Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 16th October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) struck the right note when she said this is a serious debate. We have to discuss these issues with due seriousness, and my hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey) clearly set out our serious concerns about the Bill in her opening contribution.

The Bill should be unnecessary, and the Opposition hope it may yet be so. What the Government should be doing is setting their goal as the UK’s continued participation in Euratom as a member, if possible, or as close to that relationship as we can get. There is a lot of cross-party agreement on that goal—I exempt the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who extravagantly celebrated our crashing out of Euratom—but in the Westminster Hall debate on the issue back in July, ably led by my hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen), who is a champion of this sector, even the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who was here earlier and who is not a noted dove on these issues, said that we should be working

“towards something like associate membership.”—[Official Report, 12 July 2017; Vol. 627, c. 96WH.]

It appeared then that the barrier to that relationship was the role of the European Court of Justice, as the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) pointed out. Indeed, the former chief of staff to the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the former Chancellor of the Exchequer have both suggested that that is why Euratom was linked to the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, and the responsibility for that lies with the Prime Minister. It is deeply irresponsible to put our nuclear industry at risk because of a reckless and ideological decision to make the future role of the ECJ a red line in all matters relating to Brexit.

As hon. Members have pointed out, and as the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy said in his opening remarks, the Bill provides for safeguarding arrangements for all civilian nuclear facilities in the UK, which is clearly needed if we leave Euratom, but that is only one part of what is at risk. The wider issues were exercised in the Government’s own position paper, which was issued over the summer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) pointed out, Euratom oversees the transport of nuclear fuel across the EU and enables vital co-operation on information, infrastructure and funding of nuclear energy. It is the legal owner of all nuclear material, and the legal purchaser, certifier and guarantor of any nuclear materials and technologies that the UK purchases. That includes, for example, our nuclear trade with the United States.

Euratom has helped us become a world leader in nuclear research and development. In their position paper on the issue, the Government rightly said that they want a “close and working relationship” with Euratom, and we welcome that. That position paper set out six high-level principles for nuclear materials and safeguards that would frame their approach to the issue. So may I ask the Minister to explain why the Bill fails to address five of those six high-level principles, which are the Government’s own objectives?

Why is the Bill so limited in its scope? Is that because the Government aim to secure ongoing membership and have just brought this Bill forward as a contingency? Will the Minister confirm the answer that I understood the Secretary of State to give to the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill): that it is the Government’s intention to seek associate membership? Is it because their thinking has not advanced sufficiently on all the other issues connected with our membership of Euratom? Or is it, as was said by some of the more excitable Conservative Members, such as the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), that they are looking forward to crashing out of Euratom—[Interruption.] Perhaps “excitable” was not quite the right word, but he was working towards it. Given that the Prime Minister has talked it up, will the Minister say what work has been done on a no-deal scenario in the event that we leave Euratom in the way that some Conservative Members would seem to like?

[Tom Pursglove]

Is not the whole purpose of a Bill such as this to stop anybody crashing out? The hon. Gentleman is using totally irresponsible language.

[Paul Blomfield]

I agree that it is irresponsible language and I am sorry to have heard it from some Conservative Members during this debate.

This is an important issue and the sector is hugely important, as the hon. Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) pointed out in a thoughtful and informed contribution when she said that it is important that we get this right. The Government therefore need to answer some key questions. The ONR cannot exercise these new powers until it has a voluntary offer agreement and additional protocol from the IAEA for a UK safeguards regime. What work has been done on that and when do the Government anticipate that will be ratified? What have the Government done to ensure that the ONR has the necessary skills to take on the safeguarding of nuclear material? Euratom employs 160 people on safeguarding, 25% of whom work on UK installations, whereas the ONR currently employs eight staff. I understand that it takes five years to train a nuclear safeguards inspector. Two years will not be long enough to reskill the necessary number of inspectors. Are plans under way to re-employ the current Euratom officials or do the Government have another contingency up their sleeve?

[Dr Drew]

The problem is that the nuclear industry is not currently able to call on that level of expertise. It already suffers because of a shortage of labour in many parts of the industry, so that can only get worse.

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point, which I am coming straight to. As a number of Members have mentioned, it is planned to halve the current Government grant to the ONR by 2020. I recognise that this is only one part of the ONR’s funding, but can the Minister confirm that that is no longer the Government’s intention? Will he outline what their new funding plans would be, given the additional responsibilities they are seeking to place on the ONR?

An important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), and echoed by some others, was that outside Euratom the Government would have to negotiate individual nuclear collaboration agreements not simply with Euratom, but with every country outside of the EU with which we currently co-operate through our membership, including the US, China, Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan and South Korea. The right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) mentioned the example of the United States. A section 123 agreement with the US—a legal necessity if we are to trade nuclear goods with the US—would have to go through the Senate and the House of Representatives, with final sign-off needed from the President. Does the Minister really believe it is possible to achieve that in the time we have left?

What provisions have been put in place to ensure that normal business in the UK is not disrupted? As the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) pointed out, an important part of that will be ensuring that the UK has the right skills to build, operate and decommission nuclear power stations. What will be the Government’s migration policy for the nuclear worker who previously enjoyed free movement under the provision of the Euratom treaty?

A key benefit of the UK’s involvement in Euratom has been our participation in R and D programmes. The Government have given limited commitments on Culham, but what are their wider intentions on the full Euratom work programme from 2019-20 onward?

Seventeen months does not give us much time to resolve such a huge number of issues. The paralysis at the heart of the negotiations, created by the divisions at the heart of the Government, do not give us much confidence that the issues can be resolved within the time available. One further key question: will the Government seek to continue membership of Euratom—or to come to an arrangement that replicates the benefits and responsibilities of that membership—for a transitional period after we leave the EU in March 2019?

The Bill is inadequate. It fails to address so many of the vital questions that the Government themselves raised in their own position paper. It gives the Secretary of State powers to amend legislation without reference to the House—powers that, although narrower in scope, in many ways go further than those in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. For these reasons, we cannot support it. Nevertheless, we recognise that, if the worst comes to the worst—as some Government Members seem to anticipate—and we crash out without agreement, we would be in breach of our international responsibilities under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons if we do not have a safeguarding regime in place. For that reason, we will seek to amend the Bill significantly in Committee, but we will not oppose it tonight.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (First sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 31st October 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)]

My husband, father and brother work at Sellafield, as well as many other family members.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I am a member of Unite.

Examination of Witness

Dr Mina Golshan gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Richard Harrington)]

Q Dr Golshan, thank you for appearing today. I know that you are a regular at these things. From your point of view, how critical are safeguards in underpinning the UK nuclear industry?

Dr Golshan: Establishing a domestic safeguards regime, now that the policy decision has been made that the UK will be leaving the Euratom treaty, is fundamental to the industry in the UK. It is the cornerstone of establishing nuclear co-operation agreements. It is essential for the industry to operate. Without a domestic safeguards regime in the UK that works in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency requirements, the industry simply will not be able to operate.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I want to ask you about the Office for Nuclear Regulation’s capacity to take on the additional responsibilities implicit in the Bill, given your current staffing levels and the large number of people employed by Euratom to fulfil these roles.

Dr Golshan: Perhaps I should start by saying that, given our membership of Euratom, it has not been necessary for the UK and ONR to build capacity and resilience in this area. Now that we are in a different position, we have started to recruit. The first phase of recruitment is complete. We successfully recruited four individuals, three of whom have already started with us. An area of shortage for us was subject matter expertise. That was a worry for me, but I am pleased to say that we will hopefully be in a position to rectify that by the middle of this month.

Broadly, we need to continue with our recruitment if we are to staff ourselves in order to deliver the new safeguards function. In the first instance we need an additional 10 to 12 inspectors, which will bring us to a level that allows the UK to fulfil its international obligations, but we have already heard from the Secretary of State that the intention is to put in place a regime that is equivalent to Euratom. That will require ONR to recruit further and will mean around 20 additional inspectors. We know that we are dealing with a limited pool of expertise, and our success so far, although encouraging, is by no means the end of the story.

[The Chair]

Dr Golshan, can I ask you to speak up slightly, because this is a very large room and we are having trouble hearing you. I am getting older—you know how it is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Bradley (Mansfield) (Con)]

Q Can you tell us a bit about the ONR’s track record of delivering new regulation previously? Do you feel that you have the right relationships within the industry to deliver this new programme?

Dr Golshan: It is fair to say that this is unprecedented territory for us as far as the size of the job is concerned. In the past we have not had to establish a new function from afresh to this extent, but we have got experience of setting out and working with officials from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy—and previously the Department for Energy and Climate Change—to bring forward new regulation.

We are working closely with officials at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and we have engaged with the industry—I have had a number of meetings with the industry. We are explaining what we are doing, how far we have gone down this route and what there is left to do. We are working with all our stakeholders to make a success of this.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q May I follow up on your earlier answer, Dr Golshan? You have been clear and helpful. From what I understood, you said that you were recruiting an additional 10 to 12 inspectors now, with the potential of a further 20. Is that the whole size of the establishment you might be looking for? I might be wrong, but I understand that Euratom employs about 40 people on nuclear safeguarding in relation to UK establishments.

Dr Golshan: Let me break it into two bits. Our intention is to start recruiting in the new year for the additional 10 to 12 people we will require. The reason is that we were waiting for the Second Reading of the Bill to give us some certainty in relation to the people we are going to take on permanently. That process will start. In relation to your next question, on Euratom’s numbers, for its own purposes, Euratom carries out activities in the UK that, as a state delivering an equivalent regime, we would not need to deliver. The order of 20 to 25 is not far from what we need to staff ourselves to deliver this function.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q This is a sector with which most of us are—with some exceptions—relatively unfamiliar.

[The Chair]

Mr Blomfield, could you speak up? Not all of us can hear you.

[Paul Blomfield]

Can you give us a little more understanding of the talent pool from which you are drawing, the recruitment opportunities and the training needs there might be to fulfil the skills needs you anticipate?

Dr Golshan: As I mentioned at the beginning, although these do not seem like large numbers, we are dealing with a limited talent pool here: the expertise is unique. As I said, the UK as a whole has not had to focus on developing resilience in this area, so we are limited in what and who we can recruit.

The next step, if we are getting the right expertise in these people, is to turn them into regulators and inspectors. That means that our training function—training materials and expertise in training these individuals—needs to develop. We have started that process, but it is a long road and I am not going to sit here and pretend that it is all going to be a smooth run.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q Could you give us a sense of the length of that road? How long will it take you to get from A to B?

Dr Golshan: Our aim, currently, is to have a system in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international obligations by March 2019, which is when we intend to leave Euratom. I have been very clear in the past—I will repeat it here—that we will not be able to replicate Euratom standards on day one. That is unrealistic, and given the scale of what needs to be put in place, I fear that if we go that way, the best will become the enemy of the good. So it is important that we focus our efforts on delivering a regime that enables the UK to meet its international obligations.

[Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)]

Q Now that the Bill has been introduced, what in your view is the main priority in developing a new nuclear safeguards regime for the UK?

Dr Golshan: There are a number of aspects. The first one is to ensure that the secondary legislation is in place at the right time, because that provides us with the mechanisms to exercise our powers. The Bill itself is an enabling part—it gives us the fundamental powers—and the secondary legislation gives us the mechanisms to deliver. Secondary legislation will also give us some certainty in relation to what guidance and standards we need to develop to make this happen.

For us, we need to have an IT system; a safeguards information management system. It is a live system that enables us to get data from our licensees, to process those data and to put them into a reporting format that the IAEA currently receives from Euratom. We are working on that; it is at proof of concept stage at the moment. Once we have established that we are able to do it, we will need to move into a phase that determines whether we are going to do it in-house, tender it out, or have a combination of the two.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Harrington]

Q Thank you, Mr Cowan, Mr Leech and Tom, for your support for the Bill. Everything you have said is the reason why we are introducing the Bill, and I thank you very much for your support for it. I have read your opinions and amendments and have taken them into consideration. Thank you very much for the work that you have done. Please do not think that the evidence that you have given is taken lightly, but I must underpin that by confirming your answer to a previous question, which was that you do support the Bill. I accept fully the reasons why you do.

Rupert Cowan: We support the Bill completely. We suggest the amendments for the reasons described.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I want to explore the concerns about the gap between the existing safeguarding regime and that envisaged by the Bill. Dr Golshan said that the new regime that she was seeking to establish would not replicate the functions undertaken by Euratom in relation to safeguarding. I am also conscious that the NIA’s evidence talked about the importance of leaving without any gap, but that you were worried about the gaps provided. I wonder whether you could elaborate on that a little more, Tom.

Tom Greatrex: As the ONR said earlier this morning, it will not be possible to replicate the safeguarding regime on day one. If the Government have said that they intend to replicate the standards that we currently have as a member of Euratom, there is obviously a concern that we will not be in the position where we will be meeting the same standards at the point at which we leave Euratom. That is the crucial point about the need for a transitional arrangement or parallel working—there are different ways of describing what is broadly the same thing—which is to avoid that gap.

If you do not have the correct arrangements in place, as you have heard from others on the panel, the series of other arrangements that are effectively contingent on the safeguarding regime will not be able to be in place. That is why it affects absolutely everything to do with the functioning of the industry as it currently functions and has functioned for the past 40 years or more.

We can take a practical example. Because of the international nature of the nuclear industry, the Sizewell reactor currently generating power in Suffolk is based on Westinghouse technology. That technology is therefore US technology. Because of the legal requirement to have a nuclear co-operation agreement in place, there are very real—these are not scare stories—and legitimate concerns that even the ability to exchange information between the operators of the site, EDF and where the technology originates from will potentially be illegal at the point when we come out of Euratom, if we do not have successor arrangements in place or a period of time to enable the transition to be finalised and for the new regime to be put in the place.

It is not about being against the Bill. The Bill does the first step, but there are many more subsequent steps that have to be taken. The ability to do that in a very limited timeframe is the cause of the majority of the concern.

[The Chair]

We will discuss that in this room when we are considering subsequent Bills, no doubt.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Second sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 31st October 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Trudy Harrison]

Q We have heard examples of how we need it; are there examples of why other countries need it in place, for their own benefit?

Angela Hepworth: Yes; there is a nuclear supply chain across the EU and the UK is a great opportunity for those countries. For example, two-thirds of the value of the construction of Hinkley Point will go to companies in the UK but that leaves one-third of the value of the construction going to countries from further afield. Many of those are companies in Europe but, for example, there are companies in the US and Japan which are also involved in the Hinkley Point supply chain. It is in the interests of those companies and countries to have future co-operation agreements which enable them to participate in the supply chain. The UK has great opportunities for international companies: there is supporting the operation of the existing nuclear fleet; there is the nuclear new build programme; there is decommissioning coming up. So there should be real opportunities for other companies to be involved in the UK supply chain if we can get those agreements in place.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Q On the same theme, in your evidence you very diplomatically describe the challenge that we face, even if the Bill proceeds in a timely manner. The legal and practical challenges to the Government and the ONR to put the necessary arrangements and resources in place remain significant. I guess that what you are trying to say, in code, is that that is not really very doable by March 2019.

Angela Hepworth: I am not saying it is not doable; I am saying it is challenging. You heard first-hand from Dr Mina Golshan of the ONR this morning about the practical steps that need to be taken. There is an awful lot that it needs to do in terms of recruitment and having systems and processes set up. We are mindful of the fact that that is a challenge in the time available. That is one reason we support an implementation or transitional phase.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q You would find it helpful to have that in the Bill?

Angela Hepworth: Again, we are looking for assurance and clarity. I am less concerned about whether that is set out in the Bill or not; it is assurance and clarity that the industry is looking for.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q From the point of view of EDF’s operations across the world, what is your view on whether, and in what form, association with Euratom might be a reasonable proposition for the future, and on whether the associations already in existence might fit the bill as possible models for UK association with Euratom?

Angela Hepworth: In terms of a future relationship, EDF Energy has been clear from the outset that far and away the best outcome for the UK nuclear industry would be to remain in Euratom. That remains, we think, the right answer for the UK nuclear industry. Assuming that that is not possible and that we have to look at a future agreement, the models of association agreements in place now are limited to engagement in research and development programmes. That is valuable, but it does not address the key issue that we are concerned about, which is the movement of nuclear materials. What we are most concerned about in all of this is our ability to move nuclear fuel, nuclear components, information and services. The current framework of association agreements would not meet that need. If that were going to solve the key issues, we would need to think of some different model of association.

--- Later in debate ---

[Trudy Harrison]

Q So that critical path when there is project management talk about what steps need to be taken on what date and by whom.

Sue Ferns: Indeed, and what the risks are at each stage, so that they can be known and are transparent. I am sure that various stakeholders are working on them at the moment, but I do not think that the critical path with the risks at each stage is a transparent timeline at the moment.

Another thing that would build confidence is making it clear that everyone will work to achieve this, but if we do not achieve it, we must have a longer transition period. For the sake of the industry, we absolutely cannot afford to step out of the regime that we have now until it is absolutely clear that there are equivalent standards in place and that they are operating. It is quite difficult to impose an arbitrary timescale on that because, as I said, there are a number of risk factors: specifying, procuring and getting new IT systems up and running—there is not always a great track record on that—and making sure that we have appropriately qualified and skilled inspectors.

Reflecting on the previous question, Kevin is absolutely right: the UK has a first-class reputation. We all know how easily reputations can be lost. They take years to win, but they do not take years to lose. There should be a combination of having the critical path, which is transparent about the risks at each stage, and being clear that if we need a longer transition in this sphere, we should have a longer transition because that is in the interests of the industry.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I want to pursue the issue of the time that it will take to get the necessary staff in place. Sue, you said that you were uncertain about the training period. Prior to this Committee, it had been suggested that it could take up to five years to train safeguards inspectors. Is that a reasonable period?

Sue Ferns: I think that that is a reasonable assumption. The reason I said I was a bit uncertain is that it depends on where you get these people from and what their previous experience is. A reasonable approximation is several years—it is not a matter of months but years for people to be able to do that job. Yes, it is about knowledge and skills—and there are a lot of knowledge and skills in the industry—but there are specific aspects of an inspector’s role. This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role. I think that it is a period of years. Of all the things that worry ONR, this is probably one of the key ones, if not the key one. As I say, I think it is doing the absolute best it can, but this is one of the things that keeps them awake at night.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q That comment probably reflects the very helpful conversation we had with Dr Golshan this morning. I think we all formed the impression that it is doing its very best, but that there is a real worry about the size of the talent pool from which it could draw. Do you want to reflect on that?

Sue Ferns: Absolutely. It is a small talent pool, and it is a challenging talent pool even in the best of times. To use what may or may not be an appropriate analogy, it is fishing in a defined and restricted pool, and we are now saying it has to increase its catch from that pool. That is a hard and really difficult thing to do. Also bear in mind that ONR is subject to public sector constraints in its recruitment and payment practices. If it has to compete with the commercial sector, something will have to give in that regard. How can the catch from that limited pool be increased under the constraints it is operating in? The job is getting tougher and bigger, and there are multiple challenges.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q You said in your evidence, Sue, that you were concerned that the powers of the inspectors were not set out in the Bill. Can you elaborate on exactly what your concerns are?

Sue Ferns: The concerns are set out in our evidence. If you look at sections 20 to 22 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013, they set out in some detail what the powers of the inspectors will be. I know there is reference to that in the schedule to the Bill. These concerns come directly from people who will have to do this job. As warranted inspectors, they feel that it is important to have those powers in the Bill. It is important for purposes of parity, to ensure continuity—these things should not be left to the discretion of future Ministers—and also, as we have discussed, for external confidence in the way the job will be done. That is why we believe very strongly that those powers should be specified. I have not heard an argument to say why, if it is good enough for the 1974 Act and the 2013 Act, we should contemplate a change in practice for this piece of legislation.

[Dr Whitehead]

Q May I briefly follow up on that thought? As you say, schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013 looks like a comprehensive range of powers and definitions for what inspectors can and cannot do, except it excludes nuclear safeguarding from that definition. If nuclear safeguarding were included among those powers for inspectors, would it be the case in your view that what is in the 2013 Act—provided you switched off those prohibitions—would be sufficient to give the inspectors the powers and the arrangements they felt would be necessary for the transfer of inspection from Euratom to ONR? Or are there other matters that you think should perhaps be included in the schedule to the Bill that would comprehensively do the job, as far as those inspectors were concerned?

Sue Ferns: I think achieving that would be an important step forward. However, as we have set out in our evidence, we have identified three other matters, because you would then have to be clear about what safeguarding means in law. The three bullet points in paragraph 5 of our evidence are points where we think that specific clarity is required in relation to what that would mean in a safeguarding regime. Is that clear?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mary Robinson]

Q Are they being attracted here?

Professor Matthews: They were, but they are not any more.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q Professor, could we return to your primary concern, which we have also exercised with previous witnesses? It concerns the ability of the ONR to recruit sufficient inspectors by March 2019—you helpfully clarified the difference between safeguarding inspectors and safety inspectors. How likely is it that the ONR could meet the staffing levels necessary to take over the Euratom function in safeguarding by that date?

Professor Matthews: I heard the recording this morning of the ONR representative. It looks unlikely that it will be fully functioning by March in two years’ time. The question is: how can we bridge the gap until everything is working properly?

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I guess in lots of other areas, having got close and being not quite but almost fully functioning might be satisfactory. In this specific area, what are the consequences of not having a fully functioning safeguarding regime in place?

Professor Matthews: Springfields, which produces nuclear fuel, will stop working. The Urenco plant at Capenhurst, which is part of three plants in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, will stop working because it will not be able to move uranium around. We in the UK no longer do conversion, which is changing uranium into uranium hexafluoride, which then goes to the enrichment plant and is converted back to oxide or metal for application. That requires movement, and all of that would stop.

It would be difficult for Sellafield and other decommissioning sites, such as the old research sites at Dounreay, Harwell or Winfrith; some of the work there would grind to a halt as well. Eventually, when the fuel charges were removed from reactors operating in EDF Energy’s plant, those would all stop, which would take something like 9 GW of power out of our network at a time when we are perilously close to blackouts. It would be a very serious measure indeed if there was a hiatus.

[Richard Harrington]

Thank you for that, Professor Matthews. You are of course using my argument for why we need the Bill; thank you for supporting it. Dr Mina Golshan, whose organisation is responsible for recruiting the 15 people we are talking about, said that recruitment had already started. Once the Bill proceeded beyond Second Reading—I thank everyone, including Opposition Members, for voting for that—it meant that the financial resources needed for the IT and recruitment are provided. We are very well aware of that.

I thank you for your de facto support for the Bill. I have of course noted the points you have made, and I will be very happy to chat about them on another occasion. The purpose of the Bill is precisely to get over some of the obstacles that you are talking about and prevent what you have explained would happen—as we accept would happen—if we did not have a safeguards regime in place.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Third sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 2nd November 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Richard Harrington]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that valid point, which requires both a simple and a complex answer. The simple answer is that there is a sequence, and the agreements have to be ready but will not come into force until after we leave Euratom. The IAEA has a ratification procedure, which I intend to come to. The agreements have to be ratified by its board. The bilateral agreements referred to have to be ratified by the Parliaments of each country involved. I am not led to believe that that will be a problem, because I am pleased to say that these negotiations are more in the form of constructive discussions than one side wanting one thing and another side wanting another. What I am about to say will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions. If not, I am sure that he will say so, and I am happy to meet him any time to discuss that.

I understand that hon. Members are concerned to ensure that there is parliamentary scrutiny. I have covered that, but I must stress that the measures in the amendment would be a significant departure from the usual position on the ratification of treaties, and I do not consider it appropriate in the context of the Bill. As Members will be aware, the UK Government are responsible for negotiating and signing international treaties involving the UK and always have been. The ratification of international treaties is covered in legislation, as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provides a ratification process that requires treaties to be laid before Parliament prior to ratification, except in exceptional circumstances—I do not know what the exceptional circumstances are, but I imagine they would be a war or something like that.

The Government have the power to conclude international treaties under their prerogative powers. Of course, that cannot automatically change domestic law or rights and cannot make major changes to the UK’s constitutional arrangements without parliamentary authority. That remains the case for international agreements relating to safeguards that are currently under negotiation—for example, the nuclear co-operation agreements currently being negotiated with the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, and the new safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Parliament will therefore have the opportunity to consider those agreements before they come into force.

We have been open and honest with Parliament about ongoing negotiations and will continue to do so. The intention is for those agreements to be presented to Parliament before ratification, ahead of the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom, and they will come into force immediately upon our exit. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr McCabe. I hope to respond to the Minister with the same collaborative approach he has tried to set for the Committee, and I hope all our discussions will be along those lines.

It is worth saying at the outset that I do not doubt for one moment—I do not think any Opposition Members do—the Minister’s good intent in seeking to reassure us on this issue. However, it is also important to recognise in not only this discussion but the wider discussions we will have in our remaining sittings just what is at stake. On a number of issues relating to our negotiations on exiting the European Union, Departments have shown good intention, but because there has been insufficient follow-through, that intention has not necessarily produced the outcomes to reassure other sectors.

It might be in some other areas possible to blur things a little bit at the edges, but we need to remind ourselves of the evidence we had from Professor Matthews on Tuesday. Nothing can be left to chance here. Professor Matthews outlined that if we do not get the safeguarding regime right, the consequences are that,

“Springfields, which produces nuclear fuel, will stop working. The Urenco plant at Capenhurst…will stop working because it will not be able to move uranium around.”

He went on to say:

“It would be difficult for Sellafield and other decommissioning sites, such as the old research sites at Dounreay, Harwell or Winfrith; some of the work there would grind to a halt as well.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 43, Q88.]

There is a lot at stake in ensuring we get this not just more or less right, but precisely right. That is one of the key factors behind our amendment. We must not simply be reassured in the Committee; Parliament needs to be reassured and to have the opportunity to express its view on this before we face the sort of consequences that Professor Matthews talked about.

The Minister has reassured us—again, I do not doubt his intention—on the full parliamentary scrutiny through the affirmative process. My reading of the clauses suggests that there is a bit more ambiguity. New paragraph (1B), which he referred to, says that the Secretary of State will not necessarily provide regulations but “may by regulations”, which gives quite a significant grey area. If the Minister is as sure as he indicated that there will be full parliamentary scrutiny by the affirmative process, the simplest thing to do would be to accept our amendment, which seeks nothing less.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out in some detail the path by which he considers Parliament would have some scrutiny of the arrangements with the IAEA when they come about. However, I am concerned, as is my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), about whether what the Minister points to in the Bill actually does the job he thinks it does.

In new subsection (1)(1A) and (1B), inserted by clause 1(3), there is a curious circularity. I will not go through the whole thing, but new paragraph (1B) states:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations specify agreements for the purposes of subsection (1A)(b).”

If we then look at paragraph (1A)(b), it says:

“is specified in regulations under subsection (1B)”.

We then go back to paragraph (1B), and the regulations specified there are the regulations that the Secretary of State may make—that is it. We do not get very far in what I consider real parliamentary scrutiny by that semi-circular argument.

It appears that a relevant international agreement is as specified under new paragraph (1B), and a relevant agreement can be specified by regulations that the Secretary of State may make. If the Secretary of State does not pass regulations specifying those agreements, that is not the case, and the relevant international agreement then does not apply for the purposes of the legislation.

I suggest it would be far simpler to accept our amendment in view of the unique circumstances we are in at the moment. We are having to make treaties anew, and we need to be satisfied that they fully replace what we previously had for a number of years through Euratom. I appreciate that that is a voluntary agreement that has been entered into, and I appreciate that that agreement will undoubtedly be pursued in the light of co-operation, because of the voluntary nature of the agreements being entered into by the IAEA.

The central fact of the matter is that that is being undertaken not only while the Committee considers what it is going to do, but is actually tucked into the legislation as something that will remain outside what the Committee considers, because we have to take decisions about what we want to make our safeguarding regime look like when we do not know what those agreements will consist of. Having this particular system in place, which I accept is not the case for all international treaties, as far as the Bill is concerned, appears to close the circle, as far as the relationship between what the Committee is doing and what the treaty will look like when it comes out is concerned.

As I said, unless someone explains to me that I have completely misread new paragraphs (1A) and (1B), and that there is something else there that does not actually do what I think it says it does, I cannot take full reassurance from those clauses in the way the Minister suggests.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Fourth sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 2nd November 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)]

I said earlier that I do not think there is public energy behind us not participating in Euratom in some way. Similarly, in our discussions, neither the experts we had in front of us nor hon. Members said that leaving Euratom is desirable and that we should actively choose to do it. Rather, it is a necessity of circumstance, and this Bill is a contingency to cover such an event.

I am in favour of this cluster of amendments and the new clause, because it is important that we provide evidence that we have taken every step to try to maintain what is currently a successful relationship. In doing so, we will resolve the debilitating difference of legal opinion on this matter, as my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test characterised it.

The Minister said clearly that we are leaving Euratom, but on Second Reading of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, the right hon. Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones), who at that point was a member of the ministerial team for the Department for Exiting the European Union, said:

“Triggering article 50 therefore also entails giving notice to leave Euratom.”—[Official Report, 1 February 2017; Vol. 620, c. 1131.]

I believe there is a difference between saying we are leaving and saying we have to leave, as, in effect, the right hon. Gentleman said. The Minister may say that that is a distinction without a difference. However, in the first sitting of this Committee, we took evidence from two senior lawyers in this area—Jonathan Leech and Rupert Cowan from Prospect Law—and I asked them whether triggering article 50 necessitated, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, leaving Euratom as well. Jonathan Leech said, “No”, and Rupert Cowan said, “Absolutely not.” Jonathan Leech continued to say:

“The advice would be that you do not have to accept this and it may not be in your interests to do so.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 12, Q23.]

This is clearly contested space.

We subsequently heard, as my hon. Friend said, that perhaps it is something to do with the Government’s preferred future approach to the European Court of Justice. Perhaps they think we ought to escape immediately anything that seems to have some sort of tie to the ECJ. That may well be the view of the Prime Minister and No. 10, but it is considerably different from what was said on Second Reading of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which is that we have to do it.

Leaving Euratom is a political choice and, as such, ought to be debated in the usual way. We should make a democratic decision about it. The best way for us to do that, as Members across the Committee have said, is to carry on with this contingency Bill, but in doing so prove the case either way. I am perfectly willing to accept that there will be conflicting legal advice. A Minister has been very clear in this place that he believes it to be absolutely one way, and this Committee has heard evidence to the complete contrary. The best way to resolve that is for us to see the information and talk about it. Critically, as these amendments require, future Ministers should lay before both Houses of Parliament what advice they have taken, what course they have chosen and why they have had to do that. If they do that, I believe that both the House and the public will have confidence that that very difficult, possibly traumatic, decision is the only one that could have been taken.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Unsurprisingly, I rise to speak in favour of this cluster of amendments and the new clause, which gets to the very heart of our purpose here. We should be at one—I am sure we are—with the Minister, who described the Bill as a contingency. We should see it as a safety net, but the overriding ambition should be to stay within Euratom.

All the witnesses we heard in our evidence session on Tuesday said, when the Minister pressed them on it, that they support the Bill, but only if we cannot remain in Euratom, which would be a far more preferable option. My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test set out the case very well in his opening remarks. There is a strong case for having a purpose clause that frames the Bill, because of its unique characteristics. The other amendments will fall into place. If that is the position, we need to say that full membership is our negotiating purpose in the Brexit talks. If that proves not to be possible, we need to set out, as amendment 3 suggests, a strategy for seeking associate membership, recognising that the current examples of associate membership fall short of what we would hope to achieve. However, we are in unknown territory in all these negotiations over our departure from the European Union.

Amendment 1 sets out that, if this is a safety net, what are the conditions under which we have to open it? That should be in the form of a report from the Secretary of State. Amendment 8 clearly sets out the requirement for Parliament to fully explore the many other benefits of Euratom membership, whether in relation to medical isotopes or to the research work in nuclear fusion at Culham, which we lead the world in. This is an important cluster of proposals from Labour and we hope they are all helpful.

The contribution my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North made a moment ago brings us to a central political issue: why are we in this position when there appears to be such unanimity about wishing to remain in Euratom? He made a point about the discussion on Second Reading. As far back as February I challenged the then Minister of State at the Department for Exiting the European Union, the right hon. Member for Clwyd West, about suggestions that it was the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice that had led the Government to issue a notice to withdraw from Euratom. In response, he told the House:

“it would not be possible for the UK to leave the EU and continue its current membership of Euratom.”—[Official Report, 8 February 2017; Vol. 621, c. 523.]

However, as we know, there are conflicting legal views on that. The Government have, apparently at the desire of No. 10, chosen to take one set of views, which is why they decided to trigger the departure from Euratom alongside the article 50 proposals. I am sure that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer is highly regarded by hon. Members on the Government Benches. In his new role he wrote, on 10 July, that the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union

“was open to Britain remaining party to the Euratom Treaty…It was Mrs May who overruled Mr Davis and others in the Cabinet, such as Greg Clarke, to insist that we sacrifice those sensible international arrangements on the altar of the dogmatic purity of Brexit.”

I would not want to disagree with the former Chancellor of the Exchequer on this point.

Here we see a Bill that has been introduced partly because there has been an apparent surrender of the real negotiating ambition that we should have of remaining within Euratom, simply because of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That dogmatic red line, as the former Chancellor of the Exchequer describes it, is something we should be concerned about, because remaining in Euratom makes such overwhelming sense to everybody involved in the industry and to Members on both sides of the House. It was interesting when we had the debate on Euratom in Westminster Hall in July that the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who is not a noted dove on issues relating to the European Union, said that we should surely explore some closer form of co-operation and that we should not rule out some form of associate membership of Euratom. There is a huge consensus on this issue. It is unfortunate that this red line about the ECJ has got in the way of what is transparently in the interest of not only the industry but our country. It is all the more ludicrous when we recognise that in all the period the ECJ has been the arbitration body in relation to the European Atomic Energy Community, the Minister would find it hard to identify a single ruling—there have not been many—that we have not supported.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Harrington]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I sympathise with the Opposition’s general aim, but I disagree with how they are going about it. I also disagree with the definition of “membership”, but I will come on to that in a minute.

I think the Opposition would accept that the Government would be reckless to do anything other than start what we are doing now, irrespective of the views of Members on both sides of the Committee about whether we should have membership, whether to call it associate membership, which I argue it is not, and whether it is a looser arrangement or a closer one. Contingency means that we are in the process of setting up a regulatory regime.

The amendments cover the fundamental issue of the UK’s future relationship with Euratom, which I understand. I think most commentators, experts and Members would accept that we have had many benefits from Euratom. As I said yesterday at the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, we could not find any ECJ judgments that we have been involved in. There may be some, but the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), who is probably a lot cleverer than me in many ways—she is a physicist—could not find any, and we have not found any. In practice, this has not been an appellate jurisdiction issue at all. It has been providing a set of rules that we have all abided by. As far as I can see, it has gone pretty well.

[Paul Blomfield]

This seems to be an appropriate opportunity for the Minister to confirm that he agrees with us that the Government’s negotiating ambition should be that we remain a member of Euratom.

[Richard Harrington]

I cannot, unfortunately, confirm that, but I can confirm that it is our intention to have as close a relationship as possible with Euratom, to cover the areas that Euratom covers with us at the moment.

The Government decided to serve the article 50 notice to leave the European Union. I am not a lawyer, but I accept the legal advice on both sides and have read a lot of the commentary around it. Whatever our views on that, it has been done, and it is our job as a Government to set up a suitable regulatory regime and negotiate with Euratom the closest possible relationship.

I would like to deal with the question of associate membership. It has been used in amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which will come before the House, and it has been mentioned a lot in conversation. I have had conversations with the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, the hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), and with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey).

Associate membership implies a form of membership that I am sure one would have at the finer gentlemen’s clubs in London—not that I belong to any—where someone can be a member or an associate member. It is not like that, as I am sure hon. Members accept. I do not want to make too much of the terminology, because there is not an off-the-peg associate membership. There are agreements with two countries, which have been mentioned—Switzerland and Ukraine, with Ukraine being the most recent. I could go into more detail, and I am happy to if there are further questions.

Switzerland’s agreement is purely for research and development—I do not make light of that; it is a really good thing—and Ukraine’s is that and a little bit more, but neither is actually akin to Euratom membership. Those are a close form of association in their fields, but we are looking for a close form of association in every single field that Euratom covers, of which the nuclear safeguards is one element, although there are important others.

[Paul Blomfield]

The Minister will have noted that I pointed out in my remarks that both existing forms of associate membership—for Switzerland and Ukraine—would not meet the requirements to which we aspire. However, the difference there is surely that neither of those were formerly full members of Euratom. We are in the unique position of withdrawing from Euratom, and the negotiations therefore put us in a different sort of place, as other Ministers have argued in relation to other aspects of the negotiations.

[Richard Harrington]

I fully accept the hon. Gentleman’s point. I only mentioned Ukraine and Switzerland because they were mentioned by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test in terms of associate membership. I accept that they are different; in fact, that would be one of my main points were I reading my notes, but I am not, because I am trying to respond to the question.

Article 206 of the Euratom treaty deals with association. I quote from it:

“The Community may conclude with one or more States or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.”

It may seem pedantic but I think it is an important point: it is an association, not membership. However, what is in a name? I accept that we or any country can try to negotiate any kind of arrangement it wants with Euratom or anyone else; it takes two sides and a lot of goodwill.

However, I feel that the coverage sometimes gives the impression to my constituents who take an interest in this—I accept, as colleagues have said before, that very few actually do—but who are not studying it in detail that there is an open option for associate membership or for rejoining after we leave. I am sure that anything is on the table with Euratom, but our negotiations are entirely on the basis that we will leave Euratom on the same date as we leave the European Union, and that we are negotiating for ourselves the closest possible agreements for all of the activities.

We have mentioned safeguards, but for the record—I know hon. Members are probably aware of this—I will briefly mention the other important activities: research and development, which we have discussed; the Common Market trade arrangements for nuclear goods or products—let us call it free movement of goods and products; free movement of nuclear workers, which we discussed the importance of yesterday, in the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, and the day before; and the setting of safety standards through regulations and directives, even if they are not carried out directly by Euratom, as we discussed this morning. In many ways, the R and D side is the easiest of them. We briefly discussed Ukraine and we certainly discussed Switzerland. I believe that progress can be made quickly on those things.

On the second article, article 101 gives the power to conclude various types of agreements with third countries. It is worth the Committee noting that the current “association” enjoyed by Switzerland, which, as I have said, specifically relates to research, was made under this narrow article—101—and not under the wider article 206, which I just quoted.

So, when hon. Members cite this “association” as a precedent that can be followed, I do not disagree—as I say, it is very encouraging—but I do point out the narrow scope and limited power under which it is achieved. It does not amount to what people would generally refer to as “associate membership”—not by a long way.

However, I must make it clear that nothing is off the table in discussions with the EU—nothing—because those discussions have not actually started yet. The preliminary discussions have, as has been well discussed before. They are what is called the “separation arrangements” and hon. Members will know, from discussions concerning the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, the difference between the two types of discussions. We are in phase 1 of the negotiations, but the future relationship between the UK and the EU, and the details of any implementation period, are for the next phase of negotiations.

I accept that some areas of Euratom are linked to much wider issues, such as the free movement of goods and services. That must be linked to the general negotiations on the free movement of—well, materials that are not non-Euratom-compliant in every other sector, and very important they are. I do not underestimate the challenge that we face, in this area and in the wider negotiations.

However, given the uncertainty about the outcome of all the negotiations, it is absolutely vital that we continue to press ahead with work to set up an internationally approved safeguards regime and to put in place the nuclear co-operation agreements we will need. So, I am happy with the word “contingency”, which has been used, but “contingency” has to start now; it cannot start after all else has not succeeded. It is as much a logistical operation as anything else, but it would send a signal to our partners that we are serious, and we would be very negligent in our duties if we did not start it. I know that Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition are not negligent in their duties; I am not saying that we are “holier than thou” and the other side could not care less; of course we are all very concerned, but we would be very negligent in our duties if we did not start on this “contingency” work now.

I know—well, I hope and I believe—that I have full cross-party support on that point, even from Members who do not believe at all in nuclear generally; it has been well publicised about Scotland. However, the safeguards regime element of nuclear, given that we have got nuclear, is as important to the Scottish Government as it is to the UK generally. I mean, it would be impractical and not right—and I would like to say that that is not believed at all by the Scottish National party or indeed any other mainstream party in Scotland.

I also acknowledge that the hon. Members who tabled this group of amendments are not trying to wreck the Bill at all. Their actions are not irresponsible; I hope that we are having an informed and intelligent discussion on what to do, as we try to achieve the same object. I say that because amendments are always regarded in a partisan way. The Government put something forward; the Opposition, if you like, try to ruin it. However, that is certainly not the case in this instance and I would not like anyone to think so. There are quite a few experienced Members here—both Government Members and Opposition Members.

We must introduce the Bill to ensure that we meet international safeguards. This is to do with non-proliferation issues after we withdraw from Euratom. I would like to put it on the record that we are making very constructive progress in negotiations on the bilateral agreement with the IAEA and on the agreements with key partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. They will all require—I say “will” because, obviously, they are not yet signed and finalised—or are contingent on our having the domestic safeguards regime in place on exit day.

We have to maintain the momentum and reassure the international community that the UK remains committed to nuclear non-proliferation and will provide clarity to the industry, which is very important. Tomorrow, I am meeting—possibly in this room but certainly on this floor—representatives of the nuclear sector, to discuss the nuclear sector deal. The industry wants to know that it can move vital materials, parts and expertise after exit day. Whatever word we use for our relationship—membership, associate membership, close association—the industry needs to know that it will be able to perform those functions.

[Paul Blomfield]

The Minister told me in answer to a previous intervention that he was unable to commit fully to our negotiating ambitions in relation to membership. I hear what he says, but I am sure that what the sector wants to hear tomorrow is clarity. In a different context, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has said that the Government intend to seek from our future trading relationship “the exact same benefits” that we currently enjoy from membership of the single market and the customs union. Is it, then, the Government’s ambition to seek in our future relationship the exact same benefits that we currently enjoy as members of Euratom? I am sure that the sector will be keen to hear that tomorrow.

[Richard Harrington]

I could not have put it better myself. I am sure my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union will be delighted to have been quoted. But it is a serious point and I would confirm seriously that it is our intention to achieve exactly the same terms and conditions in this sector as we have enjoyed with the benefits of Euratom. I will make that clear tomorrow to the industry, as I have done before; I do not think that the industry would say otherwise.

We have to ensure that we are committed to nuclear co-operation. I would never joke about North Korea, but I cannot imagine that any responsible person in this Committee Room or in the whole Palace of Westminster could ever think that we could leave ourselves without nuclear safeguards, because then we would be like North Korea. We must be able to compete internationally and do the things that decent countries do in this field. Euratom has provided that ability, and it is our full intention to ensure that that continues.

I hope that the hon. Members for Southampton, Test, for Sheffield Central and for Bristol West will withdraw their amendments. To summarise my argument, I would say that each of them would complicate or delay—in my view, to no good effect—the vital process of preparation that we are now embarking on. We are already committed to the path down which the amendments are trying to push us, so although I am sympathetic to them, I argue that they are not necessary.

New clause 1 would undermine our position in our negotiations with international partners beyond the EU. It would change the purpose of the Bill to permit arrangements for a safeguards regime to be put in place only in the wake of failure of the discussions with the EU. We need to pursue discussions bilaterally and with the IAEA now, while we await the start of negotiations with the EU on our future relationship. In fact, as I said, those discussions are well advanced. Over the past few days, several hon. Members from various parties have asked the Government in various forums how confident we are that new bilateral arrangements can be put in place in time. Our answer is that we are indeed confident, but only as long as we can continue to push at full speed; we cannot afford to await the outcome of our discussions in Brussels.

Amendments 1, 3 and 8 would risk delaying the legislation necessary to implement the domestic safeguards regime; I do not believe that that is their intention, but that would be their effect. I will address the transition period when we consider new clause 2.

The Government’s strategy is to progress the Bill; to continue to negotiate with the EU to achieve the closest possible future association with Euratom; to continue to negotiate an agreement with the IAEA, the importance of which I cannot overstate; to continue to negotiate nuclear co-operation agreements with our key trading partners; to increase the capabilities of the Office for Nuclear Regulation to deliver a robust domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime; and to push for research and training partnership, having committed to delivering the UK share of the Joint European Torus project after withdrawal from Euratom. I hope that after hearing those arguments, Opposition Members will feel able to withdraw their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Harrington]

I am sorry to be pedantic in front of the hon. Lady. It might affect the safeguards, which are to do with non-proliferation and so on, not the safety. If there were not enough inspectors to do safety, it would have the effect the hon. Lady mentioned, but this particular Bill it is to do with safeguards. I know that sounds like one word against the other, but it is a different regime—albeit a very good one, and it also has skill recruitment issues, just like any other. I am not making light of her comment, but in this case it is not safety in the sense of health and safety— people getting hurt or leaks—important though that is, but it would certainly affect the safeguards regime if the recruitment and other things were not done properly, which is why we have started this straightaway.

[Paul Blomfield]

Could the Minister clarify a little more the scope of the impact assessment in relation to staffing provision, because in response to concerns raised on this side of the House he suggested that it would address our concerns that we will not have an adequate safeguarding regime in place for March 2019, and then in response to an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West he said that it will be impossible to assess? What exactly will we get from this impact assessment in relation to the staffing needs and the ability of the ONR to address them, accepting that while Dr Golshan was a very impressive witness, representing what is clearly an impressive organisation, there are a number of factors beyond her control?

[Richard Harrington]

Dr Golshan is a very impressive person. I think in my answer to the hon. Member for, pardon me—

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank the Minister for that.

[Paul Blomfield]

The Minister is talking about a very specific impact assessment on the work of the ONR, but a wider impact assessment has been completed of the impact of the withdrawal from the European Union on the nuclear industry. It was one of the 58 sectoral assessments that we debated in the House yesterday, when I made the point that it would help the work of this Committee if that assessment were made available to us. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister might be able to give a commitment on that point too?

[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That assessment would inform this Committee considerably and, since we are not meeting for a few days now, it might be possible for it to be available to us when we come back from the recess. If the Minister can use his good offices to make that available, that would be considerably appreciated by Members on both sides of the Committee.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Fifth sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Richard Harrington]

I shall do my best to implement the wise advice you gave us, Mr Gray.

In summary, I believe that the intentions behind amendment 14 are entirely good, but I would argue that it is defective because it would turn on the improvement notice power for nuclear security. That does not need to be turned on because there are existing, stronger direction-making powers. I shall briefly try to make that argument—hopefully with some success—to the Committee. Of course, I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern to ensure that the ONR inspectors have the right powers to fulfil their responsibilities. That is the whole purpose of the Bill.

This issue was raised by the Prospect union. As a result of its evidence, I asked it for a meeting, which I have arranged for the next couple of weeks, to discuss all the issues it raised, together with the other union that gave evidence at the same time.

Paragraph 11(2) of the schedule to the Bill amends paragraph 3(5) of schedule 8 to the Energy Act 2013, extending the power to inspectors who are appointed. That is important so that inspectors can issue improvement notices for non-compliance in relation to nuclear safeguards. Therefore, I would argue that the Bill already achieves the purpose of the amendment.

Paragraph 4 of the schedule amends section 82 of the 2013 Act such that relevant statutory provisions will include nuclear safeguards. That is the key to switching on the ONR power. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman, and colleagues on both sides of the Committee, that the Bill achieves the purpose of the amendment.

I shall leave it at that, Mr Gray, in keeping with the advice you gave. I would like to discuss this matter in greater detail, but that was the sentiment of your instructions to us.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

rose—

[The Chair]

Before the hon. Gentleman speaks, I should perhaps remind him that he may not withdraw the amendment, even if he wishes to. That must be done by the Member who proposed the amendment. He may, by all means, speak to it.

[Paul Blomfield]

Thank you for that clarity. Do not worry, Mr Gray, I was intending not to usurp my colleague’s role, but simply to underline the point that the Minister made.

An important part of our proceedings are the public evidence sessions that precede consideration of the Bill. Speaking on behalf of inspectors, Sue Ferns gave powerful evidence on a range of issues, but she was very clear on this one, as the Minister mentioned. She stated:

“As warranted inspectors, they feel that it is important to have those powers in the Bill. It is important for purposes of parity, to ensure continuity”—

and this is a crucial point in relation to safeguarding—

“also, as we have discussed, for external confidence in the way the job will be done.”

She went on to say that she had heard no argument to say

“why, if it is good enough for the 1974 Act”—

the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act—

“and the 2013 Act, we should contemplate a change in practice for this piece of legislation.”––[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 31 October 2017; c. 35, Q71.]

That was powerful evidence on behalf of warranted inspectors that should lead the Government to think again. The Minister has been very accommodating and positive in trying to achieve consensus and agreement on issues where we share common concerns. I wonder whether he is able to reach out in the way that he did on earlier amendments to see whether an accommodation can be reached.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. The Minister is straying slightly, I think, into concerns that we may well address this afternoon: it is true that there are time constraints, and there are ways to sort that out.

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. Friend is right to underline the importance of the point. I am sure that he, like me, would accept the Minister’s point about urgency in good faith, but is not there a problem in that the provision could apply to a range of issues? It is central to the Government’s argument about Henry VIII powers in general—

[The Chair]

Order. That is going well beyond the scope of the Bill. Mr Whitehead is, I think, about to wind up.