Government Policy on Iran Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateMaria Miller
Main Page: Maria Miller (Conservative - Basingstoke)Department Debates - View all Maria Miller's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(3 years, 8 months ago)
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I beg to move,
That this House has considered Government policy on Iran.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller. I will concentrate on two issues: the nuclear issue in Iran and state-sponsored terrorism. That will leave the field open to others to consider matters such as human rights. For many years, colleagues from across the House have raised concerns over Iran’s malign activities and their impact on the UK’s interests in the region and beyond. The recent expiration of the UN arms embargo and the election of President-elect Joe Biden offer us an invaluable opportunity to review events in the region and consider the UK’s policy towards Iran. It is a policy that I believe requires urgent reassessment and that would benefit from a clear-sighted assessment of Iran and the challenges it poses to the UK and its allies.
Ever since the Islamic revolution altered the course of Iran’s hitherto great history, its fundamentalist leaders have been driven by a central goal: expanding Iranian hegemony in the region and exporting the revolution. The founding father of the Islamic Republic spoke clearly of his vision for the new Iran:
“The Iranian people’s revolution is only a point in the start of the revolution of the great world of Islam.”
That is a mantra that Tehran’s leaders have ruthlessly and violently pursued ever since.
The radicalisation at the heart of that ideology has led to untold suffering in Iran, throughout the region and far beyond. Iran’s support for international terrorism is perhaps the best documented means of exporting its fundamentalist concept of Islamic revolution. It is why Iran is often referred to as the world’s biggest state sponsor of terrorism. It certainly explains why, to this day, Iran’s leaders ensure that vast sums are invested in its terrorist proxies, even amidst a devastating pandemic and economic crisis, to the detriment of its long-suffering citizens.
Iran’s operation of an ever-expanding nuclear programme presents the international community with an historic challenge. The joint comprehensive plan of action nuclear agreement has not restrained Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and certainly has not made it reassess its harmful trajectory, as many wishfully advocated at the time of its signing. The JCPOA was signed in 2015 and was heralded as an historic moment in non-proliferation. Sadly, events have shown that that was far from the truth. Although the deal included extensive verification mechanisms to allow the international community a line of sight into aspects of Iran’s nuclear work, it has fallen short of the necessary safeguards in many areas.
Mindful of the time we have for this debate, I will provide a brief overview of the most concerning aspects. First, much of Iran’s advanced nuclear infrastructure was merely mothballed, instead of being dismantled. That has enabled Iran rapidly to bring enrichment equipment online in recent months, after it decided to breach the terms of the JCPOA and enrich uranium, not only at a higher purity, closer to that required for weapons grade, but in higher quantities. By the International Atomic Energy Agency’s own estimation, Iran now has 12 times the permitted amount of enriched uranium. That far exceeds the amount required for a peaceful domestic nuclear programme and is reportedly sufficient to produce two nuclear warheads. Much of the advanced enrichment work has even taken place deep underground in new production halls at the controversial Natanz nuclear facility.
Secondly, Iran’s historic nuclear activities—especially those with possible military dimensions—were inexplicably left unaddressed by the JCPOA. It emerged in 2018 that Iran entered the 2015 nuclear deal on false pretences, after an Israeli intelligence operation found documents proving that Iran had conducted more advanced testing related to nuclear weapons development than it had declared.
Thirdly, the deal failed entirely to address the pressing problem of Iran’s support for international terrorism. The failure to pursue a broad deal and the segregation of core issues from Iran’s nuclear activities was a costly strategic mistake. Iran has shown no inclination to open those activities to negotiation following the JCPOA’s signing. Why would it? It achieved invaluable sanctions relief at a critical moment in the country’s economic life; and, besides, the export of terrorism is the very cornerstone of exporting revolution.
Fourthly, the JCPOA failed to address Iran’s ballistic missile programme, which we must not forget is the primary means for delivering a nuclear warhead. While the UN sanctions in effect may relate to that programme, that has not for one second given Iran cause to pause its test launching and construction of advanced missiles capable of delivering explosive material thousands of miles from Iran.
Fifthly, human rights abuses were not even discussed in the negotiations, despite Iran’s having one of the worst human rights records in the world. The manner in which any country treats the lives of its own citizens sends an unmistakeable message about its integrity. I am a member of the Council of Europe, the foremost human rights organisation in Europe, and it is an embarrassment having such a pariah on our own doorsteps.
Last, and by no means least, by lifting all nuclear-related sanctions with immediate effect the P5+1 lost any leverage it retained to prevent Iran from subsequently breaching the terms of the nuclear deal.
It should be little surprise that our Prime Minister said earlier this year that this was “a bad deal”. While the deal itself was unquestionably bad, I fear that the P5+1 has further undermined its collective efforts in the implementation of the deal. This year, despite many breaches, there have been no tangible consequences for Iran. Just this week, the UK joined its E3 partners in speaking of their efforts to preserve the JCPOA, and Iran’s egregious breaches warrant nothing more than the expression of deep worry.
I wholeheartedly supported the UK’s triggering of the dispute resolution mechanism at the beginning of the year. That stood to be an important moment in restraining Iran’s actions. Conversely, it appears that the E3 has allowed the process to become an interminable period for dialogue, without any tangible action or sense of authority, despite the fact that the IAEA has provided extensive evidence of increased Iranian non-compliance. Will the Minister please outline the strategy of Her Majesty’s Government in the administration of the dispute mechanism and say whether, in his assessment, it has any impact on Iran’s nuclear activities? In addition, what outcome is the E3 working towards with the dispute mechanism?
The snapback of sanctions was an important failsafe measure enshrined in the JCPOA—a measure that has not been initiated by the P5+1 signatories, with the exception of the United States—so will the Minister please outline how the Government’s position on the reimposition of sanctions on Iran as a result of its non-compliance is going to work out? Have the Government notified Iran at any stage of the possibility of sanctions being re-enforced? What message does the Minister think it sends to Iran when we condemn its nuclear non-compliance but do not enforce the consequences agreed in UN Security Council resolution 2231 and repeatedly state our commitment to preserving the JCPOA?
The expiration of the UN arms embargo on Iran was problematically mishandled this year. By this point, Iran was in full defiance of the JCPOA. Allowing the embargo to expire without extension sends a regrettable signal to Iran that its actions elicit no consequences, regardless of how flagrant they are. That is particularly relevant, given that a further set of embargoes, including on missiles, is set to expire in 2023. The depth of concern felt on the Conservative Benches about the expiration was seen clearly in October when more than 80 Conservative parliamentarians signed a letter to the Prime Minister, co-ordinated by Conservative Friends of Israel.
Earlier this year, Ministers stated that the UK was
“working…to address the planned expiry”,
but we ultimately abstained on a US-led UN Security Council resolution to extend the embargo to August. I regret to say that the UK’s assessment at the time that the motion would not have passed anyway so we should not support it seems illogical. I am sure it is not UK Government policy to abstain on votes purely on the basis that they are unlikely to pass.
It should cause additional alarm to Her Majesty’s Government that our P5+1 partners Russia and China opted to enable the resumption of advanced weapons sales to Iran, which will further Tehran’s dangerous regional activities. China is reportedly negotiating a $400 billion deal with Iran to increase military co-operation. I fear that history will not favourably judge our inability to bridge the divide between the United States and our European allies by ultimately abstaining.
What is the Minister’s assessment of the growing divergence within the P5+1 and its implications for any future attempts, first, to bring Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA and, secondly, to negotiate a broader framework with it? Although an EU arms embargo is set to remain in force until 2023, does the Minister accept that concerns are centred around Iran’s ability to procure advanced weaponry from states outside the EU?
Iran seeks nuclear weapons as a protective umbrella for its dangerous activities throughout the middle east, which is why combating its support for terrorism abroad should be part and parcel of our Iran policy. In Lebanon alone, Iran has armed the Hezbollah terror organisation with an estimated arsenal of up to 150,000 rockets—more than 10 times more than it had in the 2006 war. I welcomed the UK’s proscription of Hezbollah last year, and it has been reassuring that several other countries have followed suit, but there is much work still to be done.
Iran is reportedly distributing almost $20 billion per year to its proxies throughout Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and Yemen, and it is backing President Assad in Syria. The sanctions relief windfall that Iran received from the JCPOA would have directly facilitated such extensive financial support. The consequences of Iran’s investments need no explanation. As the Defence Secretary said, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force is one of the foremost architects of Iran’s malign activity. Yet although the IRGC is believed to be responsible for the deaths of dozens of British servicemen and women, and IRGC-linked terrorist activity in Europe is well documented, the UK does not proscribe the group as a terrorist organisation. The US proscribed the IRGC last year—a significant step in the fight against international terrorism.
The UK Treasury lists the IRGC, the IRGC Aerospace Force and the IRGC Quds Force as being subject to UK terrorism and terrorism-financing sanctions, so they should surely meet the criteria for full proscription. I am aware that the Government do not comment on such matters, but perhaps the Minister can highlight that discrepancy with cross-departmental colleagues. The US includes non-nuclear Iranian targets in its sanctions regime. Does the Minister agree that our new Magnitsky-style sanctions regime should be used to keep the pressure on Iran on non-nuclear issues?
It is of great regret that the UK’s policy towards Iran in recent years has failed to curtail its wider regional aggression. Iran has shown no desire to come in from the cold, and continues to subvert regional peace and stability. That stands in ever more stark contrast with the push for peace in the region that we have seen between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Not only is it in the UK’s interest to curtail Iran’s regional aggression, but it is quite simply the right thing to do. It is incumbent on the UK to work with our international partners to formulate a new strategy to combat the Iranian threat. The acceptance that Iran’s war by proxy and nuclear programme are not mutually exclusive must be at the heart of our new programme.
There are some who say we should keep the JCPOA on life support indefinitely, as it is the only deal on the table. In reality, that deal has been dead for some time, and we must accept that in order to make progress. As we all know, the US withdrew from the agreement in 2018, but President-elect Biden has expressed willingness to return to the deal as an interim step, if Iran complies with its terms. If, in due course, Iran begins to indicate a preparedness to return to the JCPOA, it will be critical that sanctions relief is not given prematurely. The UK, along with its P5+1 partners, must ensure that Iran reaches a number of verifiable technical milestones, proving it is committed to compliance before sanctions are lifted. Specifically, it must remove its stockpile of enriched uranium and end enrichment beyond the permitted JCPOA limit. Beyond that, the only way forward is a new comprehensive agreement, addressing all of these concerns. What steps has the Minister taken alongside our international partners in working towards that?
Iran’s actions over the last year are of concern to many in this place, as witnessed by the number of hon. Members who have turned up for this debate. I hope that the Government will take this opportunity to adopt a clear-sighted approach to Iran. Unless we begin rolling back Tehran’s harmful activities, UK interests and the much-desired peace and security of the middle east will be jeopardised.
Before I call the next speaker, I remind colleagues that they cannot contribute from the seats in the Gallery. Perhaps others can make space to allow people to move forward as and when. This is a heavily subscribed debate, so I suggest a three-minute informal time limit to try to get everybody in. I will be calling Front-Bench speakers at 3.28 pm.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) on securing this important debate. I shall begin by talking about sanctions relief and how that has helped to shape the challenges we face today; I think we may have made the same mistake twice.
Prior to the JCPOA, the international community had constructed one of the most stringent and far-reaching sanctions regimes of modern times. It was the result of strong global co-operation and had the necessary impact of bringing Iran to the negotiating table. As part of the JCPOA, many of those sanctions were lifted almost immediately. We must be cautious in removing them and proceed slowly; as the old proverb goes, we must “trust but verify”.
The sanctions relief brought billions of dollars to Iran. We know that, far from curtailing its activities since the JCPOA came into force, Iran has stepped up its proxy activities, as we have heard today, using terrorism as a form of foreign policy. It has increased its investment in violence, openly seeking to extend its Hezbollah franchise into southern Syria and even replicating that approach in Iraq.
We made a similar mistake when we failed to extend the UN arms embargo. That has now given Iran’s future defence contracts the undesirable cover of legitimacy. As a result, regional neighbours of Iran will undoubtedly feel compelled to strengthen their own defence capabilities and we will need to stand ready to support them in doing that, including by encouraging further steps towards peace between the Gulf nations and Israel.
We also need to think carefully about the steps that China is taking with Iran. Our own relationship with China has changed in recent years and will no doubt continue to do so. We should of course work together on our shared challenges, but with a clear eye on the strategic issues, because China is using all the tools at its disposal to influence activity, including not just foreign policy, but economic and security policy. As my hon. Friend the Member for Henley said, reports indicate that China is advancing a strategic agreement with Iran— a 25-year deal worth $400 billion. Already Iran’s largest trading partner, the deal will see massive injections of Chinese investment into areas such as energy, infrastructure, and telecoms, as well as defence. The potential of joint Iranian-Chinese training exercises, intelligence sharing, military research and development and more poses a clear challenge to UK interests in the region and beyond. Further plans would also see China establish a strategic foothold in the Persian gulf: a vantage point on a globally important shipping lane, and a listening post covering the middle east. We know the importance of that region and should remember that it was only months ago that we had to arrange Royal Navy escorts for vessels passing through. I urge the Minister and the Government to reflect on some of these emerging strategic challenges as the Government proceed with the integrated review.
Before I call the next speaker, may I say that for the last two speakers, unfortunately, it will be two minutes so that we finish on time? There will be a full three minutes, however, for Brendan Clarke-Smith.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) on securing this timely and important debate. Since the signing of the nuclear deal in July 2015, Iran’s regional aggression has continued unabated, as has its deeply troubling human rights record, which remains one of the worst in the world. The Islamic Republic is still a leading sponsor of state terrorism, providing financial and material support to extremist Islamist terrorist groups across the middle east, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.
Iran not only supports acts of terrorism, it seeks to form militias in parallel to national armies throughout the region, in order to bolster its influence. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is tasked with exporting Iranian revolution, with its infamous Quds Force establishing pro-Iranian proxy militias in other countries. Those forces are created using the IRGC’s effective blueprint, which includes the creation of social welfare projects financed by Iran, in order to take advantage of power vacuums and gain support in local communities for the militias.
As we have heard, Hezbollah has amassed an arsenal of up to 150,000 rockets on Lebanon’s border with Israel, and currently has an estimated 45,000 fighters, many of whom have extensive battle experience from their time in Syria, where Iran is deeply engaged in supporting Assad’s regime. In May this year, Iran’s supreme leader compared Zionism with a virus and a cancerous tumour, and said that Israel must be eliminated as soon as possible. Hamas, meanwhile, has fully restored its military strength to levels before the 2014 Operation Protective Edge conflict in Gaza, including its rocket arsenal, military infrastructure and attack tunnels infiltrating Israeli territory.
Last year, the US designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organisation, the first time a part of another Government has been named an FTO. The US said that that underscored the fact that Iran’s actions were fundamentally different from those of other Governments. The US was right to state that the IRGC was the Iranian Government’s primary means for directing and implementing its global terrorist campaign. I urge the Minister to encourage governmental colleagues to examine the IRGC for proscription, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) has already outlined, following the welcome move to proscribe Hezbollah in its entirety.
We now move on to contributions from the Front Bench. Please leave two minutes at the end for John Howell to wind up.
It is a delight to contribute to this important debate under your chairmanship, Mrs Miller.
I want to highlight the immense suffering of the Iranian people during covid. Iran has been particularly badly affected due to its broken economy and its high level of disease. We must always bear in mind in foreign policy discussions that there are human beings there who suffer enormously because of politics that goes wrong.
In foreign policy terms—that is the essay question for today—Iran has remained a significant challenge for all of us in western countries for many years with its woeful human rights record, the low role of women in society, the proxy wars in the region, the nuclear programme and the high-profile hostage diplomacy. I have a constituent who is currently in Evin prison with Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe.
Obviously, the past four years, with President Trump in the White House, have been rather unpredictable, and the question is whether it has helped the dialogue that needs to happen on Iran. We know that the recent assassinations of the military general Qasem Soleimani and the nuclear expert Mohsen Fakhrizadeh—excuse my pronunciation; I believe that we have a Farsi speaker among us—have been subject to high-profile reporting in Iran, and I believe that has made it a little more difficult to enter into dialogue.
The US’s 2018 withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action, which was carefully crafted by Baroness Ashton in the other place as our EU high representative back then, has increased tensions between the US and Iran, and I believe has undermined progress on the nuclear programme. The hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) mentioned the important deadline that we have on deterrence in 2023. I hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency verification process can step up, and that there can be more international observers so that we know exactly what is happening in terms of proliferation.
Obviously, the issue of US sanctions and the Magnitsky question are very much for the Minister. I look forward to hearing what his position on that is and what the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is currently thinking about the scope. The Magnitsky tools are new for us in the UK, but they provide an opportunity to clamp down on a small number of very dangerous individuals. I look forward to hearing whether much progress has been made within the FCDO on that question.
I also want to highlight the excitement that perhaps Mr Biden will bring a fresh change. Many hon. Members have questioned whether the JCPOA is a bit tired. It is always hard to have to reinvent things that were the thing in 2015. Hon. Members who were here in 2015 will remember that the then Member for Runnymede and Weybridge came and spoke to the House, and we could hear a pin drop because it was such an important moment. That is hard to recreate, so we need some very creative experts in the FCDO to bring us another solution. Hopefully, it can bring dialogue so that we can talk about human rights, non-proliferation and eventually some form of good, high-quality economic involvement in the future.
I also want to touch on the crucial dialogue with Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi with the aim of reducing tensions in the region and laying the foundations for future co-operation. Hon. Members have mentioned the role that the G7 will play in the coming 12 months. I wonder whether our leadership of COP and the climate challenge provides another work stream that we could introduce into any future dialogue.
I want to highlight the ongoing harassment and persecution of the staff and journalists of the BBC Persian service. The Iranian authorities have been systematically targeting BBC Persian journalists, who are mainly based in the UK, and their families in Iran since the service launched on satellite TV in 2009. That is a form of terror. Intimidation of BBC Persian staff’s family members in Iran is a regular occurrence and has increased in the past three years. We have a duty to stand up for the free press. I urge the Minister to highlight the support that the Government are providing to the BBC and to clarify whether such attacks and occurrences have been brought up in engagement with the Government.
I have about one minute—
Lovely. I have enjoyed the debate and hearing the many contributions from the different regions and parts of our Parliament. I hope that the Minister can bring us an exciting new alternative to what appears to be a dangerous situation, with the human rights of so many affected and so many suffering—particularly the diaspora. Many of us have people who come to our advice surgeries to tell us of the pain and suffering in Iran. I also hope that he will bring some solace for those of us who are worried about Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and all the others still in prison in Evin and other places for no good reason except that they happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. That hostage diplomacy must stop—we all agree on that across the aisle. I look forward to the Minister’s contribution and clarification on those questions.
On a point of order, Mrs Miller. I would like to convey to you, and perhaps you can convey it to those responsible, that Westminster Hall has become a cold house for many people, not because people are not allowed in here, but because the heater over there, and I suspect others, is blowing cold air, and the heaters behind us do not work. I do not want to make a complaint, but really—I say this respectfully—there are ladies here. I say this because yesterday there were ladies coming into Westminster Hall and they took their scarves and overcoats off, but after half an hour in here, their scarves and overcoats were back on and their collars were turned up. Really, we need to do something. Can I perhaps ask you, Mrs Miller, to please do that? Thank you.
I am sure that many hon. and right hon. Members will be very thankful to the hon. Member for putting that on the record. I can assure him that his comments will be relayed back to the Chair of Ways and Means to see whether we can get some action on that.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered Government policy on Iran.