Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill
Debate between Luke Evans and Luke PollardTuesday 9th September 2025
(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 View all Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Luke Pollard
I said I would take one intervention from each side of the House. I have done that, so I will make some progress, but I am certain that Members will get another chance in a moment.
This treaty is indispensable to keeping Britain secure at home and strong abroad. It is an expression of our unbreakable defence and intelligence bonds with the United States. It strengthens and extends our power to respond to terrorists and hostile states, wherever they may be. It protects some of the world’s busiest trade routes, on which British businesses and consumers rely. It is a long-term investment in our core national interests, and it will benefit British people for generations to come.
Luke Pollard
I am going to make some progress, but I will be happy to give way in a moment.
Before I start getting into the detail, I want to recognise up front the Chagossians affected by decisions taken by Britain many years ago. We recognise in the preamble to the universal deep regret over what happened. It is acknowledged on the face of the treaty, and I know there is cross-party support for the Chagossians, although there is a range of views on the deal within the Chagossian community. I want to place that on the record right at the start of the debate—[Interruption.] I will return to the Chagossians in a moment.
Both Houses have now had the opportunity to scrutinise the treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who is sitting next to me, gave evidence to three parliamentary Committees during the scrutiny period, allowing Members of this House and the other place to fully interrogate the details of the treaty. The International Agreements Committee concluded that if the treaty were not ratified, the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk. The purpose of this Bill is to make the necessary changes to domestic law to implement the treaty, so that it can be ratified and brought into force.
Let me remind the House why we needed to secure this treaty. The Diego Garcia base is central to our national security—I know that all Members of this House will recognise that very simple fact.
Luke Pollard
I am going to make a wee bit more progress, but I always like giving way to a Luke, and I will do so in a bit—do not worry—but not quite yet.
I pay tribute to all Members of the House who have taken the time to scrutinise the treaty in detail.
Allow me to set out why it is so vital. The importance of the base cannot be overstated. The joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has played a vital role in defending the UK and its allies for over 50 years. The base plays a key role in operations that support UK forces and our allies across the middle east, east Africa and south Asia. Its deepwater port, airfield, and advanced communications and surveillance capabilities, give the UK and our allies crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the United Kingdom.
But the base on Diego Garcia was under threat. Had we not signed the treaty, we could have faced further legal rulings against us within weeks, because the negotiations begun by the Conservatives had been stayed. Further legal rulings might have included arbitrary proceedings against the UK under annex 7 of the UN convention on the law of the sea, known as UNCLOS.
Luke Pollard
In a moment. I will come to the hon. Gentleman—he should not worry.
A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. It would impact on our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference, and impair our ability to ensure access to the base by air and sea, to patrol the maritime area around the base and to support the base’s critical national security functions.
Dr Luke Evans
The Minister has made it absolutely apparent that this is about the long-term security of the base, so could he explain why, under article 13, if after 99 years the Mauritians decide not to negotiate, the base will just stop. We will get first refusal, but we can easily see that the Chinese would outbid us because we in this country decide that that is not affordable. We are a hostage to fortune, and that base will crumble. He has not secured the base, he has just deferred the issue by four generations, and this House will then have to decide what to do.
Luke Pollard
It is good that the hon. Member has read the detail of the treaty. As he will know that, at the end of the initial 99-year lease, a first refusal will be offered to the United Kingdom. That is the right place to be, and that offer will mean—as he describes it, in four generations’ time—there is a decision for this House to take about what it wants to do based on the circumstances at the time. This gives us first refusal, so we can conceivably see that full control of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia could extend well beyond the 99 years I have mentioned.
Luke Pollard
I am grateful to the Father of the House for helping me to get back on track with my speech, because that is the topic of my next section. I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question in my remarks, but if a bit is missing, he may ask to intervene on me again.
We have heard some outrageous claims artificially boosting the costs of this deal. It will cost an average of £101 million per year in today’s money. That is an investment in today’s money of £3.4 billion over 99 years. That has been rigorously calculated, based on net present value, the methodology endorsed by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. All the associated costings have been laid previously before the House and were explained in full at the time of signature.
Crucially, the exaggerated numbers that have been cited ignore inflation, the OBR deflation mechanisms and the Green Book. The Government have secured a strong deal. I remind those who criticise it that the previous Government knew full well that the status quo was dangerous and unsustainable—that is why they entered into negotiations in the first place, why they held 11 rounds of negotiations under successive Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Attorneys General, and why the Conservatives have never been able to provide serious alternatives to this deal.
Luke Pollard
I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman and then to my hon. Friend.
Dr Luke Evans
Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty? As far as I am aware, there is none, so why are we pioneering that way forward?
Luke Pollard
This deal secures the base. The calculated value of the deal uses the Green Book. Other countries look at overseas bases that they rent and make the calculation based on their national accounting standards. We base it on the Green Book. Indeed, the Green Book was updated by the previous Government and has been used for such decisions for the past 20 years.
Dr Evans
It is. It is true about the legally binding aspect within the area that the tribunal covers, but that does not cover sovereignty, as we learned in 2015 when the tribunal sided with the British Government. Here we have the farcical situation of a House of policy and law shining light on one side and another, but never on the truth. This is where my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam is exactly right. If the Government were to come forward and say exactly which court, where and why, they might get more sympathy from Opposition, but we have been through an entire five-hour debate and we still do not have answers to those questions.
Another court that is often cited is the International Telecommunication Union covering spectre, radio and radar. Article 48.1 states
“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations,”
and the Government know that. Even the written answer from the Minister—it has been hinted at before—states:
“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries. This right is recognised in the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations are the international framework for the use of spectrum by radiocommunication services, defined and managed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”
It is clear here—the Government know it in their own answers—that the ITU has no role in sovereignty. It all boils down to where one believes British overseas territories stand.
Now we must talk about the cost, which has been much debated. There have been three figures in the debate: £3.4 billion, £10 billion and £34 billion. The £3.4 billion is the net present value using social time preference rate. The £10 billion is inflation adjusted, and the £34 billion is the nominal value by the Government Actuary’s Department. The question is, why use net present value? I put it earlier in the debate that there is no other precedent in the world for NPV being used in sovereignty matters. The Minister at the time asked whether the Conservatives want to do away with using NPV—of course not.
Dr Evans
Absolutely, the Minister says it is within the Green Book. Absolutely not, because it has a perfect place in domestic use for commercial practicalities, not for international sovereignty issues. No other country has looked, or would look, at this because it does not make sense.
The House of Commons Library said when asked that
“this methodology is regularly used in government accounting, but its main use is for cost-benefit analyses. It is unusual to see it used in this situation like this, where only the cost is being assessed and it is not being compared to any benefit”.
On that basis, and listening to the House of Commons Library, what cost-benefit analysis has actually been done in this case, and would it be put in front of the House so we might be able to see it?
At the end of the day, NPV is highly political because it assumes a discount rate, and what is the discount rate that one should choose? In the details, it talks about 3.5%, but the US will use 3.5% or 7%, which would vastly differentiate the figures. It goes on further, for the social time preference rate is 3.5%, but for 30 years. This deal is for 99 years, so how can the Government respond in a written parliamentary question that this
“represents good value for UK taxpayers”?
On what basis are they comparing that if there is no international comparison? We are talking only about domestic uses and for an accounting point.
As I come to my conclusions, possibly the scariest thing to me—I have tried to highlight it throughout the debate—which does seem to be falling on deaf ears, is article 13. I believe this treaty is legally bomb-proof. It looks sensible, and I am no legal expert as I have attested to, but it seems to stand the test of time. That means when article 13 says explicitly that in 99 years Mauritius can say no and just take control, that is a big worry. We have heard from many Government MPs how it secures the long-term aspirations of this country for a period of 99 years. When I mentioned that, several Government MPs scoffed. But is it not the duty of this House to provide not only for the next generation, but the rest of time for our country, in the best interests of our country? After listening to all the arguments that have been made about how essential the base is, the very fact that Mauritius could pull the base is a very scary prospect. There is, of course, a caveat: the right of first refusal. But if China decides to do a deal with Mauritius at exorbitant cost, we are over a barrel and the British taxpayer must fork out yet again to guarantee our security. Mauritius has been given a golden ticket, and it knows it.
Beyond the sovereignty and cost, my biggest concern is that we are outsourcing decision -making for our children and our children’s children. That is the modus operandi of this Government—we need only look at the borrowing in the Budget to see how they borrow on the backs of future children. Pushing this decision out for 99 years is not security for now; it will help, but it creates a far bigger problem in 100 years’ time. If the Government want to give away our islands, they should be open and transparent about how and why.
The biggest thing is that we have not even had our day in court. That is what most troubles the British public. I think that the British public would be reasonable if a court found against us—they would happily say, “We follow the rule of law”—but the Government will not even try that. They say that there is a risk. As has been said, this has been going on for years, and still we are looking at a treaty to sign it off.
That inevitably poses final questions about what happens with Gibraltar, the Falklands and Cyprus. The Minister is correct to point out that there are differences, but the biggest fundamental problem that the Government have in arguing to the British people and the people of the Falklands is about understanding. If this House cannot understand the legal concepts of the places where we are likely to fight these causes, how can we expect the public to do so? When it comes to delivering comms to the UK public, that is what they need to understand.