NATO and the High Arctic

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

As ever, Dr Huq, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this geostrategically important debate and drawing this issue to the attention of the House.

At a moment when the world’s attention is understandably distracted and drawn to other parts of the world—whether to the brutal war in eastern Europe or the escalating tensions in the middle east—it would be all too easy to park an issue such as this and see it, perhaps, as something for the future rather than as something for immediate attention. I contend, however, that that would be an enormous strategic error; history, after all, has a terrible habit of punishing those who overlook the vital importance of geography.

The opening up of the Arctic is undoubtedly one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century. As we know, climate change is transforming the region at extraordinary speed. Retreating sea ice is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to energy resources and critical minerals, drawing renewed strategic interest from major powers.

At the same time, the co-operative governance structures that once defined the Arctic are under strain. For much of the post-cold war period, the region was described as “High North, low tension”. That description no longer holds. The era of Arctic exceptionalism seems to be over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fractured the Arctic Council and accelerated the wider geopolitical tensions that now shape the region. Strategic competition is returning to the High North—not as a distant possibility, but as a clear and present reality.

Although the United Kingdom is not an Arctic coastal state, we are undeniably a near-Arctic nation. We are geographically proximate, strategically exposed and directly affected by developments in the High North. Instability in the Arctic affects our maritime approaches, north Atlantic shipping lanes, subsea cables, offshore energy infrastructure, and ultimately the deterrent posture of the Royal Navy. For the United Kingdom, the Arctic is not a remote frontier; it is part of our immediate strategic environment.

A few weeks ago, I had the enormous privilege of visiting Greenland and Denmark, alongside my Liberal Democrat colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller). I can report that in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, life often appears outwardly calm. The harbour is busy and the cafés are full. The rhythms of daily life continue, despite the long Arctic winter and the limited daylight available in February, when I was there. However, anyone spending any time talking to Greenlanders will hear something quite different: a persistent and gnawing anxiety about what might be coming down the tracks from not Moscow or Beijing—nobody realistically thinks that either Russia or China pose an immediate threat to Greenland—but, extraordinarily, from Washington.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about this subject; I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate.

Yesterday, President Trump suggested that our current Prime Minister is no Churchill. Should we not add that the current President of the United States is no Franklin D. Roosevelt? FDR was a big supporter of the development of the United Nations and knew about the importance of sovereignty. Does my hon. Friend share my view—I think he will—that who governs their countries is a matter for the Danes and Greenlanders alone?

[Dr Pinkerton]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention; the President of the United States is perhaps more Teddy Roosevelt than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He seems to be living every day under the impression that his mission should be to expand US territory and to plant the US flag, no matter how loyal and allied the country in question has been in the past.

I clearly recall the deeply offensive remarks that the President of the United States made about both Britain and Denmark’s past military contributions to US international adventurism. I remember watching a film called “Armadillo” about the extraordinary work that Danish troops did on the frontline in Afghanistan. I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments wholeheartedly.

For Greenlanders, this is not a recent experience; they have been living with the threats of Donald Trump for the best part of 12 months. Over the past year, he has repeatedly suggested that the United States should “acquire” Greenland, presenting the idea as a matter of American national security. Sitting here in Westminster, it may be tempting to dismiss such remarks as rhetorical theatre, but in Nuuk they are experienced profoundly differently. Greenland is a self-governing Arctic society of 56,000 people. When the world’s most powerful country repeatedly discusses one’s homeland as though it were a strategic asset to be acquired, the effect is not abstract.

During my visit, we heard accounts of families stockpiling supplies. Some described moving savings abroad in case of financial disruption to their homeland and their lives. Others spoke of delaying vital, essential medical treatment in Denmark—treatment that many Greenlanders rely on—because they feared that further escalation would mean that they would not be able to return to their homeland afterwards.

Greenlandic commentators have described the psychological effect of the campaign from the United States as a form of “mental terror”. It is a striking phrase, but it captures an important truth: security in the Arctic is not solely about missiles, submarines and military installations; it is also about trust, stability and the ability of societies to live without fear.

There is also a profound strategic irony here. The United States already enjoys extensive rights in Greenland under the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, including the operation of the Pituffik space base—formerly, the Thule air base—and any other base that it may wish to re-establish in the present moment. Greenland sits inside NATO’s security architecture through Denmark and benefits from the protections of article 5. The idea that Greenland must somehow be owned to be defended simply does not withstand any scrutiny. What it challenges, however, is something far more fundamental: the principle that people are not property and that sovereignty cannot be negotiated away for strategic convenience.

Across Greenlandic politics, the response has therefore been consistent and unequivocal: Greenland is not for sale. For liberal democracies, that principle should not be negotiable. If western democracies cannot defend the idea that territories cannot be simply acquired by powerful states, then the rules-based order that we claim to uphold begins to look increasingly selective and fragile. Nowhere are those principles more important than in the wider strategic geography of the North Atlantic.

At the heart of that geography lies the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: the naval corridor between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. During the cold war, NATO prioritised that corridor to detect and constrain the submarines of the Soviet northern fleet departing the Kola peninsula into the Atlantic. Today, it has again become central to NATO’s strategy. Russia’s northern fleet must transit through or around the GIUK gap to reach the north Atlantic.

Monitoring the corridor remains essential to tracking submarine activity and protecting the integrity of the north Atlantic. The corridor also safeguards the sealines of communication between North America and Europe. In any NATO contingency, the transatlantic reinforcement route would pass directly through those waters. If the GIUK gap were compromised, the United Kingdom’s western maritime flank would be exposed. Control and surveillance of the space are therefore fundamental to preventing adversaries from projecting power into the north Atlantic or threatening western Europe and North America.

Within the strategic geography, Greenland’s importance cannot be overstated. Its location makes it pivotal for missile early-warning systems, Arctic sea routes, access to the north Atlantic, and space-based infrastructure. Destabilising Greenland or undermining Danish sovereignty would fracture NATO cohesion, complicate security in the GIUK gap and weaken Arctic governance structures at precisely the moment when unity is most needed.

The Liberal Democrats are therefore clear: sovereignty and international law are not negotiable principles. I am deeply concerned that the Prime Minister has yet to state unequivocally that British soil, British bases and British facilities would never be used to propel American troops on to Greenlandic territory by force. The Government must put that matter beyond doubt.

Any suggestion that one NATO ally could coerce another would erode alliance cohesion, weaken deterrence and play directly into the hands of President Putin. Fragmentation in the Arctic theatre would directly benefit Russia’s northern fleet posture and its wider Arctic military strategy. Again, this is not about abstract diplomacy; it is about the credibility of collective defence. The UK must therefore deepen its commitment to Arctic security and north Atlantic resilience. That means strengthening anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, investing further in north Atlantic patrol and surveillance capabilities, and reinforcing defence co-operation with our Nordic and Baltic partners.

Crucially, the Government should invest further in the Joint Expeditionary Force, and convene a summit of JEF leaders here in the United Kingdom to address the rapidly evolving security environment in the High North. The reality is simple: the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern; it is at the frontline of strategic competition, alliance solidarity and international law.

I leave the Minister with three questions. First, what concrete steps have the Government taken to ensure that the UK is prepared for the reality that I have just outlined? How is the UK strengthening defence co-operation with our Arctic allies, including considering enhanced diplomatic presence in Greenland and perhaps the establishment of a permanent consulate in Nuuk?

Finally, the strategic defence review mentions the High North as a space of geopolitical and geostrategic interest, but does not offer a defence strategy per se. Do the Government intend to bring one forward? How does the Government’s future procurement reflect that strategic concern?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Louise Sandher-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for initiating this debate on the high Arctic and its increasing importance to our security—an incredibly important topic.

As my hon. and gallant Friend knows well from his time as a Royal Marine, the UK has a long and storied history in the High North, and for some 50 years the Royal Marines have practised Arctic warfare alongside our Norwegian allies. Indeed, he may have taken part in the rite of passage of plunging into the ice, as I believe the First Sea Lord did again when he visited troops there only last week.

As the threat from Russia has cast an increasingly long shadow over Europe, our High North capabilities have grown only more important, and today High North deployments of Royal Marines are up 40%, with year-round cold-weather operations. The reality is that we have a frontline with Russia in the North Atlantic, and the Russian threat is higher than it has been for decades. We have seen from the activities of the spy ship Yantar that Russia is an increasing threat to our critical underwater infrastructure. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old cold war bases. Last year, Russia and China conducted their first joint air patrol into the Arctic circle. China has declared itself a near-Arctic state and expanded its icebreaker and research vessel presence.

The changing military picture is fuelled by the changing climate and rising temperatures, and a number of Members rightly raised how pivotal it is to understand climate change and recognise the huge threat it poses to our security. It is vital to consider it in that way. The Arctic is warming up four times faster than the global average, and the strategic defence review projects the region to be ice-free each summer by 2040, opening new routes, trade dynamics and flash points. Our responses to those challenges were set out in the SDR: we need increased investment, new technologies and stronger alliances. We are prepared to meet those challenges.

Spearheading our capabilities is our littoral response group north, which is our specialised Royal Navy task group that deploys across the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the High North, with dedicated personnel, ships and helicopters to project power and respond to crises. We have also launched Atlantic Bastion, which is our groundbreaking programme to protect the UK from Russian undersea threats using an AI-powered network of sensors.

We are working ever more closely with our nine partner nations that make up the joint expeditionary force. We established Operation Nordic Warden with JEF allies, working together to track threats to undersea infrastructure from Russia’s shadow fleet—a responsibility now assumed by NATO. Last autumn, we conducted Exercise Tarassis, which was JEF’s largest ever military exercise, involving more than 1,700 British personnel, alongside air, land and naval forces from Scandinavian and Baltic nations.

On a visit to Norway last month, the Secretary of State went further still, announcing that Arctic and High North security will be strengthened against rising Russian threats as Britain steps up its presence in the region. He also announced a major joint expeditionary force, Exercise Lion Protector, which will see air, land and naval forces from JEF nations deployed across Iceland, the Danish straits and Norway, and trained to protect critical national infrastructure against attacks and sabotage, and enhance their joint command and control capabilities. The Secretary of State confirmed that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years, from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.

Finland and Sweden’s accession has transformed NATO’s northern posture, meaning that seven of the eight Arctic states are now NATO allies. The whole alliance is consequently more focused on the threats and challenges to our north.

As can be expected from a Government who have put NATO first, NATO is at the heart of our response to growing threats and tensions in the region. The UK is playing a full part in NATO’s Arctic sentry mission, which is enhancing NATO’s posture in the Arctic and High North, and we currently have 1,500 commandos deployed across Norway, Finland and Sweden as part of Exercise Cold Response. Planning is at an advanced stage for Operation Firecrest, and the upcoming deployment will see our carrier strike group across the Atlantic and High North. Of course, we continually review threat levels and will change our policies accordingly. The thousands of personnel from the three services are spearheaded by HMS Prince of Wales, and parts of the deployment are under NATO command.

Our military co-operation in the Arctic is underpinned by key bilateral partnerships that have all been strengthened under this Government. Russia’s growing activity across the Arctic, High North and north Atlantic has changed the security picture for the region. The UK, with its 50-plus years of history operating in the Arctic, and through our deep partnerships with allies, including Norway, Sweden and Finland, will be at the centre of NATO’s northern response from day one.

In December, the Defence Secretary signed the historic Lunna House agreement with Norway, which will see the UK and Norway jointly operate a fleet of submarine-hunting Type 26 warships, expand joint Arctic training and pre-position British military equipment in Norway to be better prepared for future crises. We have stood resolutely with Denmark over Greenland, the future of which is for Greenlanders and Danes alone. I welcome the uplift in Danish Arctic defence spending, worth more than £10 billion.

We have also worked closely with the Finnish military, including through NATO’s Exercise Dynamic Front, with the British Army conducting its first live firing of our Archer mobile howitzer on Finnish soil—the Army is getting in on the High North joy. We currently have three P-8 Poseidon aircraft carrying out RAF NATO air policing from Keflavik in Iceland—the largest-ever P-8 overseas deployment.

Let me turn to a couple of questions that Members asked. We are working flat out to deliver the DIP. I am sure I do not need to stress to every Member here that it is important to get this hugely important piece of work right before we commit to it. We have ordered five Type 31 frigates, and HMS Venturer should be the first of those to deliver by the end of the decade.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about Ireland. the Prime Minister is due to meet with the Taoiseach at the bilateral in just a few days’ time, and I know that the Secretary of State will call his counterpart and have discussions around some of the points the hon. Gentleman raised.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her contribution. She has been to Norway; I have never made it there—I have only been as far as Denmark—but I am sure there is time to rectify that. She is a doughty campaigner for families, and as we say in the military, although personnel join the military, their families serve too. It is within my purview to do everything I can to support families through the very difficult challenges they face when their loved ones deploy. My hon. Friend rightly noted the importance of not only the larger pieces of shiny equipment that we must procure, but simple items such as gloves. Having worn military-issue gloves, I concur. We must make sure that we have a good standard of personal protective kit and equipment.

Real tribute has been paid to the mighty Royal Marines, who have been excellent guardians of our Arctic warfare capability. It is a very difficult operating environment, and I pay tribute to those who operate there on our behalf to keep us safe. The Royal Marines are a fantastic career choice for those considering starting their careers or who might be interested in joining the reserves. Other armed services are available, including the British Army, should anyone be interested.

Politically and environmentally, the Arctic is in flux. While the eyes of the world are currently focused on the middle east, we are clear that there can be no national or global security without security across the Arctic and northern Europe.

[Richard Foord]

In its negotiations with the United States, Denmark pledged to raise defence spending from 2.4% of GDP last year to 3% of GDP this year and next. Does the Minister think that the example Denmark is setting is a good one for the United Kingdom?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am very proud of the steps that the Government have taken to raise defence spending, which are very welcome off the back of many years of underspend. In fact, this is my very next line: defence spending will rise to 2.6% in 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 5% by 2035. Just as important as raising defence and security spending is making sure that we continue to pursue a NATO-first defence policy. We are a Government who are delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.