Defence Acquisition Reform

Maria Eagle Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Let me begin by thanking the Minister for his statement and for early sight of it.

Defence procurement matters. It provides the vital kit that our forces need to fight, as well as supporting hundreds of thousands of UK jobs. We need to get this right as a nation, both for our national security and for economic growth. However, defence procurement is a mess. It needs deep and major reform. The Public Accounts Committee describes it as

“broken and repeatedly wasting taxpayers’ money.”

It has been a mess for the last 14 years. Since 2010, the Conservatives have wasted £15 billion of taxpayers’ money through mismanagement of defence procurement programmes; £5 billion has been wasted in this Parliament alone. With 46 of 52 major projects not on time or on budget, this Government are failing British forces and British taxpayers.

Time and again, this Government have been criticised for poor performance on defence procurement. There have been 17 National Audit Office reports on procurement in the MOD since 2019, four reports by the Defence Committee and eight reports by the Public Accounts Committee. They have all been critical—some highly critical—of this Government. It is right that the Minister proposes some changes—we welcome that. He mentioned Ajax; can he explain how his proposals would have stopped the disasters of the Ajax procurement? That was supposed to see vehicles in service in 2017, but now they will not be on operational deployment until 2026. More than £4 billion has been spent, but just 44 vehicles have been delivered to date. That is 70% of the budget spent for 7% of the vehicles ordered. That cannot be described as good value for money.

The MOD’s Command Paper refresh, which sets out the policy for acquisition reform, does not even tackling waste or value for money, so how would the Minister’s proposed changes stop what happened to the E-7 Wedgetail procurement? That programme, vital to enabling the UK to meet our NATO commitments, was cut from five planes to three by a ministerial decision to save money, but the changes mean that the RAF gets only 60% of the capability it wants while paying 90% of the original price. The Minister mentioned Morpheus. How would his proposals stop cost overruns, such as those that occurred in the Morpheus communication system procurement? That £395 million contract, awarded in 2017, was cancelled just before Christmas having delivered nothing at a cost of £690 million. It leaves our forces in the field having to use the ageing Bowman system for another decade.

As the Minister said in his statement, he has just announced the invitation to negotiate on the new medium helicopter. It has taken him since September 2022, when that announcement was first expected, and three subsequent delays to get the announcement finally made. Why has it taken so long and how will his integrated procurement model prevent delay after delay to expected invitations to negotiate? He expects the contract to be signed in 2025. Does it really take three years to invite negotiations and write contract specifications? Will his new integrated procurement model speed that up, or will it slow things down at the front end?

How does the Minister’s announcement today tackle the waste, poor value for money and delays that appear endemic in the current MOD procurement system? He says the new integrated procurement model will be implemented this year in respect of new procurements, but when does he actually expect to see better value and faster, less wasteful procurements? He talks about procurement anchored in pan-defence affordability, but his 10-year equipment plan is already £17 billion over budget. What adjustments will be made on that?

The long-standing failures on procurement in the MOD matter in an increasingly dangerous world. They send a message, just as over the past 14 years the Government’s hollowing out of our armed forces, creating a recruitment crisis and shrinking the Army to its smallest size since the Napoleonic era, send signals to our adversaries. Labour believes that defence procurement can strengthen UK sovereignty, security and economic growth. Defence procurement reform will be a top priority for a Labour Government to ensure that our troops have the kit they need to fight and to fulfil our NATO obligations.

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for her comments. Some issues are above party politics and playing politics, especially when we look at the threat we face and our need for more competitive military procurement, but she is aware, for all she said, that we have seen a one-year reduction in procurement time from December 2020 to December 2022. There have been extraordinary efforts in DE&S in particular to get equipment into Ukraine. We should never understate the way we have gifted our own stocks and scoured the world to find an enormous amount of munitions, not least 300,000 artillery shells. That is very positive procurement and in the hour of need as far as Ukraine is concerned.

The right hon. Lady asked a perfectly fair question. Obviously, we cannot say how any of the measures would have worked in the past, but let me take one of her hypothetical questions: how would Ajax—the key example, given the Sheldon report—have been helped? I can only speculate, but the emphasis on exportability, for example, will be robust and from the start of programmes. That applies more pressure where requirements are overly exquisite, because it will be balanced out by international demand. The reason we want to promote exportability is ultimately to strengthen the resilience of our industrial base. Our market is not big enough. If we have that check in place, it will reduce the tendency towards the exquisite.

Secondly, we will have a new set-up in terms of the expert advice we receive at the beginning—the second opinion, as I call it—in particular from scientists at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, export experts at the Department for Business and Trade, and our own civil servants on finance and so on. We will have very clear advice, which will look at the technical issues around potential platforms. At the moment, to be frank—I appreciate this is only possible to say from internal knowledge—we do not get that level of balance and challenge against the primary requirement coming forward from the frontline command.

The right hon. Lady asked how the new model would apply to the new medium helicopter and whether it would add time at the beginning. I cannot comment on the specifics of NMH, because it is commercially sensitive, but talking in generality, I would trade more time at the beginning, thrashing out the big issues, working out and locking down the policy on, for example, industrial production, so that those issues do not find themselves being reopened later. Of course, I am talking generically and not about specific programmes, but if such things are not locked down, there is a real habit of them coming back later and creating the biggest delay, putting the programme in question. So, that is crucial.

Finally, the right hon. Lady asks about the affordability issue in the equipment plan, which I think is the most important part. I spoke about the munitions strategy. We could simply ask the single services to come forward with their priorities for new munitions, but the best way is to look robustly at the threat we face. That is the most important issue: to work back from that and prioritise at a pan-defence level the most urgent requirements for new munitions. I think many people would think that that is common sense, but it has not necessarily been how the system has worked.

Let me finish by saying that perhaps the most positive experience I have had as the Minister for Defence Procurement was visiting one of our small and medium-sized enterprises, which was bringing forward a drone we were using in Ukraine. It was receiving data from the frontline and, based on that data, spirally developing the platform within days to go back into service so it was competitive against the threat it was facing. I want to create a constant loop between industry and the MOD, where we are sharing data and frontline knowledge, so that we have a far more rapid period of technological innovation. The equipment plan, which was very static over 10 years, will look like an old fashioned way of doing things. The priority is to get technology into the hands of the military. That will increasingly be on the software basis and that is how we strengthen our armed forces overall.