Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill

Paul Maynard Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Tuesday 25th June 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Paul Maynard)]

I am greatly encouraged by the quality of the debate that we have had today and by the broad support that the Bill has received from Members on both sides of the House. I particularly thank my hon. Friends the Members for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and for Solihull (Julian Knight), the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian C. Lucas), my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris) and the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) for their support.

The Bill is intended to help to heal family relationships when division has become unavoidable. No one, of course, seeks such an outcome. Few stand at the altar, or before a registrar, contemplating an ending rather than a beginning—“till death do us part” remains the golden thread of marital aspirations—but such is the flawed and fragile nature of human relationships that it can never be avoided altogether.

I know that all Members have families’ interests at heart. I know, too, that we share a belief in the vital importance of the commitment that marriage and civil partnerships bring, not only to couples and their families but to the wider wellbeing of our society. However, I am keenly aware that we arrive at that belief on the basis of different views and experiences.

I recognise that some Members have misgivings about the Bill. I should confess, as a Catholic myself, that when the Secretary of State presented me with it six weeks ago, I took rather a large gulp. What could I, a good Catholic boy, do with a divorce reform Bill? But the more I studied the Bill and looked at it carefully, the more I saw a civil and human measure that sought to lessen acrimony and create space for reflection. The misgivings that people have, however, are no less a part of the debate, and I am grateful to the Members who have voiced their concern as well as those who have expressed their support.

[Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Paul Maynard]

I will happily do so, briefly.

[Karl Turner]

I am very grateful to the Minister, not least because I have only just come into the Chamber.

I congratulate the Government on introducing this incredibly important Bill. I also pay tribute to Philip Marshall QC, my colleague at the Bar, who has campaigned on the issue of no-fault divorce for many years. Does the Minister agree, however, that we must not only pass this important Bill, but reintroduce legal aid so that couples who are considering divorce can be advised by solicitors at an early stage? That saves a lot of money in the long run, and it is much better for the entire family.

[Paul Maynard]

I may well deal with that point briefly later in my speech.

It is worth pointing out that the breakdown of a marriage and the legal process of divorce that comes after it are two very different things. There was a time when the only legal exit from a marriage demanded an act of adultery, but that never stood in the way of anyone walking out on anyone else, and the law as it stands today does not prevent it either. There are general protections for respondents and vulnerable parties in any proceedings, and those will remain. We are also extending to all respondents the ability to apply for the final order to be delayed while the court considers their financial position following divorce.

My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) raised a number of important points. I am not unsympathetic to her wider agenda on support for families, and I look forward to meeting her and, indeed, Lord Farmer in the coming weeks to discuss their manifesto for families. She will be aware of our reducing parental conflict programme, to which £39 million has been allocated, our troubled families programme, and many other initiatives across government. I take on board her point that we need to do far more to support relationships further upstream, because we do not wish to reach a point at which relationships fall apart unnecessarily. I also take the point made by many Members on both sides of the House about the need to reform the finances of divorce, but I consider that to be a much greater issue than can be contained in this Bill. It is highly complex, and there is, as yet, no consensus. However, we recognise that it is an issue that will need to be discussed at some point.

The hon. Member for Bath rightly mentioned adverse childhood experiences. What she said went to the nub of why I believe the Bill to be a humane measure. At the end of the day, children often bear the brunt of the unpleasantness that divorce can cause, and we do not wish to add to that unpleasantness by ensuring that the divorce process is dragged out or becomes more acrimonious than it needs to be.

Many Members have expressed concern about so-called unilateral divorce. We should bear in mind that as marriage is a voluntary union of two people, the moment one person decides that the marriage is over, it is indeed over. The current divorce laws do not prevent unilateral divorce. Only about 2% of divorces are contested, many owing to the mistaken belief that attributing fault can somehow prevent the divorce from occurring. Indeed, when a divorce is contested, the only reasonable option is to prove that there was some flaw in the validity of the marriage originally. It is important to bear in mind what the law actually does, rather than what we might seek to believe that it can do.

I hear the points made by the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and others about legal aid. Legal aid remains available to those who need it, such as victims of domestic abuse. It also remains available for mediation when couples are in dispute about finances or child arrangements, which provides a non-litigious route to resolving issues and helping families to move forward constructively. I also hear the point about the bar on the dissolution of marriages in the first year. The remedy for domestic abuse remains a range of proactive orders that the court can make, including non-molestation and occupation orders. We hope that those will include the domestic abuse protection orders referred to in our draft Domestic Abuse Bill.

We have heard from many stakeholders—a wide range of third parties—who take an interest in these issues and who support the measures that the Government are taking, including, as was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, the chair of the Marriage Foundation, Sir Paul Coleridge.

The Bill will not, in my view, make divorce more common. It will not make divorce any easier, and it will certainly not make divorce any quicker: the 26-week period will remain in place. However, it may make divorce less acrimonious, and for that reason alone I think it is a worthwhile Bill on which to embark. Divorce and dissolution will happen regardless of how the legal processes effecting them operate, because the irretrievable breakdown of some marriages and civil partnerships is, unfortunately, inevitable. The Bill deals with that reality with the minimum of acrimony by creating the conditions that will allow people to move forward and agree arrangements for the future in an orderly and constructive way, and for that reason I commend it to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 4 July 2019.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Rebecca Harris.)

Question agreed to.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (Money)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State.—(Rebecca Harris.)

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (First sitting)

Paul Maynard Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I am conscious of the time, and I want to bring the Minister in shortly. Does anyone else have a simple, straightforward question they have not had a chance to put yet? I guess it is over to you, Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Paul Maynard)]

Q For the benefit of the wider Committee, could you set out what, when people submit their evidence of fault, the court does with that piece of information? How is it handled by the court? What weight do they place on it?

Nigel Shepherd: The short answer is that the average time that court officials—this is now mostly done by legal advisers in regional divorce centres—have to scrutinise the evidence is four minutes per case, broadly. Although current legislation says that the court has a duty to investigate the situation as far as is reasonably practicable, the reality is that our process does not allow that to happen at all. If a petition goes in on behaviour, and it is not defended, the legal advisers looking at it are simply checking to make sure that the jurisdictional grounds are correct, and that there is the necessary legal connection between the behaviour and the breakdown—in other words, that the boxes are correctly ticked.

There is no investigation and, what is worse, if the respondent to that petition writes five pages on why it is all untrue, if it is not formally defended with an answer and a fee paid of £200, it is ignored. That is the worst of all worlds, because respondents, particularly those without the benefit of legal advice, think that they are saying that they disagree with something about the petition, but that nobody is listening. That makes it even worse. There is no realistic scrutiny at all in the system. It is impractical to have that scrutiny, because who knows really what goes on behind the closed doors of a marriage? That is why this change is fundamentally so important; it means that there is no pretence anymore. It is intellectually dishonest at the moment; that is what Sir James Munby said in the Court of Appeal in the case of Owens. We would be getting rid of that dishonesty and acrimony at the start of the process.

David Hodson: I can add to that as a part-time judge at the central London family court. Until two or three years ago, when we had divorce centres, part-time judges had to do four or five of these special procedures every time we sat. It took a matter of moments. We would give careful consideration to the document that had been drawn up by the legal adviser as to whether there were any procedural errors. We would look at the unreasonable behaviour allegations, but I find it difficult to remember in recent years—we have softened as the years have gone by—anything having been sent back. Sometimes it is so minuscule, but if it is undefended, it will go through.

The 1996 legislation had a knock-on effect. If Parliament decided in 1996 that no-fault divorce was appropriate, though Parliament subsequently did not bring it into force, should judges be turning around and saying no? Owens was a distinctive case. It was a defended case, whereas if it is undefended, as Nigel said, it will go through. That makes it a crying pity that people have got to go through that process in the first place.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)]

Q Good morning. You gave evidence a little while ago about the fact that in order to respond to a fault being mentioned in a divorce, a person has to memorise reams and reams of letters and make a very detailed, comprehensive response to the allegation, but unless they pay the money, they are not even going to be considered. One of the problems with a fault having to be alleged is that often, the respondent or the applicant will then have to spend quite a lot of money to get the process through, so it is almost a double whammy: they have to pay money to blame each other and get a divorce.

David Hodson: One of the Law Society’s concerns is the court fee. I appreciate that this is not in primary legislation, but may we express our concern? At the moment, it is £550.

[The Chair]

Minister, this will have to be your last question.

[Paul Maynard]

Q Do not worry, Chair; it is. To follow up on my previous question, what assessment have you made of the introduction of a joint application for a divorce? How might that change the dynamics of the process?

Nigel Shepherd: We are all in favour. It is absolutely right, and people ask for it all the time. People come in and say, “We both agree. Can we make this a joint decision? It is really important because we want to say to our children that this was a joint decision that we made as adults, rather than having Kramer v. Kramer—an applicant and petitioner against, with one person being blamed and the other not.” We are absolutely in support; it is a crucial part of the Bill.

Aidan Jones: We absolutely support that as well. We believe that is the right message. When the sadness of a divorce is approaching, it is the right message for the children to see that two adults can still co-parent and get on with each other. In the interests of the children, it is the best way forward.

David Hodson: We tried it under the present process in a number of cases where we had agreed particulars of unreasonable behaviour and cross-petitions. In other words, it went through on the petition of both the petitioner and respondent. Then we got the decree absolute, and we still had the original petitioner described as the petitioner, though it had gone through on the petition of the respondent as well, because there was a joint petition with jointly admitted unreasonable behaviour on both sides. That was so unfair. It is the unfairness of that decree absolute. If only we could have, “This is the marriage of x and y, and they have jointly asked for this.”

I think—we can discuss this—there will be a number of instances where there is a sole petitioner and a joint application for the decree absolute. Again, that embraces what we want to see—that by the end of the period before the application for the decree absolute, they have both come to terms with it. They may not have been okay with it at the beginning, but if at the end, they have come to terms with it, how much better that would be for the children, the future parenting and all those other issues. That is why we are desperately keen to see not only a change to our laws, but a change in the terminology—the way the forms are set out—because that signals so much more for the couple.

[The Chair]

I thank the panel for the evidence. We will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Professor Liz Trinder and Mandip Ghai gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I think we shall move to the Minister.

[Paul Maynard]

Q Thank you both for your evidence so far. For the benefit of the wider Committee, will you set out some specific examples, where there is coercion and control in a relationship, of how the current process facilitates that coercion and control?

Mandip Ghai: Some of it has been mentioned already. Professor Liz Trinder has already mentioned how defending divorce petitions can be used as a tactic. One other thing that we find—I disagree with the previous panel, one of whom suggested that the time period of 20 weeks should start from service—is that sometimes perpetrators will avoid service, deliberately not responding to the petition even though they have received it, or avoiding being served with it, as a way to try to control the applicant and stop her from proceeding with the divorce. They might suggest that they will consent to the petition proceeding, or accept service, if she agrees not to make any financial claims or agrees various things related to children.

Professor Trinder: I agree absolutely with that. Defence is a very stark example; you get respondents defending—causing huge distress to and huge financial costs for the petitioner—not because they believe that the marriage is repairable or saveable but because they simply want to control the other party. Looking at the case files, there are very clear examples of that, so the removal of that ability to continue to control the petitioner in that way is a really welcome future from the Bill.

Mandip Ghai: The other way, which I mentioned earlier, is that sometimes the perpetrator will issue the divorce petition first to prevent her starting divorce proceedings based on his behaviour.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. Thank you. That brings us to the end of our oral session today. The Committee will meet again this afternoon to begin our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Note that we will be in Committee Room 9 at 2 o’clock.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Matt Warman.)

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (Second sitting)

Paul Maynard Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Minister, do you wish to make any opening remarks?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Paul Maynard)]

I will see what hon. Members have to say and then round up.

[The Chair]

That is entirely up to you. I call Eddie Hughes.

--- Later in debate ---

This is an important issue. The Minister probably knows that Women’s Aid raised concerns during the consultation on the Bill because it does not remove the bar on petitioning for divorce in the first year of marriage. This rule can leave women who are suffering domestic abuse trapped during that year. Has the Minister listened to the concerns of charities acting for survivors of domestic abuse? Perhaps the Ministry of Justice can explore this at another time. I hope that he will consider the one-year rule and legal aid. The Opposition will not vote against the clauses or table any amendments.

[Paul Maynard]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, and to see so many people in the room, discussing what will be a very important piece of legislation. It is rare that we deliver social change in this place. It often occurs at a glacial pace. However, there are locks on the great canal of British history. Every so often, the locks open, the water flows and the ship of state moves on. It never occurs by unanimity. There will always be some in the avant-garde driving the canal boat through the locks, navigating carefully and ensuring that all the locks open and shut in synchronicity. Others may be less at the forefront—more at the bow of the ship perhaps, questioning, querying, holding to account and analysing the detail. Both are important as we consider any item of social change, and it is right that Parliament reflects all these views. As my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North has demonstrated, it is very rare to achieve unanimity on any social issue, not just among colleagues in this House but across the country as a whole. I would never object to anyone raising concerns about this sort of legislation when it comes before the House.

We all come to Bill Committees with expectations and enthusiasm. When I served on the Committee that considered the Deregulation Bill in 2014, we spent at least 45 minutes discussing the idea of abolishing the age limit for purchasing chocolate liqueurs. There was a great, furious controversy about how many chocolate liqueurs one had to eat to become inebriated, and no consensus was achieved. I therefore hope that we might achieve a somewhat more broad—in fact, unanimous—consensus on this Bill, which frankly is far more important than the age at which one can purchase a chocolate liqueur.

This Bill is exceedingly important to millions of people up and down the country who are facing the prospect of divorce, have gone through it in their past and have strong views as a consequence, or who are currently in a marriage and considering what they intend to do. Its provisions, taken together, provide for reformed legal requirements in England and Wales by which a marriage or civil partnership may be legally ended through a court order for a divorce or dissolution, or by which an order for separation may be made allowing the parties to a marriage or civil partnership to remain in a legal relationship, but to live apart.

I will start by stating what I hope is agreed by everyone, and is a core Government belief: that marriage is vital to our functioning as a society. It is deeply sad for all those involved when a marriage or civil partnership is beyond repair. The decision to seek a divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership is an intensely personal one. The Government have heard calls to reform the legal process so that it does not make matters worse—calls that are supported by evidence, including that which we have heard this morning, about the harm done by the current legal process and how it is out of step with reality.

The Bill does not seek in any way to diminish the importance of the commitment made when two parties enter into a marriage or civil partnership with each other; that is a profound and deeply personal commitment between two people. I declare an interest: like my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North, I am a Catholic, and I personally believe that marriage is a sacrament in the sight of God. Equally, I recognise that not everybody shares that point of view. We are looking purely at marriage as a civil institution; clearly, many people from many different faiths and none will have religious concerns, but today we are looking at the law on the dissolution of a marriage.

Relationships can, and ultimately do, fail. When a marriage or civil partnership breaks down and is beyond repair, the law must deal with reality, by creating the conditions for people to move forward with the minimum of acrimony and agree arrangements for the future in an orderly and constructive way. Above all, the legal process should not exacerbate conflict between parents, which is especially damaging for children. The process must better support and encourage parents to co-operate in bringing up their children.

The evidence is clear that the current legal requirements needlessly rake up the past to justify the legal ending of a relationship that is no longer a beneficial and functioning one. The requirement for one person to blame the other if it is not practical for them to separate for at least two years can introduce, or worsen, conflict at the outset of the process—conflict that may continue long after the legal process has concluded. Allegations about a spouse’s conduct may bear no relation to the real cause of the breakdown and can be damaging to any prospect that couples will reconcile or agree practical arrangements for the future. In the extremely difficult circumstances of divorce, the law should allow couples to move on constructively when reconciliation is not possible.

I will now deal with clause 1, which relates to divorce as a whole. This clause is key to the Government’s whole approach to this Bill and its principled approach to reducing conflict in divorce proceedings. Other clauses regarding the legal requirements for judicial separation, the dissolution of a civil partnership or the legal separation of civil partners reflect that same approach with the appropriate modifications. Clause 1 substitutes for section 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 a whole new section 1. The current section 1 contains the grounds for divorce, the legal requirements that a party must satisfy to establish those grounds to the satisfaction of the court, and the powers of the court to grant the divorce if so satisfied.

The sole legal ground for divorce—that the marriage has broken down irretrievably—is retained. Under the existing section 1, a petitioner for divorce is required to show one of the five facts to evidence irretrievable breakdown. Three of the facts relate to the other party’s conduct in terms of adultery, behaviour and desertion, and the remaining two relate to the continuous separation of the parties to the marriage before the petition for divorce is filed. In new section 1, the requirement to show a fact is removed and is substituted by a requirement that the divorce application be accompanied by a statement that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The new statement is to be conclusive evidence of irretrievable breakdown, and where such a statement has been validly made the court must make the divorce order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I wonder what the Minister thinks the purpose of that six-week delay really is. What does he think will happen in these marriages during that six-week period?

[Paul Maynard]

Part of the objective, I believe, is to improve the financial arrangements. People may wish to delay a little longer until such a point. It is not a maximum period; it is a minimum, and the process might well take longer. It is about ensuring that we take a progressive, step-by-step approach to bringing the marriage to an end, and people may wish to tie up further loose ends, which may take longer than six weeks. There has always been a six-week gap to ensure, if nothing else, that all the paperwork is in order.

Crucially, however, new section 1(5) introduces into the legal process of divorce a minimum period of 20 weeks between the start of proceedings and when a party, or either or both parties to a joint application, may confirm to the court that the conditional order may be made. Those two periods together will now mean that in nearly all cases a divorce may not be obtained in a shorter period than 26 weeks, or six months. The 20-week period is a key element of the reformed legal process. For the first time, a minimum period has been imposed before the conditional order of divorce is made. The intention is to allow greater opportunity for the applicant to reflect on the decision and to decide arrangements for the future where divorce becomes inevitable.

The prospect of a couple reconciling once divorce proceedings have started is low, but our intention is that the legal process should still allow for that possibility. It is never too late for a couple to change their mind, which is one reason why we have decided to retain the two-stage process for divorce.

Separately, the new section 1(8) inserted by clause 1 retains the ability of the court in an individual case to shorten the period between decree nisi and decree absolute, which are now the conditional order and the final order, and also extends this discretion to the new minimum period between the start of proceedings and when confirmation can be given that the court may grant the final order or divorce.

I will come on to some of the points that have been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North and by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bolton South East. My hon. Friend made some interesting and helpful points about how we can ensure, as I have just referred to, that this is as considered a process as possible, and how we can best utilise the 20-week period that I have just set out.

As my hon. Friend may have picked up during the evidence session earlier today, there is more going on to reform the divorce process than just what is in the Bill. There are a number of online initiatives to try to make the process smoother for those going through it, and one thing that we will look at is what changes we can make to that online process to signpost people towards mediation of some sort, counselling and so on, to make sure that they are aware of the broad range of options available to them, which they might not have thought of when they initiated the divorce process.

My hon. Friend also made a point regarding the Law Society’s concerns as to when that 20-week period should start. We have explored this at some length during the consultation. Starting the time period from the acknowledgement of service, as some have suggested, could incentivise an unco-operative party to delay a divorce and could enable a perpetrator of domestic abuse to exercise further coercive control, which is why we have erred on the side of starting it earlier than that.

It is also worth flagging the caveat that we should bear in mind at every stage of this process. When we talk about mediation at this stage of a divorce process, it is often around finances or childcare. The mediation that my hon. Friend and I might think of as laymen is more a form of marriage counselling and relationship support. We should always be careful about that: when we initiate a divorce proceeding, mediation takes on a slightly different meaning from what it might perhaps have during a marriage. As I mentioned to the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston, 20 weeks allows people more time to sort out their finances, in as constructive a way as possible.

The shadow Justice Minister mentioned the one-year bar on divorce and asked for the reason for that. I confess that I too have asked officials of the first rank what was in the Bill and why this might be. We consulted on it before the introduction of the Bill and there was certainly no broad consensus or hard and fast evidence either way. Many felt that it went against the grain of reforms that recognise marriage as an autonomous troth, as indeed did the Law Society and the Association of Her Majesty’s District Judges. Faced with a lack of consensus and a lack of hard evidence at this stage that the bar causes hardship or is a problem, we propose to keep the status quo. That does not mean to say that the law can never be changed, but we do not believe that it would be the right step at this stage.

Understandably, the shadow Justice Minister raised the issue of legal aid and indeed legal support for those going through a divorce. She will be more than aware that legal aid is already available for mediation for couples who have finances or child arrangements that are in dispute. This provides a non-litigious route, resolving issues and helping families to move forward constructively. We are also investing some £5 million to support innovation across the sector that will help people to access legal support as close to their community as possible.

The shadow Justice Minister rightly made a point about litigants in person. As I have said to her in the past at the Dispatch Box, we are doubling our investment in our litigant in person strategy, but the wider reforms that I have just mentioned with regard to online processes for divorce should make it simpler and more straightforward for people to initiate proceedings online, so they would have less need for active legal help at that stage of the process. The reform programme, the litigant in person strategy and the legal support action plan are all about opening up newer avenues to access legal support that are not just about someone getting that legal help as they come through the courtroom door.

On that particular note, I beg to move that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Judicial separation: removal of factual grounds

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

Does anybody wish to participate in debate on clause 2? I do not see anyone who does. Minister, do you wish to make any concluding remarks?

[Paul Maynard]

I am not sure people will have the patience for me to read out all my notes on every clause.

[The Chair]

There is no requirement.

[Paul Maynard]

I do feel I ought to. My notes are now all shorter than they were for clause 1. It might help Members if I make it clear for the sake of the record that clause 2 refers to the idea of judicial separation, by which a party to a marriage may obtain a judicial separation order. Judicial separation is rarely used nowadays, with fewer than 300 judicial separation petitions made annually in comparison with around 110,000 petitions for divorce. We recognise, however, that divorce is not an option for some couples because of deeply held religious or other beliefs. Judicial separation therefore continues to provide an important legal alternative for those couples, and that is why we have decided to retain it. Clause 2 broadly reflects the changes made in clause 1 and applies them to the issue of judicial separation. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Dissolution: removal of requirement to establish facts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

Minister, do you wish to make any opening remarks? Does anyone else wish to participate in debate on clause 3? I will take that as a no. Minister, do you wish to say anything in conclusion?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Maynard]

I was going to take clauses 3 and 4 together.

[The Chair]

You may refer to them both, but we have to take them separately.

[Paul Maynard]

The only point I will make to colleagues is that, just as we had judicial separation in clause 2, clause 3—and indeed, clause 4 for that matter—refers to civil partnerships and the Civil Partnership Act 2004. It once again takes all the elements I referred to in clause 1 and translates them on to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 so that that is also up to date from where we are currently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 4 and 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

We support the Bill very much. We had some concerns about the powers that the Lord Chancellor would have in relation to clause 6, but given that they are so limited in scope, we do not propose to object to them. However, we do not wish it go unnoticed that we have concerns about Ministers having—I will not call them Henry VIII powers in relation to divorce proceedings—draconian powers in pushing forward legislation that would remain as primary legislation. I will leave it at that. We do not oppose this clause, but I wish to put on record that we have wider concerns about Ministers’ powers.

[Paul Maynard]

I was going to say a few words on this clause, so I am grateful to have the chance to respond to the debate. The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly fair point about the delegated powers. We got the idea from the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which was introduced by the hon. Gentleman’s party. We are reflecting the changes in that Act in the Bill. The powers we are conferring on the Lord Chancellor were exercised by the High Court with the introduction of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. In 2004, when the legislation was updated, it was decided that the power was better vested in the Lord Chancellor for civil partnerships. We are now catching up across the broader spectrum of proceedings with that decision to move the power from the High Court to the Lord Chancellor. I can justify the devolved powers in question even to myself, and I can even call them Henry VIII powers.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clauses 7 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Maynard]

On a point of order, Mr McCabe. It is customary to give a lengthy thank you to all those who have participated in the Bill. I fear I would end up making a speech longer than any other speech if I tried to do so, but I thank all Members for their contributions, even if they have been silent contributions of good will emanating towards us. That is good enough for me.

More importantly, I thank all the officials who have worked hard on the Bill for many months. They may even be disappointed that we have taken only 47 minutes to progress it through Committee. I will put them at their ease, because if it is only 47 minutes, it means there is far less chance for me to muck it up at any stage. There will be a sigh of relief at the Ministry of Justice, I suspect, that I have been hidden from scrutiny by taking a bit less time. I thank all my officials and I thank you, Mr McCabe, for chairing the Committee so adeptly. You have facilitated our rocket-powered canal boat moving down the great canal of British history through one more set of locks.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I place on record my thanks to all Members who have attended today and those who spoke in the Chamber on Second Reading. I thank you, Mr McCabe, for your excellent chairing of this Bill Committee.