Ukraine and Russia

Richard Foord Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2026 Commons Chamber

[Wes Streeting]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that question, and I am proud of the role that the UK is showing through the UDCG. With our friends and allies, we will continue to mobilise international support in that way to raise the resources and capability that Ukraine needs to win its freedom.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I agree with the Secretary of State that differences on defence should not be manufactured for party political advantage, and it is sad to see that happen elsewhere in Europe. The EU still gets 12% of its gas imports from Russia. While this is down from 45%—the level before the full-scale invasion—the proceeds are still fuelling the Russian war machine. What is the Secretary of State doing to maintain unity across Europe, as well as across the House? Will he encourage our friends in the European Union to cease all Russian gas imports?

[Wes Streeting]

I certainly welcome the support we have seen from member states of the European Union through the UDCG. I also pay tribute to the European Union’s work to mobilise support and financing for Ukraine, including some considerable announcements made only recently. The hon. Gentleman is right to raise the issue of Russian imports. These are the sorts of conversations that we have with our friends and allies.

Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) for making this debate happen. I have been to see his bookshelves and, trust me, the books on strategy and military affairs in his library are well thumbed. He knows what he is talking about, and he has done well to corral us all into talking about it today.

Let me begin by talking about defence spending. It is fair to say that others have covered it, but I will repeat the fact that we are not spending sufficiently on defence. I want to challenge the hon. Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman). He did a bold thing in challenging the prevailing consensus, the mood of the House, and views that are now quite mainstream in the House, but while it is compelling to think about all the welfare need that exists in this country—and I acknowledge that there is a great deal—he has a crude oil refinery in his constituency.

[Brian Leishman]

No, I do not.

[Richard Foord]

Forgive me, but I understood that Grangemouth was a crude oil refinery.

We need only look to Eurasia—we need only look at what has been happening in Ukraine and Russia—to see that war comes to those who do not really want it to come to them at all. Yes, that is a failure of diplomacy, but it is also a failure of preparedness. Today, I will focus my remarks on the business of readiness.

We are currently spending 2.5% of GDP on defence, and the target is 3.5% by 2035. We really ought to be getting midway between those two by 2030, yet we are projected to be at only 2.68% by then. Of course, the Prime Minister is currently at the NATO summit in Ankara. Nye Bevan said to the Labour conference in 1957 that his party members should not send him

“naked into the conference chamber”,

and I fear that the Prime Minister has been sent naked into the Ankara conference chamber. The defence investment plan is indeed a skinny dip.

The hon. Member for Stevenage (Kevin Bonavia) talked about the famous “King and country” debate at the Oxford Union in 1933. I completely agree with him that people who thought that they would not fight for King and country in 1933 found that, by 1939, they had no choice but to do so because of the circumstances. He knows a great deal about that from his time on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

[Mr Francois]

The university’s records do not show how every individual student voted, but we know that many of the students who were present at that famous debate in 1933 subsequently signed up in 1939 and 1940.

[Richard Foord]

The shadow Minister is exactly right. Of course, those people’s parents fought in the first world war. They were a generation who really did not want to meet war, but war came to them none the less.

Clausewitz, the philosopher of war, talked about government, military and people being the remarkable trinity concerned with war. A lot of today’s debate has centred on the military, on defence, on procurement, and perhaps a little on government as it pertains to policy. We have talked a bit less about people, although the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) did talk about our servicepeople. I want to add to that by talking about people in the country more broadly—the people we represent. We need to think about defence as a national endeavour that builds on everyone’s understanding of the threat and the need to defend the nation. When we discuss warfighting readiness, we are talking about not just platforms, ships, tanks and aircraft, but information.

The Foreign Affairs Committee published a report on disinformation. We talked about the use of military and non-military—overt and covert—methods to blur the lines between war and peace, to sow doubt in the minds of target populations, and to destabilise and undermine societies. Last year’s strategic defence review covers sub-threshold attacks, and it talks about how such attacks are difficult to attribute to a perpetrator with certainty due to the methods used and the frequent reliance on proxy actors. The focus has to be on countering Russia’s hostile activities in the information space, as well as thinking about preparing to fight a war and have war readiness, because that is the reality of modern conflict.

Conflict does not necessarily begin when a missile is fired or a border is crossed. It can begin when public trust is systemically eroded, when elections are manipulated, when information is weaponised or when hostile actors succeed in weakening a society’s confidence in its own institutions. The objective is often not mere propaganda or the spreading of false information, but to persuade societies that a particular lie is true. The aim is to persuade people that objective truth no longer exists. I want us to think about war readiness in the round, including in the information space.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

Much of the commentary on the defence investment plan is on the threat to the UK mainland, our interests and our assets. First, does the Secretary of State think that it is more useful to think about the Russian threat to NATO in general terms? Secondly, now we have the DIP, is the UK still 31st out of 32 NATO members, when it comes to our commitment to strengthen and modernise the armed forces?

[Dan Jarvis]

As I hope the hon. and gallant Member will acknowledge, we are the third-largest contributor in cash terms to NATO. This weekend, I visited our personnel deployed on NATO operations in the High North, and together with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, I am going to the NATO summit in Ankara. Our allies look to us for leadership. We have provided that in the past, and I guarantee that we will provide it in the future.

Defence Spending and Readiness

Richard Foord Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

So far, the debate has been about how much funding should be found for defence. We should also think about the resignation speech by the former Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), who said last week that the DIP, which he has seen, does not strike the right balance between high-end sophistication and low-end mass. He said that

“the defence investment plan does not strike that balance”.—[Official Report, 16 June 2026; Vol. 787, c. 732.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to think about the balance between sophistication and mass?

[Dr Pinkerton]

My hon. Friend speaks from a position of authority from his personal experience and his role in Committees in this House. I defer, as always, to his superior insights on the matter, and would not differ on anything he has suggested.

Britain’s European allies share our values and commitment to collective defence. We cannot be a spectator while Europe rebuilds its defences; instead, we should shape and lead that effort.

On the Conservatives’ watch, our Army fell to its smallest size since the Napoleonic wars, while the Navy’s surface fleet fell to its smallest size since the English civil war. We saw crises of recruitment, retention and morale and a failure to look after our service personnel and veterans properly, with shoddy housing and one of the worst privatisation deals in British political history.

Defence Readiness

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 20th May 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I will now turn to some of the contributions to the debate. As I said, 37 Back Benchers have spoken, and I am going to turn to some of their contributions now. I will start with the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison), if I may. He urged us to reprovision our nuclear programme, and I would just say to him that, in this Parliament alone, we are putting £15 billion into the warhead programme and £6 billion into upgrading Barrow to produce the submarines that we need.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North (Catherine McKinnell) rightly talked about the impact that defence skills have across the economy. She also talked about the skills gaps that need to be filled, which is a central part of the defence technical excellence colleges, the defence growth deals and the Defence Universities Alliance that we are putting in place.

My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne) spoke passionately about the work he is doing on the Right to Food UK Commission. The testimony that he gave us from workers and parents about the pressure they are under and the problems that creates was really moving. We look forward to the commission’s report. My hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd North (Gill German) also ranged more widely than defence, and mentioned the pressure on families and the action that the Government are now taking on rising costs. She talked about the importance of the legislation in the King’s Speech on railways and on housing for the future.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton West (Warinder Juss) talked about the importance of resilience that runs through every aspect of our defence programme. My hon. Friends the Members for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) and for Hemel Hempstead (David Taylor) both spoke movingly, and for the House, on the scourge of antisemitism and the need to stamp it out wherever it is, and about the threat of Iran and the edge of threat that the IRGC poses to this country, as well as to Iran’s own people.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) asked for comments on Cabrit and Estonia. I shall be out there in Estonia with our forward land force tomorrow, so if he will forgive me, I will probably be able to give him a more up to date and informed comment if he would like to wait until I come back, rather than commenting from the Dispatch Box today.

My hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Anna Gelderd) talked about the important fact that our armed forces depend on the strength of the innovators and the strength of the industry that stands behind them. This is a lesson that we can draw from Ukraine: when a country is under threat or forced to fight, it is its industry, its innovators and its wider society that must stand behind it to give it strength. She rightly paid tribute to and reminded us about the civilian workforce that supports our uniformed personnel.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

On the point about Ukraine, we learned today about the delay to a ban on jet fuel and diesel made from Russian crude oil and refined in places like India and Turkey. Does the Secretary of State accept that the British people do not want to contribute one more ruble to the Kremlin for use in its war machine against the Ukrainian people?

[John Healey]

I rather regret giving way to the hon. Member because he has not been in the debate, and clearly was not in for the urgent question either, when it was made very clear that there are new sanctions to clamp down on Russian oil revenues and that the licensing regime is a way of bringing those new sanctions in. I urge him to consult the record.

Strategic Defence Review: Funding

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 15th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I do not think Britain gets stronger by pushing kids into poverty. That is the fundamental difference, as I see it, between the welfare policies of our two parties. I am absolutely clear that we should address the high levels of child poverty that we inherited from the previous Government—that is exactly the right thing to do.

The hon. Gentleman will know, because I have said it a number of times, that we are working flat out to deliver the defence investment plan. It will be published when it is ready. I think he would, in hindsight, much prefer a plan that is ready to be published over one that is not. That is why we are working to deliver our defence investment plan, which will set out spending for the next 10 years, up to 2036 or so.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I entered this House months after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and I was struck at the time that the debates on Ukraine were solemn, dutiful and not party political. The contrast with the debate over defence spending is stark. The Leader of the Opposition has decided to use it as a foil for her party, while the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) was on the radio last night saying that the Labour party will not be helped electorally by an increase in defence spending. With Trump making threats about US commitment to NATO, does the Minister share my view that we need to link armed forces capabilities to the external threat, rather than indulge in this party political navel gazing?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question and for his service to the nation. He is absolutely right to say that NATO is the cornerstone of our defence. It benefits not just the United Kingdom but every NATO member state, including the United States, and we are stronger when we stand together. That is why we are delivering against the NATO target and delivering new NATO regional plans, and it is why a debate that looks at how we can develop the latest capabilities, and bring forward more skills into the sector and more private sector investment into our defence companies, is good for us. We do this because it is in the national interest to support our national security. I stand at the Dispatch Box not for party politics but for our national security. In darker times, I hope that is what we would all be doing.

North Atlantic Submarine Activity

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 13th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

We need to accept that Ireland in itself is exceptionally close to the mainland and we therefore have shared security interests. The Prime Minister has had constructive conversations with his Irish counterparts to ensure that, where applicable, we share those resources and protect both Ireland and, of course, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Minister talked about Government investment to deter adversaries in the north Atlantic, the Atlantic Bastion programme, extra money for P-8 aircraft and the additional service vessels on order, but unless I missed it, he did not say anything about plans for the AUKUS submarines that are in development with the United States. Will he comment on the future of the AUKUS programme?

[Al Carns]

The AUKUS programme is not in question; it continues at full strength. It is a fantastic trilateral partnership between us, the Australians and the Americans.

Middle East

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 23rd March 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I do indeed. My hon. Friend speaks with the authority of his service experience and his service on the Defence Committee. He reminds the House, as I did at the end of my statement, that with all eyes on the middle east, we cannot lift our focus and deflect our priority from stepping up support for Ukraine, and, as the strategic Defence review encourages us to do, learning the lessons from Ukraine. He is right to remind the Conservative party that during its 14 years in office it cut the number of frigates and destroyers by a quarter, and the number of minehunters by more than a half, and in its first five years the defence budget was cut by fully £12 billion.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Secretary of State talked a lot in his statement about British hardware, but coercing an adversary also requires us to understand their war aims and their beliefs. In Iraq, we learned late about the need to develop cultural awareness. Martyrdom is central to Shi’a Islam and viewed as redemptive suffering. Alongside all the kit that the Secretary of State talked about, will the Government also invest in cultural capability?

[John Healey]

I am a somewhat simple man, and I am not clear what cultural capability really means. If the hon. Gentleman would like to write to me with his proposition, I would be happy to have a look at it.

Middle East: Defence

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. Members will have noticed that there are still a lot of people on their feet. I am aiming to finish this statement at around 6.45 pm. I call Richard Foord.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Secretary of State made the distinction between permitting the use of British bases for offensive action and for defensive action. I understand the need to protect and defend British citizens in the middle east, but can the Secretary of State explain how he is seeking to maintain this distinction between offensive and defensive action, given that it would require a degree of control over US military activity that the British Government may not possess?

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman is a military man by experience. He will understand the nature of the requests that nations make of each other, the agreements that they put in place and how those work. Accessing, basing, overflights—that is exactly the request that we had when it was clear that the Iranian response to the first wave of attacks took us into a new phase. It was a request from the US that we allow US bombers to operate from Fairford and Diego Garcia for specific defensive purposes: to take out the Iranian missile positions. That is what they are doing.

NATO and the High Arctic

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

As ever, Dr Huq, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this geostrategically important debate and drawing this issue to the attention of the House.

At a moment when the world’s attention is understandably distracted and drawn to other parts of the world—whether to the brutal war in eastern Europe or the escalating tensions in the middle east—it would be all too easy to park an issue such as this and see it, perhaps, as something for the future rather than as something for immediate attention. I contend, however, that that would be an enormous strategic error; history, after all, has a terrible habit of punishing those who overlook the vital importance of geography.

The opening up of the Arctic is undoubtedly one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century. As we know, climate change is transforming the region at extraordinary speed. Retreating sea ice is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to energy resources and critical minerals, drawing renewed strategic interest from major powers.

At the same time, the co-operative governance structures that once defined the Arctic are under strain. For much of the post-cold war period, the region was described as “High North, low tension”. That description no longer holds. The era of Arctic exceptionalism seems to be over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fractured the Arctic Council and accelerated the wider geopolitical tensions that now shape the region. Strategic competition is returning to the High North—not as a distant possibility, but as a clear and present reality.

Although the United Kingdom is not an Arctic coastal state, we are undeniably a near-Arctic nation. We are geographically proximate, strategically exposed and directly affected by developments in the High North. Instability in the Arctic affects our maritime approaches, north Atlantic shipping lanes, subsea cables, offshore energy infrastructure, and ultimately the deterrent posture of the Royal Navy. For the United Kingdom, the Arctic is not a remote frontier; it is part of our immediate strategic environment.

A few weeks ago, I had the enormous privilege of visiting Greenland and Denmark, alongside my Liberal Democrat colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller). I can report that in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, life often appears outwardly calm. The harbour is busy and the cafés are full. The rhythms of daily life continue, despite the long Arctic winter and the limited daylight available in February, when I was there. However, anyone spending any time talking to Greenlanders will hear something quite different: a persistent and gnawing anxiety about what might be coming down the tracks from not Moscow or Beijing—nobody realistically thinks that either Russia or China pose an immediate threat to Greenland—but, extraordinarily, from Washington.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about this subject; I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate.

Yesterday, President Trump suggested that our current Prime Minister is no Churchill. Should we not add that the current President of the United States is no Franklin D. Roosevelt? FDR was a big supporter of the development of the United Nations and knew about the importance of sovereignty. Does my hon. Friend share my view—I think he will—that who governs their countries is a matter for the Danes and Greenlanders alone?

[Dr Pinkerton]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention; the President of the United States is perhaps more Teddy Roosevelt than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He seems to be living every day under the impression that his mission should be to expand US territory and to plant the US flag, no matter how loyal and allied the country in question has been in the past.

I clearly recall the deeply offensive remarks that the President of the United States made about both Britain and Denmark’s past military contributions to US international adventurism. I remember watching a film called “Armadillo” about the extraordinary work that Danish troops did on the frontline in Afghanistan. I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments wholeheartedly.

For Greenlanders, this is not a recent experience; they have been living with the threats of Donald Trump for the best part of 12 months. Over the past year, he has repeatedly suggested that the United States should “acquire” Greenland, presenting the idea as a matter of American national security. Sitting here in Westminster, it may be tempting to dismiss such remarks as rhetorical theatre, but in Nuuk they are experienced profoundly differently. Greenland is a self-governing Arctic society of 56,000 people. When the world’s most powerful country repeatedly discusses one’s homeland as though it were a strategic asset to be acquired, the effect is not abstract.

During my visit, we heard accounts of families stockpiling supplies. Some described moving savings abroad in case of financial disruption to their homeland and their lives. Others spoke of delaying vital, essential medical treatment in Denmark—treatment that many Greenlanders rely on—because they feared that further escalation would mean that they would not be able to return to their homeland afterwards.

Greenlandic commentators have described the psychological effect of the campaign from the United States as a form of “mental terror”. It is a striking phrase, but it captures an important truth: security in the Arctic is not solely about missiles, submarines and military installations; it is also about trust, stability and the ability of societies to live without fear.

There is also a profound strategic irony here. The United States already enjoys extensive rights in Greenland under the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, including the operation of the Pituffik space base—formerly, the Thule air base—and any other base that it may wish to re-establish in the present moment. Greenland sits inside NATO’s security architecture through Denmark and benefits from the protections of article 5. The idea that Greenland must somehow be owned to be defended simply does not withstand any scrutiny. What it challenges, however, is something far more fundamental: the principle that people are not property and that sovereignty cannot be negotiated away for strategic convenience.

Across Greenlandic politics, the response has therefore been consistent and unequivocal: Greenland is not for sale. For liberal democracies, that principle should not be negotiable. If western democracies cannot defend the idea that territories cannot be simply acquired by powerful states, then the rules-based order that we claim to uphold begins to look increasingly selective and fragile. Nowhere are those principles more important than in the wider strategic geography of the North Atlantic.

At the heart of that geography lies the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: the naval corridor between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. During the cold war, NATO prioritised that corridor to detect and constrain the submarines of the Soviet northern fleet departing the Kola peninsula into the Atlantic. Today, it has again become central to NATO’s strategy. Russia’s northern fleet must transit through or around the GIUK gap to reach the north Atlantic.

Monitoring the corridor remains essential to tracking submarine activity and protecting the integrity of the north Atlantic. The corridor also safeguards the sealines of communication between North America and Europe. In any NATO contingency, the transatlantic reinforcement route would pass directly through those waters. If the GIUK gap were compromised, the United Kingdom’s western maritime flank would be exposed. Control and surveillance of the space are therefore fundamental to preventing adversaries from projecting power into the north Atlantic or threatening western Europe and North America.

Within the strategic geography, Greenland’s importance cannot be overstated. Its location makes it pivotal for missile early-warning systems, Arctic sea routes, access to the north Atlantic, and space-based infrastructure. Destabilising Greenland or undermining Danish sovereignty would fracture NATO cohesion, complicate security in the GIUK gap and weaken Arctic governance structures at precisely the moment when unity is most needed.

The Liberal Democrats are therefore clear: sovereignty and international law are not negotiable principles. I am deeply concerned that the Prime Minister has yet to state unequivocally that British soil, British bases and British facilities would never be used to propel American troops on to Greenlandic territory by force. The Government must put that matter beyond doubt.

Any suggestion that one NATO ally could coerce another would erode alliance cohesion, weaken deterrence and play directly into the hands of President Putin. Fragmentation in the Arctic theatre would directly benefit Russia’s northern fleet posture and its wider Arctic military strategy. Again, this is not about abstract diplomacy; it is about the credibility of collective defence. The UK must therefore deepen its commitment to Arctic security and north Atlantic resilience. That means strengthening anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, investing further in north Atlantic patrol and surveillance capabilities, and reinforcing defence co-operation with our Nordic and Baltic partners.

Crucially, the Government should invest further in the Joint Expeditionary Force, and convene a summit of JEF leaders here in the United Kingdom to address the rapidly evolving security environment in the High North. The reality is simple: the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern; it is at the frontline of strategic competition, alliance solidarity and international law.

I leave the Minister with three questions. First, what concrete steps have the Government taken to ensure that the UK is prepared for the reality that I have just outlined? How is the UK strengthening defence co-operation with our Arctic allies, including considering enhanced diplomatic presence in Greenland and perhaps the establishment of a permanent consulate in Nuuk?

Finally, the strategic defence review mentions the High North as a space of geopolitical and geostrategic interest, but does not offer a defence strategy per se. Do the Government intend to bring one forward? How does the Government’s future procurement reflect that strategic concern?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Louise Sandher-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for initiating this debate on the high Arctic and its increasing importance to our security—an incredibly important topic.

As my hon. and gallant Friend knows well from his time as a Royal Marine, the UK has a long and storied history in the High North, and for some 50 years the Royal Marines have practised Arctic warfare alongside our Norwegian allies. Indeed, he may have taken part in the rite of passage of plunging into the ice, as I believe the First Sea Lord did again when he visited troops there only last week.

As the threat from Russia has cast an increasingly long shadow over Europe, our High North capabilities have grown only more important, and today High North deployments of Royal Marines are up 40%, with year-round cold-weather operations. The reality is that we have a frontline with Russia in the North Atlantic, and the Russian threat is higher than it has been for decades. We have seen from the activities of the spy ship Yantar that Russia is an increasing threat to our critical underwater infrastructure. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old cold war bases. Last year, Russia and China conducted their first joint air patrol into the Arctic circle. China has declared itself a near-Arctic state and expanded its icebreaker and research vessel presence.

The changing military picture is fuelled by the changing climate and rising temperatures, and a number of Members rightly raised how pivotal it is to understand climate change and recognise the huge threat it poses to our security. It is vital to consider it in that way. The Arctic is warming up four times faster than the global average, and the strategic defence review projects the region to be ice-free each summer by 2040, opening new routes, trade dynamics and flash points. Our responses to those challenges were set out in the SDR: we need increased investment, new technologies and stronger alliances. We are prepared to meet those challenges.

Spearheading our capabilities is our littoral response group north, which is our specialised Royal Navy task group that deploys across the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the High North, with dedicated personnel, ships and helicopters to project power and respond to crises. We have also launched Atlantic Bastion, which is our groundbreaking programme to protect the UK from Russian undersea threats using an AI-powered network of sensors.

We are working ever more closely with our nine partner nations that make up the joint expeditionary force. We established Operation Nordic Warden with JEF allies, working together to track threats to undersea infrastructure from Russia’s shadow fleet—a responsibility now assumed by NATO. Last autumn, we conducted Exercise Tarassis, which was JEF’s largest ever military exercise, involving more than 1,700 British personnel, alongside air, land and naval forces from Scandinavian and Baltic nations.

On a visit to Norway last month, the Secretary of State went further still, announcing that Arctic and High North security will be strengthened against rising Russian threats as Britain steps up its presence in the region. He also announced a major joint expeditionary force, Exercise Lion Protector, which will see air, land and naval forces from JEF nations deployed across Iceland, the Danish straits and Norway, and trained to protect critical national infrastructure against attacks and sabotage, and enhance their joint command and control capabilities. The Secretary of State confirmed that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years, from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.

Finland and Sweden’s accession has transformed NATO’s northern posture, meaning that seven of the eight Arctic states are now NATO allies. The whole alliance is consequently more focused on the threats and challenges to our north.

As can be expected from a Government who have put NATO first, NATO is at the heart of our response to growing threats and tensions in the region. The UK is playing a full part in NATO’s Arctic sentry mission, which is enhancing NATO’s posture in the Arctic and High North, and we currently have 1,500 commandos deployed across Norway, Finland and Sweden as part of Exercise Cold Response. Planning is at an advanced stage for Operation Firecrest, and the upcoming deployment will see our carrier strike group across the Atlantic and High North. Of course, we continually review threat levels and will change our policies accordingly. The thousands of personnel from the three services are spearheaded by HMS Prince of Wales, and parts of the deployment are under NATO command.

Our military co-operation in the Arctic is underpinned by key bilateral partnerships that have all been strengthened under this Government. Russia’s growing activity across the Arctic, High North and north Atlantic has changed the security picture for the region. The UK, with its 50-plus years of history operating in the Arctic, and through our deep partnerships with allies, including Norway, Sweden and Finland, will be at the centre of NATO’s northern response from day one.

In December, the Defence Secretary signed the historic Lunna House agreement with Norway, which will see the UK and Norway jointly operate a fleet of submarine-hunting Type 26 warships, expand joint Arctic training and pre-position British military equipment in Norway to be better prepared for future crises. We have stood resolutely with Denmark over Greenland, the future of which is for Greenlanders and Danes alone. I welcome the uplift in Danish Arctic defence spending, worth more than £10 billion.

We have also worked closely with the Finnish military, including through NATO’s Exercise Dynamic Front, with the British Army conducting its first live firing of our Archer mobile howitzer on Finnish soil—the Army is getting in on the High North joy. We currently have three P-8 Poseidon aircraft carrying out RAF NATO air policing from Keflavik in Iceland—the largest-ever P-8 overseas deployment.

Let me turn to a couple of questions that Members asked. We are working flat out to deliver the DIP. I am sure I do not need to stress to every Member here that it is important to get this hugely important piece of work right before we commit to it. We have ordered five Type 31 frigates, and HMS Venturer should be the first of those to deliver by the end of the decade.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about Ireland. the Prime Minister is due to meet with the Taoiseach at the bilateral in just a few days’ time, and I know that the Secretary of State will call his counterpart and have discussions around some of the points the hon. Gentleman raised.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her contribution. She has been to Norway; I have never made it there—I have only been as far as Denmark—but I am sure there is time to rectify that. She is a doughty campaigner for families, and as we say in the military, although personnel join the military, their families serve too. It is within my purview to do everything I can to support families through the very difficult challenges they face when their loved ones deploy. My hon. Friend rightly noted the importance of not only the larger pieces of shiny equipment that we must procure, but simple items such as gloves. Having worn military-issue gloves, I concur. We must make sure that we have a good standard of personal protective kit and equipment.

Real tribute has been paid to the mighty Royal Marines, who have been excellent guardians of our Arctic warfare capability. It is a very difficult operating environment, and I pay tribute to those who operate there on our behalf to keep us safe. The Royal Marines are a fantastic career choice for those considering starting their careers or who might be interested in joining the reserves. Other armed services are available, including the British Army, should anyone be interested.

Politically and environmentally, the Arctic is in flux. While the eyes of the world are currently focused on the middle east, we are clear that there can be no national or global security without security across the Arctic and northern Europe.

[Richard Foord]

In its negotiations with the United States, Denmark pledged to raise defence spending from 2.4% of GDP last year to 3% of GDP this year and next. Does the Minister think that the example Denmark is setting is a good one for the United Kingdom?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am very proud of the steps that the Government have taken to raise defence spending, which are very welcome off the back of many years of underspend. In fact, this is my very next line: defence spending will rise to 2.6% in 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 5% by 2035. Just as important as raising defence and security spending is making sure that we continue to pursue a NATO-first defence policy. We are a Government who are delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.