Neighbourhood Planning Bill

Lord Young of Cookham Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th February 2017 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 69 and 75. They are pretty much self-explanatory. The former simply requires that guidance should be provided when there are temporary rights that can be granted at the same time over the same piece of land. Amendment 75 is rather more important because it provides that the section should not come into force until guidance has been published in relation to it. I assume that is the Government’s intention, and I hope they will accept that amendment.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, the co-pilot is back in charge. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Shipley and Lord Beecham, for tabling their amendments to Clause 14. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, made it clear that his amendment was probing. Before I move on to discuss these and the government amendments to this clause, it may be helpful if I begin with a brief description of Clauses 14 to 26, which introduce the new temporary possession power.

All acquiring authorities may need to enter and use land for a temporary period. For example, they may require land to store materials for a scheme or to provide access to a construction site, as the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, explained. The problem is that, currently, only certain acquiring authorities have temporary possession powers—for example, under special Acts which are needed for very large schemes such as the Crossrail Act 2008. Crucially, compulsory purchase orders cannot authorise temporary possession. There is no good reason for this difference, and it is unfair to those who do not have the powers. Clauses 14 to 26 seek to create a level playing field by giving all acquiring authorities the same power to take temporary possession of land. It may also be in the interests of those on the receiving end of a CPO to have the possibility of being deprived of their land temporarily rather than permanently.

In giving acquiring authorities this power, we shall ensure that those whose land is taken are fairly compensated and that there are appropriate safeguards in place to protect their interests. That is set out in Clause 19. For example, temporary possession will have to be authorised in the same way as compulsory acquisition. Also, in certain circumstances, owners and occupiers will be able to require the acquiring authority to acquire the land permanently instead of occupying it on a temporary basis, if that is what they want.

Government Amendments 66, 67, 70, 71, 74 with Amendments 105 and 106 and amendments to other clauses, which I shall deal with later, remove the requirement for the temporary possession to be linked directly to a scheme for the acquisition of other land either by compulsion or agreement. Decoupling is the word that the professionals have been using. The reason for this change is that there may be situations where an acquiring authority needs to take only temporary possession of land. For example, an acquiring authority may need temporary possession of land for a contractor’s compound when they have been able to buy all the land needed for their scheme by agreement, or they may need access to land temporarily to maintain a highway. That is the impact of some of our amendments.

Government Amendments 105 and 106 are consequential on Amendment 66; they simply remove definitions of terms that are no longer required. Non-government Amendments 65, 68 and 72, which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, also seek to remove the requirement for the temporary possession to be directly linked to a compulsory acquisition scheme. I hope, therefore, that he will agree they are unnecessary in the light of the Government’s amendments.

On Amendment 69, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Kennedy, I agree with the noble Lord that we need to ensure that the interests of leaseholders are adequately protected in introducing this new power. However, I believe that that amendment is not needed, because we have already built in a safeguard which would deliver the same outcome that is requested, but in a more flexible way.

Amendment 69 would restrict the temporary possession power so that it could never be used when a leasehold interest would have less than a year to run after the land was handed back, even if that was the preference of the leaseholder, the freeholder and the acquiring authority. It sounds counterintuitive to prohibit that. The effect of this amendment would be that, if the land was essential to the delivery of the scheme, the acquiring authority would instead be driven to exercising the more draconian power of compulsory acquisition of the land permanently. However, as I have said, we have already built in a safeguard for leaseholders, which I believe will achieve the outcome that noble Lords are seeking. The safeguard is in Clause 17(3), which allows leaseholders to serve a counternotice preventing the acquiring authority taking temporary possession of the land. On receipt of the counternotice, if the land is essential to the delivery of the scheme, the acquiring authority can proceed as if the land were subject to compulsory acquisition and take the land permanently. In these circumstances, the leaseholder would, of course, be compensated for both the value of his lease and losses caused by reason of being disturbed from possession of the land taken. I believe this is a neater solution, which gives leaseholders the flexibility to decide what is right for them.

Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, seeks to clarify what will happen when a tenant’s land is subject to compulsory purchase. As government Amendment 103 seeks to do the same thing—although our approach is different—I will speak to both amendments together. Government Amendment 103 provides that the terms and obligations under the tenancy, with the exception of the payment of rent and the length of the tenancy, will be disapplied to the extent that the temporary possession prevents reasonable compliance with them. Any expenditure which a leaseholder incurs as a result of the temporary possession would be claimed back from the acquiring authority. The noble Lord’s amendment, in contrast, provides that all the terms and obligations are unenforceable for the period of temporary possession.

The reason we have disapplied the terms and obligations only to the extent that the temporary possession prevents reasonable compliance with them is that there may be circumstances in which only a small part of land subject to a lease is also subject to temporary possession. In these situations, there may be no easy way in which to separate out the terms that relate to the land subject to temporary possession from terms that relate to the remainder of the land.

The second point of difference is the exclusion of the payment of rent and the length of the tenancy. We have done this because, again, where only a small part of a tenant’s land is required, making these terms unenforceable could result in a tenant having to pay an uncertain portion of the rent for the land not subject to temporary possession. The loss that would be compensated is not the rent payable for the existing lease, but any rent payable for alternative premises, as that is the loss that has been caused. Under the Government’s amendment, responsibility for paying the rent for the land under temporary possession remains with the tenant. However, the tenant will be entitled to claim compensation from the acquiring authority in relation to any expenditure which a leaseholder reasonably incurs as a result of the temporary possession.

The other point of difference with the noble Lord’s amendment is to do with proposed subsections (4) to (6), which make provision with regards to those who have protected tenancies under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. Occupiers with such a protected tenancy have a right to apply for the grant of a new tenancy, provided they remain in occupation. However, if their land is subject to temporary possession they will no longer be in occupation and will lose this right. Government Amendment 103 and non-government Amendment 73 both seek to preserve this right to renew the tenancy. However, in doing so, the government amendment imposes a requirement for the tenant to confirm in writing to both the landlord and the acquiring authority that they intend to resume occupation after temporary possession. I think it is clear that both amendments are after the same thing: greater clarity for tenants and landlords as to what happens during the temporary possession period, including the treatment of rent.

Finally, in this group, I will respond to Amendment 75, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. The noble Lord made a very valid point, which I entirely agree with, that where the Government intend to provide guidance on the use of a new power, that guidance should be available by the time the provisions come into force. That is, of course, the Government’s intention. The particular element of the temporary possession provisions that the noble Lord has identified is in Clause 15(3)(a), which will allow both temporary possession and compulsory acquisition powers to be obtained concurrently for the same piece of land.

Although this so-called doubling-up of temporary and permanent powers can be authorised, it will not give acquiring authorities carte blanche to double up in all cases. It would not be fair to claimants if there was not a very good reason for an acquiring authority to make an order which included this doubling-up. It would not be wise to anticipate precisely what might be in the guidance at this point, but as I have just said, there would be a high bar to justify doubling-up. The most likely circumstances would be linear transport projects where the final design is not complete by the time compulsory powers are obtained. We know of a handful of orders in the last dozen years where this has been authorised, such as the Docklands Light Railway and the Nottingham tramway.

As for compulsory acquisitions, each case would be considered on its individual merits at a public inquiry before an inspector, and considered by the relevant Secretary of State, before a decision was made whether doubling-up was justified in the public interest.

I hope that I have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with a firm undertaking that the Government will be seeking views on the draft guidance and will publish it before these provisions come into force. I apologise to the Committee for a somewhat lengthy oration on these amendments, but there are quite a few of them. When the time comes, I will move government Amendments 66, 67, 70, 71, 74, 103, 105 and 106. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 65 and for noble Lords not to press Amendments 68, 69, 72, 73 and 75.

[Lord Shipley]

I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. I draw his attention to two facts. First, the Government have brought 34 amendments for consideration this afternoon, this Bill having passed in the other place. Secondly, some of them were tabled quite late, and after I tabled my amendment. I understand the need for all this to be brought together for Report, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

66: Clause 14, page 13, line 14, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert “a person (an “acquiring authority”)—
(a) has a power conferred by an Act to acquire land compulsorily (with or without authorisation from another person), or(b) is or has been, at any time, otherwise authorised to acquire land compulsorily.”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

70: Clause 14, page 13, line 21, leave out “enactment” and insert “Act”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

74: Clause 14, page 13, line 31, leave out subsection (6)

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

76: Clause 15, page 13, line 35, leave out “same”

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, we now move to the second group of amendments on temporary possession. Clause 15 deals with the procedure for authorising temporary possession of land, requiring it to be authorised by the type of authorising instrument that would be required for the permanent acquisition of land—for example, a compulsory purchase order.

Government Amendments 76 to 79 remove redundant wording in Clause 15(2) as a consequence of government Amendment 66 to Clause 14(1). Government Amendments 80 to 82 amend Clause 15(3) to clarify that the same land may be subject to both temporary possession and compulsory acquisition powers concurrently. We debated the need for guidance relating to the clause a moment ago on Amendment 75, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, so I shall not repeat what I said about that. Government Amendments 83 to 85 and 87—the last also, happily, endorsed by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley—all remove redundant provisions in the context of the previous amendments. For example, Amendment 87 refers to “relevant land”: this is no longer needed because the concept of relevant land is removed by Amendment 66. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, Amendment 86 is in my name, and I want to ask the Minister a question. Clause 15 sets out the procedures for authorising temporary possession. It is not clear from the clause whether it is intended that there be a time limit for the life of a temporary power—for instance, three years for service of a notice post the confirmation of a compulsory purchase order. Do the three-year and five-year standards for compulsory purchase orders in statutory instruments apply, and does the power apply to post-construction maintenance during a defect period?

The Government’s amendments to remove superfluous words are helpful. I am not sure whether Amendment 87, which deletes subsection (7), is right—I am having second thoughts about it. I think it is right, but as the relevant land is the land required for the scheme, it seems appropriate to make it clear that temporary possession can be taken after action to secure the land required permanently. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comment.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I may need to write to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, about the specific issue he has raised on Amendment 87 and subsection (7) relating to relevant land. As I said, this is no longer needed, because the concept of relevant land has been removed by Amendment 66, with which we have just dealt. However, I will make some inquiries following his representations.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has proposed in Amendment 86 that Clause 15(6) should be omitted. This is intended to be helpful clarification. It confirms that the authorising instrument—for example, a CPO—does not need to include the dates for any particular period of temporary possession. It would be difficult for an acquiring authority to do that, because it would not know the date of the confirmation at that stage. The cross-reference to Clause 16 points users to the provisions which specify the dates of temporary possession. The Government believe that there is no need for users of this legislation to be deprived of this clarification. He also asked a question about whether CPO powers would expire after a certain period. Again, I will write to him about this when I have made some inquiries. In the meantime, I hope that he will not move his Amendment 86.

Amendment 76 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

77: Clause 15, page 13, line 36, leave out “as is or would be”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

87: Clause 15, page 14, line 18, leave out subsection (7)

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[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 89, 91, 92, 93 and 94 in my name. These five amendments relate to Clause 17, which makes provision for a person affected by temporary possession to serve a counternotice to limit the total period which the temporary possession can last to 12 months in the case of a dwelling and six years in any other case. Leaseholders can also serve a counternotice providing that the acquiring authority may not take temporary possession. Having received the counternotice the acquiring authority must decide whether to accept it, withdraw the notice or proceed to take the land permanently.

As drafted, Clause 17 seems unnecessarily complex. The hope is that the Government might be able to simplify it without losing any of its statutory force. Regarding Amendment 89, Clause 17 applies wherever an acquiring authority gives notice of intended entry on to land for a temporary period to a person who is either the freeholder of the land affected or a leasehold owner. The clauses that follow seem to have a different counternotice procedure, depending on whether it is a freeholder or a leaseholder. So in connection with Amendment 89, is there a need to distinguish between leaseholders and freeholders? This amendment and the consequential amendments seek to avoid that and therefore to simplify the clause.

Amendment 91 refers to Clause 17(3), which allows a leaseholder to give the acquiring authority a counternotice to prevent it taking temporary possession of the land. It appears that this right is not available to freeholders, who can serve only a counternotice limiting the period of temporary possession. Surely, this right should be available to freeholders. This amendment therefore seeks to clarify the matter by stating:

“The owner may give the acquiring authority a counter-notice which provides that the authority may not take temporary possession of the owner’s interest”.


We then have consequential Amendments 92, 93 and 94. Clause 17(10) states that nothing in that clause,

“prevents an acquiring authority acquiring land compulsorily after accepting a counter-notice or withdrawing a notice of intended entry”.

My question is: should a permanent acquisition be available for temporary land unless a counternotice has been served requiring a permanent rather than temporary acquisition? Clause 17(8) is relevant in this respect. Amendment 94 would therefore leave out lines 38 to 40 on page 15. The concern is that landowners could potentially face a period of six years of temporary possession with the acquiring authority then deciding to acquire the land permanently. In the interests of fairness, the land should surely have been acquired permanently in the beginning. Scheme promoters should know how they wish to use the land and whether it needs to be permanently acquired from the outset.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for tabling his Amendment 88. I appreciate that his aim in doing so was to make things clearer, an ambition which I fully support. However, on this occasion I do not think that an amendment is necessary because subsection (7) provides that Clause 16 must be complied with,

“in relation to each subsequent period of temporary possession”.

That makes it clear that acquiring authorities can serve more than one notice. Having said that, this is the sort of thing that could usefully be covered in guidance. We will update our compulsory purchase guidance in light of the reforms in the Bill, and in the light of what the noble Lord has said, I will ask for this matter to be looked at again.

Amendments 89 and 91 to 93 deal with the counternotice provisions in Clause 17. These provisions are an improvement on the current temporary possession regimes, which have no counternotice procedure in them. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for tabling his amendments. No one would be keener than I to simplify all this, if it were possible so to do. I doubt whether it would be realistic wholly to redraft this clause between now and Report but I endorse his sense of direction. He is quite right to say that there is a difference between the treatment of leaseholders and that of freeholders. This is because the Government believe that there could be a greater impact on leaseholders than freeholders when their land is subject to temporary possession, as the leaseholder may be left with a useless lease at the end of the temporary possession period—for example, when there is only a short period left to run on the lease. We considered this in debate on Amendment 69.

Clause 17(3) affords leaseholders additional protections in these circumstances by giving them the option to serve a counternotice, as the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, said, providing that an acquiring authority cannot take temporary possession of their land at all. However, no such issues arise for freeholders. The justification for the temporary possession of the land will have been carefully considered on its individual merits at a public local inquiry before an independent inspector and confirmed only where it is in the public interest.

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[Lord Beecham]

I would not say that I was unduly disturbed, but I would be grateful if the Minister would comment on it.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am sorry for doing a disservice to the noble Lord.

Amendment 90, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Kennedy, seeks to limit the period of temporary possession of land not occupied by dwellings to three years rather than the six years proposed in Clause 17(2). It is a matter of judgment whether one draws the line at three, six or nine years. The limit of six years is designed to give those affected greater certainty on the total period that non-dwelling land can be subject to temporary possession. Restricting the period to three years, as suggested, would limit the usefulness of this new power, as the lower the upper limit, the more likely it is that an acquiring authority would, on a cautionary basis, decide to take the more draconian and unnecessary route of compulsory, permanent land acquisition instead.

As I said, there needs to be a balance between giving acquiring authorities the power they need to deliver their schemes and ensuring that the interests of those whose land is taken are protected. We consider that an upper limit of six years strikes the right balance. It is an upper limit and, of course, in many cases temporary possession will be for far less time and the issue will not arise. Where possession will need to be for infinitely longer, acquiring authorities might go for compulsory acquisition in the first instance. I assure noble Lords that we can and will keep this under review as the new power begins to take effect. The regulation-making power in Clause 24 will allow the Government to make changes if required. With those assurances and explanations—and with apologies for trying to take a short cut—I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his response in respect of Amendment 88. He is entirely correct that the intent of our amendment is just to get clarity as we debate the legislation. With compulsory purchase, I am conscious that there is the risk of lawyers getting involved at a later date and arguing about what something does or does not mean—although I know my noble friend is of course a lawyer, and I would not wish to deprive him of any work. I may be reading it incorrectly but Clause 16(7) appears to refer just to the one, single case. All my amendment sought was to add that you can have more than one. I may well be wrong about this, and the Bill may be perfectly correct, but I would not mind if the noble Lord and his officials looked at it once more before we get to Report. It may well be that guidance is all we need, but we are trying to get absolute clarity so that we do not get any problems in the future on this. Other than that, we are in complete agreement on this clause as it stands.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, speaking as a lawyer, although happily not practising, I see no need to amend the term “injury” to “damage”. Legally, injury embraces damage of all kinds. I would not go to extremes to defend the Government on this or any other occasion, but if the Minister felt disinclined to accept the amendment, I would not dissent from his judgment.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I am grateful for this growing cross-party alliance on how to deal with one of the amendments. I shall deal with as much as I can in writing, but some government amendments are tucked into this group which I need to address.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for tabling his amendments, which, as he said, deal with compensation for temporary possession. Clause 19 provides that claimants will be entitled to compensation for any loss or injury which they sustain as a result of the temporary possession. Where the claimant is operating a trade or business on the land, they will be entitled to compensation for disturbance of that trade or business.

I turn to Amendment 95, for which the noble Lord has explained his reasons. I think this comes down to a difference in approach to drafting. The Government have used the term “loss or injury” instead of “loss or damage”, as the noble Lord has suggested. Both terms have been used previously. In this instance, the Government have opted to follow the precedent of Section 20 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965.

The important point is that both formulations have the same meaning. I am reinforced in my view by the recent intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.

On the second part of this amendment, adding,

“as a result of the temporary possession of the land”,

is unnecessary because subsection (1) makes the same point.

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

98: Clause 19, page 16, line 29, leave out “claim” and insert “cause of action”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

101: Clause 19, page 16, line 33, leave out from “section” to end of line 35 and insert “in relation to a particular head of loss or injury carries interest from the day after the last day on which that loss or injury occurs.”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

103: After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause—
“Impact of temporary possession on tenancies etc
(1) Subsection (2) applies where an acquiring authority takes temporary possession under section 14(2) of land subject to a tenancy.(2) A person is not to be treated as being in breach of—(a) any term of the tenancy, or(b) any other obligation associated with the tenancy or the land subject to temporary possession,to the extent that the person cannot reasonably comply with the term or other obligation as a result of the temporary possession.(3) Subsection (2) does not affect terms or obligations about—(a) the length of the tenancy, or(b) the payment of rent.(4) Subsection (5) applies where—(a) an acquiring authority takes temporary possession of land subject to a tenancy to which Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (security of tenure for business tenants) applies immediately before the period of temporary possession,(b) the tenancy expires during the period of temporary possession, and(c) prior to the period of temporary possession the tenant notifies in writing both the acquiring authority and the landlord that the tenant intends to resume occupation of the land after the period of temporary possession.(5) For the purposes of Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 the tenant is to be deemed to continue to occupy the land in accordance with the tenancy mentioned in subsection (4)(b), and any tenancy which succeeds that tenancy, despite the period of temporary possession.(6) But if the tenant notifies in writing both the acquiring authority and the landlord that the tenant no longer intends to resume occupation of the land after the period of temporary possession subsection (5) ceases to apply.(7) In this section, “tenancy” includes a sub-tenancy.”

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, and speak to Amendment 104A which requires the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to make provision for the reinstatement of land at the end of a period of temporary possession. This is not drafted particularly for the benefit of the residents of Aberystwyth or places in the vicinity; it stems from the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee which draws attention to a number of issues, only some of which are embodied in this amendment.

In dealing with the issue mentioned in Amendment 104A, the committee regarded it as inappropriate to leave the discussion of whether or not to include provisions about reinstatement in the regulations to the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers. Hence, it recommended that the clause should be amended to impose the duty referred to in the amendment. However, that was not the end of the committee’s concerns. In particular, it also took issue with Clause 24(2)(a), which it regarded as,

“inappropriately wide and should be redrafted to reflect the narrow policy intention referred to in the DCLG document which explained the power to modify provisions”.

In particular, the committee felt that the power goes much further than the declared objective in the policy document and,

“it would enable the regulations to make substantial changes to Clauses 14 to 26 in a wide range of cases, for example, by excluding the provisions about compensation”.

I confess that the document, only having reached us at the end of January, shortly before the amendments were drafted, ought to have been subject to an amendment specifically dealing with that issue. I do not expect the Minister to respond immediately, but I hope that, before Report, he will indicate whether the Government would be minded to accept the redrafting recommendation referred to by the Delegated Powers Committee. If not, I give notice that we will remedy the omission this evening and table an appropriate amendment.

The committee was clear about the issue that I have raised, but it also makes a more general point about the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers exercising this novel power, which could potentially have far-reaching consequences without first being required to consult interested parties. It therefore considered a consultation duty even more important, in view of the provision dispensing with the House’s hybrid instruments procedure. That raises issues about secondary legislation that have so often been raised. As I say, I would not expect the Minister to respond to something of which he did not have notice by way of an amendment tonight. I hope that the matter can be resolved en route to Report, but reserve the right to table amendments if it cannot be.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, I shall deal first with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has just made. Of course, I have read the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and there are three relevant recommendations relating to this Bill, two of which he mentioned. We take this very seriously; we are considering all three recommendations very carefully, and intend to respond before Report, so I hope that the nuclear option mentioned by the noble Lord may not be necessary.

I turn to Amendments 104, 104A and 129B. Clauses 14 to 26 of the Bill set out the broad framework for how the temporary possession power will work, establishing protections and providing for the payment of compensation. Further technical provisions will be necessary for the implementation of the temporary possession power. Clause 24 gives the Secretary of State the power by regulations to make further provision in relation to the authorisation and exercise of temporary possession powers where necessary. We will respond on that—and in the meantime we set out in the policy document what we propose to do. There is something there about reinstatement.

On Amendment 104, certain special kinds of land, including land held inalienably by the National Trust, are afforded additional protection under the compulsory acquisition process. This additional protection provides that a compulsory purchase order may be subject to special parliamentary procedure when an objection is sustained to the relevant order by, for example, the National Trust, or when exchange land for that to be acquired cannot be given, perhaps because no suitable land is available. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, that National Trust land should benefit from additional protection under the temporary possession regime; this is also true of those other special kinds of land. The Government have set out their intention to do precisely that in a policy document; we propose to do that through regulations made under Clause 24. Paragraphs 48 to 51 of that document set out more details.

The Government’s proposed approach under temporary possession differs from that under compulsory acquisition. Where the temporary possession of special kinds of land is happening without any associated compulsory acquisition, the special parliamentary procedure would not apply. Instead, the temporary possession will be allowed only when the confirming authority is satisfied that it would not cause serious detriment to the owners and users. Such serious detriment could include, for example, irreparable damage to the land concerned, or blocking access to other land or assets. When both temporary possession and compulsory acquisition of a special kind of land is included in the same order, and the compulsory acquisition is subject to special parliamentary procedure, the temporary possession land would also be subject to the special parliamentary procedure. However, I have listened with great interest to the case made by the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, who raises an important issue, and the Government will, therefore, give further careful consideration to it before confirming our approach, to which I have just referred.

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

105: Clause 25, page 20, leave out line 43

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I will be brief. In this group, I have Amendments 116, 117, 118 and 119. The first three seek to leave out “highway” on page 24, lines 14, 16 and 17, and insert “transport project”. We thought that would make the issue clearer. New Sections 6D(3), 6D(4)(a) and 6D(4)(b) in Clause 27 use “transport project” and I therefore did not understand why later in the same clause it was referred to as a highway scheme. Can the Minister explain why that is the case and if my amendments are not necessary? If they are, I hope he will accept them as it is odd to move from the wider and encompassing definition of transport project to the narrower definition of “highway”.

Amendment 119 seeks to provide further clarity by removing “announced”. In these sorts of schemes you get into arguments about when things were announced so we thought it would be much clearer to put,

“first proposed in consultation with the public”.

There will be an actual date on which a consultation is started and when papers and a clear plan are sent out. We thought this would be much better as we do not want disputes later because everyone is arguing about when the scheme was formally announced. That is the purpose behind the amendment and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, we have moved on to the no-scheme principle. The problem with this principle is that since it was first established it has been interpreted in a number of complex and often contradictory ways. Clause 27 is intended to clarify the position. It creates a statutory no-scheme principle and sets out a series of clear rules to establish the methodology of valuation in the no-scheme world. It also extends the definition of the scheme to include a relevant transport project in circumstances where land acquired in the vicinity for a regeneration or redevelopment scheme is facilitated or made possible by that project. We are extending the scheme because we want to ensure that an acquiring authority should not pay more for the land it is acquiring by reason of its own or someone else’s public investment.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for explaining the need for Amendment 107. The Committee will have observed that it is similar to government Amendment 108, so I am pleased to say that I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord. It is entirely correct that increases, as well as decreases, in the value of the land caused by the prospect of the scheme should be disregarded.

Amendment 109 was also proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. He argues that the words “in particular” should be omitted from the introduction to the rules defining the no-scheme world as they imply that some other rules might also be in play. He argues that the rules set out in new Section 6A should be an exclusive list. The Government’s expectation is that in the vast majority of cases the application of the rules as set out will be sufficient to establish the no-scheme world. There may, however, be rare cases in unforeseen circumstances where the Upper Tribunal considers that the application of the rules alone would not give a fair result. Retaining the phrase “in particular” gives the tribunal sufficient flexibility in these rare cases to fall back on the underlying no-scheme principle set out in new Section 6A(2) and its own common sense to arrive at a fair outcome. While I appreciate the noble Lord’s point about the need for clarity, the Government’s view is that the Upper Tribunal should retain this flexibility in order to reach a fair outcome in such unforeseen circumstances.

With Amendment 111, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and government Amendment 112 we now move to consideration of the rules themselves. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, argues that Rule 4 is unnecessary and should be omitted. The Government’s view is that it remains necessary in order to complement Rule 3. Rule 3 assumes that there is no prospect of the same scheme or any other project to meet the same or substantially the same need as the scheme underlying the compulsory purchase. Rule 4 assumes that there is no prospect of any other scheme taking place on the land concerned. As currently drafted, this is too wide, so Amendment 112 restricts Rule 4 to disregarding only those schemes that could be undertaken only by the exercise of statutory functions or compulsory purchase powers. This means that the prospect of schemes brought forward by the private sector would still be considered as part of the no-scheme world. This is a fine point of valuation practice. In the light of what the noble Lord said, I think that the Government should further consider this issue very carefully with the expert practitioners who may conceivably have been briefing the noble Lord to find a solution.

Amendments 116, 117 and 118 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. New Section 6D(6) specifies that when the scheme to be disregarded under Rule 3 is a highway scheme, the reference to “any other project” includes another highway scheme to meet the same need as the actual scheme. This provision reflects the planning assumption in Section 14(5)(d) of the Land Compensation Act 1961. It is important that the assumptions for the no-scheme world and the planning assumptions that should be applied in that no-scheme world should be consistent. The current Section 14 was substituted by the Localism Act 2011. A similar provision was added to the original version of Section 14 by the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. The noble Lord put forward a powerful case that this clarification could apply equally to other transport projects. If it did, Section 14 would also need to be amended to keep the two sets of assumptions in step. I think that this is another issue which the Government should reflect on with expert practitioners.

Turning to the definition of the scheme that must be disregarded before compensation may be assessed, government Amendments 113, 114 and 115 make some small adjustments in the context of the extension of the scheme to relevant transport projects. These have arisen from discussions between the Government and the Greater London Authority and Transport for London, which have only recently been concluded. I am very happy to give details if noble Lords would like them, but as they are relatively small adjustments, I propose to skip that part of the text.

I now return to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Amendment 119 seeks to clarify new Section 6E(3) which disapplies Section 6E for land bought after a relevant transport project was announced but before this Bill was published. If such land were to be included in a redevelopment or regeneration project in the vicinity of that relevant transport project, it would be valued as if the relevant transport project was not part of the scheme to be disregarded.

The noble Lord’s amendment is much more specific than the Bill as currently drafted. The Government’s view is that such precision may not be necessary. The provision refers to an event that has already happened, and it is quite possible that a project may have been announced in some other way than that specified by the announcement. If so, it would be unfair to restrict this provision because the announcement did not fit within the somewhat narrow definition proposed.

However, having said that, it might be possible to clarify, perhaps in guidance, exactly what is meant by an announcement. That is certainly something that I would like to reflect on. I invite the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, to withdraw Amendment 107.

[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 107. I look forward to reading carefully in Hansard what the Minister has said, with a view to potentially coming back to this on Report.

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

108: Clause 27, page 21, line 25, after “land” insert “, or by the prospect of that scheme,”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

112: Clause 27, page 21, line 40, leave out “if the scheme had not been commenced or” and insert “in the exercise of a statutory function or by the exercise of compulsory purchase powers”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

120: Clause 31, page 27, line 27, leave out “section 333ZA and paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 11” and insert—
“(a) section 333ZA of this Act, and(b) paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 11 to this Act or Part 12 of the Highways Act 1980,”

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, we now move on to Clause 31, which deals with the joint acquisition of land by the Greater London Authority and Transport for London, and whose purpose I will briefly explain.

At the moment, for the GLA to bring forward a comprehensive redevelopment scheme in London involving both transport and other development, two compulsory purchase orders are needed: one promoted by the Greater London Authority for the regeneration or housing elements of the scheme, and the other promoted by Transport for London for the transport or highways elements of the scheme. This division makes no sense. It adds complexity and delay to the process and causes confusion among those most affected. Clause 31 removes this unnecessary division and allows the Greater London Authority to promote joint compulsory purchase orders with Transport for London and vice versa. It inserts new Section 403A into the Greater London Authority Act 1999, which enables either the Greater London Authority or Transport for London, or both, to acquire all the land needed for a joint transport and regeneration or housing scheme on behalf of the other.

The government amendments make two changes to the provisions as currently drafted. Amendments 120, 121 and 123 enable the Greater London Authority to promote a joint compulsory purchase order with Transport for London using Transport for London’s compulsory purchase powers as a highway authority under the Highways Act 1980 in addition to its general compulsory purchase powers under the Greater London Authority Act 1999.

Government Amendment 124 delivers the second change. New Section 403B of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 will enable a mayoral development corporation to promote a joint compulsory purchase order with Transport for London for a joint transport, including a highway, and regeneration project as an alternative to the Greater London Authority itself. Having set up a mayoral development corporation to regenerate an area, such as at Old Oak Common, the GLA would not normally seek to use its own powers in that area. I hope the Committee will agree with me that these are sensible provisions. With that explanation, I beg to move government Amendment 120.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I have Amendments 122, 125 and 126 in this group. I will speak to them very briefly and look forward to the noble Lord’s response to the points I raise. Amendments 122 and 125 seek to make the situation clearer and to avoid the suggestion that a beneficial interest may exist, by removing the words,

“on behalf of the other”.

We do not think those words are necessary, and I propose to remove them in Amendments 122 and 125.

Amendment 126 would insert a new subsection into Clause 32, which would ensure that the GLA, TfL or a mayoral development corporation has the power to acquire land compulsorily for purposes under the Housing and Planning Act if it was previously able to do that under Sections 403A and 403B of the Greater London Authority Act 1999. I hope that we again get a positive response from the Minister accepting that I have highlighted an important issue to which, if nothing else, the Government will respond on Report.

[Lord True (Con)]

I see the wisdom of what is proposed in these amendments, reinforced by government Amendment 124, where an MDC is involved. I take it that it means only one compulsory order so that TfL is able to acquire land to advance housing projects, et cetera.

This may be my ignorance or otiose, but it appears that the way that this is drafted, based on the Greater London Act, TfL could exercise this new authority only in concert with the GLA or an MDC. However, there are other development authorities and planning authorities in Greater London: the London boroughs. I can envisage circumstances where there is neglected land alongside on a red route where TfL is the highways authority and a borough has an interest, but it may be too small to attract the interest of the Mayor of London. I simply raise the question to seek elucidation. It may not be necessary. Will it be possible when this is liberalised for TfL to use this power in concert with a borough without needing to go via the GLA or to set up a mayoral development corporation?

TfL gets cross when I say this in your Lordships’ House, but it is not always the most nimble authority when it comes to development. Some boroughs might be able to encourage it a little. I do not expect an answer now, but perhaps my noble friend will consider the need for such flexibility if TfL is to be given this new partnership power to acquire.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My noble friend Lord True invites me to go way beyond my negotiating remit by extending to London boroughs the powers under the clause, which is intended to remove an existing duplication. However, I will of course consider his suggestion.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

The noble Lord, Lord True, makes an interesting point. I am a member, although not the leader, of another London borough council. I think he makes a valid point which the Government could look at.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

It is indeed a valid point, but it goes wider than the narrow issue before us. As a former member of a London borough, albeit in 1968, I have an interest in enabling the boroughs to fulfil their full potential. I shall make some inquiries and write to my noble friend.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for tabling Amendments 122, 125 and 126. They deal with two different clauses—Clauses 31 and 32—but as Amendment 126 is consequential on Amendments 122 and 125, I shall deal with them together.

I shall briefly explain what Clause 31 does. The Housing and Planning Act 2016, which will be fresh in the memory of many Members of the Committee, extended the statutory power to override easements and restrictive covenants when undertaking development to all bodies having compulsory purchase powers. Clause 32 amends this power to ensure that it operates as intended for the GLA and Transport for London and brings land acquired by their landholding subsidiary companies within the scope of the powers so that development on that land is not hindered.

I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendments 122 and 125. The Government’s intention in bringing forward the measure in Clause 31 is to allow the Greater London Authority or a mayoral development corporation and Transport for London to use their powers more effectively by allowing them to promote joint orders, as I explained. The amendments the noble Lord is proposing go beyond that and are not quite as innocuous as the noble Lord implied. They would effectively allow both organisations to acquire land for purposes for which they have no statutory power. For example, they would allow Transport for London to acquire land compulsorily for housing or regeneration purposes. This raises broader issues about competence. For those reasons, the Government do not think they are appropriate. It is a key principle of a compulsory purchase system that acquiring authorities should be allowed to acquire land by compulsion only for purposes associated with their statutory functions. Housing is not a statutory function of Transport for London.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 126 relates to the power to override easements in the Housing and Planning Act 2016 and appears to be consequential on Amendments 122 and 125 being acceptable, which, for the reason I have outlined, I am afraid they are not. I know it will come as a disappointment, but I invite the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, not to press Amendments 122, 125 and 126, for the reasons that I have given.

Amendment 120 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

121: Clause 31, page 27, line 33, after “Schedule 11” insert “to this Act or Part 12 of the Highways Act 1980”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

123: Clause 31, page 27, line 42, after “Schedule 11” insert “to this Act or Part 12 of the Highways Act 1980”

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Moved by

[Lord Young of Cookham]

124: Clause 31, page 28, line 13, at end insert—
“403B Acquisition of land by MDC and TfL for shared purposes(1) This section applies where a Mayoral development corporation and Transport for London agree that the purposes for which they may acquire land compulsorily under—(a) section 207 of the Localism Act 2011, and(b) paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 11 to this Act or Part 12 of the Highways Act 1980,would be advanced by one or both of them acquiring land for a joint project.(2) The purposes for which the Mayoral development corporation may acquire land compulsorily under section 207 of the Localism Act 2011 are to be read as if they included the purposes for which Transport for London may acquire land compulsorily.(3) The purposes for which Transport for London may acquire land compulsorily under paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 11 to this Act or Part 12 of the Highways Act 1980 are to be read as if they included the purposes for which the Mayoral development corporation may acquire land compulsorily. (4) The Mayoral development corporation and Transport for London may agree that one of them is to acquire land on behalf of the other.(5) Where subsection (4) applies, a compulsory acquisition is to proceed under—(a) section 207 of the Localism Act 2011 if it is agreed that the Mayoral development corporation will acquire the land, or(b) paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 11 to this Act or Part 12 of the Highways Act 1980 if it is agreed that Transport for London will acquire the land.(6) Subsection (7) applies where—(a) the Mayoral development corporation and Transport for London both propose to acquire land compulsorily for a joint project, and(b) the proposed compulsory acquisitions require authorisation by different confirming authorities.(7) The proposed compulsory acquisitions are to be treated as requiring the joint authorisation of the confirming authorities.(8) The Mayoral development corporation or Transport for London may acquire land by agreement for the same purposes as those for which that body may acquire land compulsorily by virtue of subsection (2) or (3).(9) The joint project mentioned in subsection (1) is to be treated as the scheme for the purposes of the no-scheme principle in section 6A of the Land Compensation Act 1961 (impact of scheme to be disregarded when assessing value of land for compulsory purchase).””

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My noble friend Lord Beecham and I fully support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord and look forward to a positive response from the Government on it.

The noble Lord mentioned Millwall Football Club. A couple of weeks ago, when the noble Lord, Lord Young, was speaking to an order on overview and scrutiny committees in combined authorities, I put it on record that I did not think the council got it quite right, to say the least. Thankfully the CPO has now been withdrawn and the council has made it clear that whatever goes ahead in future will do so only with the involvement and agreement of the club, local businesses and the local community. I was very pleased with that, and pay tribute to my overview and scrutiny colleagues for their work to prise information out of the council to enable them to convince the mayor and the cabinet that that was the way to proceed. I also pay tribute to the campaigners, fans, supporters and the club. We certainly had a lot of unhelpful publicity in recent weeks, but overview and scrutiny, in particular, did a very good job.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, argued eloquently for a comprehensive review of the compulsory purchase system, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I listened to the very pertinent questions that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said needed to be addressed, including international comparisons, looking at marriage values of freehold and leasehold and all the other issues, and I read the first line of his amendment, which states that by the end of next year we have to complete a review and bring forward proposals. It seems to me a mammoth task to embrace all the questions that he has raised—of course there may be others—within a very challenging timescale.

The advice that I have is that, were we to undertake this review, it would take three years and we would end up with 250-plus clauses. I do not know about other members of the Committee, but 24 CPO clauses seems to me quite a lot. Then there would be a number of schedules. There is no realistic prospect of doing that within the timescale that the noble Lord suggests. However, I recognise that there is a strong desire among many for the compulsory purchase system to be simplified. We have heard speeches to that effect during our proceedings. As my honourable friend the Minister for Housing and Planning said in the other place, he has some sympathy with that, but, as I said a moment ago, a comprehensive review would be a huge undertaking. While the Government do not rule it out completely, we would need very careful consideration before we took it forward, and there would need to be clear consensus on its terms of reference and objectives.

I appreciate that this does not go nearly as far as the noble Lord has suggested, but the Government have been tackling specific issues within the CPO regime which practitioners have identified as causing problems, and we have tried to do this in the Bill by introducing the temporary CPO processes and rationalising the Greater London Authority and TfL powers, as well as by clarifying the no-schemes valuation process. We hope that that will make a real, practical difference on the ground and allow the compulsory purchase system to operate more effectively.

It is relevant to mention briefly the White Paper published yesterday, Fixing Our Broken Housing Market, because it flags up two further areas, which I am sure that the noble Lord would want to add to his list. First, there is the role that the CPO could play in helping to kickstart development on stalled housing sites. The White Paper sets out our intention to consult on new guidance encouraging local authorities to use their existing compulsory purchase powers to support the build-out of stalled sites. Secondly, the White Paper sets out the Government’s intention to investigate whether auctions, following the taking of possession of the land, are sufficient to establish an unambiguous value for the purposes of assessing compensation payable to the claimant when the local authority has used its compulsory purchase powers to acquire the land. Furthermore, the White Paper also makes it clear that we will continue to keep compulsory purchase under review and notes the Government’s willingness to consider representations on how the process might be reformed further to support development.

As I said, we have an open mind on the need for further reform—but I hope that, in the meantime, noble Lords will agree that we should not delay progress on delivering the reforms that we already have in hand, including those in the Bill. So although I have enormous sympathy with the noble Lord’s amendment, it would be unrealistic to expect the Government to support it.

[Lord Cameron of Dillington]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Beecham, for their support. The Minister seemed to hint that he is willing to accept the principle of the amendment; that is how he started off. I accept that it might take longer than we had anticipated. To be honest, until I came to write my few words, I did not know how many questions I was going to find in the maelstrom of information that there is out there. I believe that it really would be worth doing, if only to consolidate the legislation list that I read out. As the Minister rightly said, there are probably even more questions than those that I discovered. I look forward to further conversations on this point and hope that, sooner rather than later, the Government will address this area with seriousness. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, Amendment 128 is grouped with 129, both of which stand in my name.

Amendment 128 seeks to clarify the application of Section 31 of the Housing Act 1985 to TfL or its subsidiaries to dispose of their surplus land for housing development where that is considered appropriate as long as the price obtained is,

“having regard to all the circumstances of the case … the best that can reasonably be obtained”.

The amendment uses the wording of Section 31 of the Housing Act 1985 and contains a restriction in paragraph 29 to Schedule 11 of the GLA Act 1999 to ensure that the powers to sell and develop land for housing are consistent in this context. Amendment 129 is similarly worded and seeks to ensure that there is consistency between the TfL and the GLA in this regard. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My Lords, this will be my last contribution to this exchange. I am happy to end on a more consensual note than was the case on some of the earlier contributions.

Amendments 128 and 129 in the name of the noble Lord seek to make new provision in the Greater London Authority Act 1999, which would amend the powers of Transport for London and the GLA to dispose of land.

Amendment 128 seeks to give Transport for London the flexibility to dispose of land for housing, even if a higher value use was available, provided the best consideration reasonably obtainable for housing use had been achieved. To support this aim, Amendment 128 would also remove the requirement for TfL to,

“act as if it were a company engaged in a commercial enterprise”,

when disposing of land for housing.

Amendment 129 would make related provision in respect of the GLA. It would enable the GLA to dispose of land for housing without obtaining the Secretary of State’s consent, even if a higher value use was available, provided that the best consideration reasonably obtainable for housing use had been achieved.

I am very sympathetic to the intention of these amendments of providing flexibility to ensure that we can prioritise land for housing development. However, the legal issues involved are not entirely straightforward, and I think the public interest would be best served if a meeting was held between the Government, the GLA and TfL before Report to consider this further. With the reassurance that I will facilitate such a meeting, I hope that the noble Lord might be prepared to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

I thank the noble Lord very much for that positive response to these two amendments. On that basis, I am very happy to withdraw the amendment and look forward to a very fruitful meeting between the various parties.