Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Second sitting)

Trudy Harrison Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 31st October 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Drew Hendry]

I am surprised that you do not have an idea of what you might require as part of the industry—that you might not have an idea of how long you might need as a run-in time to adjust to new regulations.

Angela Hepworth: I think it is more a question of understanding the timeline from the Government and the ONR that they need to have these arrangements in place. Speaking from an industry perspective, we welcome certainty and stability. An early signal that there would be a period of continuity after the Euratom exit date where the arrangements for trade would continue to apply would be very reassuring.

[Trudy Harrison (Copeland) (Con)]

Q To declare my interest, my husband and various other family members work at Sellafield in my constituency of Copeland. I have heard loud and clear that there is a need for a critical path for us all to have sight of, to understand how this process is running, and also the transition period. I think it would be helpful to understand what outcomes we would need from that transition period from other countries outwith Europe, but also for us to understand how it is necessary for other countries to have this in place. How do other countries rely upon the UK to continue with their business in the nuclear industry?

Angela Hepworth: If we are thinking about countries outside the EU, there are a number of countries where it is either illegal or a policy requirement that they have a nuclear co-operation agreement in place if they are going to export nuclear material. The countries that the UK Government have rightly prioritised for negotiating agreements are the US, Canada, Japan and Australia. In each case the UK Government will need to negotiate a nuclear co-operation agreement with that country to enable the trade.

Why does it matter? For example, our Sizewell B power station relies on Westinghouse technology, so we rely on our links with the US in order to be able to operate and maintain that power station. If we wanted to import a part from America, or to draw on expertise and services from America for that power station, there has to be a nuclear co-operation agreement in place between the UK and the US in order to do that. As we understand it, the US will not agree a nuclear co-operation agreement unless the UK has a safeguards regime in place, which is one reason we see the Nuclear Safeguards Bill as a key priority, to put that in place. Each of those countries will have its own internal processes in order to agree nuclear co-operation agreements.

As I understand it, for example, in the US it will have to be agreed by the President and it will have to go through Congress. We have been telling Government we would like to see, as an industry, a timeline that sets out for our benefit the steps that need to be taken in order to put a safeguards regime in place, to get it approved by the IAEA, to conclude the negotiations with third countries, but also the ratification processes for those countries, in order to understand the end-to-end process and how those various components interact, so that we can have the safeguards regime in place and also the nuclear co-operation agreements with those third countries. Then, as I said, we need a future agreement with Euratom: there needs to be an agreement in place, negotiated between the UK and Euratom, which explains the framework for nuclear trade going forward once we have left Euratom.

[Trudy Harrison]

Q We have heard examples of how we need it; are there examples of why other countries need it in place, for their own benefit?

Angela Hepworth: Yes; there is a nuclear supply chain across the EU and the UK is a great opportunity for those countries. For example, two-thirds of the value of the construction of Hinkley Point will go to companies in the UK but that leaves one-third of the value of the construction going to countries from further afield. Many of those are companies in Europe but, for example, there are companies in the US and Japan which are also involved in the Hinkley Point supply chain. It is in the interests of those companies and countries to have future co-operation agreements which enable them to participate in the supply chain. The UK has great opportunities for international companies: there is supporting the operation of the existing nuclear fleet; there is the nuclear new build programme; there is decommissioning coming up. So there should be real opportunities for other companies to be involved in the UK supply chain if we can get those agreements in place.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Q On the same theme, in your evidence you very diplomatically describe the challenge that we face, even if the Bill proceeds in a timely manner. The legal and practical challenges to the Government and the ONR to put the necessary arrangements and resources in place remain significant. I guess that what you are trying to say, in code, is that that is not really very doable by March 2019.

Angela Hepworth: I am not saying it is not doable; I am saying it is challenging. You heard first-hand from Dr Mina Golshan of the ONR this morning about the practical steps that need to be taken. There is an awful lot that it needs to do in terms of recruitment and having systems and processes set up. We are mindful of the fact that that is a challenge in the time available. That is one reason we support an implementation or transitional phase.

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[Eleanor Smith]

Q Yes, and other people you require, because you said there are numbers that you need. I just wondered how long training would take.

Sue Ferns: It takes quite a number of years to train a nuclear inspector. Obviously, if you get people from the industry, they have a level of experience, but not in that context. I believe that ONR is considering whether it can provide additional training to some of its other staff, to enable them to take this role. They are people who inspect, but don’t inspect for safeguarding. However, none of that happens overnight. This is a highly skilled, very specialist area, which is why there is such a premium on this source of labour, so it will take a period of time to be able to do that.

Kevin Coyne: The reputation of the UK nuclear industry and its attendant skills and safety record are things that we, including the trade unions, are very proud of. I would argue that it is important that Euratom inspectors are highly regarded and renowned throughout the world, but that takes time. It is very important to have that reputation, so that people in the rest of the world believe the reports and the regulations that emanate from that.

[Trudy Harrison]

Q I absolutely share your pride in our nuclear industry, and I am certainly looking forward to the future. In terms of the expertise that we already have in this country, my constituency alone has 14,500 Nuclear Industry Association members and 10,000 staff working at Sellafield, many with the skills to lend themselves to being nuclear inspectors. Indeed, the 17 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority sites across Britain are already compliant, which means that they must have staff in place to ensure that compliance, regardless of inspection. Sue, you mentioned not being confident, but what specific steps should we take to provide that confidence?

Sue Ferns: I think that there are a couple of things. First, as the previous witness said, there should be a clearer timetable for various steps. At the moment there is a deadline and then there are two years. How will we get there? The path is unclear.

[Trudy Harrison]

Q So that critical path when there is project management talk about what steps need to be taken on what date and by whom.

Sue Ferns: Indeed, and what the risks are at each stage, so that they can be known and are transparent. I am sure that various stakeholders are working on them at the moment, but I do not think that the critical path with the risks at each stage is a transparent timeline at the moment.

Another thing that would build confidence is making it clear that everyone will work to achieve this, but if we do not achieve it, we must have a longer transition period. For the sake of the industry, we absolutely cannot afford to step out of the regime that we have now until it is absolutely clear that there are equivalent standards in place and that they are operating. It is quite difficult to impose an arbitrary timescale on that because, as I said, there are a number of risk factors: specifying, procuring and getting new IT systems up and running—there is not always a great track record on that—and making sure that we have appropriately qualified and skilled inspectors.

Reflecting on the previous question, Kevin is absolutely right: the UK has a first-class reputation. We all know how easily reputations can be lost. They take years to win, but they do not take years to lose. There should be a combination of having the critical path, which is transparent about the risks at each stage, and being clear that if we need a longer transition in this sphere, we should have a longer transition because that is in the interests of the industry.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I want to pursue the issue of the time that it will take to get the necessary staff in place. Sue, you said that you were uncertain about the training period. Prior to this Committee, it had been suggested that it could take up to five years to train safeguards inspectors. Is that a reasonable period?

Sue Ferns: I think that that is a reasonable assumption. The reason I said I was a bit uncertain is that it depends on where you get these people from and what their previous experience is. A reasonable approximation is several years—it is not a matter of months but years for people to be able to do that job. Yes, it is about knowledge and skills—and there are a lot of knowledge and skills in the industry—but there are specific aspects of an inspector’s role. This is a warranted role; this is not just working in the industry. It is not just about knowledge, but experience and commanding the confidence of the companies and the organisations that you deal with, so there are very specific aspects to that role. I think that it is a period of years. Of all the things that worry ONR, this is probably one of the key ones, if not the key one. As I say, I think it is doing the absolute best it can, but this is one of the things that keeps them awake at night.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Q I want to get a better understanding of the duties and responsibilities—and, indeed, appointment and placement—of inspectors when we exit the EU. What view might the IAEA take about the readiness or otherwise of the regime when it considers the voluntary agreement that we will have to make with the IAEA when we exit Euratom? Is it your understanding that one of the things that the IAEA will consider is whether we are genuinely ready to undertake the additional work and reporting back to the IAEA rather than Euratom that the voluntary agreement would entail? The IAEA will either come to an agreement based on the fact that we look ready or, alternatively, say that more work is needed before we can come to an agreement. Presumably, however, an agreement will have to be reached by the time we exit the EU.

Sue Ferns: My understanding is that the IAEA will require certain standards to have been met before anything else can happen. What I understand, though, is that during the Second Reading debate on the Bill, there was a lot of talk about replicating the Euratom powers. My understanding is that that is not necessarily the IAEA hurdle, because I think the IAEA hurdle is slightly lower than replicating the Euratom powers. Certainly, there will be a requirement to meet IAEA standards.

[Trudy Harrison]

Q Just changing tone slightly, I notice, Kevin, that you have a reference to concern around radioactive isotopes. I do not share that concern. I do not understand why you think this is relevant to Euratom, because they are not fissile material. I have not heard of anyone using plutonium or uranium in medical practice. I wonder, if they have not been risk-assessed by the IAEA, why you would feel there is a concern about their falling under the realms of Euratom.

Kevin Coyne: I think that is an area which is of serious consequence. I think it is generally not well known—the fact that Euratom covers the transportation of materials—or that isotopes that are used in the NHS, for instance, come from Holland and other countries. We do not have the reactors in this country to produce them. I understand what you say about the registration. We highlighted that as a concern because there is a two-day, three-day shelf-life; this comes from us as a union that operates within the NHS at quite an extensive level. In terms of the delivery and transportation of that, there are sometimes delays. So our point is that the change of regimes and the difference in what might occur may cause that to be delayed even further and therefore impact upon the NHS itself. We make no stronger point than that we ought to look at the impact upon isotopes in hospitals.

[Richard Harrington]

Q On that point, if I may clarify, given that that has been brought to my attention—I have agreed to see the Royal College and other people who are interested. Is your point that the movement of the isotopes is perhaps to do with what happens with Brexit—that is, the movement of any foreign goods—or is it a Euratom point? We think on the former you have a point, but on the latter you are mistaken.

Kevin Coyne: A Euratom point—and you think I am mistaken about that?

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[The Chair]

They already are. That has answered the point; good.

[Trudy Harrison]

Q May I ask for clarification? You say they already are: will there be some kind of appraisal of the staff skills, knowledge and qualifications required to carry out the function of Euratom in the UK, to determine what skills are required?

[Richard Harrington]

Is it acceptable for me to answer?