Draft Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) (Custodial Premises) Subordinate Provisions Order 2018
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 1 month ago)
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Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
This is the second time in less than a week that we have been in this room debating tidying-up regulations, which are important but only about correcting things that we thought were already in place. Given that I have made it clear to the Minister on several occasions that the Labour party would support the Government on legislation on a range of issues—even in my narrow Home Office brief—including tackling acid and knife crime, protecting police engaged in pursuit and response, giving the forensic regulators statutory powers, or dealing with the cost of policing football matches, I again place it on the record that the Opposition would like to see parliamentary time also made available to tackle those important issues.
We support the draft order, however. The Minister said that it was prompted when the Crown inspectors transferred to the Home Office in 2016. Was that the only issue to prompt the investigation of contract and leasing arrangements? Will he also confirm how those arrangements have been made over the past few years?
The impact assessment refers to rack-rent. Is it the case that the Government were not receiving rack-rent for the leases for those institutions that no longer fall under the Crown inspectorate? Have all those contracts been awarded recently, under this Government or the coalition, and how far back to do they date? How many institutions are affected? The impact assessment states 5% and, separately, 7% of the Ministry of Justice and Home Office estate. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide a list of institutions and contracts that the order refers to. I understand if he cannot list them now, so he may wish to write to me and the Committee.
Finally, will the Minister confirm whether he is concerned that any of the institutions were not properly inspected while the loophole was in place and before the draft order was brought before us? As I said, however, the Opposition are happy to support the order and do not wish to delay the Committee any further.
Data Protection Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 1 month ago)
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Victoria Atkins
I am coming on to that.
Any cross-border sharing of personal data must be consistent with our international obligations and be subject to appropriate safeguards. On the first point, the provisions in clause 109 are entirely consistent with the requirements of the draft modernised Council of Europe data protection convention—convention 108—on which the preventions of part 4 are based. It is pending international agreement.
The provisions in the convention are designed to provide the necessary protection for personal data in the context of national security. The Bill already provides that the intelligence services can make transfers outside the UK only when necessary and proportionate for the limited purposes of the services’ statutory functions, which include the protection of national security; for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purpose of criminal proceedings.
In addition, on the point the right hon. Gentleman just raised, the intelligence services are already under statutory obligations in the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to ensure that no information is disclosed except so far as is necessary for those functions or purposes. All actions by the intelligence services, as with all other UK public authorities, must comply with international law.
Victoria Atkins
Yes, but I am coming on to further safeguards, if that is the point the hon. Lady wants to raise.
Louise Haigh
Under those pieces of legislation, are the intelligence services subject to the Information Commissioner, and will they be subject to the commissioner under the Bill’s provisions?
Victoria Atkins
I am about to come on to the safeguards that govern the intelligence services’ information acquisition and sharing under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. They ensure that any such processing is undertaken only when necessary, lawful and proportionate, and that any disclosure is limited to the minimum number of individuals, in accordance with arrangements detailed in those Acts.
Those Acts, and the provisions in the relevant codes of practice made under them, also provide rigorous safeguards governing the transfer of data. Those enactments already afford proportionate protection and safeguards when data is being shared overseas. Sections 54, 130, 151 and 192 of the 2016 Act provide for safeguards relating to disclosure of material overseas.
Those provisions are subject to oversight by the investigatory powers commissioner, and may be challenged in the investigatory powers tribunal. They are very powerful safeguards, over and above the powers afforded to the Information Commissioner, precisely because of the unique nature of the material with which the security services must act.
Margot James
I can only be the Minister I am. I will try to improve. I was not saying that Lord Mitchell’s amendment is not within the scope of the Bill; I was making the point that some of the databases and sources referred to by the right hon. Gentleman in his speech went into the realms of general rather than personal data. I therefore felt that was beyond the scope of the Information Commissioner’s remit.
I share the right hon. Gentleman’s appreciation of the value and the uniqueness of the NHS database. We do not see it just in terms of its monetary value; as the hon. Member for Edinburgh South made clear in his intervention, it has tremendous potential to improve the care and treatment of patients. That is the value we want to realise. I reassure the right hon. Gentleman and put it on record that it is not my place as a Minister in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, or the place of the Bill, to safeguard the immensely valuable dataset that is the NHS’s property.
Louise Haigh
Before the Minister concludes, given that she has focused so much on NHS data, can she update the Committee on the Government’s progress on implementing Dame Fiona Caldicott’s recommendations about health and social care data?
Margot James
I cannot give an immediate update on that, but I can say that Dame Fiona Caldicott’s role as Data Guardian is crucial. She is working all the time to advise NHS England and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care on how best to protect data and how it can deliver gains in the appropriate manner. I do not feel that that is the place of the Bill or that it is my role, but I want to reassure the Committee that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, to whom I am referring Lord Mitchell, is alive to those issues and concerns. The NHS dataset is a matter for the Department of Health and Social Care.
Amendment 122 agreed to.
Schedule 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 117 and 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 14 agreed to.
Clauses 119 and 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 121
Code on personal data of national significance
Draft Police Powers of Designated Civilian Staff and Volunteers (Excluded Powers and Duties of Constables) Regulations 2018
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 1 month ago)
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Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston has said. She raises important questions. It is right that the power should go only to fully warranted police employees, so the Opposition fully support the regulations.
Data Protection Bill [Lords] (Fourth sitting)
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 1 month ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)
Thank you, Mr Hanson. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again.
I will first provide some context for this part of the Bill. The provisions in the Bill relating to national security exemptions and certificates are wholly in line with the provisions in the Data Protection Act 1998 and its predecessor, the Data Protection Act 1984. What we are doing in the Bill is preserving an arrangement that has been on the statute book for more than 30 years and has been operated by successive Governments.
The national security exemption is no different in principle from the other exemptions provided for in the Bill. If it is right that certain provisions of data protection legislation can be disapplied for reasons of, for example, crime prevention or taxation purposes, or in pursuit of various regulatory functions, without external approval, surely it is difficult to take issue with the need for an exemption on the grounds of national security on the same basis.
Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
The Minister is absolutely right that the provisions mirror those in the DPA. That is exactly why we take issue with them. They mirror unacceptable preventions of rights in the tribunal appeal process, but do not mirror the rights in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Why were safeguards put in place in that Act, but will not apply in this Bill?
Victoria Atkins
If I understand the hon. Lady’s argument correctly, she has presented the judicial commissioners as permitting, for example, warrant to be granted. Having sat through the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill and then the Public Bill Committee, I can tell her that I am afraid that is not how that Act works. What happens is that the Secretary of State grants the warrant and then that decision is overseen by the judicial commissioner. I will come on to the difference between the Investigatory Powers Act and this Bill in due course, because the terminology used draws on that in the Investigatory Powers Act, but that Act is very different from this Bill, which is about the processing of data, in its engagement with people and their rights.
Louise Haigh
But what the national security certificate does not require is a statement of what data is being processed or the exemptions under which the Ministry of Defence or the intelligence services require it. That is what our amendments seek to introduce. If the Bill proceeds unamended, national security certificates would require only very broad details and no information on what data was being processed. It would therefore not be very likely that a tribunal would be able to oppose the decision on the basis of a judicial review.
Victoria Atkins
I have a copy of a live certificate granted by the then Secretary of State, David Blunkett, on 10 December 2001. In the certificate, he sets out in summary the reasons why the certificate has been granted, including:
“The work of the security and intelligence agencies of the Crown requires secrecy.”
I assume hon. Members do not disagree with that. Another reason is:
“The general principle of neither confirming nor denying whether the Security Service processes data about an individual, or whether others are processing personal data for, on behalf of with a view to assist or in relation to the functions of the Security Service, is an essential part of that secrecy.”
Again, I assume that hon. Members do not disagree with that. As I said, this is a live certificate that has been given to the Information Commissioner, and is in the public domain for people to see and to check should they so wish. Those reasons are given in that certificate.
Louise Haigh
That is wonderful, but the Bill does not require that. It is great that my noble Friend Lord Blunkett put that on his national security application, but the Bill does not require that in law, so I am afraid that it is not a sufficient argument against the amendments that we have tabled.
Victoria Atkins
What we are doing is transposing the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 into the Bill. It is difficult to see a situation in which a national security certificate will be granted on the basis that the work of the security and intelligence agencies of the Crown does not require secrecy.
Victoria Atkins
Very much so—indeed, this debate ran through the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which was one of the most scrutinised pieces of legislation. Senior parliamentarians who served on the Committee on that Act during long careers in this House, including the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes), said that it was an incredibly well scrutinised Bill. There was constant debate about the battle, or tension, between ensuring the national security of our country in the most transparent way possible, and the fact that by definition there has to be some secrecy and confidentiality about the ways in which the security agencies work.
What was important in the debates on that Act, as it is in those on the current Bill, was making it clear that the idea that rogue civil servants or security agents can run around with people’s information with no checks is very wrong. We are replicating in the Bill the system that has been used for the past 30 years, because we consider that that system has the appropriate and necessary safeguards in the often very fast-moving context of a national security situation.
Victoria Atkins
I will make a little progress, then I will take more interventions.
To be absolutely clear, a national security exemption is applied not by a Minister but by a data controller. Data controllers—be they the intelligence services, the Ministry of Defence or any other body—are well placed to make the determination, given that they will have a detailed understanding of the operational context and the extent to which departure from the requirement of the general data protection regulation—or parts 3 or 4 of the Bill as the case may be—is necessary to safeguard national security. In short, a data controller decides whether the national security exemption should be applied in a particular case, and the certificate is the evidence of the need for such an exemption in the event that someone challenges it.
Victoria Atkins
I will give an example first, because I think it is so important. I fear that a bit of misunderstanding has crept in. Let us take the example of a subject access request. Mr Smith asks an intelligence service whether it is processing personal data concerning him and, if so, for information about that data under clause 94. The intelligence service considers whether it is processing personal data, which it will have obtained under its other statutory powers, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
If the agency determines that it is processing personal data relating to Mr Smith, it then considers whether it is able to disclose the data, or whether a relevant exemption is engaged. For the agency, the key consideration will be whether disclosing the data would damage national security, for example by disclosing sensitive capabilities or alerting Mr Smith to the fact that he is a subject of investigation. If disclosure does not undermine national security and no other exemption is relevant, the intelligence service must disclose the information. However, if national security would be undermined by disclosure, the agency will need to use the national security exemption in relation to processing any personal data relating to Mr Smith.
If the intelligence service does not process any personal data relating to Mr Smith, it will again have to consider whether disclosing that fact would undermine national security, for example by revealing a lack of capability, which could be exploited by subjects of investigation. That is why, on occasion, when such requests are made, a “neither confirm nor deny” response may be necessary, because either confirming or denying may in itself have ramifications, not only in relation to Mr Smith but in relation to other aspects of national security.
Mr Smith may complain to the Information Commissioner about the response to his request for information. The intelligence service may then be required to demonstrate to the commissioner that the processing of personal data complies with the requirements of part four of the Bill, as set out in clause 102, and that it has responded to the request for information appropriately.
If, in legal proceedings, Mr Smith sought to argue that the national security exemption had been improperly relied upon, a national security certificate could be used as conclusive evidence that the national security exemption was required to safeguard national security. Any person who believed they were directly affected by the certificate could of course appeal against it to the upper tribunal, as set out in clause 111.
Louise Haigh
Does the Minister accept that in response to the case of Watson and others against the Government, the Government conceded that additional safeguards, including a far more robust system of independent oversight, were necessary? That test of judicial review is simply not sufficient as oversight. It cannot contest the merits of the case and applies only to the very limited, narrow appeal right of judicial review. It is just not sufficient.
Victoria Atkins
I will come on, if I may, to the judicial review test. I have quite a lot about that.
Victoria Atkins
There might be many reasons why we process information. The end result of processing might be for national security reasons or law enforcement reasons—my officials are scribbling away furiously, so I do not want to take away their glory when they provide me with the answer.
I have an answer on the Watson case, raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, which dealt with the retention of communications by communications service providers. Again, that is an entirely different scenario from the one we are talking about, where the material is held by the security services.
Amendment 161 goes further than the 2016 Act, because it places the decision to issue a certificate with the judicial commissioner. As I have said, national security certificates come into play only to serve in legal proceedings as conclusive evidence that an exemption from specified data protection requirements is necessary to protect national security—for example, to prevent disclosure of personal data to an individual under investigation, when such disclosure would damage national security. The certificate does not authorise the required use of the national security exemption, which is properly a matter for the data controller to determine.
Amendments 163 and 164 relate to the form of a national security certificate. Amendment 163 would require a detailed rather than general description of the data identified on a national security certificate, but we believe this change to be unnecessary and unhelpful, given that much data can be adequately described in a general way. Amendment 164, which would prevent a certificate from having prospective effect, appears to be dependent on the prior judicial authorisation scheme proposed in amendments 161 and 162, and again contrasts with the prospective nature of certificates currently under the Data Protection Act 1998.
Prospective certificates of the type issued under the 1998 Act are the best way of ensuring that the use of the national security exemption by the intelligence services and others is both sufficiently foreseeable for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights, and accountable. The accountability is ensured by the power to challenge certificates when they are issued, and that is something that has real teeth. The accountability is strengthened by the provision in clause 130 for the publication of certificates. The documents we are discussing will therefore be in the public domain—indeed, many of them are already. But it will now be set out in statute that they should be in the public domain.
Amendments 166 to 168 relate to the appeals process. Amendment 166 would broaden the scope for appealing a national security certificate from a person “directly affected” by it to someone who
“believes they are directly or indirectly affected”
by it. I wonder whether the Opposition did any work on the scope of the provision when drafting it, because the words “indirectly affected” have the potential to cause an extraordinary number of claims. How on earth could that phrase be defined in a way that does not swamp the security services with applications from people who consider that they might be indirectly affected by a decision relating to a national security matter? I do not see how that can be considered practicable.
Louise Haigh
As I have already said, the issue is that the judicial review process for appeal is incredibly narrow and limited. Under section 28 of the DPA, where an individual requests to access his or her data that is subject to a certificate, they will merely be informed that they have been given all the information that is required under the Act. They would not be informed that their data is being withheld on the grounds of a national security certificate. That means that it is impossible for them to know whether they even have the right to appeal under a judicial review, and they do not have the information available to allow them to take that judicial review case forward. That is why the amendment is drafted in this way. If the Minister would like, she can suggest some alternative wording that would solve the problem.
Victoria Atkins
We get to the nub of the problem. Is the hon. Lady seriously suggesting that the security services should notify someone who puts in an access request that they are the subject of an investigation? That is the tension facing the security services. That is why we have internationally met standards, with regard to article 108 of the convention, which the Bill complies with. That is why we have to build in all these safeguards, to try to ensure that those people who intend ill will to this country do not benefit from our natural wish to be as transparent as possible when dealing with people’s personal data.
Louise Haigh
I have already explained that there would of course be an exemption for not informing individuals if they were under surveillance or being processed, but there are not sufficient oversights, safeguards or appeals. In the absence of any of those three, the Minister has to accept that there are absolutely no checks and balances on the exemptions listed under the clause.
Victoria Atkins
There most certainly are: they have the right to appeal to the upper tribunal.
Victoria Atkins
The Government have listened to the concerns of the House of Lords. We added clause 130 in the Lords to provide for the publication of national security certificates by the Information Commissioner, so that they would be easily accessible to anyone who wished to mount a subject access request, and could be tested accordingly. In her briefing to noble Lords about the Bill, the Information Commissioner said that the clause was
“very welcome as it should improve regulatory scrutiny and foster greater public trust and confidence in the use of national security certificate process.”
It will also ensure that any person who believes that they are directly affected by a certificate will be better placed to exercise their appeal rights.
The Bill’s approach to national security certificates is tried and tested. We rely on those 30 years of experience of the regime being in place. In her written submission to the Committee, the Information Commission has not raised any issues in respect of the provisions in clause 27.
I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley. I suspect from the interventions that she may well press the amendment to a vote, but I invite her to withdraw it. We have scrutinised this matter, and the Government are clear that the Bill reflects the past 30 years of the regime. It has worked and the Information Commissioner has not raised any concerns about clause 27.
Louise Haigh
I am afraid that the Minister is correct; she has not reassured Opposition Members. The amendment is not about putting obstacles in the way of our intelligence agencies going about their operational capabilities—that is the last thing we want to do—but the Minister has been unable to give us a clear argument as to why there should be stronger safeguards on the collection of data than on processing. That the Home Office would like to have the data is not a sufficient argument.
Victoria Atkins
Please do not trivialise the matter. It is not the case that the Home Office would like the data; this is national security. This is the regime that our security services use at the moment. It is the regime they need. That is why the Government are pressing the issue. Again, I would have thought that this week of all weeks is the week to back our security services, not to put more barriers in their way.
Louise Haigh
The intelligence agencies, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill has said, take parliamentary oversight and scrutiny seriously. The safeguards and oversights are not built into the Bill in the way they were in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. There is no clear argument why those safeguards should be in place for collection, but not for processing. The Minister has constantly relayed that that decision is based on 30 years’-worth of data but, as has already been said, the scope for the collection and processing of data is so far transformed, even from when the Data Protection Act was written in 1998, that the oversights and safeguards need to be transformed as well. That is why we are proposing these amendments.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has suggested that the exemptions put forward in the Bill are not legal and introduce arbitrary interferences into people’s privacy rights. It is this Committee’s responsibility to ensure that the amendments pass. That is not trivialising the issue, but ensuring that there is a proper debate about security and the individual’s data subject rights. That is why we will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Louise Haigh
There is the example of Durham police force—an excellent police force in many regards—using automated decision making to decide who does and does not remain in custody, and when people receive their charge. A human is involved in that decision-making process at the moment, but the Bill would enable that to be taken away and allow it to be done purely on an automated basis. I am sure the Minister understands our concerns about removing humans from that decision-making process.
Victoria Atkins
I have to say that I am not familiar with that example. I look to my officials—
Victoria Atkins
I will pick up on the comments by the right hon. Gentleman, if I may.
In the Durham example given by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, I do not understand how a custody sergeant could sign a custody record without there being any human interaction in that decision-making process. A custody sergeant has to sign a custody record and to review the health of the detainee and whether they have had their PACE rights. I did not go into any details about it, because I was surprised that such a situation could emerge. I do not see how a custody sergeant could be discharging their duties under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 if their decision as to custody was based solely on algorithms, because a custody record has to be entered.
Louise Haigh
I thank the Minister for allowing me to clarify. I did not say that it was solely an algorithmic decision already. Durham is using an algorithm known as the harm assessment risk tool. A human makes a decision based on the algorithm’s recommendations. The point I was making was that law enforcement is using algorithms to make very important decisions that limit an individual’s right to freedom, let alone the right to privacy or anything else, but the Bill will enable law enforcement to take that further. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about PACE and the need for a custody sergeant, but the Bill will enable law enforcement to take that further and to remove the human right—
Victoria Atkins
This has been a moment of genuine misunderstanding. Given how the hon. Lady presented that, to me it sounded as if she was saying that the custody record and the custody arrangements of a suspect—detaining people against their will in a police cell—was being done completely by a computer. That was how it sounded. There was obviously an area of genuine misunderstanding, so I am grateful that she clarified it. She intervened on me when I said that we were not aware of any examples of the police solely using automated decision making—that is when she intervened, but that is not what she has described. A human being, a custody sergeant, still has to sign the record and review the risk assessment to which the hon. Lady referred. The police are using many such examples nowadays, but the fact is that a human being is still involved in the decision-making process, even in the issuing of penalties for speeding. Speeding penalties may be automated processes, but there is a meaningful element of human review and decision making, just as there is with the custody record example she gave.
There was a genuine misunderstanding there, but I am relieved, frankly, given that the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill was making points about my being unaware of what is going on in the Home Office. I am entirely aware of that, but I misunderstood what the hon. Lady meant and I thought she was presenting the custody record as something that is produced by a machine with no human interaction.
Victoria Atkins
Clause 35 establishes the principle that subject access requests should be provided free of charge in most cases. That will be the default position in most cases. In terms of the fees, that will not be a matter to place in statute; certainly, I can write to the right hon. Gentleman with my thoughts on how that may develop. The intention is that in the majority of cases, there will be no charge.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Meaning of “applicable time period”
Amendments made: 29, in clause 54, page 32, line 14, leave out “day” and insert “time”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.
Amendment 30, in clause 54, page 32, line 15, leave out “day” and insert “time”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.
Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 55 to 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Data protection impact assessment
Louise Haigh
I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 64, page 37, line 2, leave out “is likely to” and insert “may”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 143, in clause 64, page 37, line 2, leave out “high”.
Amendment 144, in clause 64, page 37, line 15, leave out “is likely to” and insert “may”.
Amendment 145, in clause 64, page 37, line 15, leave out “high”.
Amendment 146, in clause 65, page 37, line 19, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) This section applies where a controller intends to—
(a) create a filing system and process personal data forming part of it, or
(b) use new technical or organisational measures to acquire, store or otherwise process personal data.”
Amendment 147, in clause 65, page 37, line 23, leave out “would” and insert “could”.
Amendment 148, in clause 65, page 37, line 23, leave out “high”.
Amendment 149, in clause 65, page 37, line 44, at end insert—
“(8) If the Commissioner is not satisfied that the controller or processor (where the controller is using a processor) has taken sufficient steps to remedy the failing in respect of which the Commissioner gave advice under subsection (4), the Commissioner may exercise powers of enforcement available to the Commissioner under Part 6 of this Act.”
New clause 3—Data protection impact assessment: intelligence services processing—
“(1) Where a type of processing proposed under section 103(1) may result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, the controller must, prior to the processing, carry out a data protection impact assessment.
(2) A data protection impact assessment is an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data.
(3) A data protection impact assessment must include the following—
(a) a general description of the envisaged processing operations;
(b) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects;
(c) the measures envisaged to address those risks;
(d) safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with this Part, taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of the data subjects and other persons concerned.
(4) In deciding whether a type of processing could result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals, the controller must take into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing.”
New clause 4—Prior consultation with the Commissioner: intelligence services processing—
“(1) This section applies where a controller proposes that a particular type of processing of personal data be carried out under section 103(1).
(2) The controller must consult the Commissioner prior to the processing if a data protection impact assessment prepared under section [Data protection impact assessment: intelligence services processing] indicates that the processing of the data could result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals (in the absence of measures to mitigate the risk).
(3) Where the controller is required to consult the Commissioner under subsection (2), the controller must give the Commissioner—
(a) the data protection impact assessment prepared under section [Data protection impact assessment: intelligence services processing], and
(b) any other information requested by the Commissioner to enable the Commissioner to make an assessment of the compliance of the processing with the requirements of this Part.
(4) Where the Commissioner is of the opinion that the intended processing referred to in subsection (1) would infringe any provision of this Part, the Commissioner must provide written advice to the controller and, where the controller is using a processor, to the processor.
(5) The written advice must be provided before the end of the period of 6 weeks beginning with receipt of the request for consultation by the controller or the processor.
(6) The Commissioner may extend the period of 6 weeks by a further period of one month, taking into account the complexity of the intended processing.
(7) If the Commissioner extends the period of 6 weeks, the Commissioner must—
(a) inform the controller and, where applicable, the processor of any such extension before the end of the period of one month beginning with receipt of the request for consultation, and
(b) provide reasons for the delay.
(8) If the Commissioner is not satisfied that the controller or processor (where the controller is using a processor) has taken sufficient steps to remedy the failing in respect of which the Commissioner gave advice under subsection (4), the Commissioner may exercise powers of enforcement available to the Commissioner under Part 6 of this Act.”
Louise Haigh
The amendments in my name, and in the names of my right hon. and hon. Friends, are all designed to strengthen the requirement to conduct impact assessments, and to require permission from the Information Commissioner for the purposes of data processing for law enforcement agencies. Impact assessments are a critical feature of the landscape of data protection, particularly where new technology has evolved. It is vital that we have in place enabling legislation and protective legislation to cover new technologies and new methods of data collection and processing.
Since the introduction of the Data Protection Act 1998, the advance of technology has considerably increased the ability of organisations to collect data, as we have discussed. The impact assessment as envisaged allows for an assessment to be conducted where there are systematic and extensive processing activities, including profiling, and where decisions have legal effects, or similarly significant effects, on individuals. In addition, an assessment can be conducted where there is large-scale processing of special categories of data, or personal data in relation to criminal convictions or offences, and where there is a high risk to rights and freedoms—for example, based on the sensitivity of the processing activity.
Given the breadth and reach of new technology, it is right that impact assessments are conducted where the new technology may present a risk, rather than a “high risk”, as envisaged in the Bill. That is what we seek to achieve with the amendments. New technology in law enforcement presents a unique challenge to the data protection and processing environment. The trialling of technology, including facial recognition and risk assessment algorithms, as already discussed, has not been adequately considered by Parliament to date, nor does it sit easily within the current legal framework. I do not doubt that such technologies have a significant role to play in making law enforcement more effective and efficient, but they have to be properly considered by Parliament, and they need to have adequate oversight to manage their appropriate use.
Facial recognition surveillance was mentioned in Committee on Tuesday. The Minister was right to say that it is being trialled by the Metropolitan police, but it has been trialled for three years running. I suggest that it is no longer a trial. It is also being used by South Wales police and other police forces across the country, particularly when policing large events. The Metropolitan police use it in particular for Notting Hill carnival.
In September last year, the Policing Minister made it clear in response to a written question that there is no legislation regulating the use of CCTV cameras with facial recognition. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 introduced the regulation of overt public space surveillance cameras. As a result, the surveillance camera code of practice was issued by the Secretary of State in 2013. However, there is no reference to facial recognition in the Act, even though it provides the statutory basis for public space surveillance cameras.
Neither House of Parliament has ever considered or scrutinised automated facial recognition technology. To do so after its deployment—after three years of so-called trialling by the Metropolitan police—is unacceptable, particularly given the technology’s significant and unique impact on rights. The surveillance camera commissioner has noted that “clarity regarding regulatory responsibility” for such facial recognition software is “an emerging issue”. We urgently need clarity on whether the biometric commissioner, the Information Commissioner or the surveillance camera commissioner has responsibility for this use of technology. Our amendments suggest that the Information Commissioner should have scrutiny powers over this, but if the Minister wants to tell me that it should be any of the others, we will be happy to support that.
Victoria Atkins
I have just a small correction. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley said in error that the Home Office were holding on to the photographs. It is not the Home Office. It is individual police forces that hold that.
Louise Haigh
No, it is on the police national computer. That falls under the responsibility of the Home Office, not individual forces.
Victoria Atkins
That is run by the police. I do not want the misapprehension to be established that there is an office in the Home Office in Marsham Street where these photographs are held on a computer. It is on the police national computer, which is a secure system that people have to have security clearance to get into. It is not completely accurate to say that the Home Office has possession of it.
Louise Haigh
I would be grateful if the Minister can confirm that all the examples we raised today will fall under the “high risk” category in the Bill.
Victoria Atkins
I will deal with the definition of high risk in a moment. Clause 64 separates out the processing most likely significantly to affect an individual’s rights and freedom, which requires an additional level of assessment to reflect the higher risk. The amendments would water down the importance of those assessments. That is not to say that consideration of the impact on rights and freedoms can be overlooked. It will, of course, remain necessary for the controller to carry out that initial assessment to determine whether a full impact assessment is required. Good data protection is not achieved by putting barriers in the way of processing. It is about considering the risk intelligently and applying appropriate assessments accordingly.
On the question of high risk, officers or data controllers will go through that process when considering whether a data protection impact assessment is correct. I will write to the hon. Lady to clarify whether the bodies and lists she mentioned will be defined as high risk. The fact is that they are none the less regulated by various organisations.
Victoria Atkins
Indeed. A pertinent example of that is the development of artificial intelligence to help the police categorise images of child sexual exploitation online. That tool will help given the volume of offences now being carried out across the world. It will also help the officers involved in those cases, because having to sit at a computer screen and categorise some of these images is soul-breaking, frankly. If we can use modern technology and artificial intelligence to help categorise those images, that must surely be a good thing.
Louise Haigh
There is absolutely no argument over that. As a former special constable myself, I have no wish to put obstacles in the way of law enforcement. There is a particular need to develop technology to help digital investigations, and I think the Government have been delaying that. Human failures in those investigations have led to the collapse of several trials over the past couple of months.
The Minister says that the surveillance camera commissioner has a role. The commissioner has said that there needs to be further clarity on regulatory responsibility. It is not clear whether it is the surveillance camera commissioner, the biometrics commissioner or the Information Commissioner who has responsibility for facial recognition software. Does she accept that the Government urgently need to provide clarity, as well as guidance to the National Police Chiefs Council and police forces, about the use of this potentially invasive software?
Victoria Atkins
Specifically on clause 64, which is about the data protection impact assessment, the judgment as to whether the proposed processing is high risk must be a matter for the controller. On the face of it, many of the systems that the hon. Lady described in her speech will involve high risk, but with respect the decision is not for me to make as a Minister on my feet in Committee. We must allow data controllers the freedom and responsibility to make those assessments. They are the ones that make the decisions and what flows from that in terms of processing.
If the hon. Lady will write to me on the more general, wider point about oversight of the surveillance camera commissioner and so on, I would be happy to take that up outside of Committee.
Louise Haigh
The issue about whether it is high risk is of course a matter for the data controller, but we are scrutinising this Bill, and the Minister is asking us to support a test of high risk. I am sure the whole Committee would agree that all the cases that have been suggested today involve an incredibly high risk. They involve deprivation of liberty and invasion of privacy. The idea that we would accept a definition of high risk that does not cover those examples is too much for the Opposition to support. That is why the amendment exists. We need to test exactly what the Government envisage in the definition of high risk.
Victoria Atkins
May I just clarify whether the hon. Lady intends to amend her amendment to list the various categories she listed in her speech? I have been very clear that high risk is defined as including processing where there is a particular likelihood of prejudice to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. I would be very cautious about listing examples in the Bill through an amendment, because as we have all acknowledged, criminality and other things develop over time. It would be very bold to put those categories in the Bill.
Louise Haigh
No one is suggesting that such examples should go in the Bill. I appreciate this is the Minister’s first Bill Committee, but the job of the Opposition is to test the definitions in the Bill and ensure that it is fit for purpose. My concern is that the definition of high risk is set too high to cover law enforcement agencies and will allow egregious breaches of individuals’ data rights, privacy rights and right to liberty. It is our job as the Opposition—there is nothing wrong with us exercising this role—to ensure that the Bill is fit for purpose. That is what we are seeking to do.
Victoria Atkins
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for clarifying her role. My answer is exactly as I said before. High risk includes processing where there is a particular likelihood of prejudice to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. That must be a matter for the data controller to assess. We cannot assess it here in Committee for the very good reason put forward by members of the Committee: we cannot foresee every eventuality. Time will move on, as will technology. That is why the Bill is worded as it is, to try to future-proof it but also, importantly, because the wording complies with our obligations under the law enforcement directive and under the modernised draft Council of Europe convention 108.
Victoria Atkins
Clause 65(2) states:
“The controller must consult the Commissioner prior to the processing if a data protection impact assessment prepared under section 64 indicates that the processing of the data would result in a high risk”.
There are many complicated cases that the police and others have to deal with. That is why we have guidance rather than putting it in statute—precisely to give those on the frontline the flexibility of understanding, “This situation has arisen, and we need to calibrate the meaning of high risk and take that into account when we look at the prejudices caused to a person or a group of people.” That is precisely what we are trying to encompass. Presumably, that is what the Council of Europe and those involved in drafting the law enforcement directive thought as well.
Of course, there will be guidance from the Information Commissioner to help data controllers on those assessments, to enable us to get a consistent approach across the country. That guidance will be the place to address these concerns, not on the face of the Bill.
Louise Haigh
Can the Minister confirm that the Metropolitan police consulted the Information Commissioner before trialling facial recognition software? I appreciate that she might not be able to do so on her feet, so I will of course accept it if she wishes to write to me.
Victoria Atkins
I am afraid that I will have to write to the hon. Lady on that.
The intention behind this part of the Bill is not to place unnecessary barriers in the way of legitimate processing. Nor, we all agree, should we place additional burdens on the commissioner without there being a clear benefit. These provisions are in the Bill to address the need for an intelligent application of the data protection safeguards, rather than assuming that a one-size-fits-all approach results in better data protection.
Amendment 149 would insert a new subsection (8) to clause 65, which would permit the commissioner to exercise powers of enforcement if she was not satisfied that the controller or processor had taken sufficient steps to act on her opinion that intended processing would infringe the provisions in part 3. It is worth noting that the purpose of clause 65 is to ensure consultation with the commissioner prior to processing taking place. It is therefore not clear what enforcement the commissioner would be expected to undertake in this instance, as the processing would not have taken place. If, however, the controller sought to process the data contrary to the commissioner’s opinion, it would be open to her to take enforcement action in line with her powers already outlined in part 6.
I do not know, Mr Hanson, whether we have dealt with new clauses 3 and 4.
Louise Haigh
I remain concerned that the Bill leaves gaps that will enable law enforcement agencies and the police to go ahead and use technology that has not been tested and has no legal basis. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill said, that leaves the police open to having to develop their own guidance at force level, with all the inconsistencies that would entail across England and Wales.
The Minister agreed to write to me on a couple of issues. I do not believe that the Metropolitan police consulted the Information Commissioner before trialling the use of photo recognition software, and I do not believe that other police forces consulted the Information Commissioner before rolling out mobile fingerprint scanning. If that is the case and the legislation continues with the existing arrangements, that is not sufficient. I hope that before Report the Minister and I can correspond so as potentially to strengthen the measures. With that in mind, and with that agreement from the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 65 and 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67
Notification of a personal data breach to the Commissioner
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Liam Byrne
The Committee is looking for some guidance and for tons of reassurance from the Minister about how the clause will bite on data processors who do not happen to base their operations here in the United Kingdom. This morning we debated the several hundred well-known data breaches around the world and highlighted some of the more recent examples, such as Yahoo!—that was probably the biggest—and AOL. More recently, organisations such as Uber have operated their systems with such inadequacy that huge data leaks have occurred, directly infringing the data protection rights of citizens in this country. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I am unaware of any compensation arrangements that Uber has made with its drivers in this country whose data was leaked.
Even one of the companies closest to the Government—Equifax, which signed a joint venture agreement with the Government not too long ago—has had a huge data breach. It took at least two goes to get a full account from Equifax of exactly what had happened, despite the fact that Her Majesty’s Government were its corporate partner and had employed it through the Department for Work and Pensions. All sorts of information sharing happened that never really came to light. I am not sure whether any compensation for Equifax data breaches has been paid to British citizens either.
My point is that most citizens of this country have a large amount of data banked with companies that operate from America under the protection of the first amendment. There is a growing risk that in the years to come, more of the data and information service providers based in the UK will go somewhere safer, such as Ireland, because they are worried about the future of our adequacy agreement with the European Commission. We really need to understand in detail how the Information Commissioner, who is based here, will take action on behalf of British citizens against companies in the event of data breaches. For example, how will she ensure notification within 72 hours? How will she ensure the enforcement of clause 67(4), which sets out the information that customers and citizens must be told about the problem?
This morning we debated the Government’s ludicrous proposals for class action regimes, which are hopelessly inadequate and will not work in practice. We will not have many strong players in the UK who are able to take action in the courts, so we will be wholly reliant on the Information Commissioner to take action. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister reassured the Committee how the commissioner will ensure that clause 67 is enforced if the processor of the data is not on our shores.
Data Protection Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 1 month ago)
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Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
I rise to put on record my thanks to the Minister for listening carefully to my noble Friend Lord Stevenson. There was strong cross-party consensus on these common-sense reforms.
We all know that in our own constituencies there are extraordinary people doing extraordinary things in local groups. They are the life-blood of our communities. Many of them will be worried about the new obligations that come with the general data protection regulation and many of them will take a least-risk approach to meeting the new regulations. Putting in place some common safeguards to ensure that it is possible to keep data that allow us to spot important patterns of behaviour that can lead to appropriate investigations is very sensible and wise. These amendments will therefore be made with cross-party support.
Amendment 84 agreed to.
Amendments made: 85, in schedule 1, page 126, line 38, at end insert—
“Safeguarding of children and of individuals at risk
14A (1) This condition is met if—
(a) the processing is necessary for the purposes of—
(i) protecting an individual from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, or
(ii) protecting the physical, mental or emotional well-being of an individual,
(b) the individual is—
(i) aged under 18, or
(ii) aged 18 or over and at risk,
(c) the processing is carried out without the consent of the data subject for one of the reasons listed in sub-paragraph (2), and
(d) the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) The reasons mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) are—
(a) in the circumstances, consent to the processing cannot be given by the data subject;
(b) in the circumstances, the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing;
(c) the processing must be carried out without the consent of the data subject because obtaining the consent of the data subject would prejudice the provision of the protection mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, an individual aged 18 or over is “at risk” if the controller has reasonable cause to suspect that the individual—
(a) has needs for care and support,
(b) is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and
(c) as a result of those needs is unable to protect himself or herself against the neglect or harm or the risk of it.
(4) In sub-paragraph (1)(a), the reference to the protection of an individual or of the well-being of an individual includes both protection relating to a particular individual and protection relating to a type of individual.”
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data which is necessary for the protection of children or of adults at risk. See also Amendments 116 and 117.
Amendment 86, in schedule 1, page 126, line 38, at end insert—
“Safeguarding of economic well-being of certain individuals
14B (1) This condition is met if the processing—
(a) is necessary for the purposes of protecting the economic well-being of an individual at economic risk who is aged 18 or over,
(b) is of data concerning health,
(c) is carried out without the consent of the data subject for one of the reasons listed in sub-paragraph (2), and
(d) is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) The reasons mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) are—
(a) in the circumstances, consent to the processing cannot be given by the data subject;
(b) in the circumstances, the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing;
(c) the processing must be carried out without the consent of the data subject because obtaining the consent of the data subject would prejudice the provision of the protection mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
(3) In this paragraph, “individual at economic risk” means an individual who is less able to protect his or her economic well-being by reason of physical or mental injury, illness or disability.”—(Victoria Atkins.)
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data which is necessary to protect the economic well-being of adults who are less able to protect their economic well-being by reason of a physical or mental injury, illness or disability.
Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 150, page 126, line 38, at end insert—
“Register of missing persons
14A This condition is met if the processing—
(a) is necessary for the establishment or maintenance of any register of missing persons, and
(b) is carried out in a manner which is consistent with any guidance which may be issued by the Secretary of State or by the Commissioner on the processing of data for the purposes of this paragraph.”
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hanson. Amendment 150 seeks to provide a similar exemption to the one that the Minister has just laid out. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill said, we completely support the principles behind this exemption to schedule 1. As the Minister made clear, too often serious case reviews or reviews after an incident of this nature, particularly in child protection cases, show clearly that if the data had been shared more effectively—often in health cases—the child could have been protected and their life might have been saved.
We tabled this amendment because of the increase in the number of missing persons and missing children over the past few years. As the shadow Police Minister, I approach this issue from a policing perspective. It is important that all data handlers fully understand their obligations and the powers that are bestowed on them. Too often, under the existing legislation, they hide behind data protection to avoid sharing data, and we fear that that tendency will become even stronger under the Bill.
Sharing data relating to missing persons is important for a number of reasons. The demand on police services from such cases has rocketed over the past few years. Police officers spend only 17% of their time responding to crime, so 83% of police time is spent responding to non-crime demand. That includes mental health call-outs, but largely it relates to missing persons. Some police forces tell me that missing persons place the greatest demand on their time.
In the west midlands, since 2015 the number of missing person incidents has doubled to nearly 13,000 cases a year. In Northumbria—one of the smallest police forces in the country—as of this minute there are 43 men and 20 women missing. For such a small police force, that is a significant number of people to be out looking for. Last year alone, such investigations cost the police service more than £600 million. One fifth of those missing persons are children in care, more than 50% are children, and a significant proportion are elderly people missing from care. Crucially, about one third are reported missing on more than one occasion. It is those individuals we seek to address with the register.
There are various reasons for the increase, one of which is certainly better police reporting. Our ageing population means that more people are in care and are going missing from care. The police have responded to that issue in various ways, including by tagging elderly individuals who go missing from care repeatedly —we have tabled amendments to explore the issues arising from that. Cuts to other public services mean that the increasing demand, which previously would have fallen elsewhere—in particular, on local authorities—is now landing on the police. We are seeing a higher tolerance of risk across the care sector, and possibly the health sector too, and a tendency to pass the buck for these issues and other vulnerabilities on to the police, who have a very low risk threshold and nowhere to pass them on.
I believe we need a review of all agencies that are involved with safeguarding to ensure that they are taking seriously their responsibilities in this regard. When the issue relates to resources, they must make the case for those resources, rather than merely pass the problem on to the police. I have heard stories about private children’s care homes where staff may see that the child is outside their window or down the street, but because they are five minutes over curfew they ring the police and say that the child is missing. That passes on the responsibility, but has very serious implications for the police. It diverts resources from tackling crime and from responding to genuine cases of missing children and high-risk missing persons.
Estimates of the time associated with this activity suggest that approximately 18 hours of police time is needed for a medium-risk missing persons investigation. In 2015-16, that equated to more than 6 million investigation hours, or more than 150,000 officers occupied full time with that activity. Not being dealt with by the appropriate agency and not being responded to correctly has real implications for the individual. Going missing can be a precursor to various aspects of significant harm, such as abuse, exposure to criminal activity and mental ill-health. There are enough issues relating to police forces sharing data among themselves, let alone with other agencies. As a result, various criminal activities exploiting those weaknesses have developed. In the past, the Minister and I have discussed county lines at length, which is a criminal activity whereby organised criminal gangs exploit children. They take them, internally traffick them across the country, set them up in another vulnerable adult’s home and leave them to deal drugs on their behalf. That is a very profitable criminal activity, but the perpetrators have been able to evade real enforcement because of the weaknesses in data sharing and cross-agency working between police forces and agencies. The amendment will ensure that the police and all appropriate safeguarding agencies have access to the relevant data to ensure that at-risk missing people are found as quickly and safely as possible, and have their needs dealt with in the most appropriate way.
Victoria Atkins
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley for affording me the opportunity to update the Committee on our progress in establishing a national register of missing persons, and to touch on the missing children and adults strategy that the Government are currently working on, which I hope will be published shortly. It will address many of the themes that the hon. Lady drew on in her speech, particularly the deliberate targeting of vulnerable children by county lines gangs, children who go missing—usually, sadly, from care homes—and the exploitation that occurs.
As the hon. Lady said, this is an important subject because each year more than 337,000 calls are made to police stations in England and Wales about missing and absent people. Happily, the vast majority are found within 24 hours, but 2% or thereabouts remain missing for more than a week. Anyone who has ever met the parents of children who go missing knows the heartache that those parents face, not just on an annual basis, but on a daily, minute-by-minute basis. They feel that pain constantly.
People who go missing are often the most vulnerable in society, and it is vital that those tasked with investigating their disappearance have the most accurate and up-to-date information available. We accept that the current technology available to frontline staff to deal with missing persons is insufficient. For example, the police national computer identifies only those currently reported as missing, while the National Crime Agency database includes only those missing for more than 72 hours. We know that the search must start the moment that a child or vulnerable person is identified as missing; we cannot wait for 72 hours. There is no national record of the history of missing persons in England and Wales.
The Government’s “Tackling child sexual exploitation: progress report” published in February last year set out our commitment to deliver a national missing persons register. This will enable police officers to access up-to-date data about missing people across force boundaries and take appropriate action when they investigate missing person incidents or encounter a missing person who is away from his or her home force area. The register is being established as part of the national law enforcement data programme, which will replace the police national computer and the police national database with a new national data service. The current timetable, agreed with the police, is to launch the capability for forces to record manually missing and associated found incidents from mid-2019 with releases thereafter, including automation and establishing the ability to share controlled information beyond policing to other agencies.
In terms of the way in which the register and the scheme interplay in the Bill, the processing of the personal data held on the database will take place under either the GDPR or part 3 of the Bill. Processing of the data by the police will often be for a law enforcement purpose, including the prevention, investigation or detection of a criminal offence and any sensitive processing would fall within paragraph 3 of schedule 8, which enables processing where necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another individual, or under the new safeguarding condition, which we have just debated. Where the processing is undertaken under the GDPR, the conditions in respect of protecting the vital interests of the data subject, or preventing or detecting unlawful acts, may apply. Again, the new safeguarding condition may also be applicable.
Given those provisions and the very clear timetable that the Government and police have for their programme, we are of the view that the amendment is unnecessary, but I am, of course, very appreciative that the hon. Lady has raised this in the Committee. Obviously, I will keep her informed of progress on the new register.
Louise Haigh
That is fantastic news. It is a very ambitious deadline for a police IT transformation programme. I know that South Yorkshire is going through the transformation on the CONNECT programme at the moment; it is woefully behind the timescale envisaged and over budget, as every IT transformation in the history of any Government, of any colour, has always been. I wonder, therefore, given the urgency of this issue, whether it is possible for this information to be recorded on the PNC for the time being.
Victoria Atkins
I am looking at my officials and they will stop me if I am wrong, I hope. If she prefers, may I write to her? I do not think that the PNC has the capability at the moment. That is why we are having to develop this new programme, but we will write to the hon. Lady in any event. As I say, I will keep her up to date with progress. But I invite her to withdraw the amendment, please.
Louise Haigh
Given that the Minister asked so nicely, I will. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 87, in schedule 1, page 127, line 30, at end insert—
“( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”
This amendment clarifies the intended effect of the safeguard in paragraph 15(4) of Schedule 1 (processing necessary for an insurance purpose).
Amendment 88, in schedule 1, page 127, line 39, at end insert—
“( ) is of data concerning health which relates to a data subject who is the parent, grandparent, great-grandparent or sibling of a member of the scheme,”.
This amendment provides that the condition in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 (occupational pension schemes) can only be relied on in connection with the processing of data concerning health relating to certain relatives of a member of the scheme.
Amendment 89, in schedule 1, page 128, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (2)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”
This amendment clarifies the intended effect of the safeguard in paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 1 (processing necessary for determinations in connection with occupational pension schemes).
Amendment 90, in schedule 1, page 131, line 14, at end insert—
“( ) If the processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a body or association described in sub-paragraph (1)(a), or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met even if, when the processing is carried out, the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place (see paragraph 5 of this Schedule).”
This amendment provides that when processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a body or association that is responsible for eliminating doping in sport, or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in paragraph 22 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (anti-doping in sport) is met even if the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place when the processing is carried out.
Amendment 91, in schedule 1, page 133, line 17, leave out from “interest” to end of line 21.—(Margot James.)
This amendment removes provisions from paragraph 31 of Schedule 1 (extension of conditions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 referring to substantial public interest) which are unnecessary because they impose requirements which are already imposed by paragraph 5 of Schedule 1.
The Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Margot James)
I beg to move amendment 92, page 134, line 18 [Schedule 1], leave out “on the day” and insert “when”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.
Louise Haigh
The case that my right hon. Friend raises is certainly not hypothetical. The Metropolitan police have been trialling facial recognition scanning at the Notting Hill carnival for the last three years with apparently no legal base and very little oversight. We will move on to those issues in the Bill. That is exactly why the amendments are crucial in holding law enforcement agencies to account.
Margot James
As the hon. Lady says, the police are trialling those things. I rest my case—they have not put them into widespread practice as yet.
Returning to the GDPR, we have translated the GDPR protections into law through the Bill. As I said, the data subject has the right to request that the decision be retaken with the involvement of a sentient individual. That will dovetail with other requirements. By contrast, the amendments are designed to prevent any automated decision-making from being undertaken under article 22(2)(b) if it engages the rights of the data subject under the Human Rights Act 1998.
Victoria Atkins
There may be occasions when there is a person we have lost track of whose status is irregular. If we know they have a child, we will seek from the Department for Education assistance to find the whereabouts of the child. That child has not committed a criminal offence, so I would be very concerned to ensure that the Home Office, Border Force or whoever else acted lawfully when seeking that data in order to enable them to find the parent or whoever is the responsible adult, as part of the immigration system.
Louise Haigh
In that example, would the exemption not be covered under the safeguarding exemption, as brought by the Government amendment to schedule 1?
Victoria Atkins
No—the child is not missing, but the parent is; so we seek advice from the Department for Education about where the child is. It may be that cleverer lawyers than me in the Home Office will find an exemption for that, but the point of this exemption of paragraph 4 is to cover the lawfulness of the Home Office in seeking such information in order to find parents or responsible adults who may have responsibility, and either to regularise their stay or to remove them.
I encourage the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill to withdraw his amendment, as we believe that it is not the wholesale disapplication of data subjects’ rights, and it is a targeted provision wholly in accordance with the discretion afforded to member states by the GDPR and is vital to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of our immigration system.
Hate Crime
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Victoria Atkins
I thank my right hon. Friend for her impassioned plea for recognition throughout the country of the role not only of her local mayor, but of many other people in public life who happen to practise the Muslim religion as part of their way of life and who contribute so very much to our community. I put on record my thanks to her local mayor.
There are many definitions of Islamophobia, but most people tend to adhere to the one used by the Runnymede Trust. We do not accept the need for a definitive definition, but we know that Islamophobia is clearly recognised and that we have very effective monitoring of race-hate crimes. Considerable work is done on these matters by Tell MAMA and the anti-Muslim hatred working group.
Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) on securing it.
The despicable sentiments behind these sickening letters has caused revulsion throughout our communities. Although we can be confident that, thanks to the tireless dedication of community leaders, charities, faith groups and civil society, such deliberate attempts to divide us will not succeed, this act will have struck fear into the heart of communities—indeed, that was the intention. It is absolutely an incitement to violence and it cannot go unpunished.
As we have heard, hate crimes are rising nationwide. In London alone, there has been a fivefold increase in attacks on Muslims in the past year. As the outgoing counter-terror chief Mark Rowley has said, the threat from the extreme right wing is significant and requires urgent attention. We have seen the murder of our colleague and friend Jo Cox, the attack at Finsbury Park mosque, the proscription of National Action, the jailing of the leaders of Britain First, and the reports from the Anderson review, which suggested that the extreme right wing is engaged in credible attack planning, including bomb making. There is now overwhelming evidence that the threat from the extreme right is growing increasingly violent. We have to be clear that by threatening members of our diverse communities, these people are also a threat to our national security through their anti-democratic, dehumanising and murderous beliefs.
Given the overwhelming evidence, it is clear that so-called domestic extremism needs to be dealt with as a first-order threat, so will the Minister reassure us that, in line with the Anderson review recommendations, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre will start to produce national threat assessments of domestic extremism? Will she increase the role for MI5, JTAC and the counter-terrorism network in the monitoring and handling of investigations of domestic extremism? Is it not time to update the Contest strategy to reflect the growing threat from the extreme right?
More broadly, can the Minister assure us that counter-terrorism policing has the resources it needs? The Government’s funding settlement last month gave only half what the police requested for counter-terror purposes, while the police and our intelligence services are facing an unprecedented threat from terrorism in all its forms.
We all deplore these despicable letters. They are an attempt to divide us; in that, they will not succeed. We must be united as a House and as a country in bearing down on the insidious beliefs contained within these letters and be absolutely clear on how we are going to bring together the police, schools, colleges and all authorities to stand up to hate crime and terrorism in every single one of their forms. Finally, we must ensure that all of us, as elected politicians, are at all times responsible in our language and rhetoric and never seek to embolden those who hold such insidious and extremist views.
Victoria Atkins
I am sure that everyone in the House agrees with the hon. Lady, particularly on that last point about the importance of using language very carefully. She asked me about police resources; of course, we have increased them and, as she will know, the Home Secretary reviews those resources constantly. We ask the police whether they have the resources that they need, and the Home Secretary acts accordingly. May I undertake to write to the hon. Lady specifically on JTAC and her other queries? Finally, let me say that it is gratifying to see so many Members present, unified in condemning these dreadful letters and their sentiments and in our determination to tackle them.
Police Station Closures: Solihull and West Midlands
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 2 months ago)
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Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I thank the hon. Member for Solihull (Julian Knight) for securing the debate, as it allows us to set the record straight on police station closures—not only in the west midlands, but across the country.
I start by zooming out for a second and taking a look at what has happened to police stations and front counters over the last eight years. More than 40% have been shut during the time the Conservative party has been in government. In 2010, there were 901 front counters able to deal with the public; the figure today stands at just 510. West Mercia, just next door to the west midlands, now relies on only three front counters, down from 31. Warwickshire has four, down from 14. Bedfordshire has just two to serve the entire county. In Cambridgeshire last month, Jason Ablewhite, the Conservative police and crime commissioner, was forced to announce the closure of one of only two police stations open to the public left in Cambridge as part of a massive savings drive.
Collectively, that handful of stations now serve millions of people. In those counties, stations were a fixture in each town. They have disappeared. The face-to-face contact and the trust that that engendered, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) said, has gone, as officers have been reduced to offering a purely responsive service. Officers now routinely have to travel large distances to book in suspects or take evidence. Preventive and proactive crime prevention, which would have taken place out of a community hub, has now been diminished.
We could make party political points in each of these cases. After all, the closures mentioned in all those examples were under Conservative PCCs. However, the public would recognise how absurd that is—they would call me disingenuous—because the chief constables, in consultation with the PCCs, can only play the hand they have been dealt by the Government in Westminster. That hand has been anything but helping. More than £2.7 billion has been cut from the overall police budget in real terms since the Conservatives came to power, with more than 21,000 police officers lost. Meanwhile, crime has soared and demand has rocketed. Communities have noticed it; they see police officers less and they feel increasingly insecure.
The force in the west midlands knows that as well as any. The last eight years have been truly unprecedented in its history, as we have heard. It has reached the bare bones—of that there can be no doubt. The choice facing the West Midlands chief constable, and indeed the PCC, is now an unenviable one. Do they add to the toll of 2,000 officers lost, when more than 80% of the force’s budget is for staffing, or do they make savings in the estate? Is that a choice any force would like to face? Of course not, but it is a choice that has been imposed on them.
Julian Knight
Does the hon. Lady not recognise that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) said, with £121 million in reserves, the police and crime commissioner could at least wait and show us precisely what he plans for my borough and its policing?
Louise Haigh
I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has spoken to either the PCC or the chief constable recently, but I have a detailed plan from the chief constable of what he plans to spend his reserves on. The force currently has £106 million in reserves. By 31 March 2019, it will have £54 million, of which £12 million is required by the National Audit Office to be held for general reserves, and £10 million will be held for an insurance reserve. By 2020, reserves will be held only at levels legally required and necessary for day-to-day operational policing.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned earlier that he had not heard of any capital projects going ahead in the west midlands. In fact, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary has praised West Midlands police for preparing for the future and investing in a huge IT transformation project and data-driven analysis, so it is interesting that he does not know of those projects, or indeed what the reserves are being spent on.
Julian Knight
I did not actually say that there were no capital projects; I said that the money from the sale of the police stations could not be used to directly fund capital projects unless they could be shown to be money-saving.
Louise Haigh
I think the hon. Gentleman said that he was not aware of any capital projects benefiting Solihull. There are two that will directly benefit Solihull and indeed will replace the front station access that is being closed down.
Incredibly, the outlook that I just set out is set to get even worse as a result of further real-terms cuts that Conservative Members from the west midlands voted for last month. David Jamieson has warned that, after receiving the biggest cut in the entire country, West Midlands police will need £22 million just to stand still. This is not only at a time when crime is soaring: 999 and 101 calls have reached levels that only used to be received on new year’s eve; missing persons are being reported to the police at unprecedented levels; and mental health calls are being dealt with by the police at levels never seen before. Some 83% of calls to command and control centres are now non-crime, while crime and antisocial behaviour is soaring.
Counter-terror spending was also mentioned, as well as the reserves. Both are used by the Government and Government Members as a diversion, saying that money is being spent on policing when in fact, for every £1 spent on counter-terror, £2-worth of demand is generated for local forces. Neither of those can be said to be reducing demand and increasing funding to West Midlands police or any other police force across the country. The fact is that six Conservative Members from the west midlands voted for these cuts and are now crying foul when the chief constable has been forced to set out their consequences.
The 24 buildings that the chief constable plans to release will save £5 million per year. Regrettably, that will not make up for the real-terms cut in Home Office funding for West Midlands in the year ahead. Nevertheless, even while making those savings, which have been forced on the force, the plans will retain all 10 front counters, recognising the vital service that they offer to the public, while tech and data innovations will mean that the police are not required to return to the station as often as they used to.
However, with crime continuing to soar in the west midlands—14% in the last year alone—further real-terms cuts are reckless, and the public are clear that the responsibility lies with the Government and with Government Members who voted them through. It is the Tories who took a reckless gamble with public safety, and now communities in the west midlands are paying the price.
Mr Philip Hollobone (in the Chair)
Will the Minister conclude his remarks no later than 5.28 pm, to allow the hon. Member for Solihull (Julian Knight) to respond?
Oral Answers to Questions
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Hurd
Like the right hon. Gentleman, I am a London MP, and my constituents express similar concerns about plans in north-west London. The bottom line is that these operating decisions are being driven by the police and crime commissioner team and the commissioner. They are accountable to the public for their decisions.
Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary identified forensics as one of the key areas impeding police efficiency. Crucial forensics tests can make the difference as to whether a person is jailed or loses their family or their job, yet shockingly the Minister told me in a recent written answer that private providers in civil cases do not need to meet any specific scientific standards. There is no regulation in this area at all. Forensics is becoming the wild west of the criminal justice system, so when will the Government stop dithering and give the regulators the powers they have been calling for?
Police Grant Report
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 3 months ago)
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Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
I want to start, as the Minister did, by paying tribute to the men and women who serve in our police service. The counterpart to this debate took place a little under a year ago, and no one could have imagined the unspeakable series of attacks that would follow in 2017. Throughout, our police service officers have risen to the highest standards of bravery, dedication and duty, truly honouring the founding principles of policing in the process. Chief among that covenant is that our police service depends ultimately on public support. After a year in which we have seen officers run into danger to keep the public safe, the police can rarely have counted on such strong public support as they enjoy today.
But I know from speaking to those officers that they are tired of warm words, backed up with no action from politicians. Today they are under sustained pressure the like of which the service has rarely, if ever, encountered, and today we have heard that there is not to be a single extra penny from central Government for local police forces.
Before I go into the detail of the funding settlement before us, I want to deal with the demand that the Minister says he recognises the police are under. Between 2010 and 2017 the average number of 101 and 999 calls has rocketed; in South Yorkshire it has tripled. Just last year 999 calls increased by 15%. Forces such as the West Midlands police are receiving the number of calls on one day in June that they used to receive only on new year’s eve. In the last year overall crime has risen by 15%, the largest increase since records began, violent crime is up by 20%, robberies by 29% and sexual offences by 23%. Last year over 1.4 million more people than the year before experienced antisocial behaviour, while the number of orders handed out fell by a quarter. Yet those are only a tiny proportion of the issues our police have to deal with.
On becoming Home Secretary, the now Prime Minister told the police their only “mission” was
“to cut crime. No more, and no less”,
but 83% of calls to command and control centres are non-crime-related. They are calls associated with mental health—last year the Met took an average of one mental health call every five minutes—or with missing persons, a demand that has tripled for some forces over the last seven years. They are associated with a raft of vulnerabilities, because, as other services buckle, the police are relied upon more than ever as the social service of last resort.
Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that, contrary to what the Minister has alleged, what Labour Members are doing today is standing up for their constituents and voting against cuts that are unsafe and putting our constituents at risk?
Louise Haigh
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Today we will be voting against a completely inappropriate police funding settlement that leaves our communities exposed and the public at risk.
On top of all the demand I have listed, there is the unprecedented terrorist threat our country now faces. It is frankly unbelievable that, as the National Police Chiefs’ Council has recognised, the report before us fails to meet those growing needs and exposes gaps in the protection of the public.
So we have no choice but to vote against the motion tonight. We do so for three key reasons. First, the report prescribes an eighth consecutive year of real-terms cuts in Home Office funding. Secondly, it pushes the burden on to hard-pressed local taxpayers, and the very areas that have seen the most substantial cuts will get the least, inevitably creating a lottery of winners and losers that has no place for public safety. Thirdly, it fails to meet the needs identified by police chiefs, first and foremost in the area of counter-terrorism but also in local policing.
Simon Hoare
I am sure the hon. Lady has done a lot of homework before today’s debate, as we all have. Therefore, given the backdrop to what she has just said, can she advise us how much money—how many pounds, shillings and pence—her party would be adding to the police grant this year?
Louise Haigh
As the hon. Gentleman will know, our manifesto spelled out very clearly that we would dedicate 10,000 additional neighbourhood policing officers. The settlement before us today does not dedicate any additional funding to local policing and in fact, as I will come on to, would be swallowed up almost completely by inflationary and cost pressures.
One of the chief jobs of Parliament is to hold the Government accountable for the promises they make to the public and for their record of action in office, so I want to briefly focus on the context for this year’s police settlement. In 2015, the current Prime Minister promised the public that after a period in which £2.3 billion had been taken from police budgets, the Conservatives would now “protect police funding”. On many occasions that promise has been repeated to the public and to this House. Indeed, it was repeated by the Prime Minister at Prime Minister’s questions just today. In fact, the House of Commons Library has shown that real-terms central Government funding to local forces has fallen by £400 million since 2015—the equivalent of more than 7,000 officers.
Sandy Martin
Does my hon. Friend agree that when the Conservatives say we are inventing the cuts, they are not taking into account the cuts to police officer numbers? Between 2010 and 2017, Suffolk has seen 150 fewer officers, 100 fewer specials, 86 fewer PCSOs—50% of the group—and 200 fewer support staff. That represents a 25% cut in personnel across the board, so it is not surprising that we have seen a concomitant increase in crime.
Louise Haigh
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Despite what the Government like to say, every single Member of this House will have seen frontline cuts to police forces. Two weeks ago, the Leader of the House insisted in this Chamber that
“frontline policing throughout the country as a whole has not changed—it has, in fact, slightly increased since 2010.”—[Official Report, 25 January 2018; Vol. 635, c. 421.]
This has been a familiar refrain throughout the Government’s time in office: “Yes, we are making cuts, but they are having no real impact.”
Gloria De Piero
More than 36,000 101 calls went unanswered or were abandoned in Nottinghamshire last year, which is a 201% increase year on year. Those people needed genuine help, but they did not get it.
Louise Haigh
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The number of abandoned calls has increased as the number of calls to 101 and 999 has increased. We now have 21,000 fewer police officers on our streets than there were when Labour left office in 2010, 17,000 fewer police staff, who perform vital functions in investigations, and 6,000 fewer PCSOs. Neighbourhood policing—the absolute bedrock of our model of policing—has been decimated, which is an appalling legacy of this Government. Neighbourhood policing is not just a “nice to have”; it is vital to our policing system and underpins the police’s ability to police by consent. It is almost wholly responsible for building and maintaining relationships with communities, and if we reduce our police to nothing more than a blue light that arrives only when the absolute worst has happened, we risk rolling back all the progress that has been made in police accountability and trust over the last generation.
Paula Sherriff (Dewsbury) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a compelling speech. Does she agree that the cuts to police numbers in areas such as mine mean that there simply are not enough police officers to attend crimes as they happen, such as burglaries that are in progress? Vans are continually broken into and people have their tools stolen time and again, but the resources to help those people simply are not there.
Louise Haigh
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Minister has heard time and again from Opposition Members that the police do not have the resources to respond to serious crimes, with burglaries being a particular problem, but the Government seem happy to sit back and allow that to happen. They are the only Executive in modern times to have presided over consecutive falls in police numbers in every single year of their time in office.
Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)
Will the hon. Lady join me in welcoming the policy of Katy Bourne, the Sussex police and crime commissioner, who is recruiting an extra 100 officers?
Louise Haigh
If that is the case, I am delighted for Sussex police that it is recruiting additional officers, but that comes in the context of severe cuts and a fall in police officer numbers over the past seven years.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that any current recruiting follows year-on-year consecutive cuts to police numbers? Southwark has lost 200 police officers and PCSOs despite having the highest volume of 999 calls in London, experiencing a terror attack last year, and seeing high rates of moped and knife crime.
Louise Haigh
My hon. Friend is right that the context is seven years of prolonged, deep cuts from this Conservative Government that have led to police officer numbers falling and crime rising. Looking across Europe for international comparisons, we see that only Lithuania and Iceland, both of which are suffering deep depressions, chose to cut frontline policing by proportionally more than we did over the past 10 years. These choices have not been made out of necessity; they have been made out of ideology. Promises to the British public have been broken time and again. That is why we were right to treat the Policing Minister’s statement before the Christmas recess with a heavy serving of scepticism. He told us the settlement would give the police “the resources they need.” When Opposition Members doubted him, he told us to go away and read the detail so that we might feel more positive. Well, we have, but we are not.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council has also read the detail and said that it did not meet the level of investment required. It is not hard to see why. The council’s funding document, which was submitted to the Home Office ahead of the settlement, requested £450 million for local policing alone, not for the entire service, as the Minister has sought to claim. It estimates that inflationary pressures on local forces add up to £209 million—not to mention cost pressures of £38 million and the additional pressure of the unfunded pay rise announced last year. Taken together, all of that will almost entirely wipe out the funding raised from precepts, meaning that local people will be paying more and getting less. As has been said, that will happen on top of an eighth year of real-terms cuts in the support the Government give to local forces. The flat cash settlement this year will equate to a cut of £100 million over the next year, so it is not difficult to see why commissioners across the country are calling the settlement “smoke and mirrors.”
I turn to the precept, because it is not additional money from Government, as the Minister tried to claim. Any additional money will come if PCCs take the decision to increase their policing precept. Once again, the Government display the worst type of localism: passing all the blame on to local decision makers while refusing to fund the tough decisions that they have to make.
What is more, this method of funding the police is fundamentally unfair. The areas that have taken the biggest hit from funding cuts since 2010 stand to gain the least from the maximisation of the precept. For example, the West Midlands, which has lost a staggering 2,000 officers since 2010, will raise a little over 2% from the precept. By contrast, Surrey, which has half the population, will raise almost the same in cash terms as the West Midlands, but by maximising the precept it will be able to raise 7.5% of its budget. When it comes to public safety, the settlement creates winners and losers based on postcode. The police funding formula at least made an attempt to fund forces based on need, but it seems to have been kicked into the long grass yet again. The alternative—funding the police through the precept—means that community safety depends on the ability of the local community to pay.
Before I conclude, I want to discuss reserves, which the Minister was keen to dwell on and which have been published with greater transparency this month. When the unfunded pay settlement was announced last year, police forces were lectured over their levels of reserves and were advised to use them for the 2% unconsolidated increase. The figure bandied about for the total amount of reserves is £1.6 billion, but the Minister knows full well that the vast majority of that figure is earmarked for capital projects or for known future spending. The real figure of usable reserves is £378 million, as the Minister’s own publication shows. Much of that is routinely being used for day-to-day policing as a result of cuts, and there is a danger that some forces will be put in the vulnerable position of not being able to respond to an emergency. In fact, the last available HMIC analysis revealed that only nine forces out of the 43 have more than the 5% level of reserves recommended by the Audit Commission, so the attempt to continue to distract us with the reserves is transparent, and the public and police leaders across the country will see right through it.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly given the horrific events of the last year, I want to turn to counter-terrorism. Nobody who has read the report of David Anderson, QC’s review into the four fatal attacks in the spring and summer of 2017 can be in any doubt about the strain on counter-terror policing. In one chilling excerpt, he notes:
“On 21 March 2017, prior to the Westminster attack on the following day, investigation of Khuram Butt”—
one of the London Bridge attackers—
“was suspended. Investigation of the other SOIs”—
subjects of interest—
“investigated under the operation had been suspended the previous week, due to resourcing constraints brought on by a large number of P1 investigations”—
that is, priority one investigations.
Mark Rowley, the national lead for counter-terrorism policing, told the Home Affairs Committee in October that counter-terror policing was dealing with a 30% uptick in operations. He warned that
“dealing with this uplift in work at the moment is a real stretch”,
and that counter-terrorism had been put on an “emergency footing”. He continued:
“Given that we now have a growing number of subjects of interests we are investigating and a very big growth in the number of investigations…we have a bigger proportion of our investigations that are at the bottom of the pile and getting little or no work at the moment.”
I am certain that will horrify the public, as it horrifies me. I am equally certain that the public will wish the Government to give counter-terror policing the resources it needs to counter that threat. It is therefore staggering that Ministers have chosen, through this settlement, to give counter-terror policing just half of the resources it requested to keep the country safe.
Police chiefs are now openly warning, in an unprecedented way, of tough choices as a result of Ministers’ failure properly to resource their efforts in a threat climate described as “stratospheric.” If the first duty of any Government is the safety and security of their citizens, the responsibility of the Opposition is to make sure the Government keep to that promise. The failure properly to resource the counter-terror effort alone would be justification enough for the Labour party to vote against the police grant today, but in fact this settlement fails to meet not only our security needs but the needs of local policing and of the communities that are most in need.
The Minister has said time and again that he will ensure the police have the resources they need to do the job. There will not be a single chief constable in this country who can tell him that he or she has the resources needed to fully protect the public and provide a professional service in the current climate. Under the Government’s watch, crime is soaring and the public are exposed. The Government must urgently think again.
Mr Hurd
With the leave of the House, I will respond to some of the contributions from Back Benchers. Given how many interventions I took at the start of the debate, and in the interest of time, I do not propose to take any now. It has been good to hear so many Members on both sides of the House paying tribute to the hard work, bravery and dedication of their local police forces.
My hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) has spoken to me regularly about fair funding for Dorset. He wants more officers on the ground, and I am sure he will make representations to Dorset’s police and crime commissioner about what the PCC proposes to do with the additional £4.2 million he should receive from the settlement.
My hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) made the extremely important point that as crime is changing, the police have to change, too. That point was also made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris). We never hear Labour talk about this, but the Government are committing £1.9 billion for cyber-security, for example. My hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset asked me to look seriously at merger proposals, and we will do so once we see a business case.
My old friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Waveney (Peter Aldous), has been a long and passionate advocate for fairer funding for Suffolk, as have other Suffolk MPs, not least my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds (Jo Churchill). My hon. Friends the Members for Waveney and for Newton Abbot have my assurance that we will look seriously at concluding the fair funding review in the context of the next comprehensive spending review, and I noted the representations from my hon. Friend the Member for Waveney about the emergency grant. He made a very important point about the precedent of Ipswich Town in the policing of football.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) inevitably raised the tone of the debate by speaking about the parable of the talents. He is right about reserves, and I note his desire to see more officers in Dover and Deal. I know he will make representations to Matthew Scott, who now has more resources to deliver just that.
Various Labour Members offered variations on the same theme. A number of Labour west midlands MPs, including the hon. Members for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe), for West Bromwich West (Mr Bailey) and for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey), talked about cuts and depleted reserves. The fact is that West Midlands police will receive an additional £9.5 million next year, which the police and crime commissioner says he will use to recruit a further 100 officers. Not unlike many other forces, West Midlands police has increased its reserves by £26.9 million since 2011.
The hon. Member for Burnley (Julie Cooper) again talked about cuts and depleted reserves, but Lancashire police will get an additional £6.1 million and has increased its reserves by £26.6 million since 2011. I am sure that she will be as curious as I am about how it intends to use that money.
The hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) made a typically thoughtful and well-informed speech on police matters. Again, however, her local force will receive an additional £8.9 million, and has increased its reserves by £60 million since 2011. I am sure that she will make representations about how that money is spent. She was rightly thoughtful about the issue of mental health, and there is a common theme across the system that police are spending more of their time dealing with people on the mental health spectrum. In many cases, that is entirely legitimate, as the police might be pursuing criminal activity or being deployed for public safety, but we are actively working with the police to get a better evidence base on exactly what is happening. Obviously, we want people on the mental health spectrum to be dealt with by qualified people and we want our police officers to be focused on their core job. The hon. Lady asked me about the date for the next stage of the “Protect the Protectors” Bill, and I can tell her that this will be on 27 April. I can also assure her that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) will get an answer to his letter.
Given the various themes that came out of the speeches made by Labour Members, I am disappointed by Labour’s approach to this. Policing is one of our most important public services. These are very serious and demanding times for the police, so a serious response is required. I have to say that it sounds as though Labour is now very much in the scaremongering, fake news business, totally detached from reality. For example, Labour continues to use the mantra that crime is rising, even though the independent statisticians show that it is falling. The bottom line is that, as the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) said, Labour Members will vote against £450 million of increased funding for policing, including a £70 million uplift for counter-terrorism in the face of the worst terrorist threat for a generation. That is the position of the modern Labour party. On this side of the House—
Mr Hurd
I will not give way. The Government will continue to invest in policing, meaning that this country will invest £13 billion next year in policing. We will do the right thing to make sure that the police have the resources they need, and I commend the motion to the House.
Question put.
The House proceeded to a Division.
Draft Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2018
Louise Haigh Excerpts(6 years, 3 months ago)
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Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
The Committee will be pleased to hear that I do not intend to speak for the full remaining hour and a half. Like the Minister, I do not even intend to address all of the draft regulations, even on this day of the centenary of women’s suffrage. I was pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East arrive; I was worried I would be the token woman serving on the Committee.
I want particularly to address the issues around the regulatory amendment to the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the reform of the pre-charge bail system. The Opposition are very happy to support the draft regulations, but there are some concerns about the implementation of these reforms. As the Minister said, as a consequence of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, rather than being bailed, a large proportion of defendants are now released under investigation, which has already begun to raise a number of issues in practice.
First, unlike what the regulations intend, there is no clarity or timescale whatsoever for the suspects as regards their investigation, leaving them in limbo and with that investigation stretching ahead of them. Suspects are now unaware of when it is safe to assume that they are no longer under investigation, or indeed whether they are likely to face further police involvement if they contact someone connected with the allegation, despite there being no bail conditions preventing them from doing so.
Furthermore, many elements of police investigations can take substantially longer than 28 days, such as the examination of electronic devices, as we have seen recently with the issues around police disclosure. That means that the police will still investigate the matter as normal, but a suspect is no longer required to return to a police station to formally answer their bail. However, without that impending bail appointment, it is possible that investigations will take even longer to conclude, as the police no longer have fixed deadlines by which to provide updates. I know personally of several cases where suspects have waited for months for investigations into the most minor offences with no clarity about their investigation. The legislation is therefore having the opposite effect of its intended laudable consequences.
Concerns have also been raised about the consequent costs for policing and the court system as a whole. The evidence appears to suggest that releases under investigation have simply replaced bail with a fall of 26% of suspects bailed last March down to 4% in the three months that followed, while releases under investigation rose to 25% in the same period. Will the Minister review the figures and consider whether the new system has achieved its intended outcome, as it has been in place for almost a year? As I say, the Opposition are happy to support the regulations.