European Union (Withdrawal) Act

Mark Pritchard Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

In June 2016, after 40 years—a generation—my constituents, along with the rest of the country, were given a voice on the European question. My constituency overwhelmingly voted to leave the European Union. Tonight I will honour their views and their voice, and—to paraphrase my right hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan)—represent them despite the fact that I voted to remain.

Setting aside the details of the legally binding withdrawal agreement, I want to address conversations I have had with my constituents rather than with distinguished colleagues and friends in the House. My constituents’ vote to leave did not suggest any fear of foreigners or concerns about wage deflation and immigration. It reflected an understanding of the universal and overarching principles of freedom, sovereignty and independence, as was so ably put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab).

My constituents’ support for Brexit is not inconsistent with a fond affection for Europe, shared European values, and a belief in the rule of law, high environmental and employment standards, freedom of speech and, dare I say it, democracy. Their decision is also not inconsistent with a recognition of EU citizens’ huge contribution to the NHS, UK farming—particularly in Shropshire—and car, food and defence manufacturing. In all those sectors, EU citizens make, and will, I hope, continue to make, a highly valued contribution to our economy and society.

Brexit was not a vote against Europe, but it was a vote for Britain—a free and independent Britain. I will not be supporting the withdrawal agreement because it puts the United Kingdom in a weaker position than under our current status as a full member of the European Union. It makes us rule takers, not rule makers. It does not set Britain free to implement bilateral trade deals with countries around the world.

Much has been said in this place over many weeks about those who voted to leave the European Union. We have heard some low commentary from both sides of the House, but it was a higher principle that led my constituents to vote to leave the European Union: the freedom, independence and sovereignty of this country.

Child Sexual Exploitation and Consent to Sexual Intercourse

Mark Pritchard Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd May 2018 Westminster Hall

[Lucy Allan (Telford) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of child sexual exploitation and consent to sexual intercourse.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone. I am delighted to see that the Solicitor General is here to respond to the debate. I put on record, however, that I am disappointed that no one from the Home Office is here to discuss the issue. It was intended that the Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), would be here, but she is not. However unintentional that may be, I find it suggestive of a lack of interest in this topic—it is not the first time that I have had difficulty in engaging the Home Office on the issue.

Recent press coverage of child sexual exploitation and grooming gangs in Telford has enabled many victims to come forward. Some speak about historical crimes that they have not previously reported; others speak of the enormous challenges that they have faced in getting justice. I will focus on the latter point.

Anyone listening to the debate will be astonished, as I was, to learn that a child as young as 13 can be targeted and groomed for sex with multiple men, and that those men can say to police, by way of defence, “I had no reason to believe that she did not consent. I had no reason to believe that she was under 16.” In such circumstances, unless the victim can show otherwise, the police may not have the perpetrator charged with any offence at all. All the perpetrators have to do is say, “The victim willingly met for sex and did not tell me her age.”

It is worth pointing out that, under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, under-age sex is an offence and consent should not be a factor, but in practice, the police can take a different approach. That suggests that they may not fully understand grooming and the power that a perpetrator can exert over a victim who has been groomed. A child who is groomed into acquiescence is not willingly and voluntarily consenting to sex, but they may not get justice unless they can show that they made the perpetrators aware of their age and that they were unwilling.

Grooming is coercion, and it brings about a sense of control over the victim. It can be subtle or indirect, or it may be direct, by way of a threat to shame a child by exposing their sexual activity to their parent, school or friends. Either way, it is a process of psychological manipulation to force a vulnerable child to do something that they do not want to do and would not otherwise have done. That cannot be equated with consent. Just because physical force is not present, that cannot be grounds for the police to infer that a groomed child is consenting.

How can the authorities assume that a child as young as 13 would willingly consent to sex with multiple men? Let us be honest: in the cases I am talking about, the men are not in the child’s social network—they are not young teenagers from the child’s school, or known to the child’s parents or older siblings. They are groups of adult men targeting young girls through street grooming or in takeaways and restaurants. How can the police possibly assume with good reason that the targeted child consents simply because she did not refuse sexual intercourse? Consent must be freely given without duress or coercion. Consent is a voluntary act.

A young girl in Telford was groomed for sex with a group of men. The grooming began while she was celebrating her 13th birthday in a local restaurant. While she was still 13, she became pregnant by one of those men, and her parents realised what was going on and went to the police. The identity of the perpetrators was not an issue and arrests were quickly made. Two things went wrong, however: the police failed to identify that the men were connected to each other, or that the child had been groomed. The police treated the men as if each one was in a separate relationship with the child. She was treated as willingly engaging in sexual activity with men she had voluntarily chosen to have a relationship with.

The offences the police were to consider in the case were rape and engaging in sexual activity with a child under 16. The police accepted that the perpetrators could not have known from the victim’s actions that she did not consent and, further, that the perpetrators reasonably believed that she was over 16, as she had not disclosed her true age to them until after she became pregnant.

It is clear in this case that the child could not articulate in the testimony that she gave to the police the psychological impact of grooming and coercion. When it was put to her by the police, she accepted that she had not told the perpetrators her age and that she had not refused sexual intercourse. Despite not wanting to have sex with any of the men, she accepted that they would not have known that she did not want to have sex, so the police did not ask the Crown Prosecution Service to bring charges. The grooming was ignored: she had not said no, she had not been physically forced and she was over 12, so it could not be rape, and as she had not revealed her true age, the perpetrators had a reasonable belief that she was over 16, so it could not be sex with a minor.

The destruction and damage to the girl’s life and to her family is impossible to communicate. The family exhausted every avenue in their battle to get justice. One perpetrator, who had sex with the child again while on bail, received three and a half years for sex with a minor, but all the agencies upheld the police’s position when complaints were brought. The family were told that it was right that no charges had been brought against the other perpetrators in the case. How do the parents explain that to their daughter? What message does it send to perpetrators if no charges are brought in such a case?

I want to believe that that is a one-off, isolated case, because under the law consent should not come into it at all. However, the family wrote to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the CPS, the professional standards board, the Home Office and the Prime Minister, and all the parties that responded took the view that the police’s course of action was correct.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate on an important local and national issue, and on attracting to the debate the Solicitor General, who is probably the most qualified person in Parliament to respond. The police can always learn lessons, but charging decisions are often a joint exercise with the Crown Prosecution Service. Some of the cases she refers to are of vulnerable young adults who are known to the local authority. Telford and Wrekin Council, which is a key stakeholder in the issue, needs to get on with conducting the independent inquiry, appointing an independent chairman, restoring public confidence in the local council and ensuring that victims get the justice they deserve.

[Lucy Allan]

I fully agree with my hon. Friend that the Solicitor General is an eminent and learned colleague. I also agree with his point about Telford and Wrekin Council. Now that it has decided that it will have an investigation into child sexual exploitation in Telford, it is imperative that it gets on and appoints a chairman. We have already waited two months, and I cannot see that anything has happened yet. I hope it will take the opportunity to delay no longer on that. I thank my hon. Friend for making that point.

To return to the case that I was raising, the family wrote to all those different parties and the answer was that the case had been correctly handled. The CPS sent a letter to the family about the perpetrator who was responsible for the victim’s pregnancy, which said:

“It was right that no charges have been brought in this case.”

It explained why it came to that conclusion by saying that

“the prosecution must prove that a victim was not consenting to the sexual intercourse and...that the person accused did not reasonably believe that the victim was consenting.”

It went on to say that the victim

“was clear that although she may not have wanted sexual intercourse…the suspect would not have been aware from her actions at the time that she did not want to have sexual intercourse…As such a charge of rape is not appropriate and indeed the police did not seek a charging decision from the CPS for an offence of rape.”

It then addressed the possibility of bringing a charge of sexual activity with a child under 16, and said:

“The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the suspect did not reasonably believe the victim was over 16. We could not prove this to the required standard. The victim agreed that she had not told the suspect her age until after she discovered that she was pregnant. I believe a jury may have doubts as to whether the suspect is guilty. For these reasons, it was right that no charges were brought against this suspect.”

I repeat that it was judged

“right that no charges were brought against this suspect”.

The authorities were telling the father of a child victim of abuse that there was no good reason to prosecute the men responsible.

Anyone else looking at the facts of this case would see grotesque and traumatic abuse and exploitation of a child by multiple perpetrators; anyone else would understand the lifelong impact that this horrendous crime would have on this child and her family. But the police did not see that. When I discussed this case with them, it was almost as if they thought that it had been the child seeking out the perpetrators and not the other way round. They did not value the account given by the victim. They did not see an abused child; they saw a young woman who had failed to reveal her true age willingly engaging in sexual activity with multiple men.

Social services became involved in the case after the event and held multi-agency meetings; in fact, they held a number of them. At every one of those meetings, what was discussed was a behavioural contract for the child—a code of conduct for the victim. It was the victim who was placed on a curfew and not allowed out after school. I am sure that everyone in the extensive cast list at those multi-agency meetings meant well and wanted to protect the child from further harm, but why was it her behaviour that was in question and not the behaviour of the men who had committed the crime?

Public Legal Education

Mark Pritchard Excerpts

Tuesday 15th May 2018 Westminster Hall

On resuming—

[Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)]

For the sake of clarity, this debate may now run until 4.17 pm, and the sitting as late as 5.50 pm, unless there are more Divisions in the House—that is not currently anticipated, but who knows?

[Joanna Cherry]

As I was saying, public legal education in Scotland begins at an early stage. Human rights is part of the curriculum for excellence that is taught in Scottish schools, and it is a core element of the health and wellbeing module of that curriculum. Schools in Scotland work in collaboration with organisations such as Amnesty International to deliver the human rights element of the curriculum.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is carrying out an inquiry into the enforcement of human rights and attitudes towards them. Last week, we heard evidence from a number of witnesses who said that there is a demonstrably different discourse about human rights in Scotland. They put that down to the teaching of human rights in Scottish schools, as well as to media in Scotland, which are less hostile to the concept of human rights.

Good human rights practice in Scotland flows from that less hostile environment towards human rights. The witnesses giving evidence to our Joint Committee last week gave as an example of that the embedding of human rights in the new Social Security (Scotland) Bill, which I am proud was introduced by my good friend and colleague Jeane Freeman, the Minister for Social Security in Scotland.

The witnesses also spoke of the wonderful work done by the Scottish Youth Parliament on legal education and rights. The Scottish Youth Parliament is a grassroots project—run in conjunction with the Scottish Parliament—that does a lot of good work in the area of human rights principles and children’s rights.

I am sure that other hon. Members present will, like me, have in their constituencies schools that are part of the UNICEF Rights Respecting Schools project. I am advised that 1.5 million children across the United Kingdom go to a rights respecting school. I am proud that I have worked with two schools in my constituency, Redhall School and Oxgangs Primary School, on rights respecting. The children were particularly interested in the importance of respecting the rights of child refugees.

Why teach human rights, and indeed legal education, in school? Scotland’s curriculum for excellence aims to enable students to become responsible citizens. As other hon. Members have said, learning about the law, rights, respect for others, and a commitment to participate in all aspects of public life helps children to grow up and aspire to be good citizens.

Students across Scotland, particularly law students, are involved in the delivery of public legal education through the Scottish Universities Law Clinic network. A number of universities in Scotland run free legal advice clinics for members of the public.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Pritchard Excerpts

Thursday 25th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that in the most recent case in the Court of Appeal, in November last year, the provisional view was that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was not inconsistent with EU law. A reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Union. I will not comment on that particular case, but I can assure him that when it comes to issues of compatibility, anxious consideration is always given to ensure that legislation here is in accord with the rule of law.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

In an unsafe world, we need to keep the United Kingdom, and indeed our European partners, safe. With the security charter for the draft Investigatory Powers Bill, how will the Government get the balance right between civil liberties on the one hand and national security on the other?

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend asks probably the most important question about that balance. I can reassure him that the draft Bill, and indeed the legislation that will come forward shortly, strikes that balance, most notably in involving judicial authorisation for the granting of warrants. That double-lock process, which involves the Secretary of State and the judiciary, strikes the right balance.

Abortion Act

Mark Pritchard Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr Burrowes]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. In cases of assisted suicide, the DPP has come forward with guidance to provide some clarity, and that was carefully worked through. One of my requests to the Attorney-General is to reflect on what has happened and, with the DPP, to come forward with clear guidance to ensure that confidence in the integrity of the law that many say has been lost. I also ask the Attorney-General to comment on the former DPP’s view. In addition, it must be in the public interest, in policy terms, for such cases, in which there has been an obvious abuse of abortion legislation—the cases are unusual and rarely see the light of day, because they are not readily detected—and in which the evidential threshold has been passed, to be seen in court.

The danger now is that the decision by the DPP, following on from the CPS, sets a precedent—no prosecutions under the Abortion Act without clearer evidence. Where will we get that clearer evidence? Do we now have a new evidential test for abortion-related offences, which can rarely be satisfied due to the lack of the different factors affecting this, not least the lack of professional guidance from doctors?

Another concern about the CPS decision not to find public interest to prosecute was the deferral to the GMC to enforce the breach of law. That was particularly apparent in the original decision of the CPS, which saw that as a key factor. The last time that I checked on enforcement of the Abortion Act, it was for the courts to do, and not for a disciplinary committee of GPs, which was never mentioned or even suggested in 1967. That option is certainly not in statute. This is specifically prescribed in statute as a contravention, and the law should be enforced. I trust that the Attorney-General will make it clear today that criminal sanctions cannot be avoided because of professional status—making a point about integrity—and that applies across the board with other instances of criminality involving the professions. Plainly, everyone is equal under the law, although some of us would say that that is not the case for an unborn child.

The CPS decision to drop the case and to leave it to the GMC highlights the gap between abortion law and practice. That must be filled somehow, at least by guidance through GPs, but also by reform of the legislation. I therefore welcome the assurance that I received from my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, then an Under-Secretary of State for Health, that the Department of Health has requested that the chief medical officer issue guidance. I look forward to it, and hope that there will be proper consultation on it.

Such guidance is needed not only because of the cases involving GPs highlighted by The Daily Telegraph, but also because of the CQC investigation in July last year. Fourteen NHS hospitals throughout England failed inspections, all involving the photocopying of doctor’s signatures and other breaches. For example, Rochdale hospital’s regular routine was to pre-sign all abortion forms—not only in one case—and the Princess Alexandra hospital in Harlow used the photocopied signature of a doctor for so long that it was well beyond the time that he had been employed as a doctor or could have had any knowledge of the cases. Such is the extent of the abuse and breaches of the Abortion Act. Such malpractice would not be tolerated by patients or others in the prescription of antibiotics or common painkillers, for example, and yet a blind eye is being turned in abortion cases.

The scandal is not only about malpractice, however; those hospitals were not referred to the police for investigation, and no CQC investigation has resulted in any prosecution to date. Why is that? What is going on? Will the Attorney-General respond about the policy? The system is open to abuse, to dishonesty and to criminality, which, without reform, are going unchecked and unprosecuted.

Why was the DPP not more involved at an earlier stage in the initial CPS decision on whether to prosecute, given the significant public interest? Was the Attorney-General consulted on that decision, given the public policy considerations, and if not, why not? Will guidance be provided to the CPS for consideration of future contraventions of the Abortion Act? Will a review consider whether the safeguards set down by Parliament, in good faith, are being properly applied in 2013 and still have full force in law?

On the subject of public interest, which is what we are discussing today, I want to thank The Daily Telegraph, which has been acting in the public interest by investigating and exposing the problems with the Abortion Act, which are of concern to many, on all sides of the fence on the issue of abortion, in particular because such problems might have led to sex-selection abortion. Without such investigative reporting on behalf of the public interest, there would probably be no one to complain, and the issue would go by the bye. The reality is that the unborn child has no complaint process. There is a lack of transparent information, and no real safeguards. It is up to Parliament to deal with that, and we must seize on it in this debate and beyond by speaking up for the voiceless, ensuring that we respect life and at least to ensure that the Abortion Act contains safeguards with proper meaning and proper force.

[Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)]

Five hon. Members have indicated that they wish to speak, and I do not want to impose a time limit so I hope that colleagues will be mindful of others, given that I want the wind-ups to start at 3.40.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

If the hon. Gentleman will hold his breath, I will get there. In my view, it is not in the public interest for us to behave in this way. We must make it absolutely clear that, as a country, we have no truck with this. I am a staunch advocate of women’s right to choose, but I do not accept that that corners me into supporting something as plainly monstrous as gender-selective abortion.

I am also concerned that if the public see abortion as being used for gender selection, support for abortion will erode. In my view, there has been and remains a clear majority, albeit a silent one, in favour of abortion, and their views are reflected in the very thoughtful contributions made today by the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston) and my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott). We must not play into the hands of the likes of those who claim that the most dangerous situation to be in in Britain today is to be in a womb and to be a female. We need to take a sensible view of this.

My second objection, which was echoed at the time by the former Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord Macdonald, was about the amount of deference that the CPS seemed to be showing the medical profession. The CPS seems to believe that doctors can have the discretion to disapply the law in their surgeries. It seems to me that when a roofer breaks the law, he is hauled into court and faces the prospect of prison. When a doctor does, he should also be hauled into court and should not simply be heard by a panel of his peers with no criminal powers. That is taking the idea of “Doctor knows best” far too far. The rule of law has to apply to all equally; otherwise, it is meaningless.

Following the outcry, the DPP, Keir Starmer, has issued a statement seeking to explain further the reasoning behind the decision. That statement, which comes a full month later, introduces a number of new lines of argument, while quietly dropping some of the old ones. Mr Starmer now tells us that the evidential threshold for the allegation that this was a gender-based abortion has not been met. He says that that was because other factors were alluded to during the discussion between patient and doctor. Instead, the matter hinged on whether the doctors fulfilled their duty under the Abortion Act to carry out a sufficiently robust assessment of the risk to the pregnant woman’s mental and physical health to reach a good-faith opinion that the continuation of the pregnancy would involve a risk, greater than if the pregnancy was terminated, to the woman’s mental and physical health. The director explains that there is no guidance on how a doctor should assess that and therefore no yardstick by which to measure whether the doctors’ assessments fell below a standard that any reasonable doctor would consider adequate. The director concludes that it would be of questionable public interest to prosecute amid such uncertainty.

That is a more elegant and persuasive way of hoofing the matter back to the GMC. Gone is any suggestion that we will not prosecute criminal attempts because the victim is unharmed. Gone is any impression given by the earlier statement that the very fact of the GMC’s involvement is sufficient and that the criminal courts need not be involved. Gone is any suggestion that it is somehow okay for doctors to abort fetuses merely because they are female.

I am reassured by the director’s statement that had the decision boiled down to one of whether to prosecute on the basis that the doctors attempted a gender-specific abortion,

“there might be powerful reasons for a prosecution in the public interest”.

To my mind, the director’s statement illustrates the need to ensure that the DPP personally signs off all decisions about prosecutions under the Abortion Act 1967, whether those decisions are in favour of or against prosecution. I hope that the Attorney-General can assure the House that that is what will happen in future.

[Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)]

Before I call the Attorney-General, I note, just for Hansard, the unusual circumstances in which we have present at the debate three Ministers: the Minister responsible for public health, the hon. Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison); the Solicitor-General; and the Attorney-General.

Ian Tomlinson

Mark Pritchard Excerpts

Monday 26th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

On that latter and final point, I have to tell the hon. Lady that it is a matter for my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Justice. As she is aware, provision is available to help families in certain inquests and that matter would have to be considered. It would also have to be considered by the Legal Services Commission to which application would be made.

May I return to this point: I do not think it is a question of the application of undue weight on anything? The responsibility of the CPS is to apply the code and test of Crown prosecutors as to whether there is a basis on which a prosecution can be brought. In a case of prosecution for manslaughter, that is not possible for the reasons I have already given the House and the hon. Lady. In a case of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, if the CPS were to depart from its own standards and guidelines, which have, I think, been in existence for some 15 years—I seem to recollect they were introduced following some criticisms that there were excessive variations in when assault occasioning actual bodily harm was charged or not—that decision could be open to criticism and challenge.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

Is it not time that coroners were issued with new guidance that they should not appoint pathologists when there is a direct and/or present relationship with the police force they are investigating?

[The Attorney-General]

My hon. Friend raises an interesting question. Normally, as I understand it, that is a matter for the discretion of the coroner. It may be that one of the matters arising from this case that needs to be considered is how pathologists are appointed by coroners in all cases.