospective customers are seeking finance.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Windsor for referencing the work I have done alongside my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Alex Baker). Last year, along with 100 Labour parliamentarians, we wrote to fund and bank managers about ESG. I was really pleased that two things came off the back of that. First, some funds marketed as sustainable said they were going to invest in defence companies, because they found nothing in the rules that inherently disbars sustainable funds from investing in defence—there is nothing in the regulator’s rulebook that does that. That is just a fact, and that fact was ultimately confirmed by my old employer, the Financial Conduct Authority. I am immensely grateful to its chief exec, Nikhil, for his speech last year on defence, and for the FCA’s statement. The FCA has been rock solid and clear that there is no tension between ESG regulatory rules and defence financing—none whatsoever. I say to the financial services practitioners who are listening: please take heed of that.

As I mentioned, there have been some good shifts, but ESG and broader ethical considerations are only part of the structural barriers facing defence firms. Recent work by colleagues across the House, including a report I co-authored, “Rewiring British Defence Financing”, makes the point clearly. That work shows that ESG considerations sit alongside and are outweighed by deeper, more persistent problems across access to capital, commercial lending risk, cash-flow pressures, contracting structures and compliance complexity. Defence SMEs are not failing to secure finance because they are somehow irresponsible actors, but because they operate in an ecosystem defined by long payment cycles, sometimes single dominant customers like the primes, uncertain procurement pipelines and fragmented support across Government.

On that last point, let me turn to the work of my hon. Friend the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, who cannot be here today. He has done some phenomenal work setting up the office for small business growth in the Ministry of Defence, which is designed to break down some of the contractual complexities and the fear factor that many defence SMEs face when trying to contract with the MOD. I am happy to confirm to the House that one company in my York Outer constituency, Flyby Technology, will be part of the new OSBG’s shaping cohort, to get into the nitty-gritty of how we can streamline the contracting processes for SMEs, in line with the Government’s mission to increase the direct spend in defence SMEs across the country.

I want to touch on the role of primes when it comes to SMEs in particular. Sometimes the cash-flow challenges created by defence primes are not acceptable. The primes are great employers in this country. I have been to Barrow-in-Furness and seen at first hand how BAE Systems is transforming the fortunes of that town. The primes have a great understanding of their tier 2, 3 and 4 suppliers, but they need to make sure that they pay SMEs on time and quickly.

This is not a mundane point. Were Members to sit down with the chief financial officers of these SMEs and look at their cash flows, it would be clear: a 90-day payment term with a prime, or even a 120-day payment term, increases working capital requirements. The company then has to go out to lenders to try to get financing to cover the shortfall, because the primes are really slow. In turn, that means that when defence SMEs try to get loans for inventory or asset financing, they are often offered worse terms. Primes have a duty to start paying the wonderful SMEs of Britain quickly, because improving their payment terms will create a cyclical effect. Some great primes are better at it. Overall, the result is a system in which highly capable, export-ready firms struggle with the basics—securing bank accounts, insurance and working capital—not at the margins but as a matter of course.

I am worried that some insurers are becoming increasingly hesitant about insuring defence companies because of the risk of political violence. I have worked with Aviva and others on this issue. It is interesting to note that some of the protesters who target the insurers may well themselves have insurance policies with them, or their defined-contribution workplace pensions may well be held in one of these insurer’s accounts. There is a degree of hypocrisy there. Insurers should have every confidence from Members in this place that they are doing right by the defence sector in supporting its growth and development.

Why do all these complexities matter? As the hon. Member for Windsor touched on, they create serious consequences, because if challenges mount up, they could undermine our sovereign defence capability. If British firms cannot raise capital here, what will they do? They may choose to scale abroad or sell to overseas buyers rather than to the British base, or fail altogether. We could become more dependent on foreign supply chains for critical technologies. The Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Chris McDonald), has done some really strong work on critical minerals and our sovereign capability in that respect. We have to ensure that there is a sovereign financial base to support our sovereign defence industry.

The challenges we have talked about in procurement, ESG and access to finance hit SMEs the hardest. They do not have big teams of financial experts, and the larger primes can navigate the challenges more easily as they have access to wider capital pools that the smaller firms do not. There is a risk of strategic contradiction, because on the one hand we are asking defence firms to scale, innovate and deliver at pace, but on the other hand we seem to be tolerating a financial system that treats some firms as a reputational liability. That is not sustainable, to borrow a term. The issue is not necessarily ESG principles themselves, but the absence of clarity in how lenders apply their risk tolerance to defence. ESG concerns are only one part of the financing challenge facing defence firms, alongside credit risk, contracting structures and cash flow, but they are the tip of the iceberg. Because these issues are often poorly defined, they create uncertainty that deters lending.

What is missing is a shared understanding across Government, regulators and financial institutions that defence, when conducted lawfully, in line with UN weapons conventions and in support of democratic security, is not a problem but a public good to be enabled. The hon. Member for Windsor touched on the theme of their being nothing more ethical than lending to defence companies that are equipping our Ukrainian friends. Other countries around the world understand that. The US has been much more explicit in aligning its financial system with its national security priorities, particularly in terms of single-use and lethal military equipment.

What needs to change? There is an overwhelming case for a multilateral defence bank—such as the proposed defence, security and resilience bank—that would meet some of the financing challenges. We cannot just look at incremental fixes. I do not want to take up too much time on that, but there is a role for multilateral development finance.

As the report I wrote sets out, private capital alone is not filling the gap, particularly for SMEs in the dual-use space, and where finance does flow, it can be short term. I do not want to get into the details, but we need to make sure that the institutions of the state, be that the NSSIF—the national security strategic investment fund, an arm’s length body that is part of the British Business Bank—or the National Wealth Fund or UK Defence Innovation, sing together and make sure that their finance comes into innovative technologies.

We need to learn the lessons from the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency in the US. I heard that a significant proportion of US GDP growth comes from the DARPA investments of the 1980s—of course, that agency invented the internet, the smartphone and so many other underlying technologies. Let us learn from the leadership role of DARPA.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman plainly knows a great deal about this subject and is educating a few of us on it. He talks about the US example; could he also reflect on the European Union regulatory regime around ESG, given that the EU is about to start investing considerably more in defence?

[Mr Charters]

When it comes to our European friends, we have to have cross-border financing. I have met some of the main German commercial lenders that want to come in; likewise, British financial services are investing in success stories such as Rheinmetall and some of the great European defence brands. We have to come together, not just with our European friends, but with Canada and other allied nations around the world, to approach defence financing on a multilateral basis. That is the real lesson.

Let me touch on what our adversaries are doing. They know that they need to innovate quickly when it comes to building up their own financing capabilities. Russia is moving towards more off-balance-sheet lending to a lot of its defence sector. Russian advance manufacturing companies are increasingly gaining access to the Chinese bond market. In general, the Russian war economy is mobilising at pace. Clearly, when it comes to some of our adversaries’ financing mechanisms, they are daring to do things differently—according, of course, to the rule books and ethics of their particular countries. We need to be agile enough to reform our own financing capabilities at pace, too. I am very concerned that we risk forcing British defence SMEs to seek foreign ownership, to offshore their operations or to seek finance overseas simply to survive. That is strategic self-harm when it comes to our sovereign defence capabilities.

You will be pleased to hear, Ms McVey, that I am about to close. In an era of renewed geopolitical competition, the question is not whether the state should play a role in defence finance, but whether we are prepared to act now in order to do so with the seriousness that our security environment demands. I believe that a strong defence financing sector acts as a deterrent to some of our adversaries and means that, where we need to scale industrial capability much quicker, we are ready to do so, if we have a defence financing revolution. This is not a choice between values and security; it is about recognising that, in the world we live in, the two are inseparable.

I hope the Minister will take this opportunity to set out how the Government can encourage lenders to turn on the taps for some of the innovative defence SMEs, no matter whether they are producing prisms, training our special forces or insulating our helicopters. There is nothing more ethical, in our modern world, than supporting the defence SMEs that are maintaining our collective security.