European Council

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

There were long discussions about this issue because the Mediterranean countries in particular feel extremely strongly that we have got to do more to strengthen borders and Frontex, which can help to secure Britain’s perimeter. Britain is fully supportive of that, and we are not in the Schengen area, which means that we are protected from some of the problems that Schengen countries are suffering from. I think we have the best of both worlds—backing the action taken at Europe’s perimeter while at the same time being able to maintain tough and strict border controls for our own country.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

In the midst of all the other pressing issues on which the Prime Minister has reported from the European Council, was there any acknowledgement of the gathering ravages of conflict in parts of Sudan, the humanitarian crisis facing people there yet again and the plight of aid workers and journalists from Europe in that situation? Does the duty to protect extend to them?

[The Prime Minister]

The issues of Sudan were not discussed at the European Council itself, but they will be discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council that is coming up soon. I raised the issue of Sudan with Premier Wen today, because of the close relationship between China and northern Sudan. It is important that the terms of the comprehensive peace agreement are properly stuck to and that we deliver that and the two-state solution that is being put in place, in which Britain has played a constructive part.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, in a House of Lords without any elections of any description whatever, no party has an overall majority in any event, so a balance of power in a reformed House of Lords is no different from the status quo.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

If, as the Deputy Prime Minister told us last week, the main role of a reformed House of Lords will be as a revising Chamber, why does he propose that people should be appointed under prime ministerial patronage as Ministers and Members of that House? Would it not be better if nobody could sit as a Minister in that House? Would not that properly differentiate the role of this Chamber from that one?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

We looked at this very carefully and proposed, on balance, that a very small number of appointees should be Lords only for the time that they hold ministerial office. We need to ensure that Ministers are held to account in either this Chamber or the other place. We therefore felt it right to suggest that the Prime Minister retains a prerogative for a very small number of positions, so that for the limited time that those appointees are Ministers, they are accountable to the reformed House of Lords.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Does the Minister recognise that dissidents try to make the argument on the ground in nationalist areas that those of us who support the Good Friday agreement have gone derelict on Irish unity? Does he recognise therefore that he has to treat with validity those of us who make the case for framing progress towards unity? Will he confirm that in the event of a referendum the British Government would play no part in imposing or opposing any free choice that would be made by the Irish people?

[Mr Swire]

The hon. Gentleman’s party’s position is well known and I pay tribute here again to the way in which his party has embraced the ballot box and the democratic process. In a referendum, that would be for the people of Northern Ireland to decide. I can do no better than support the words of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—it is probably a career-advancing thing to do—who, in a speech in May 2010, stated clearly and unequivocally:

“I will never be neutral on our Union. We passionately believe that England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are stronger together, weaker apart”.

I believe that, as Aristotle said, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

House of Lords Reform (Draft Bill)

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 17th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

I remind the hon. Gentleman that last year he fought a campaign in favour of—this was in the Conservative party manifesto—

“a mainly-elected second chamber to replace the current House of Lords”

without a commitment to a referendum.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

Does the Deputy Prime Minister recognise that Lords reform is essentially a penalty shoot-out in which no one will score, because nearly everyone is opposing nearly everyone else’s proposed reforms? If we are to join him in this constitutional version of the fantasy football league, will he tell us whether there will be a limit to the number of Members of the House of Lords who can be appointed by virtue of being Ministers, whether it will be possible for elected Members to be appointed as Ministers, and why there is still discrimination in favour of one Church and England in respect of the Lords spiritual?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

Whatever one’s views about the Church, it is a fact that it is an established Church, and that is reflected in the composition of the House of Lords. As for ministerial appointments by the Prime Minister, we think it acceptable in principle—and this is another matter that we would invite the Joint Committee to examine—for future Prime Ministers to make supernumerary appointments of Ministers to the reformed House of Lords, but only for the duration of their holding of ministerial office. In other words, there would be a temporary mechanism whereby Ministers appointed by the Prime Minister could be held to account by one or other of the Houses in Westminster.

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Maude]

The big society bank will not make grants. It is a bank, so it will make loans and provide investment capital for this important and growing sector. One of the problems in the social investment market has been that Futurebuilders was able to give both grants and loans, which was very distorting for the large and growing number of intermediaries in that market. The bank should be an investment organisation, not a giver of grants.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

What steps have been taken to ensure that the big society bank will be relevant and accessible in all regions? Also, is it being impressed upon the banks that the coming arrival of the big society bank will not obviate their duty to show consideration and support for the third sector in the current challenging funding environment?

[Mr Maude]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that relevant question. The introduction of the big society bank certainly does not obviate the broader need to support voluntary and social enterprises, in the interests of local residents. The bank’s remit will be UK-wide. The money put in by the banks will be for UK purposes, but the money coming into the big society bank in due course from dormant bank accounts will be for England only, unless the devolved Administrations decide to put their share of that money into the big society bank, which I hope they will be encouraged to do.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 15th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ian Lucas]

Of all the appalling aspects of this piece of legislation, for me the abolition of local public inquiries is quite the worst. No party ever proposed to abolish them before the general election. If the parties now in government had a particular concern about public inquiries, I would have expected them to express it in manifesto commitments on which the electorate could have given their verdict in the general election. However, it is only since the general election that the issue has been raised.

When the idea was raised, I was anxious to obtain the views of local people in my constituency. I highlighted to community councils—the equivalent of parish councils in my constituency—the fact that the right to deliver oral representations to a public inquiry was about to be abolished. My letter to those community councils was considered at the same time as a report from a boundary commission relating to local councils. Representations had been made by councillors of all political parties objecting to boundary commission proposals for local councils. The community councils were most concerned about the local council provisions. They then saw my letter, and became aware that the right to make representations about a parliamentary boundary change was to be taken away from them.

In Wales, public inquiries will continue to be held on matters relating to local councils and Assembly seats, but they will be removed for matters relating to parliamentary seats. The only reason why they are being removed is the electoral deal between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, who want to remove those public inquiries because they need to get the changes through by the next general election. That is why this huge constitutional Bill was not delivered in draft; it is also why many of us on both the Opposition and the Government Benches had our right to make speeches on important issues removed through the use of the guillotine when these matters were considered before Christmas.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

My hon. Friend is rightly highlighting the implications of this provision for Wales. In the context of Northern Ireland, the Bill still ignores the fact that constituencies for the Northern Ireland Assembly are exactly coterminous with parliamentary constituencies. The Boundary Commission’s terms of reference do not allow it to address Assembly considerations, but it will be the implications of the Bill for the Assembly that will prompt people to call for local inquiries. Villages will be cut off from their hinterland, which will raised geo-sectarian issues. Those are the controversies that people will want to put in front of a local inquiry, but the Bill will remove their right to do so.

[Ian Lucas]

Absolutely; my hon. Friend makes a powerful point about Northern Ireland, and I can speak for my constituency in Wales. The Bill will have profound implications for communities across the United Kingdom. In due course, the Boundary Commission will reveal the proposals and people will see what they are. Only at that stage will people will realise the true horror of the Government’s proposals. They represent the antithesis of any form of localism, and they will take away responsibility from local communities.

The dripping sanctimony that we used to hear from Liberal Democrats and Conservatives about localism is in marked contrast to their appalling unreadiness to listen to any arguments about the Bill. They should be deeply ashamed of this legislation. All legislation should be made for the long term, and should carry as much cross-party consensus as possible. Members who support the Bill will have to explain to their constituents why they will no longer have the right to make oral representations on any proposed changes to their local constituency. Those Members will rue the day that they voted for this legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

I understand why the hon. Gentleman raises this point: it is an issue in Cornwall, where a number of voters have second properties. The case law clearly talks not about “primarily reside” but about “reside”. However, it is also clear that if a second-property owner pops there on holiday for two weeks a year, that would not count as residing. Many hon. Members genuinely live in more than one location of course, because we spend some of our time in London and some of our time in our constituency. Many Members will therefore be registered to vote in both places, but for parliamentary elections we will exercise that vote only once. I suspect that Members will tend to do as I do, which is exercise it in such a way that we can vote for ourselves, either because it makes a difference electorally or because it is more emotionally satisfying—or both.

I shall return to the point I was making before we went off on a number of interesting detours. However emphatic the drafting, we do not think that attempts to limit the exercise of discretion in exceptional circumstances are likely to be as successful as do those in the House of Lords who proposed the amendment. It may be true that the drafting will discourage a court from finding against a boundary commission that chooses not to exercise that discretion, but the commissions will be under considerable pressure to exercise it, particularly given the inclusion of the concept of “local ties”. Exceptional local ties may actually exist in the UK, but the concept is already the Trojan horse which allows political parties to make arguments that are in their electoral interest—and, frankly, in their electoral interest alone.

The Boundary Commission for England noted in its fifth general report that there was usually more debate at local inquiries about local ties, in their many varied and often subjective guises, than about any other matter. That is one of the main reasons why constituencies are as unequal in size as they are today. It seems to the Government that this amendment would in practice simply increase the amount by which constituencies and the weight of vote vary, and do so by far more than those who argue for it imagine.

My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing), who is a member of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, made this point in the previous debate when she said it was important that we have clarity and as much certainty as possible. The Government’s view is that that will not be the effect of this amendment, which is why I am arguing that we should not agree to it.

[Mark Durkan]

Is it not the case that clause 11 provides for constituencies in Northern Ireland to not conform to being within the plus or minus 5% UK quota? Instead, they will vary greatly, and far more widely than that quota; the Bill makes specific provision for that. Why can Northern Ireland constituencies deviate more widely from the UK quota, and from each other, than other constituencies? These are constituencies that will also be electing six seats each to the Assembly. This completely contradicts both the Minister’s arguments and the principle of proportional representation that is in the Good Friday agreement.

[Mr Harper]

I think we debated this matter at an earlier stage in the House. The reason is very simple: Northern Ireland is a very small part of the United Kingdom and there is an issue in respect of seats being allocated between the constituent parts of the UK. If a Northern Ireland constituency is on the cusp of being or not being allocated as a seat, we could end up with a situation where a boundary commission’s ability to have flexibility was constrained to a far greater degree than the plus or minus 5%. The point of the provision is to make sure that in such cases, in that very small part of the UK where there are relatively few seats, the boundary commissions are able to take proper account of local ties. In no other part of the UK is that effect likely to take place, because the next smallest part of the UK is almost twice the size. We thought this was a sensible measure to make sure the boundary commissions were not constrained to a far greater degree than they would be in other parts of the UK because of the relative smallness of the population of Northern Ireland.

[Mark Durkan]

This stems not from the size of Northern Ireland, but from the problem of fixing—from the fact that the Bill fixes the number of seats at 600 and 600 only, and from the way in which seats are then distributed to the different constituent parts of the UK. That is the issue. It has nothing to do with being able to take account of local boundaries or geography or anything else. It is because of this insistence on 600 and 600 only.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

I will not give way.

I say that for a very simple reason, which is that when this House votes to pass legislation for a referendum so that the people can decide, just as it is necessary, according to the principles of the Bill, for there to be a system of preference voting that is said to be fair, so it has to be fair for the electorate as a whole to know that when the decision is taken there is a proper threshold. According to all the constitutional authorities, there is no credibility in a referendum whose turnout is less than 40%—I am talking about turnout, not a yes vote, which is what the Cunningham amendment related to in the 1970s. I tabled my amendment in order to be useful, to help the Government get this right and to help the Lords, who have done a great job, ensure fairness for the electorate by providing that a 40% threshold is the principle on which the provisions should go forward.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has referred to the wrecking amendments we debated and voted on in Committee. Essentially, what we have tonight are wrecking amendments that are bubble-wrapped. No matter what the sophistry of Opposition Front Benchers or anyone else, we know what the intention is: to put a serious and direct brake on the possibility of the referendum being won.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr MacNeil]

If the threshold were accepted, would that mean that if neither the first-past-the-post nor the AV systems were acceptable to the people, the single transferable vote must be preferred? The threshold argument has to cut both ways.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. People might have a variety of reasons for not voting, such as that they do not believe the alternative vote is a big enough reform of the voting system. If people do not vote, that does not mean that they are voting for the status quo.

[Mr MacNeil]

I shall take full advantage of the remaining 30 seconds—

Oral Answers to Questions

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Swire]

I associate myself with the hon. Lady’s comments. I can confirm that there are no plans to change the powers of stop and search for the military in Northern Ireland.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

How can the Minister justify not changing the Army’s powers of stop and search in Northern Ireland, which exceed those granted to the police under the 2007 Act? They are not subject to annual renewal by Parliament as emergency provisions, as they were throughout the years of the troubles, and are now permanent and not subject to any of the accountability checks that apply to police powers?

[Mr Swire]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the rising terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, and he will recognise the part played by the military’s bomb disposal units and the need to go about their business, not least in his own city of Londonderry, where unfortunately we had an incident recently.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Boles]

The hon. Gentleman is being a trifle unkind because he knew I was being a little light-hearted and frivolous; indeed he indulges himself in such behaviour. Whereas we allow him to get away with it, he has taken my light-hearted conjectures as a serious suggestion. What he has done, however, is to demonstrate the force of my argument, which is that we should have a proper discussion, separate from the Bill, about the question, “What is the right time period?”

There are many good counter-arguments; the hon. Gentleman has enumerated some of them. My sympathies for those prisoners denied their right to vote are more limited than my sympathies for the other categories of potential postal voter that he mentioned, but I am sure that those prisoners too will have their defenders. Should we not have a separate debate on a separate piece of legislation on this question—if legislation is required? Maybe it is required, but I do not think that we should be making this amendment to a Bill that needs to stand the test of time. It needs to rest as a keystone in our constitution that lasts through the ages and is not eroded by time. I hope, therefore, that everyone in the House will choose to reject the new clauses and the amendments proposed by the hon. Gentleman.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

My childhood, unlike that of the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles), was not peppered with bedtime stories of prorogations and other interesting matters.

Before I speak to the two amendments in my name, I want to discuss new clause 4 and some of the other amendments on Prorogation. I accept the point made by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) that anomalies left in legislation can lead to all sorts of continuing questions, and to absurdities and abuses. In so far as we are trying to create fixed-term Parliaments and trying to set out in clear and reliable terms the circumstances in which an election can be brought about early, we should as far as possible have those arrangements as tidy—to use the hon. Gentleman’s valleys word—as possible.

However, I accept the point that the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford made: that the amendments of themselves would not sort out all the questions. If our real fear is that a future Francis Urquhart Prime Minister will exploit these anomalies and devices to create all sorts of problems, we should recognise that the amendments themselves would not fully prevent that, because a Machiavellian Prime Minister who was able to marshal and control votes in the House would be able to do exactly the same with Prorogation. To a degree we are in the realm of,

“There’s a hole in the bucket, dear Liza”.

Each time we try to solve the problem, we come back to the basic issue of trust and control—the control that a Prime Minister and Whips could have in the House, where things rest on a vote determined by the Prime Minister.

I believe, however, that important amendments tabled by Members on the Opposition Front Bench would at least ensure that there are not open and blatant inconsistencies between election spending windows for different elections that could be taking place fairly coterminously. Simply as a matter of good legislative practice, we should as far as possible try to resolve those problems and keep things squared now.

Also in response to what the hon. Member for Grantham and Stamford said, if we are serious about the Bill being a fixed-term Parliament Bill, and if its purpose is to prevent people from being surprised into an election or an election from being called at a stroke, it could help if we had clear fixed time limits for Prorogation, such as those that are being suggested. I am somewhat like the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr Skinner) in that I come from a political tradition that does not particularly like caps being doffed in the House of Lords or anywhere else, so I would prefer to avoid the constitutional eccentricity of Prorogation, but if that is part of the chosen furniture and architecture of this place, at least let us ensure that we do not trip over it in a dangerous way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Charles Walker]

If we support the notion of a fixed-term Parliament, which I do not, surely we have to accept that risk. If we support the idea of a fixed date in the calendar, it is just tough if there happens to be a royal wedding at the same time. We cannot have it both ways.

[Mark Durkan]

That sums up my view on royal weddings, but that is my own prejudice.

Another argument that has been made is that the Bill is about removing a prerogative from a Prime Minister and giving powers to the House. If that is what we are saying—not just that the Prime Minister is giving up some powers, but that the House is getting some—my amendment would ensure that the House gets more powers. The House should be equipped, not just to pass a motion calling for an early general election, but to specify the date—instead of leaving it to the Prime Minister to recommend to the monarch when that date should be—and there should be provision for Parliament to do so sensibly in advance. The amendments that we all debated in Committee all presumed that it would be in a matter of weeks, similar to the debate that we have just had about 17 days and 25 days’ Prorogation—in other words, in fairly close calendar quarters. I believe that we should make provision in clause 2(1) to allow the House to set a date, as amendment 14 would allow. It would provide a fourth point that could be covered by a Speaker’s certificate: whether or not a date was specified and what the date was. Amendment 15 would amend clause 2(6), so that the date could be specified.

[Mr Dodds]

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s argument. I am a supporter of the Bill in principle, but having established the fixed-term principle in legislation, is not the danger of his amendments that, by resolution of the Commons proposed by the Prime Minister who rallies his troops, the principle would be effectively undermined by setting another date? So what would be the point of legislating in the first place?

[Mark Durkan]

I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but let us remember that the Speaker can issue two types of certificate—under clause 2(2), which relates to confidence motions, and under clause 2(1), in respect of a resolution passed by two thirds of Members—and my amendments deal only with those circumstances. If we legislate for a resolution to be passed by two thirds of Members and for the Speaker to certify certain things about that, it would be a gross oversight not to provide for hon. Members, in so voting in such a Division, to specify a date if they wished to do so, rather than to leave that up to the Prime Minister.

I do not wish to go into the constitutional twilight zone that the hon. Member for Rhondda took us into about some of the wily vagaries of prorogation powers, but if we simply leave it to a Minister, even the Prime Minister, to set a date and make no provision for the House to specify a date, we leave ourselves open to possible uncertainties and, indeed, abuses. I remind the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) that we have served in an Assembly where a Secretary of State had certain powers and obligations for setting election dates. There have been court cases about whether or not the Secretary of State had duly exercised those powers and whether he had chosen not to see things and then said that he had exercised the power to set a date by simply setting the same date that had been suggested. People have used the different devices that the law allowed.

I am simply saying that if we charge the House with the possibility of setting a different election date for its own good reasons—I assume that they would need to be good reasons if the motion was supported by two thirds of Members—we should at least allow the House to specify the date as well if we are to hold to the spirit of the Prime Minister giving up powers.

Like other hon. Members, I have serious reservations about Speaker’s certificates. My amendments would not suspend any of the qualifications that I and many other hon. Members have on that subject—the worries about the implications in terms of courts and so on—but the more that we charge the House with powers and controls in relation to the issue, the more content I would be with the Bill.

[Dan Byles]

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion. The entire issue of fixed-term Parliaments, sadly, is in danger of becoming yet another political football to be kicked around the House, as Members seek to manufacture objections to reform, and to posture and grandstand. I fear that the new clause and amendments for the most part would not add to the Bill in any meaningful way. The issue is really very simple. I believe that the Bill will strengthen the power of the House over a key constitutional issue and diminish the Prime Minister’s power.

Before coming to the detail of the new clause and amendments, let us remember exactly what this historic Bill is about. Previously, the Prime Minister had the power to ask for an early Dissolution of Parliament at any time. Historically, that extraordinary degree of power has been used solely to the political advantage of the party in power.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Heath]

I would do so, but that would impinge on the following group of amendments, and the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper), will be able to respond to that point during the debate about them. It would be unwise for me to leap ahead, so, although I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s point, I hope that he accepts my response.

I shall address other issues that have been raised in relation to the Prime Minister’s existing power to prorogue Parliament, because, as I stressed at the beginning of my response and stress again, many of the arguments are based on the theoretical mischief that, somehow, a Prime Minister might prorogue Parliament for his or her own purposes, without accepting the fact that they can do so equally today. They can do so, as I said in my intervention on the hon. Member for Rhondda, to prevent a vote of confidence that they feel likely to lose. So, with the Bill we are not strengthening the hand of the Prime Minister; far from it. We are taking away one critical element, but Prorogation will remain exactly as it is.

The conventions of this House are sufficiently strong. For instance, there is no obligation in law for the business managers to find time to debate an Opposition motion of no confidence, but the strong convention is that time will always be found for that purpose, because it is a convention that has worked well over the years. I do not believe that there is any reason why it should not work well in the future. I cannot accept that the artificial process that has been described is a real danger.

Let us consider the circumstances. There are two basic scenarios during the 14-day period in the Bill. In the first, political factors mean that a no-confidence motion passes, and there is no obvious alternative Government, so the Prime Minister who has lost the confidence of the House remains in place to fight the election. There would be no need, or indeed point, for the Prime Minister to prorogue the House. The alternative is that the Prime Minister resigns after the no-confidence motion and Her Majesty appoints a new Prime Minister. Even if the new Prime Minister took office and found the House prorogued, he or she would, under the current arrangements, ask the Queen to recall Parliament. Although I acknowledge the principle behind new clause 4 and amendments 2, 3 and 4, I hope that I have demonstrated that it would be unwise and unnecessary to make them.

On amendment 9, clause 3(4) specifically preserves Her Majesty’s power to set the first day for the meeting of a new Parliament by royal proclamation. As it stands, the date of the first meeting of a new Parliament is set by proclamation and is usually agreed with the House authorities and the palace. The date is conventionally set out in the proclamation that dissolves the old Parliament. The Bill retains as much as possible of that approach by providing for the Queen to issue the proclamation summoning the new Parliament once the old Parliament has dissolved, rather than after the new Parliament has been elected. Following the last election, a date was chosen that allowed sufficient time for the large number of new Members to be inducted. It is important that such flexibility is preserved.

The purpose of amendment 9 appears to be to require Her Majesty to set a date for the first meeting of a Parliament that is within 15 working days of the general election. Again, I have a quibble over drafting, because it is not entirely clear whether the intention behind the amendment is that Her Majesty should issue the proclamation within 15 working days, or whether the first meeting of Parliament should take place within 15 working days. The hon. Member for Rhondda made it clear that his intention was the latter, but that is not clear in the drafting of the amendment. Our primary purpose in the Bill has been to establish fixed terms and set out the procedures for initiating an early election. We have made only the necessary consequential changes to the Queen’s powers. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman not to press amendment 9.

Amendments 14 and 15, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Foyle, suggest that if the House votes for an early Dissolution under clause 2, it should be able to choose the date of the ensuing general election. The Bill provides that if there is to be an early general election, the date will be set by Her Majesty the Queen in a royal proclamation on the advice of the Prime Minister. That is to ensure that an appropriate date can be found, for instance so that the poll can be held on a Thursday, as has become standard practice.

Although amendment 14 provides that the date of an early general election would be set out in the Speaker’s certificate, that would be the case only if the House of Commons had specified such a date in the Dissolution motion. That is a genuine concern with the amendment because a two-thirds majority is required to agree that there should be an early Dissolution. Under the amendment, two thirds of the House would also have to agree to the date of the election. It is quite possible that Members would agree to the one proposition and not the other. Alternative dates and amendments could therefore be tabled. That would muddy the water of what should be a clear-cut process. That is a concern about the operation of the Bill, if it is enacted, which perhaps the hon. Gentleman has not considered.

[Mark Durkan]

Amendment 14 would make it optional, not obligatory, that a date be specified. If the House votes a year or more in advance of the election, why should the date not be fixed then, rather than it being left up to the Prime Minister? Under the Bill, the House, by a two-thirds majority, would be handing a power back to the Prime Minister that the Prime Minister says he wants to give up.

[Mr Heath]

I do not dismiss the hon. Gentleman’s arguments. I understand what he is saying. However, in purely practical terms, it is difficult for the House to receive advice from any quarter on what would be an appropriate date. The House as a whole would find it difficult to take the sort of advice that the Prime Minister, as an individual, could easily assemble. In the politically charged atmosphere of a vote of no confidence, it is hard to understand—[Interruption.] Sorry, not a vote of no confidence. I could see what the hon. Member for Foyle was thinking. In the consideration of an early election, it would be even more difficult to set.

There are always technical issues in establishing the most appropriate date for a general election, and the considerations of all parts of the United Kingdom must be taken into account. I know that the hon. Gentleman has had mixed experiences, but he knows that it is the experience of the devolved Administrations that it is useful in the circumstances that have been suggested for an individual to have this responsibility. Giving it to the House as a whole would be technically difficult, without a significant advance in the arrangements being achieved.

I move on to amendment 8, which the hon. Member for Rhondda said “makes things tidy”, in the words of his valet. I am sure that it would, and I have some sympathy with his argument. The amendment would lengthen the election timetable by requiring Parliament to dissolve 25 working days before polling day, rather than 17. The Government recognise that remaking the election timetable is a complex matter that we should consider. However, it cannot be done simply by edict and without the background work.

The Electoral Commission supports the idea, as the hon. Gentleman knows. He did not make a great deal of that in his speech, but I know that he knows the background material. The commission has suggested that an extension to the electoral timetable would support participation by overseas and service voters, and better support the effective administration of elections. We agree that it is an important issue, and the Deputy Prime Minister has indicated to the commission that there is merit in exploring a change to the timetable. However, as the commission has pointed out, it would require a thorough review to ensure that any change is consistent with the arrangements for elections across the piece.

A host of practical issues and consequential complexities must be considered. We will have to form a balanced judgment on where particular milestones would best fall within an extended election timetable. For example, there might be competing views about the deadline for nominations, and we would have to work to find the most effective compromise. Another crucial milestone is the deadline for registering to vote, which, although not part of the timetable structure, is inextricable from it. That illustrates that such changes to the timetable cannot be made in isolation. As part of the process, we would need to consider the current deadlines for postal and proxy vote applications. Additionally, different elections across the UK run to different timetables and moving to 25 days in Westminster would not, of itself, generate consistency.

As I have said, the Government agree that this is an important issue and we will set out our proposals on the timetable in due course. We have held initial discussions with the Electoral Commission and the Association of Electoral Administrators to identify points to address. It should be noted that the Bill already greatly enhances the ability of administrators and candidates to plan ahead, because we will know when general elections will happen, usually at least five years in advance. The various people involved in running elections will be able to factor that into their thinking and organisation. Even if the provisions for an early election were engaged, the Bill sets out clearly the steps from the Dissolution motion or no-confidence motion to the Dissolution of Parliament, and those steps will be conducted in the public eye. There will be no more snap elections, and I believe that electoral administrators and candidates can be glad about that.

The final reason for asking the hon. Member for Rhondda not to pursue amendment 8, despite its merit and the fact that the issue needs to be considered, is that the Bill is not the right place to amend the election timetable. The Bill is about fixing the date of the poll, not wholesale electoral reform, as we have said repeatedly. Governments are constantly urged by everyone to have focused legislation that deals with specific objects. This is just such a piece of focused legislation and I do not want to cloud the simple but constitutionally significant issue of fixing parliamentary terms with other electoral issues.

Having said that, I hope that the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members who have tabled amendments will not press them to a vote, so that we can continue with the debate on the final group of amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Durkan]

Those of us who have been through all the stages of this Bill, including the Committee stage and the Report stage tonight, were delighted to see the Deputy Prime Minister join us. The same thing happened during proceedings on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill; the Deputy Prime Minister came in like Janet Webb at the end, pushing out the two comedians who had run the show, to make the valedictory statements.

Many of us have no issue with the principle of a fixed-term Parliament. We support that, but we do have serious questions about details of the Bill, and how it interacts with the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. That other Bill is the real reason why the parliamentary term is being set at five years: that Bill fixes that the boundaries will be fixed every five years for each Parliament, which is what has necessitated the five-year fixed term in this Bill—it is because of that fix, and there is no point anybody denying that.

The Deputy Prime Minister and the Government have brought this Bill about in a way that has shown a complete disregard for the interests of the devolved institutions, as they also did with that other Bill. That reckless disregard almost has the air of a joyrider about it. The Deputy Prime Minister needs to recognise that the day will come when he will regret the premature miscalculation that has been involved in both these Bills. They will not hold the coalition together. As we have seen in the experience of Irish coalition politics on so many occasions, there comes a point in the life of a coalition when people look to get out of it.

The Deputy Leader of the House said earlier that this Bill will prevent any snap election in future. It will do no such thing. The device for a motion of no confidence is not unusable. It is not the case that nobody is ever going to use it; it will be used. Many of us have been through the experience in politics where the unthinkable has happened, because that is the device people had available to them. I have belonged to a system where a resignation that took place was then deemed not to have taken place at all. I have been present when judgments that were meant to be made by a Secretary of State, under the law, to select a date were then completely undone. I have served with people who, on being elected to office, immediately had letters of resignation in their pockets, simply because that was the device that could be used. People will do the absurd. In politics, as in so many other things, when the imperative comes for divorce, divorce will take place. People will not say, “We are not going for it because we will have to go through temporary embarrassment or we will take some of the blame.” That is what people will do, and the Liberal Democrats will find themselves caught in that situation, with the Tories and Labour happily ending this Parliament prematurely.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

There are two issues there. I will not dwell on the money Bill issue to any great extent, because if I were to do so you would rule me out of order, Ms Primarolo, but I have read the account of the debate in the other place to which the hon. Gentleman refers and the other place is not challenging the Speaker’s ability to rule on whether a Bill is a money Bill. It is simply disagreeing with the consequences of that, and arguing that if something is a money Bill it is perfectly appropriate for the upper House to debate it in Committee and pass amendments to it, recognising that legally those amendments will have no effect if the House of Commons chooses not to take them into account. The upper House is therefore not challenging the Speaker’s right to make that decision.

The hon. Gentleman is also not right to say that this is about the Speaker deciding, effectively, whether to bring down the Government. That would be a decision for the House. The Speaker would have to make a decision about certifying something as a vote of confidence. As we debated last week, it would be extraordinary if the House were debating a motion of confidence—which the Speaker would certify as such—with everybody remaining in ignorance of the fact that it was a motion of no confidence in the Government. I simply do not think that would happen. Everyone would be very well aware of the fact that it was a motion of confidence—that it had that import to it. It would be for the House to vote on the matter, and the Speaker would then certify in a way that means the decision is outside the ambit of the courts.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

As the Minister just appeared to touch on, under the Bill the Speaker issues the certificate only after the vote has taken place, not before. Therefore, would not the Labour amendment that specifies what is and what is not a vote of confidence be much better in everybody’s terms?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

My hon. Friend adverts to an extremely relevant precedent. What would happen if a two-thirds majority was obtained, or not obtained, by just one vote, or the Speaker interpreted the result as a vote of confidence where there was one vote in it that was represented by somebody who was or was not present for whatever reason? These are very dangerous areas.

I have two final points, and I am grateful for the indulgence of the Committee in allowing me to quote extensively from documents. The Bill is being driven by an extraordinary consensus on some issues and by the fact that it is so close to the survival of the coalition that it is difficult openly to debate it. The Prime Minister said before the election that Committee stages of Bills should not be whipped, so that what a Committee thought can be understood. The Whips are out in force today, and I do not think that we will really find out what Members think about it. However, that invites the other place to look at the privilege and immunities of the House, and to propose comprehensive amendments that protect Parliament from judicial review.

[Mark Durkan]

Is the hon. Gentleman satisfied that either the Bill or amendment 6 would protect against judicial intervention on the ground of failure to issue a certificate—a controversy that could easily arise, particularly in the light of provisions in respect of a motion of no confidence? The certificate issues only after the 14-day period has been allowed—it does not issue at the time of the debate or just after the vote, but later on—and there could be controversy about the failure to issue a certificate or about whether a certificate could be issued. Someone might try to bring that to the court.

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The amendment, as drafted by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, deals with only one aspect of the matter, and, given our limited time to scrutinise this enormously important Bill, I explicitly invite the other place to look carefully at all the aspects and the advice of the Clerk. One of its own Committees is considering the matter and might well come up with different conclusions from those of the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. The Lords sorted out the IPSA Bill, under which they kept our proceedings immune from the courts, and I very much hope that they will do the same with this Bill.

My concluding point is a general one about the Bill but is relevant to the amendment. I do not think that I can recall a major constitutional measure that was so closely associated with the survival of one Administration. We have to pinch ourselves when we think of what we are doing in reality: we are completely changing our constitutional settlement at the behest of a coalition, so that it can remain in power for five years. I do not even think that that is ethical. Parliament’s immunity is basically being screwed up, and, although a Bill can at least be repealed, once the courts have been allowed into our proceedings, we will never get them out again without a major break in the constitution such as in 1689.

All that can be forestalled if the Minister simply says, “These matters cannot be resolved today,” because they cannot be resolved on the basis of parliamentary counsel’s advice to Ministers about the drafting of Bills. We need the other place to give the highest and most independent legal advice to ensure that we do not inadvertently bring about what the Government themselves do not want to see.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Shepherd]

And formidable handicaps they often are.

The endeavour of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and those who support the amendment was to provide some form of belt-and-braces approach. None of us is confident that it can work, because the aspirations and ambitions of several of our lords justices have given one an uncertainty as to where they are heading in the rewriting of the constitution. I am also mindful of the European Court of Human Rights. We have an inferior court that we call a Supreme Court and a superior court that we call a court of human rights, and on top of all that we have another court called the European Court of Justice. Somewhere in there I can see a demented Prime Minister making an application for unfair dismissal as a result of a vote to every one of those courts in turn, while we watch on, as though it were a Gilbert and Sullivan pantomime. I shall support the amendment.

Similarly, I will support amendment 23. The matter has to be determined quickly and appropriately, so I shall not waste the House’s time having indicated the actions that I will take.

[Mark Durkan]

Like the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd), I shall speak in support of amendments 6 and 23, which are both attempts to earth the Bill against some of the dangerous shocks that could be created for the House in the future. To make some of my points, I will have to refer to what the Minister said about the previous group of amendments.

In the debate on the previous group, the Minister said that he could think of no circumstances in which a debate on a motion of no confidence would take place without the House knowing that it was a motion of no confidence, even though the Bill requires the Speaker to issue a certificate only after a period of 14 days has elapsed—it does not specify how long after. That creates a situation that we all have to consider before we even go into the danger of what will happen when the matter goes to the courts. Let us first look at the difficulties and controversies that will be created in this House.

If a motion of no confidence can be played like a wild joker, and any motion can be converted into one, then whenever there is a controversial issue or one involving Opposition or rebel tactics, the Speaker will be asked early in a debate, “Will you signal whether you would be minded to say that this debate is certifiable? Will you declare that we are going through a potentially certifiable chain of political and constitutional events?” Of course, the Speaker might wish to say, “You are trying to draw me into a matter of controversy”, because he might not be privy to what Whips are saying to Members about the significance of a particular motion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Charles Walker (Broxbourne) (Con)]

My children once asked me, “What does a heffalump look like?” I said, “You’ll know one when you see one.” Has that not been the case with confidence motions throughout history? The House has known one when it has seen one, and we are in danger of over-complicating the process in the Bill.

[Mark Durkan]

I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman says, and that was why I indicated my support for earlier amendments that would have narrowed the ambiguity and reduced the possibility of political and procedural chicanery, with which the Bill is riddled.

[Chris Bryant]

Will my hon. Friend point out to the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) that there is a picture of the heffalump in several of A. A. Milne’s books?

[Mark Durkan]

I accept that point fully.

[Mr Walker]

I shall admonish my children for not being better read.

[Mark Durkan]

I will acknowledge these interventions no further.

To return to the matter at hand, let us be clear that the Bill’s provisions are open to all sorts of contests, questions and controversies. As I have said, I believe that the Minister was wrong to say that the House will know in all circumstances when something is a vote of confidence. If he wanted to make that incontrovertibly so, he would need to provide either in Standing Orders or in the Bill for a formal indication by the Speaker that a certificate could be issued prior to the period set out in the Bill, which starts 14 days after a motion. That, in turn, would bring the Speaker into areas of political controversy and intervention. Amendment 6 is clearly aimed at ensuring that those difficulties do not make the issuing of a certificate, or possibly the failure to issue one, a matter of controversy that can be brought to the courts.

In discussing previous amendments, Members alluded to affairs currently in Oireachtas Éireann and in the Dail. Those affairs may be relevant this week, because an opposition party there has indicated that it might take to the courts the question whether, under the constitution, the agreement that the Irish Government have entered into has to be subject to a vote of the Dail. Let us not rule out circumstances in which a party here, possibly a party of Opposition, could feel that the Speaker had wrongly declined to issue a certificate, or that the Government were using all sorts of procedural chicanery to prevent certificates being issued and to reset the clock. That party might then feel obliged to take the matter to court if it felt that it faced dead ends and chicanery in Parliament. That is exactly the situation that was threatened in Dublin this week given what the Irish Labour party justice spokesman said. Let us not join the Minister in completely dismissing all such possibilities.

I do not want to move from Dublin to Northern Ireland affairs, but I have some experience of what happens in practice. I was involved in negotiating and implementing the Good Friday agreement, including as a Minister and Deputy First Minister. Ministers told this House that procedures would follow their own course and that political matters would not end up in the courts, but then I found that my election as Deputy First Minister was taken to court—when I was jointly elected with David Trimble—because all sorts of rules were bent and twisted and the clock was reset by Secretaries of State and others.

The Northern Ireland Act 1998 set a clear six-week period, but Secretaries of State discovered that if they suspended things for 24 hours, there would be a new six-week period. Whenever there is a facility to contrive a completely new situation and dispose of a statutory deadline, it is used—whenever Ministers are told that in case of emergency they can smash the glass, they do so. Completely contrary to the assurances and explanations given to the House when we debated the 1998 Act, a number of Secretaries of State found themselves doing that. In addition, Assembly Members redesignated to pass particular votes, even though they said that they would not, and so on.

In the context of the Bill, people have said that a Government would never put themselves in the embarrassing position of activating a vote of no confidence in themselves or cutting corners, ignoring rules or resetting clocks so that they can bypass dates and deadlines, but the Northern Ireland experience shows that that is not so. The exigencies of the moment, and the demands for stability and good governance, can be used as circumstantial excuses. Let us not pretend otherwise. If we are trying to provide for fixed-term Parliaments with clear, fixed and guaranteed arrangements, we must go further than the Bill does. It leaves too much power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Executive when there has been a motion of no confidence, and in respect of their influence over the decision of whether a motion is one of no confidence or otherwise.

I therefore ask the Minister to acknowledge that there are shortcomings in the Bill. Some of the amendments have their own shortcomings, but they do not diminish the serious problems with the Bill. If he will not accept amendments 6 and 23, will he agree to work in another place and in the House at another time to make his own amendments, so that the Bill does not create those difficulties and controversies?

Under the Bill, the Speaker could be the subject of controversy. What if there are differences between the Speaker and Deputy Speakers on the question whether to indicate in advance that a motion is certifiable? More importantly, as the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) said, I believe that such matters could find themselves before a court, not only because somebody might want to contest the fact or content of a certificate, but more importantly because people might want to contest the failure to issue a certificate or the fairly questionable proceedings in advance of it. We do not want the Speaker of the House of Commons to be caught in the same position as Scottish football referees. They have been accused of taking and changing decisions in relation to subsequent arguments and events. Let us protect the office of the Speaker and this House.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

I rise to make a brief contribution. I have listened with great interest to the debate and I await with even greater interest the Minister’s response to the very well advocated position on amendment 6, with which I have great sympathy.

It seems blindingly simple to me. Clause 2(3) stops at the words, “for all purposes.” The comparison with section 3 of the Parliament Act 1911 has been made, so why not include the extra words,

“and shall not be questioned in any court of law”?

The amendment proposes the use of the word “whatsoever”, which was no doubt an attempt by my hon. Friend the. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) to deal with the European question—that is perfectly legitimate and I understand entirely the reason for his wording—but the point is the same: if such a provision was good in 1911, why is it not good now? If anything, the balance between Parliament and the courts has deteriorated, as the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) eloquently outlined. The balance is now extremely fine, and it is in danger of being overturned in favour of judicial activism.

It may well be that reliance will be placed upon the residual powers of article 9 of the Bill of Rights, but as an Act of Parliament, that too is subject to judicial interpretation. Over the years, it has been interpreted in a variety of ways by the courts. Notably, it has been impliedly waived or restricted by this House. Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 is a good example of Parliament deciding, in effect, to allow its privilege to be qualified. I have strong views on the wisdom of that legislation—it was foolish and has led to unintended consequences, which are at the heart of this debate.

No Member of Parliament wants a diminution of its authority or power. This is an elected Chamber and we represent the people of this country. Sovereignty means just that. It is right that all hon. Members worry—even if it is sounds like lawyers’ caution—about any further unintended diminution of our authority. That is why I support amendment 6. Why not change clause 2(3) to put things as far beyond doubt as possible, mirroring what legislators did in 1911, to ensure that the spectre of the judiciary questioning and second-guessing the proceedings of the House does not become a reality?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

The Committee was quite right. I agree that we need to ensure that the courts do not question those matters. In a moment I will deal with the amendments and the Government’s reason for believing that the language we have used about the well-precedented use of Speaker’s certificates prevents the courts from questioning the Act.

My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex observed that judges were not more interventionist. I believe there is evidence that there has been more judicial activism in judicial reviews of Executive decisions, but as far as I am aware there is no evidence that the courts have become more interventionist in challenging parliamentary proceedings. Executive decisions and decisions of Parliament are quite different from each other. Although the Supreme Court has a new name, it has no greater powers than the judicial Committee of the House of Lords that it replaced. I do not think that my hon. Friend’s concerns are well judged.

My hon. Friend also referred to the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Justice can deal with matters related to European Union law; nothing in the Bill would engage it. Similarly, the functions of the Speaker under the Bill do not engage any of the rights conferred by the European Court of Human Rights. I think it was only last week that the Joint Committee on Human Rights agreed with that when it said that the Bill’s provisions did not need to be brought to the attention of either House on human rights grounds.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hereford and South Herefordshire (Jesse Norman)—who is not in the Chamber, as he has had to fulfil a long-standing and important engagement to attend a meeting elsewhere in the House—expressed concern about the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, it has shown the utmost respect for parliamentary privilege. In a 2003 case, A. v. United Kingdom, it was specifically held that article 9 of the Bill of Rights did not violate the convention by preventing an applicant from taking defamation proceedings against an MP for words said in parliamentary proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights strongly supported the contention that courts would not become involved in these matters.

I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon, who said that owing to the very nature of these events—the fact that they would be politically highly charged—judges would not be keen to rush in and engage in questions that are rightly to be resolved by political rather than legal means. I have heard no evidence, apart from assertion, that courts would do anything different.

[Mark Durkan]

I gave the example from 2001 when, on the third attempt, David Trimble and I were jointly elected as First and Deputy First Minister by the Northern Ireland Assembly. That was taken to the courts. Yes, the courts did not touch on issues connected with the Assembly’s standing orders, but they did entertain the suggestion that the Secretary of State had failed to use the power and duty, given to him under law, to set a date for an election if no First and Deputy First Minister have been elected after six weeks. The Secretary of State did not do so, claiming that because he had notice of the potential to elect us, which had been issued by the end day of the six-week period, he could interpret the deadline differently. The court did not throw out the case and the judges—competent, serious, senior judges—divided on the issue. In the light of that precedent, the assurance of the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) does not stand.

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. He accurately sets out the fact that at issue was not a proceeding in Parliament—a decision of this House—but an executive decision by the Secretary of State. As I have said, there is lots of evidence that courts will challenge Ministers’ decisions, and one can argue about whether they will be right to do so; Ministers would probably argue they are not, but everyone else would probably argue that they are. The case the hon. Gentleman raises involved an executive decision; it was not a decision of this House or a proceeding in Parliament, and it is not protected under article 9.

[Mark Durkan]

But what we are talking about is related to the closest equivalent in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 of the certificate powers being given to the Secretary of State. Sections 31 and 32 of the 1998 Act provide for the early Dissolution of the Assembly and early elections. They are the exact same powers, except that in Northern Ireland the Secretary of State has the powers of an “over-Speaker”, rather than their being vested in the Presiding Officer. They are the equivalent powers, however.

[Mr Harper]

No, I think there is a rather crucial difference. The powers in that Act are given to a Minister—they are not proceedings in Parliament. That leads me nicely on to amendment 6—

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Mark Durkan Excerpts

Wednesday 24th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Laing]

Let me explain further. The Select Committee rushed through its pre-legislative scrutiny process, because of the timetable for the publication of the Bill, Second Reading and Committee. Inevitably, the Select Committee had to take evidence and consider matters quickly and briefly. It is important that the issues considered by the Select Committee are put before the Committee. I have every confidence that the Minister will assure the Committee in due course that he and his colleagues have considered all the points made in the pre-legislative scrutiny report by the Select Committee.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

This is not about subsection (2)(b). If it would assist the hon. Lady in arguing against her own amendment, does she recognise that other amendments that she has tabled, such as amendment 37, if accepted, would create a serious problem in relation to amendment 33? That rests on the Prime Minister discharging a particular function, whereas under amendment 37 there could be circumstances in which there was no Prime Minister to discharge that function.

[Mrs Laing]

Indeed. The hon. Gentleman is right. We will debate amendment 37 in the next group, and I am sure I will be called to order if I go into the details of it at this point.

Once again, I am not seeking, and the Select Committee was not seeking, to put forward a coherent succession of amendments in an attempt to change the Bill. I want to make sure that the Committee has an opportunity, as it has now had, to consider the issues of exclusive cognisance and the way in which the Standing Orders of the House will be affected by the Bill. That is why I hope the Committee’s Chairman will excuse my arguing against myself, while putting the points that the Select Committee wished to make here. It is important that the results of the pre-legislative scrutiny that we undertook should be put before the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is extremely sensible and full of common sense, which is what this Bill lacks. This is about something else; it is not about the manner in which our democratic system functions. It is about something completely different and I will come to that in a moment.

[Mark Durkan]

Does the hon. Gentleman not think that his case against the idea of a special weighted majority for Dissolution in this House would be more credible if he had not previously proposed amendments to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill that required a threshold of support for any referendum on the alternative vote? He supported other amendments as well, which required not just a threshold that related to those who voted, but to the total number on the electorate. Is there not some hypocrisy in the argument he makes today?

[Mr Cash]

I am more than delighted to reply to the hon. Gentleman. Sparring with him always causes me great amusement. As for what he says, there is a substantial difference. The threshold amendment that I moved on the other Bill was to do with the threshold of a number of people who would participate in the election, and not what was going on in this House. It was not even related to the question of the threshold of those who voted yes, as in the Scotland Act 1998 and the amendment of George Cunningham, the then Member for Finsbury and Islington, so there is a significant difference. I am talking about the trust that is given to us in this House and the manner in which we discharge it.

The coalition originally proposed 55%, but that was so manifestly absurd that the coalition agreement was then torn up and the figure was replaced with two thirds. If not 55%, why two thirds? The Scottish Parliament—I am using this analogy because it has already been raised, but I think that it is completely irrelevant—does not form Her Majesty’s Government. Decisions in time of war, a Finance Bill or any of the other great levers of power are determined, and will continue to be determined, by the United Kingdom Parliament. One such great exercise of power at a most important time was the confidence motion of 10 May 1940, which was passed, as it happened, by the Government, and it led to the demise of Neville Chamberlain’s Government, because everyone knew he had to go. I do not regard the Scottish parliamentary experience as relevant. If not two thirds, why not 75%, 60% or any other number that Harry Potter’s wand might conjure out of thin air?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Shepherd]

I like the young new Member vigorously advancing an argument that I find so convincing.

The measure is not appropriate for a serious democracy. Clause 2, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone said, is an endeavour to entrench. It is as simple as that. We cannot ignore a wider picture of what is going on. At this moment, loyal and good dinner guests of those who run my party are marching into the Lords to take their place. Their doing so means that when the Bill comes to be voted on—remember, the other House that has to deal with that is the Lords—the numbers able to vote on it in the Lords in the Conservative and Liberal Democrat interest will have increased exponentially.

Overall, the Bill—clause 2, the other clauses, the Speaker’s certificate, the idea of a registered leader of a registered party and so on—is, if not humbug, then designed to defeat the very purposes that most of us in the House want: an open, democratic House. I know that this is difficult in politics, but my Conservative colleagues should listen, understand and think about the 200 very new Members in the House who are going to change a constitution without any reference point other than party loyalty. Party loyalty to what? No mandate? They are going to march blindly through the Lobby at the behest of the concept of party, when in a coalition that is a very different matter.

I shall certainly vote for amendment 4, and I hope there will be many who take that course.

[Mark Durkan]

Many valid arguments have been made about this group of amendments by a number of right hon. and hon. Members. I have total sympathy with the cynicism that has been expressed about some of the devices in the Bill and the motives for them.

However, I believe totally in the idea of a fixed-term Parliament and have supported amendments that clearly stated “fixed term”, although I believe that the term should be four years, rather than five. I have to ask myself, as all of us as legislators and members of the Committee must ask ourselves, if we do not like the present provisions, what is our alternative that would mean that we have credibly passed a Bill for fixed-term Parliaments? That is where I part company and cease to be persuaded by some of the arguments that I hear in respect of some of the amendments.

With reference to cynicism about the motives, a number of hon. Members have articulated the basic nature of the Bill. It is the means by which the two coalition parties have created a statutory harness to keep them together for this Parliament. It is, in essence, a fixed this-Parliament Bill, rather than a Fixed-term Parliament Bill. It is designed to solve the conundrum of either party collapsing the coalition. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill is for fixing future elections. This Bill is about fixing this Parliament.

If I want the Bill to be a Fixed-term Parliament Bill, I have to be judicious about its content and any amendments that I might support. That is why I have some questions about some of the amendments that have been so articulately presented today.

The hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) presented amendment 33 with a white flag and in a very novel way, which just goes to show that it is entirely possible for people to present themselves in all sorts of ways in the House. People say that a Government would not use or exploit in any way a no confidence motion against themselves, but any available device will be used in any particular circumstances. That is the nature of politics.

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) spoke to amendment 21 and made a strong case for an “immediate” as opposed to an “early” general election. The only problem is that if “immediate” can mean only six weeks, as he said to the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), what happens if, for example, we are close to Christmas—perhaps the middle of November—notwithstanding that allowances will be made for holidays? If we are truly to take account of media coverage and other activities during that time, is it credible to confine ourselves to six weeks and six weeks only? Clause 2 as it stands allows for consensus in the House on the need to bring forward considerably the due date for an election, and people might do so conscious of current and pending events.

Another hon. Member mentioned the situation in Dublin at the minute, and many people would say that, although confirmation of an early election there has helped to clear the political air, going for an immediate election might cause more market turmoil not just for Ireland, but for others. There are times when we need to leave ourselves and this House the room to make a distinction between “early” and “immediate”.

[Mr Cash]

I am well aware that the hon. Gentleman is pretty close to and talks frequently with those in southern Ireland and in the Dail, but I doubt whether the Dail or the people of Ireland would be particularly enthusiastic at this moment, when the Government are in coalition with the Greens, to have such a provision imposed upon them. I suspect that, if the idea were suggested, it would lead to serious disturbances in Ireland, and I am quite sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Gentleman raises some wider questions, and you, Mr Hoyle, have said that the next group of amendments deals with confidence, but this debate has strayed well on to that ground and conflated the two issues of whether the House, by a weighted majority, calls for an early election or whether it passes a motion of no confidence in the Government.

In 1994, the Government changed in the Dail. The Labour party left its coalition with Fianna Fail, supported a motion of no confidence in the then Taoiseach and reappeared in a new coalition with Fine Gael and the then Democratic Left. In that situation, as in the Bill before us, provision has been made for a Government to change—a new Government to be constituted—in the lifetime of a Parliament, and in 1994 the people of Ireland settled quite happily for that.

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend does not like my “immediate” provision, but I shall suggest one reason why he is wrong. The Bill, if unamended, means that Her Majesty by royal proclamation under the Great Seal, after conferring presumably with the Privy Council, determines the date of the general election, but that in essence is down to the Prime Minister. Surely, if the whole point is to take that power away from the Crown and to place it here in Parliament, there should be provision for an “immediate” general election.

[Mark Durkan]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about trying to remove powers from the Prime Minister, but I am not sure that all the amendments that he supports would do that. I think that, in a fairly effective way, the powers would remain pretty heavily with the Executive.

I am not fully persuaded of the case for the amendment. I fully accept the argument that it would bring some clarity and put some control in the hands of the House. However, there could well be good, logical reasons for having an election that occurred to people at the time, possibly well in advance of a due election date. There could be political difficulties in one of the devolved regions that are leading to elections there, or particular market issues, or all sorts of crises in Europe—although I do not want to excite the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) with that prospect. A variety of reasons could create a coincidence of interest across a number of parties from a number of places to say, “We’ll have an early election”, and a date could be set without necessarily having to do it in crisis mode for six weeks hence.

The beauty of a fixed-term Parliament is meant to be that, because we all know the dates, we do not create uncertainty and have political rushes and get all sorts of brinkmanship games being played. However, if this House is to have the power to dissolve early, it can have that power but not necessarily the power to do it immediately. It can have the power to give due notice that the date is being brought forward but without waiting until just six weeks beforehand. If there is merit in a fixed-term Parliament, there is also merit in leaving this House the opportunity to bring forward a date other than just by a vote six weeks beforehand, because that would create surprise and difficulties and a sense of crisis. I fully accept that the terms of the clause are not fully adequate: the hon. Member for Rhondda is absolutely right about that. We do not have a complete or adequate provision on fixed-term arrangements.

Amendment 4 would remove the requirement for a two-thirds majority. I accept the argument made by many hon. Members that that is a very high threshold. I do not agree that it should be two thirds of all Members regardless of whether they are voting. If we are going to set any majority, or any weighted majority, it should comprise those who are present and voting, so I do not accept the Bill as it stands. However, I cannot just simply go along with the argument that says that there should not be any sort of weighted majority, because then we are not sure what proof we are providing against anybody abusing the numbers in this House to dissolve Parliament early. Other hon. Members have referred to the powers of the Prime Minister and the powers that are exercised through party machinery—the Whips, and so on. Leaving the calling of an early election to a simple majority that can be activated to call an election within six weeks means that huge power remains in the hands of the Prime Minister.

[Mr George Howarth]

Does my hon. Friend accept that being a Member of this place carries with it not only a lot of privileges but a lot of responsibilities, and that if we can achieve a simple majority, that would mean that more than half the Members of the House of Commons—people who have been sent here to exercise their judgment—had reached the conclusion that the time was right for a general election? I cannot for the life of me see why he finds that a difficult concept.

[Mark Durkan]

I believe in the idea of a fixed-term Parliament. I am therefore not comfortable with the idea that, yes, we have fixed-term Parliaments, but that at any time a simple majority can call an election for six weeks hence. That is what I am being asked to vote for as an alternative to what is provided for in the Bill. The Bill is not perfect, and it is badly motivated—I am as cynical as anybody else about that—but I have to be judicious and logical about what I would provide in its stead.

There is an old joke about somebody going into the two-hour dry cleaners and being told, “Come back on Tuesday.” They say, “What do you mean, come back on Tuesday? It says ‘Two-hour dry cleaners’ outside.” Then they are told, “That’s just the name of the shop.” That is exactly what we have with this Bill. People say that they want a fixed-term Parliament, but they also want a Bill that means that it will not, in effect, be fixed, because a simple vote at any time can dissolve it—and who is going to be moving those votes and pulling the strings of the Whips behind the scenes? We must remember that at any time, it will be possible for people to force an election by using a simple majority to force through a vote of no confidence in the Government. If there is not a vote of confidence in an alternative Government within 14 days, there will be an election. If people want the means to force an election, that route exists.

However, it is fair and reasonable also to give the House the power to change the date of an election for reasons that are not particularly partisan, that are mature, responsible and well thought through and that can be justified in light of existing circumstances and forthcoming events. The House should be able to say, “We have a fixed-term Parliament, but we are giving all sides ample notice that we will be moving the date.” That would not be a matter of artifice or brinkmanship. If the House is being offered such a responsible, mature power that it could use with responsibility aforethought, I find it bizarre that Members are trying to twist and turn to find reasons not to take it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Chope]

I am against the Bill because of the lack of flexibility in it. From what the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) has just been telling us, I think he agrees that if we have a fixed-term Parliament, a lack of flexibility is inevitable. He said that in the current constitutional and financial crisis in Ireland it is reasonable that its Parliament should be able to call what he described as an early general election rather than an immediate one.

However, the consequence of the Bill will be that if we had a constitutional and financial crisis in this country similar to the one besetting the Irish people—God forbid that that should happen—the hon. Gentleman or I might ask my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister whether he intended to call an early general election so that the people could have their say. Under the terms of the Bill, the Prime Minister would turn around and say to me or the hon. Gentleman, “I am sorry, but I don’t have the power to call a general election now. The only way I can engineer one is for you to put down a motion of no confidence in me, with the humiliation that it would involve, or for me to try to get a two-thirds majority in the House to facilitate it.” The Prime Minister would lose the right to call an election. The Minister seems to think that is a good idea, but I do not. I trust the Prime Minister’s judgment on such issues, and I think we should trust the people and let them decide.

When our good friend Edward Heath was Prime Minister, he decided to call an early general election to deal with the miners’ strike. The people reached their verdict. Basically, they said, “We think that you have proved yourself unworthy to remain in office.” The fact that a Prime Minister calls an early general election does not necessarily mean that they are going to win it. Whether they win or not is a matter for the people.

If there was a financial or constitutional crisis, such as the one in Dublin, a reasonable Prime Minister—I should like to think of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister as a reasonable man—would say, “In the light of what has happened, we should call a general election. We should call it now. We should not have to have a contrived vote in the House of Commons. I wish to go to the Queen and ask her to exercise her prerogative to call an immediate general election.”

[Mark Durkan]

In Dublin, a budget needs to be passed and then people can make a legitimate judgment. The imperative is to get a budget passed to create some economic and financial stability to boost confidence in the wider markets—not just for the Irish economy but for other economies both inside and outside the eurozone that will be under pressure. There will be an election in late January and that is known, but at least the Dail has the opportunity to pass a budget.

[Mr Chope]

I will not get involved in the detail of what is happening in Ireland at the moment. If a similar situation were to happen in this country, people might well turn to their Members of Parliament and say, “Why should we trust this Government to pass another Budget when it has made such a Horlicks of the current arrangements? Why don’t we elect a new Parliament and a new Government to deal with the crisis?”

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

Because the legislation is changing that provision in two regards, one of which is the subject of an amendment in this group. The Government—I think rightly—want to say that after a motion of no confidence, there could be two weeks during which the House could, if it wanted, pass a motion of confidence in either the same Government, presumably, or another Government, with either the same Prime Minister or a different Prime Minister, with a different set of ministerial colleagues. That is a change from the situation thus far. There are those who want to remove that two-week element from the Bill. We on the Labour Benches disagree with them, so we will not be supporting that amendment.

There were two occasions, on 11 March 1976 and 20 July 1977, when the motion “That this House do now adjourn” was declared by the then Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition to be a motion of no confidence, first by Harold Wilson and then by Mrs Thatcher, now Baroness Thatcher. On occasion, the mere involvement of the Prime Minister, by turning up at the Dispatch Box to defend a particular motion or piece of legislation, has effectively turned it into a motion of confidence, and that has transpired during the debate. As we are abolishing the Prime Minister’s right to dissolve Parliament and placing that right in the hands of Parliament—we are putting that in statute—it would be better to state in the Bill, in clear language, precisely what constitutes a motion of no confidence, so that there can be no doubt.

I say that for several reasons. First, it would remove the Prime Minister’s power to force legislation through by calling it a matter of confidence. Perhaps Members on the Government Benches have not got used to this yet, but when we were in government, it was a fairly common occurrence whenever there was a difficult piece of legislation—whether on trade unions, the war in Iraq or whatever—for the Prime Minister to say, not necessarily in public but certainly in private, that it was a matter of confidence. That has led to some bad legislation in the past, which was certainly not helpful to us, and I am sure that there will be plenty of moments like that coming along for Government Members.

[Mark Durkan]

Just to reinforce the hon. Gentleman’s argument, a case in point when legislation was forced through with the threat that it would be treated as a confidence issue was the Counter-Terrorism Bill allowing for 42-day detention. The then Prime Minister made it clear in his pleadings to me that it would be treated as a confidence motion. He said, “Do you want an election? If you turn up and vote against, there will be an election.” He tried threatening me and his Back-Bench colleagues with an election, precisely abusing the notion of a confidence motion, which is why amendment 25, which the hon. Gentleman has tabled, is so good.

[Chris Bryant]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s support. He is absolutely right. However, I must confess to the Committee that Prime Ministers rarely said that to me personally, because I was too ludicrously loyal. Almost before the Prime Minister had even thought that a vote might be difficult, I had already decided I would be supportive. In fact, I rarely got to see the Prime Minister for that very reason. I would therefore advise Government Members that if they want to see the Prime Minister on a regular basis, they should start wondering whether they will support Government provisions. However, the serious point is that the freedom of individual Back Benchers will be tethered, because they will constantly be persuaded by the argument, “You don’t want a general election, do you? You must support this piece of legislation, because otherwise I’m going to call it a motion of no confidence.”

The second reason touches on an important element, on which the Minister got into difficult waters—I know that he does not think that he did, but others of us do, and I think that the courts will feel that too. He said that it would be for the Speaker to decide and to announce before any debate what counts as a motion of confidence or, presumably, a motion of no confidence. A minor point is whether a motion of confidence will count as a motion of no confidence if it is not carried. In the past it has, but I am not sure whether the Government intend that.

It would be wholly inappropriate for the Chair to say at the beginning of, for example, a Budget debate that if the House does not carry the Budget and if the Finance Bill falls on Second Reading or Third Reading that would be a motion of confidence in the Government, so he would issue a certificate. The Minister was sighing but is now smiling, and we prefer the smiling. I accept that in that example I am imagining what might happen, but I am more concerned what would happen if hon. Members chose to ask the Speaker whether a motion of censure counted as a motion of confidence. As I understand it, the Minister is saying that the Speaker would be required to adjudicate on whether it was a motion of no confidence. That would be wholly inappropriate, particularly at a time of political uncertainty and high drama, because the Speaker would lose his or her impartiality and be drawn into the political mêlée, and that would be wrong.

Amendment 5 would remove the two-week provision for a new Government to be formed on the basis of a confidence motion. We may have to return to some of these issues on Report, and I would be grateful if the Minister will clarify whether, if that second motion fell, there could then be a subsequent two weeks. We quite like the provision for two weeks—it seems sensible if an alternative coalition or Government could be formed. I see some hon. Members casting a wry glance as though I am eyeing up the Liberal Democrats. We are not getting on very well with the Liberal Democrats at the moment, so I do not think he needs to worry about that, but obviously if the offer is on the table, we will take it.

Amendment 22 is a minor one, and I would be interested in the Government’s view. The clause refers to the provision of 14 days being allowed after a motion of no confidence. We have suggested that it should be 10 working days simply because all other references in the Bill are to working days. I suppose it is possible that the period could coincide with a royal wedding, a day of thanksgiving, a bank holiday, Easter or Christmas, and it would seem to be sensible to specify working days instead of days.

However, we have not moved to the suggestion in other Committees of 10 sitting days, because if the House were adjourned, there would be a specific problem. I hope that the Minister will say what he thinks should happen if the House had been adjourned for a recess—for example, the day after a motion of no confidence. Should there be a requirement for the Government to bring the House back, and should there be a specific provision for the Speaker to be able to require the House to be recalled within the two weeks? We will come to Prorogation later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Laing]

Yes, the shadow Minister is correct. I am sure the Minister will have very good responses to these questions when he replies, but it is important that the House addresses them, and that is why the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee has tabled these amendments as a result of its pre-legislative scrutiny report.

Amendment 36 would, in essence, encourage the incumbent Government to keep the House sitting, and not use the prerogative power of prorogation for purposes for which it should not be used.

Amendment 37 reflects the Committee’s findings that the Bill still leaves to unwritten convention the requirement that a Government should resign if they lose the confidence of the House. The Deputy Prime Minister said to the House in July this year that the Bill would

“strengthen the power of this House to throw out a Government through a motion of no confidence”—[Official Report, 5 July 2010; Vol. 513, c. 32.]

However, although that might have been the Deputy Prime Minister’s intention, the Bill does not do that. Amendment 37 would require the Prime Minister to resign within seven days of a motion of no confidence being passed, and to advise the Queen to appoint a new Prime Minister who had the best chance of securing the House’s confidence.

The Government’s response to the Committee’s report appears to show that they do not intend that an incumbent Government faced with a successful vote of no confidence should be required to resign. The response states:

“A Government is able now, and would be able under the Bill, to remain in office after a no confidence motion and contest a general election.”

That is a very serious state of affairs. The Committee carefully examined the consequences of the Bill before putting that in its report, but the fact is that the Bill will allow a Government to remain in office after a no confidence motion and to contest a general election.

That raises a number of constitutional questions, and I wish to put four to the Minister. First, do the Government intend that the incumbent Government should be able to force an early general election following a vote of no confidence even where an alternative Government with a potential majority in the House are clearly waiting in the wings?

My second question relates to a matter that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) referred to: have the Government considered that an incumbent Government might engineer a vote of no confidence in themselves, requiring only a simple majority, and then simply sit it out for two weeks to force an early general election? Once again, although I have every confidence that the current Government and the Minister at the Dispatch Box would not behaviour dishonourably, the Bill gives a future Government the power to do that.

As I mentioned in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, some Members of the Canadian Parliament raised this issue at a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference held here last week. There is a constitutional difficulty in Canada at the moment, because more than one vote of confidence has been held at the instigation of the Government. My hon. Friend said that he is not particularly interested in examples from other countries, and I agree that just because something happens in Canada does not mean that it will happen here. However, Canada’s constitution and Government are constructed similarly to ours and we ought to learn lessons or at least look at the warning signs from a place whose legislature is so similar.

Thirdly, have the Government considered that an incumbent Prime Minister whose party has narrowly lost a general election might refuse to resign and instead choose to face the House of Commons, as Stanley Baldwin did in January 1924—the shadow Minister referred to that—and as the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) could, in theory, have done this May? A vote of no confidence in those circumstances would give the incumbent Prime Minister the choice of either resigning or forcing another general election.

An incumbent Prime Minister would not be able to exercise that choice at the moment, because the convention is that the monarch, under her existing prerogative powers, would almost certainly not agree to dissolve Parliament so soon after an election where there was a viable alternative Government. Nevertheless, the Bill, as drafted, would leave the question open, and it is our duty as a Parliament not to put the monarch under pressure to make a decision; we should never have a situation where the monarch has to exercise her prerogative power in order to keep the incumbent Prime Minister in line, as it were.

This is another matter that could easily be dealt with by amendment 37, which states:

“Where the House of Commons passes a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, the Prime Minister shall tender his resignation to Her Majesty within a period of seven days of the motion being passed.”

The amendment is quite simple and, again, is not intended to run a coach and horses through the Bill—far from it. As I have said on many occasions, I support the Bill and I want it to go through, because it is necessary for the stability of the Government and of the coalition at a time when we need stability. What the Select Committee is trying to do through these amendments is simply assist the Government to improve the Bill.

My final question to the Minister is on how the Bill strengthens the power of the House to throw out a Government by a motion of no confidence. The Select Committee considered that question as carefully as we could in the time given for pre-legislative scrutiny and there is a general opinion that the Bill does not strengthen the power of the House to throw out a Government on a motion of no confidence. I would argue, however, that the House has at present a pretty good power that it can exercise to throw out a Government on a motion of no confidence. I do not believe that the Bill strengthens that position and the Deputy Prime Minister ought not to say that it does when it does not.

[Mark Durkan]

With the exception of amendment 5, the amendments basically try to make the Bill more complete and more cogent by ensuring that there is less ambiguity about convention. That is particularly the case with amendment 25, which would remove from the Prime Minister and the Whips the ability to whisper confidence and no confidence in people’s ears, to play the question like a joker that is wild and to use it in relation to any issue that is uncomfortable for the Government or on which Back Benchers are exercising their consciences and discretion.

I gave the example in an intervention earlier of the way in which that process was used with the then Counter-Terrorism Bill. Labour MPs who had said that they would vote in good conscience against 42-day detention were prevailed on with the threat of its being a matter of confidence or no confidence. The then Prime Minister said to me that he would not even table a motion of no confidence if he lost that vote, but that he would deem it to be a vote of no confidence and would go straight away. In the first conversation, he said that the vote would have been followed by a no confidence motion but later on, he said that he would not even bother with a no confidence motion and would go straight to an election. I know that that threat brought some Back Benchers into line and they voted against their consciences and against their stated intentions.

If we are serious about altering the balance of the powers in the hands of the Executive and the Whips, we should support amendment 25, which states that a no confidence motion for the purposes of the Bill must explicitly be a no confidence motion in either the Prime Minister or the Government. Making it clear and explicit in those terms removes the ambiguity and bullying element and restores clarity.

The hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) has made strong arguments for amendments 36 and 37. They would remove possible ambiguity and abuse as well as a lot of confusion and speculation that might arise about otherwise serious circumstances. I commend all those amendments to the Committee.

Another virtue of amendment 25 is that it would go some way to mitigating many of the concerns about the Speaker’s certificate and the challenges and questions that might be raised about it, which are legitimately the subject of subsequent amendments. Because I care for the issues raised by those subsequent amendments, I would make the point that amendment 25 is relevant in containing the problems with the Speaker’s certificate that they aim to address.

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

As a new Member, I think that many of the public will be quite puzzled by some of the matters that are being discussed and will probably be quite surprised that there was such a lack of clarity about what a matter of confidence is. Given that the question of confidence in a Government is fundamental, as was expressed eloquently earlier by many speakers, it is very important that we get this right.

I have not been through some of the experiences that others clearly have, but I have heard them talk about them and it seems wrong that such a question should be used as a sword of Damocles over Members who might have legitimate views about a particular part of a policy—even if it is the policy of a Government whom they support. Had I been a Member of the previous Parliament, I am sure that detention would have been an issue on which I would not have supported the Government’s position. So I can see exactly why it is right to have a definition.