Trident: Test Firing

Richard Drax Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

It is regrettable that the phrase “cover-up” has been used, when this issue concerns our national security. Does my right hon. Friend agree that if things go wrong, the last thing we should do is give succour to the enemy by telling them that that is the case?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I agree with my hon. Friend. It is important that we maintain the secrecy of our deterrent, and it is important for our adversaries to understand that we attach paramount importance to making sure the operational details of the deterrent are as closely guarded as possible.

Defence Estate

Richard Drax Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his earlier words. Some of the decisions in this strategy document were difficult decisions. That is inevitable when we have to match the defence estate to the capabilities and needs of the modern Army. It is important that we give families certainty about where they are likely to be going, which is why some of the timescales are some way out. So far as future accommodation is concerned, all the receipts from the decisions that have been taken in this document will come back to defence, and they will be part of the regeneration and renovation of the defence estate more generally. Much of that will find its way into better and new accommodation for our service members.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

We live in uncertain times, and our armed forces have been reduced considerably. I understand the need for consolidation, but will my right hon. Friend tell the House what plans he has for the defence estate abroad, as these bases are crucial in maintaining our military flexibility and, of course, our liaison and so forth with NATO?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

That matter is important, although not directly part of my statement today. We have invested in the defence estate in the Falkland Islands, some 30 years after it was first built following the Falklands war. We have also invested in our facilities in Gibraltar and elsewhere. We have moved personnel back from Germany. As my hon. Friend says, it is important that we continue to upgrade the facilities at bases that are so important, including in the Falklands, Cyprus and Gibraltar.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Drax Excerpts

Monday 12th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mike Penning]

Let me say that I know from experience that some duties can be done once people have passed their phase 1 training. That certainly was done back in my time in 1974 when there was a Labour Government. If we are trying to recruit people, we need money, but Labour wants to cut money, and we need to be part of NATO, but the Labour party leadership wants to take us out of it. That is something that we would never do, but if they want to undermine our armed forces, they should do just that.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend to his place, and I would like to touch on Navy recruitment, if I may. Will he quash these rumours that we will not have enough trained sailors to man both our aircraft carriers when they are launched?

[Mike Penning]

We have not hidden the fact that it is very difficult to make sure that we do everything we possibly can, but we will do that. I was on the Queen Elizabeth only the week before last and I watched our other aircraft carrier being built. When the particular moment comes, we will have the crews and these carriers will be the pride of the Navy.

Shipbuilding on the Clyde

Richard Drax Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for focusing his question on that important subject, and I agree that the workforce on the Clyde are highly skilled; indeed, I make a point of meeting the trade union representatives of shipbuilders on the Clyde, and I did so last month. The short answer to his question is yes. The five offshore patrol vessels—three of which are in build, and two of which we added as part of the SDSR—do provide continuity between the Type 45s and the aircraft carrier blocks, as they finish being produced on the Clyde, and the beginning of work on the Type 26s.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

I welcome the news of the new-build ships. We still do not have enough, but we are going in the right direction. May I ask that no HM ships currently serving be withdrawn before and until any new ship is built and commissioned?

[Mr Dunne]

I think my hon. Friend is referring to the Type 23 class of frigates. The Royal Navy’s intention is that the new vessels replace Type 23s on a like-for-like basis as they come out of service.

Iraq Historic Allegations Team

Richard Drax Excerpts

Wednesday 27th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

I pay huge tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon) for such an excellent speech and for bringing the subject to the Westminster Hall Chamber. I will now gabble through my speech in two minutes and 51 seconds.

As a former soldier, I welcome the opportunity to put on the record how deeply disturbing I find the relentless pursuit of our servicemen and women by unscrupulous and opportunistic lawyers. I welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment to clamp down on the abuse, but I wish he would go further. I understand, however, that shutting investigations down would create an even more legalistic nightmare.

We all acknowledge that if and when atrocities are committed, or are alleged to have been committed, they need to be investigated. The Iraq Historic Allegations Team was established for that purpose in a genuine attempt to right historic wrongs and to deliver effective criminal investigation of allegations of murder, abuse and torture. In the case of Baha Mousa, for example, it worked.

One of the problems of the investigations now is the time that they are taking. Over the past five years, only a small number of the 1,500 cases have been looked at, and then only after nearly £60 million was given to IHAT to look into the allegations. Will the Minister comment on that when she sums up?

Another problem is that hundreds of the cases were fed to IHAT by only two legal firms, Public Interest Lawyers and Leigh Day.

[Nusrat Ghani]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Richard Drax]

I really do not have time, so I will fire on, if I may.

The perception is that left-leaning lawyers are intent on undermining one of the pillars of the establishment—namely, the armed forces. Given the opportunity, they are jumping to the task with relish. Unbelievably, it is alleged that middlemen touting for clients in Iraq received referral fees, which are prohibited, thus inviting fabrication and fantasy, which was never the intention. Those self-serving and unscrupulous firms have wrapped themselves in the banner of human rights, creating a compensation industry funded by the taxpayer.

Although I am delighted to learn that the gravy train is now coming off the rails, with both firms facing the Solicitors Regulation Authority and Leigh Day now referred to the solicitors disciplinary tribunal, the damage has been done and remains in the huge backlog of cases. For example, one British soldier could now in turn face investigations by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team and the International Criminal Court at the Hague; civil claims for compensation in the High Court; and finally an inquest by the Iraq fatality investigations—you couldn’t make it up!

Our soldiers are left feeling persecuted and betrayed. Those still serving are demoralised and people thinking of serving may think again. How on earth will we prosecute a war in the future if at every turn our servicemen and women fear being investigated for doing their duty, which, let us not forget, is to kill the enemy?

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Drax Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

Yes I can because it is not my figure or that of the Prime Minister: it is an assessment produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee, independently of Ministers. I say gently that if the right hon. Gentleman does not think that there are that many freedom fighters in Syria, how does he think that the civil war has lasted for five years, given that the Syrian army is more than 200,000 strong? People have been fighting the Assad regime.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that a significant assault by ground forces, preferably local troops, is the only way to deal with Daesh in the longer term?

[Michael Fallon]

Yes. In the end, Daesh will only be prised out of cities such as Mosul in Iraq or Raqqa in Syria by local forces. We have already seen some success in the recovery of Baiji and Ramadi in Iraq, and I hope eventually we will see such success in other cities along the Tigris and the Euphrates. In the fullness of time I hope we will see similar action in Raqqa, but that does not mean that we should not now be getting on with a full deployment of airstrikes to deal with the infrastructure that supports Daesh.

Sgt Alexander Blackman (Marine A)

Richard Drax Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2015 Westminster Hall

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the case of Sgt Alexander Blackman (Marine A).

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for what I believe is the first time, Mr Pritchard. Before I start, I welcome my hon. Friends the Members for Eastleigh (Mims Davies), for Taunton Deane (Rebecca Pow), for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), for Wells (James Heappey), and for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke), along with our colleague, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). I thank them for coming to this debate. I also welcome Sergeant Blackman’s family, friends and relations, and the four members of the Royal Marines who are also here to listen.

We shall be debating an incident that took place thousands of miles away in one of the most hostile environments on earth; in fact, it is so hostile that 454 of our finest servicemen and woman have been killed there, and thousands more wounded. Lance Corporal Cassidy Little is one of those wounded men. He served with Sergeant Blackman during the fateful tour and is present today to support the debate. On behalf of us all, I thank him and his colleagues for their bravery, courage and devotion.

In Afghanistan, the enemy were clever, motivated, difficult to identify, ruthless and cruel. Torture and death faced those who fell into their hands. It was into this hellhole that Alexander Blackman and his fellow Royal Marines from 42 Commando were pitched in 2011. Sergeant Blackman was a 15-year veteran of six operational tours: one in Northern Ireland and three in Iraq, and he was on his second in Afghanistan. There is nothing that this former Royal Marine has not seen. In each tour he had served his country and his corps with great distinction and courage. He was that most valued member of the Royal Marines, the elite’s elite—a senior non-commissioned officer—and he had been recommended for promotion, but then came his last tour in Helmand province, the toughest of his military career.

Sergeant Blackman was posted to the remote command post Omar, with 15 younger Royal Marines under his command. They lived for more than six months in a small mud enclosure, in appalling conditions of physical discomfort. Daily, they patrolled on foot for up to 10 hours in a large hostile area where the Taliban were most active. IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, the roadside landmines favoured by the Taliban, were a constant threat, to the extent that the squad seldom used their vulnerable Jackal vehicle, preferring to patrol on foot instead. They were aware that hundreds of their comrades had already been killed or maimed by IEDs. The psychological impact was devastating. Firefights with the Taliban were common. So, too, were deaths and life-threatening injuries. Overall, 42 Commando lost seven men, and a further 45 were injured, many of them very seriously indeed.

On 28 May 2011, several Marines from Sergeant Blackman’s troop were tasked with establishing a new base in an area known as the badlands. During the operation, Corporal Little was caught in the same blast that killed Sergeant Blackman’s troop commander, Lieutenant Ollie Augustin, and Marine Sam Alexander, who had won a Military Cross on a previous tour. The blast also badly wounded Lance Corporal JJ Chalmers. Later that day, the Royal Marines discovered body parts hanging mockingly in a tree. We can all imagine the effect of such an incident on hard-pressed, very young troops.

While holding it together in such atrocious conditions, Sergeant Blackman’s frequent complaints to headquarters about the impossibility of performing his assigned tasks with such a small number of men for a period far longer than the recommended tour of duty went unanswered. He had one sole visit from his commanding officer, which shows how stretched 42 Commando was. For month after month, the huge weight of responsibility bore down on him as he tried to maintain morale, but a combination of factors were taking their toll.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

When my hon. Friend says six months, does that mean Sergeant Blackman had no R and R?

[Richard Drax]

I welcome my gallant colleague to the debate. He did have two weeks for R and R.

Those factors taking their toll included: the inadequacy of the accommodation, equipment and supplies; Sergeant Blackman’s inability to sleep; the almost total lack of supervision; the general isolation; the recent death of his father; the ever-present fear of death or injury; exhaustion; and the strain of keeping the young men under his command alive, in itself an awesome responsibility.

On 15 September 2011, towards the end of their fraught tour, Sergeant Blackman and his patrol were directed to an insurgent who had been fatally wounded by gunfire from an Apache helicopter. Horribly exposed in a known hotspot for enemy activity, they knew that other insurgents were in the area. They dragged the fatally wounded man to cover. That Sergeant Blackman then shot him is beyond doubt: the incident was filmed by a head camera worn by one of the Marines on patrol. I have seen all the footage. What he did was unequivocal. He appeared calm and matter of fact—points made by Judge Advocate General Blackett in sentencing. However, no camera on earth can capture all the circumstances leading to that one momentary loss of control, or what was going on in Sergeant Blackman’s mind at the time.

Except for Corporal Little and his colleagues, none of us here has endured anything remotely approaching what those Royal Marines experienced, and, God willing, we never will. Although both the court martial and the Court of Appeal said that they took into account mitigating circumstances with regard to the sentence, Jonathan Goldberg, QC, who now heads the defence team and is here today, believes that a number of significant mistakes were made. The court was never given the chance to consider the lesser verdict of manslaughter by reason of loss of control owing to the appalling stresses to which Sergeant Blackman was subjected for months on end.

Mr Goldberg advises that, by law, the judge advocate general had a duty to direct the jury on all verdicts reasonably open to them, regardless of whether the prosecution or defence chose to raise them. The verdicts included the ability for a jury to return a verdict of not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. Possible routes to such a manslaughter verdict included: temporary loss of control after months of cumulative stress; diminished responsibility owing to battlefield fatigue and post-traumatic stress disorder; and finally, by reason of an unlawful act, in that Sergeant Blackman admitted desecrating a dead body.

Inexplicably, none of the above possible lesser verdicts were ever raised, either at the court martial or on appeal. The judge advocate general failed to direct the jury panel on those available lesser alternatives, instead imposing the mandatory life sentence for murder, resulting in a good man serving a minimum of eight years in jail without being allowed to seek parole.

On the other hand, a manslaughter verdict on these extraordinary facts could reasonably have resulted in three years in prison at worst and a suspended sentence at best. Sergeant Blackman insists that he was never advised by his then defence team that a manslaughter verdict was even a possibility. Indeed, he knew nothing of the manslaughter option until recently, when his new defence took over. Almost unbelievably in a murder case of such complexity, Sergeant Blackman was never offered a psychiatric assessment prior to his conviction. Moreover, it is bizarre that the Judge Advocate General’s said this in his sentencing remarks after conviction:

“We accept that you were affected by the constant pressure, ever present danger and fear of death or serious injury. This was enhanced by the reduction of available men in your command post so that you had to undertake more patrols yourself and place yourself and your men in danger more often. We also accept the psychiatric evidence presented today that when you killed the insurgent it was likely that you were suffering to some degree from combat stress disorder.”

The psychiatric report he referring to was presented before sentencing and not conviction. In other words, the panel did not know about the report when they found Sergeant Blackman guilty. Why not? What was the defence team up to?

Further evidence that was never heard at Sergeant Blackman’s court martial comes in the form of a 50-odd page document—the Telemeter report. Written by Brigadier Huntley, a few pages of the executive summary were released only this morning, despite frequent requests for the whole report to be published. Apart from criticising Sergeant Blackman, it confirms that there were concerns that the culture within 42 Commando

“was perceived by many…to be overly aggressive.”

The report also states:

“A number of those involved in this incident both directly and indirectly, felt that the Chain of Command had failed to provide them with adequate support before, during and after the court martial.”

[Bob Stewart]

As a former commanding officer, I find it extraordinary that this group of Royal Marines was left in the same position, obviously one of huge danger, for the whole six months. Was the rotation of the men in that position not considered?

[Richard Drax]

That is a good question, and one that my hon. Friend can perhaps ask afterwards of the Royal Marines who were on that tour. As I understand it, they were covering a vast area of land, they were under-resourced and undermanned, and rotation was not possible.

[Bob Stewart]

Why not?

[Richard Drax]

I do not know. It is perhaps something that the report—the 50 or so pages that we have not seen—may hint at. We call for the report to be published now, so that the new defence team can use it to build up its case. Ultimately, we will have to wait until, as we hope, the Criminal Cases Review Commission takes up the case and demands the release of the report, or the bits of it that we have not seen.

[Rebecca Pow (Taunton Deane) (Con)]

On the psychiatric report, I believe that the sergeant was in hospital for a week, yet no reports were submitted about how he was, what the conclusions were and what his state was when he got home. Will my hon. Friend expand on that a little further? He mentioned it just now, but I think there is a bit more to say.

[Richard Drax]

I am unable to expand on that particular point other than to say what I have already said, which is that the psychiatric report was there for sentencing, but not for conviction. That is what I know. He did spend some time in hospital, but I cannot expand on that particular period.

[Rebecca Pow]

Or on how crucial it would be to have that?

[Richard Drax]

I am afraid that I cannot expand on that.

[Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)]

Order. For the benefit of Hansard, I encourage Members to stand if they want to intervene.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

rose—

[Richard Drax]

I give way to my hon. Friend.

[James Heappey]

Rather than mention this in my remarks later on, it is perhaps relevant to do so now. I was the adjutant of 2 Rifles in Sangin during Operation Herrick X in 2009, and there was a well-established mechanism of TRiM—trauma instant management—which is the peer-to-peer post-traumatic stress management of people after each traumatic experience. Those records should exist within Sergeant Blackman’s unit. If that process had been done properly, it should have been identified well before he reached his breaking point that he was very much at risk. Those records should exist. If they have not come to light, it is a gross injustice.

[Richard Drax]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. I cannot expand on that too much now, but we are aware that Colonel Oliver Lee, Royal Marines, had written a report identifying seven criteria that commanding officers should look out for. I also believe that, as far as Colonel Lee was concerned, Sergeant Blackman ticked every box.

From reading what we have of the executive summary of the Telemeter report—what we have got of it—there is strong reason to believe that the full report is critical of the overall command structure, including the lack of supervision over Sergeant Blackman and his men, which would certainly support Sergeant Blackman’s claims. A sergeant in the Royal Marines is probably—I will get myself into trouble here—superior to, shall we say, a line regiment sergeant, in the sense that they are trained to be far more independent. That was one explanation given to me as to why, in this instance, Sergeant Blackman was left out there for as long as he was—because he was a sergeant and highly respected, and so on.

However, what happened in this instance struck me, too, as extremely odd—my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) hinted at this earlier on, and I agree with him. We are both former soldiers, and it was our duty as officers to visit our men and make quite certain that they were safe and well and doing the job that they should be doing, because that was our task. If we did not do that, things began to unravel. Maybe that was one of the reasons why things unravelled in this particular instance.

Going back to the report—50 pages of which, as I have said, still remain unseen—it is no surprise that the Daily Mail and Frederick Forsyth thunder about a cover-up and attempts to make Sergeant Blackman a scapegoat for a much wider failure of high command. Would the full report have given Sergeant Blackman a better chance in court had it been written and published openly shortly after the events, rather than long after his conviction? Vice-Admiral Jones has reportedly asked both serving and former officers not to comment if the press start asking questions.

Also of great concern is the resignation of Colonel Lee. As I understand it, he was a high-flier who resigned his commission in disgust over how Sergeant Blackman was treated and the refusal to call him in evidence at the court martial. Colonel Lee became Sergeant Blackman’s commanding officer just six days before the incident, although they never met.

[Bob Stewart]

How come the defence counsel did not call the commanding officer to give evidence?

[Richard Drax]

Again, I am regrettably not a trained QC or lawyer—I wish I were. All I understand is that he was not, which can be further explored by the QC, who is actually in the room here today.

When he resigned, Colonel Lee wrote the following, which is one of the most damning indictments that I have found in the 10 or 11 months that I have been involved in this sad case:

“Sgt Blackman’s investigation, court martial and sentencing authority remain unaware to this day of the wider context within which he was being commanded when he acted as he did.”

He went on:

“My attempts to bring proper transparency to this process were denied by the chain of command. Sgt Blackman was therefore sentenced by an authority blind to facts that offered serious mitigation…The cause of this is a failure of moral courage by the chain of command.”

That is a devastating criticism and hardly a ringing endorsement of military justice. Colonel Lee’s evidence will be important if the case is referred to the appeal court by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, which we trust it will be. It must be.

Sergeant Blackman’s conviction in 2013 left a deep impression on me as a former soldier. I visited him in Lincoln prison in December 2014—had I not, I would have gone to my grave with this nagging whatever you like to call it on my conscience and preying on my mind. There I met an intelligent, proud and professional soldier, alongside whom I would have been proud to serve. Several prison guards told me as I left that Sergeant Blackman’s incarceration was hard to comprehend. “He shouldn’t be here”, they said.

As for Sergeant Blackman, understandably he feels betrayed—a scapegoat, hung out to dry by the military and political establishments. He was fighting a war at our behest and on our behalf. He believes that his small patrol was given an impossible mission with little support or command structure. They were undermanned and overstretched, the impossible was demanded and a decent man was pushed beyond endurance. In his words, it was a

“lack of self-control, momentary lapse in…judgement.”

The aim of today’s debate is to highlight a miscarriage of justice. The debate will send an important message to those charged with administering justice to Sergeant Blackman and it mirrors the public outcry. Sergeant Blackman is the first British serviceman to be tried for murder by a court martial since the second world war, and I hope he is the last. War is a dirty, filthy, horrible, frightening business and every man— even the very best —has his breaking point.

I am indebted to the highly respected author Frederick Forsyth for his immense help and his interest in the case; to Jonathan Goldberg QC and his team, who are now representing Sergeant Blackman and are in the Public Gallery today, as I said; to the Daily Mail—which I do not often praise—for running such a well-researched campaign and for going to such incredible lengths to support Sergeant Blackman and his case; to Sir Tim Rice and Major General Johnny Holmes, both highly distinguished in their own fields, who have volunteered as directors of a fund-raising effort; and of course to the public for their support and their donations, which have now reached about £120,000 in five days. In addition, there have been thousands of letters; the Daily Mail is having to employ a team to open them.

I conclude with two observations: one concerns the court-martial panel and the other is entirely my own. When Sergeant Blackman was sentenced for murder—murder—dismissed from the Royal Marines and ordered to march out of the court, he gave his final salute in uniform. The panel, to a man, returned his salute—an act that is, as far as I know, unprecedented, especially given that they had just condemned him for murder. To me, that act speaks eloquently of their deep feelings of ambiguity.

I end finally with my own thoughts, having been involved with the case for nearly a year. Sergeant Blackman was and is no cold-blooded killer. He was just a man pushed to the very edge and sent to do a filthy job with his hands tied behind his back, and he is now no threat at all to anyone. He is paying a terrible price for a lapse of judgment. He is a man who deserves another hearing and should be allowed to go home to his wife.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Drax]

I am most grateful to the Minister for the hard work that I know he has put into researching the case, and for his frank response, which was not expected. The new legal team and the family will be grateful for the fact that he has offered to give the report to the defence team if they request it in confidence. That will help enormously. I also pay tribute to all my honourable and, in many cases, gallant colleagues. The Minister speaks humbly about his time in Afghanistan. He may not have faced the same challenges as others, but he was still there, and for that I commend him most highly.

This has been, as colleagues have said, a highly emotional, charged debate. That will not get Sergeant Blackman out of jail, however, nor will it get his case reviewed. What will are the facts. As the Minister and others have rightly said, we cannot and should not interfere with the legal process. My job and ours, along with the Daily Mail and others, is to highlight where we think that things have gone wrong. Where we see an injustice, it would be wrong not to stand up and say what we think. That is what we were voted in to do, and that is what we have done today.

I hope that the attention that the case is receiving, and the facts of the case, will get it reviewed. Regrettably, I am not as eminent, as bright, as intelligent or as experienced as Mr Goldberg, and sadly I never will be, but it is into his hands and those of his team that we place the responsibility of pursuing that legal avenue. Big Al, as he is affectionately known, and I have met him—

[Johnny Mercer]

I just wanted to build on that point and clarify what I said earlier about the MOD. I thank the Minister for the candid nature of his speech. He has shown us that we have a real opportunity, with the team of Ministers at the MOD, not only to get this case right but to tackle the causes of what happened. We all know the facts, but there are causes behind the story. We have a unique opportunity now, before the matter moves out of the public eye, to get those things right.

I know that this is strong, but in my experience of dealing with Ministers and those at the top of the MOD, there is a significant gap between the duty, attention to detail and the genuine heartfelt concerns of the ministerial team and the attitude of those at the top of the MOD. The latter have recently, in conversations about trauma risk management and how we manage people going forward, shown themselves to be delusional. We need to tighten that gap to make sure that we do not miss the bow wave of people coming home from Afghanistan and Iraq and suffering from mental health problems. I hope that as a result of our debate today, we will be able to see the many factors that contributed to the incident that we are discussing.

[Richard Drax]

I thank my gallant and distinguished colleague. Given all his experience, there is, dare I say it, no one better on our side of the House to speak in such a way.

[Mr Adam Holloway (Gravesham) (Con)]

Aside from the points about this case, do hon. and gallant Members agree that it remains extremely important that our soldiers behave with the highest possible standards, and that we do not abuse or execute prisoners of war?

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Drax]

I entirely concur with that, and I am sure that everyone in the room would do the same. We have to set a bar, and the bar has been set. There are occasions, however, and sadly this is one, where, for all kinds of mitigating reasons, one man—a highly professional soldier—snaps for a single moment. On the emotional side of the argument, very few of us here, except for the truly gallant Members who have served in Afghanistan, fully understand the pressures that these young men, and of course the officers and those in command, are put under.

I will end shortly, because I know that the Chair would like to have the final say, which is only right. I believe, as do a sufficiently large number of people, that there has been a miscarriage of justice, albeit not an intentional one. It is not for me to say otherwise, because we are talking about a court martial that did its job. The facts as I understand them were not fully presented to the court martial, however. If a court martial is to convict fairly, it needs all the facts, and I believe that they were not fully present on that day.

We hope that all the attention that this case has rightly been given will get it back to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. We rely entirely on Mr Goldberg to achieve that, and the matter is in his safe and secure hands. My aim is to bring Big Al home. If we can get the case heard, that is the first step. The rest, as has been said, is up to the law and the lawmakers.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the case of Sgt Alexander Blackman (Marine A).

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Drax Excerpts

Monday 13th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I am very grateful for the Secretary of State’s reply, but we are pressed for time.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

While I warmly welcome the 2% of GDP we have committed to spending on defence, which is excellent news, we must not be complacent, because although the quality of what we are ordering is brilliant, for future events—perhaps, God forbid, a serious and more widespread conflict—we are still down on the quantity.

[Michael Fallon]

My hon. Friend is right. The SDSR that is now under way has to evaluate not merely the current threats to our country but the future threats that may emerge over the next few years. It is only by sorting out the defence budget—the mess that we inherited—and putting it on a proper footing that we are now able to increase it and to spend on the equipment that our armed forces need.

Britain and International Security

Richard Drax Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I can confirm that Future Force 2020 is still our strategy. Reserve recruitment is now increasing rapidly—up by more than 60% on last year, with some 6,000 people having stepped forward to join the Army Reserve. We will continue to look at how to make the process of encouraging more people to join faster and simpler as the target becomes more challenging in its latter years, but that is still our ambition.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the sensible and pragmatic way in which he is dealing with all the problems around the world. He is talking about planes and ships, and about men and women doing various good things all around the world, as no doubt they are. As an ex-member of the armed forces, I am fully aware of the top quality of our men and women, and I cannot praise them enough. However, in my day those would have been called out-of-area operations, and we do not have the volume to meet a major threat. The Secretary of State has already said that we face many potential major threats. Surely we need to spend a lot more than 2% on defence to meet that awful inevitability.

[Michael Fallon]

I hope that my hon. Friend will recognise that we are rebuilding our forces, not least our reserves, which were shamefully neglected for years. We are continuing to work at that. In the 2010 review, we set out the aim of being able to put a division into the field—obviously with notice, as in any other major operation—and we are still able to field a brigade at much shorter notice. This year’s strategic defence and security review will give us the opportunity to look at exactly those points all over again.

Falkland Islands Defence Review

Richard Drax Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am sorry that I am not able to discuss intelligence gathering. That is an important part of our assessment of the threat to the islands and an important part of the islands’ defence, but I am not able to discuss in detail the arrangements for gathering intelligence about the threat. On the hon. Gentleman’s earlier point, it is important that the message goes out from all parts of the House to the islanders—I thank the shadow Secretary of State again for this—that we respect their right to determine their future and that, their having made that decision in the referendum, we will continue to defend the islands.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the aim of a deterrent is to have sufficient force to meet any threat? Nothing better exemplifies that point than the Falklands war itself, when the decision to save £16 million by withdrawing HMS Endurance led to a war costing billions of pounds and 255 British personnel.

[Michael Fallon]

As my hon. Friend may know, there was an inquiry into the causes of the war, which was led by Lord Franks. There has been much discussion since of the precise series of events that led up to the war. That is history. Our job is to ensure that the islands are properly defended. I am confident that, following this review, we have the right deployment of troops and the right maritime and air assets in place, ready to be deployed in their defence.