UK’s Withdrawal from the EU

Pat McFadden Excerpts

Wednesday 27th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I genuinely do not fear that, because what I am finding increasingly in my conversations with politicians in different parts of Europe is that they want this issue sorted out. Frankly, they have politics of their own. They have important decisions to make on a range of subjects: the future of the eurozone; the negotiation of a multi-annual financial framework without a UK contribution; the tensions that exist between some of the central European and western European powers within the EU; and the continuing problem of the very large-scale movement of people from Africa into southern Europe. It would be a mistake for hon. Members to think that the leaders of the other 27 countries spend every waking hour thinking and worrying about Brexit matters.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

rose—

[Angus Brendan MacNeil]

rose—

[Mr Lidington]

I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman, for old times’ sake. Then I will come back to the hon. Gentleman and then the hon. Lady, and then I will move on.

[Mr McFadden]

The right hon. Gentleman is being typically generous in giving way to Members from all parts of the House. He was just referring to the position of other member states. Yesterday, the Prime Minister told us, for the first time, that she would countenance an extension to the article 50 period, but today President Macron of France is quoted as saying:

“We would support an extension…only if it was justified by a new choice of the British”.

He continued:

“we would in no way accept an extension without a clear objective.”

Is it not the case that if there is to be an extension, it must be an extension with a purpose, rather than for two or three months of the same parliamentary gridlock?

[Mr Lidington]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and I do not think that what he has just said is any different from what the Prime Minister or other Ministers have been saying at this Dispatch Box for several months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

We need to begin by acknowledging that we have made a little bit of progress. Yesterday the Prime Minister finally acknowledged that there is no support in the House of Commons for leaving with no deal. It was interesting that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was in most difficulty in his contribution when he was trying to avoid answering questions about how the Government will vote if we get to that point. I will make a prediction to ease his pain: if we do get to that point, I think the Government will vote against us leaving with no deal. How could they do anything other than that given the document released yesterday, which predicts £13 billion of cost to British businesses? For what? To fill in customs declarations, with no benefit to their trade whatsoever. It also predicts rising food prices and delays at the ports. At the moment, French customs officials say, “Go on, go on,” but the moment they put their hands up and say, “Arrêtez”—“Stop”—the chaos will begin.

At the industrial coalition meeting to which the right hon. Member for Meriden (Dame Caroline Spelman) referred, the most striking moment for those of us who were there was when representatives of two major parts of manufacturing industry said simply, “If there’s a no-deal Brexit, it will be catastrophic for us.” The thing I always find it hard to understand is why people who do not run things and make things for a living think they know better about the consequences of a no-deal Brexit than people who do.

The other truth that has finally hit home—I hope the Government understand it—is that it does not matter when we are asked to vote against a no-deal Brexit. We will do it in March, we will do it in June and we will do it in October of whatever year, because the House will not allow that to happen.

If the Prime Minister’s deal is defeated when it comes back, there will be an extension to article 50, and the question that has not really been addressed yet is: for what purpose will we use the time? The amendments that probably will not be pressed to a vote today will be very important in the weeks to come, because they will provide us with the means to answer that question.

I think that only three options will face us in those circumstances. The first is to try to reach a consensus on a different kind of Brexit deal. The second is again to extend article 50, to enable us to negotiate the future partnership. The third, if we remain deadlocked, is to take the question back to the British people. None of them will be easy–there are no benefits to the British economy from Brexit. I will turn to each of those options.

The first—Norway plus or Common Market 2.0—would at least minimise the damage to our economy. It would represent a painful compromise for many people, but it would be a much better way forward than the Prime Minister’s deal. Do I think that she will ever agree to it? Sadly not, because she has shown herself to be completely inflexible.

The second option, which is really the obvious thing to do, is to go to the EU and say, “Why don’t we negotiate the future relationship now and extend article 50 for that purpose?” The House refuses to vote for the Prime Minister’s deal because each of us, for different reasons, says that we do not know what the future will look like, and therefore we are not prepared to take this enormous step of leaving the European Union on the basis of a prospectus that is completely vague and uncertain. How do we answer that question? We negotiate the future partnership.

[Mr McFadden]

On the point about the purpose of an extension, what does my right hon. Friend think of President Macron saying that there is no way the EU would accept an extension without a “clear objective”? In his view, what should that clear objective be?

[Hilary Benn]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. This is a challenge the House will face the moment it has voted for an extension, because I am sure that is what the European Union will say to us.

I am setting out what I think are the three alternatives that would be available to the House at that point. The first requires agreement. I do not think the Prime Minister is prepared to give that; that is what the evidence shows. The second would require the European Union to change its approach to the negotiations completely. It would be the sensible thing to do, but the EU may not agree. The third—the one we will be left with if we cannot agree—will be to go back to the people and ask them what they think.

I simply want to say that I welcome the decision that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition announced on Monday. It cannot have been an easy decision to make, and I do not at all underestimate the difficulties of holding a second referendum. However, it would in those circumstances answer the question from the European Union about what the extension is for. When it comes to the question in such a referendum, to me it is clear: the only deal that has been negotiated to leave—the Prime Minister’s—even though it would have been rejected by Parliament, and the alternative of remain, because there is not an alternative leave on the table. Let me say to those who might want to jump up and say, “What about no deal?”: first, if we go back to the referendum of 2016, nobody on the leave side argued for leaving with no deal—nobody; secondly, we know how damaging it would be; and, thirdly, why should an option that was never before the British people in 2016 suddenly appear on a ballot paper in 2019, if we have a referendum?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax), although I shall take a somewhat different tack. I shall make a couple of points about what the Prime Minister said yesterday about how things would be voted on in March, and about the related amendments on that issue that are on the Order Paper today.

Yesterday, for the first time, the Prime Minister was forced to admit that we do not actually have to leave the EU without a deal on 29 March, unless that is an outcome for which Parliament explicitly votes. That admission could, of course, have come much earlier, and was only dragged out of her by the threat of ministerial resignations, but it was an important admission all the same. She added that any extension must be short and limited, and must not go beyond the end of June, because that would create

“a much sharper cliff edge in a few months’ time.”—[Official Report, 26 February 2019; Vol. 655, c. 167.]

In other words, she told us that if March was a legal deadline, the end of June was a brick wall. However, there is no point in applying for an extension for a couple of months just to carry on the same parliamentary gridlock in which we lurch from one vote to another every fortnight without the fundamental issue ever being decided.

The Prime Minister is right about one thing. She was right to say that an extension like that on its own will not take no deal off the table. Unless something else changes, it will just give a bit more road for can-kicking. If we are to have an extension, it must be for a purpose, and that purpose should be clarity about the future relationship between the UK and the EU. We are having a huge argument about the withdrawal agreement when the fundamental choices about the future have not been faced up to, let alone decided.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I am generally sympathetic to what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, but I should point out that at the start of the negotiations, it was the EU, and specifically the French, who insisted that we separate the leaving deal from the future deal. They are therefore now being a bit harsh in trying to pull them back together, are they not?

[Mr McFadden]

I think that it was a mistake to split them in that way, and I think that they need to be brought back together.

The future has been left blank. We know that we are leaving, and we are told that leave means leave, but leave to where, on what basis? Are we going to have a loose relationship that will mean significant economic disruption, especially for our multinational manufacturing supply chains, and different arrangements for Northern Ireland from those in the rest of the UK, or a closer relationship that will mean the UK’s obeying a whole series of rules over which it no longer has a say? That is the essential Brexit choice, and it has been the Brexit choice since day one. It ought to be spelt out clearly to people.

[Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

I will not, because others want to speak.

The fact that that is not being done is not because it is in the national interest to keep things vague or to have a blindfold Brexit. It is because facing up to those options would mean exposing the divisions in the Cabinet and the Conservative party on which of them to pursue. It would mean slaying the Brexit unicorns that imply that there are no fundamental choices to be made. We must expose the reality of what the choices really are. Doing that would mean that the Government would have to level with the public before we left—but that is not their plan. Their plan is to get us out before all this becomes clear, on the pretence that if we agree the withdrawal deal, we can somehow move on and talk about other issues. Sometimes we see Brexit portrayed as a project for the people, and criticism of it as a project by the elite, but planning a Brexit where we hide the true reality of what it means until after we have left is the most elitist thing of all, and that is precisely what the Government are planning.

It is an illusion to pretend that vagueness achieves closure. Vagueness does not achieve closure; it just carries on the argument after we have left, and it does so when we have been placed in a much weaker position as a third country. People talk about taking no deal off the table undermining our negotiating position. It does not undermine our negotiating position; it removes a gun held to our own head. What undermines the negotiating position is agreeing to pay a £39 billion divorce settlement without having the foggiest idea of what the future relationship looks like.

If there is to be an extension to the article 50 period, let us use it for a purpose: let us set out properly what leaving means, and let us tell the people clearly once and for all whether we are going for a Canada-type model or a Norway-type model, and let us be candid with the public about the consequences of each option. Clarity would also mean the EU having to be more flexible than it has been until now about the phasing of the discussions; it would have to acknowledge that clarity about the future was in its interests too. This would be a much more honest way of proceeding.

The Prime Minister yesterday, as always, did the absolute minimum to keep the show on the road—to make any extension short and limited so it does not really change anything. But that is not good enough. Having opened the door, there is now an opportunity to do this differently, and we should seize it by making sure that any extension is focused not on a particular timescale but on the key purpose of clarity about the future.