European Union Bill

Lord Triesman Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Richard]

My Lords, I have looked at this section and tried to construe and understand it, which was difficult. If I may say so, we are making rather heavy weather of the phrase “or otherwise support”. There is only one issue that the House ought to consider—is the legislation clear as presently drafted? If it is, then of course a lot of this argument is negated. If it is not clear as drafted, someone—almost certainly the Government—ought to put it right. I am doing my best with this phrase,

“or otherwise support a decision”,

but I am finding it difficult to understand what it means. I do not know what “otherwise support” means. Does “otherwise” refer back to the original approval, or to something less than the approval that you are minded to support? This is an extremely difficult concept to grasp. In short, is it clear? The answer to that is no. Should it be amended? The answer to that is yes. Who should do the amending? It should, on the whole, be the parliamentary draftsman. If ever there was a case in which the Government should say, “Right; we agree there is something here that we can look at again”, this is one.

[Lord Triesman]

I have the same difficulties that have been expressed by a number of noble Lords in this debate. Broadly speaking, as my noble friend Lord Liddle and I have said on several occasions from this Dispatch Box, our position is that the kind of arrangement in Clause 7(1)—the requirement for Parliament to undertake the necessary work in all these circumstances—is well understood. It would increase the amount of parliamentary work on European legislation and would inevitably increase the amount of scrutiny we placed on such legislation. That is bound to be a good thing. In our submission, it is also bound to reflect well on Parliament and its responsibility to do the job adequately, without turning to a multiple requirement for referenda.

This clause, at least in some of its wording, is not just a lock but a double lock. There are two kinds of locks in it. The first is that, apart from the matters covered in the clause, there will be a referendum lock, and there is a double lock on the political process in which a Minister might take any reasonable part in any reasonable discussion of any reasonable proposition in order to make sure that their parliamentary colleagues—let alone the public—know what the issues are and how they stand on them.

There is no difficulty with the notion of the first part, where the requirement is,

“may not vote in favour”.

That is the point on which, I suspect, there is a great deal of agreement around the House. However, I do not think that the use of “or otherwise support” is a simply a drafting or technical matter. I rely in part on the fact that those words appear in many clauses. This is not the only example. Clause after clause imposes the requirement. In general, when we have talked about these kinds of clause, the government Front Bench has indicated that in some sense—not in any sense that Ministers have described to us, and certainly not in any detail—it will be all right on the night and that it will not somehow have got in the way of anyone engaging in serious political work.

We first moved an amendment to delete that wording some time ago; I continue to believe that it is unhelpful and inappropriate. I put to the Government the following thought, which flows from ministerial experience—a good many Members of this House have real ministerial experience in this and other foreign affairs issues. Ministerial experience tells me that it is wholly impractical to try to do the political job without being able to speak on any matter of substance while you are doing it. Your processes of thought—the decisions to which you may come not instantly but as a result of discussion—must remain wholly obscure. Can you even say that you wish to deploy the knowledge you have of the issue? Can you say that you think that it is in the national interest that the issue is thought about and resolved? Can you find words in the process in which you are engaged—some of us have been engaged in these processes in much detail over the years—that are so neutral that nobody could misunderstand any word or syllable that you said as being other than completely neutral and not demonstrating any inference of support? Can you realistically anticipate that everyone will agree that what is said is so neutral that they will not claim that it is a breach of the law when they do not agree with you or the outcome? We have heard noble Lords saying in terms that they are in fundamental disagreement with almost anything. I do not mean noble Lords on the government Benches—they are just happily confused—but noble Lords in UKIP, for example, have found it almost inconceivable that anything that could be said would not represent some slippage into a greater presence of Europe in the United Kingdom.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that it is not a matter of how she reads Clause 7(3). Of course it is all about decisions. Draft decisions are bound to give rise to the expression of a view, or nobody would have drafted them. That is precisely why you would draft a decision. I cannot believe that we do not agree on that basic proposition.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

Does the noble Lord then agree that “or otherwise support” could as easily imply assent—in other words, agreeing to support it?

[Lord Triesman]

No, my Lords, I do not agree with that. In the process of any kind of discussion, people will say something which either indicates support, or which they hope is sufficiently neutral not to indicate support but others will say that they believe that it does. The moment that anybody drafts anything, it will be seen or thought to be a clear indication of support by the very nature of going through the process of drafting it and putting it into the public domain. In real politics, that is precisely what will happen.

That is all fundamentally unhelpful, and I really hope that in their own interest—because at the moment they provide the Ministers who are taking part in discussions in Europe and elsewhere—the Government will not put themselves in so calamitous a position as to be unable to operate effectively.

[Lord Dykes]

Is there not a further irony that shows how throughout the Bill, from Clauses 2, 3 and 4 up to Clause 7, which basically deals with the system of passerelles, there has been a problem for the Government of trying to find the correct draftsmanship and making it incredibly complicated as a result? Is it not ironic that the then Conservative Government in the mid-1980s were mad keen on the passerelles to help the Single European Act—that was when the system first started? Subsequently, there were very few, but in the Lisbon treaty, all the member states regarded them as indispensable to allow the Union to move forward on matters which had already been decided in substance—that is Clause 7 in essence—and therefore did not require an intergovernmental conference or a unanimous decision. Why is there so much agony for the government draftsman about this unnecessary clause?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I can only say that I strongly agree with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, has made. It does not make any sense at all either historically or in terms of what is required now.

The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about specific deployments and whether the wording is helpful or unhelpful also leads me to an area of agreement. It appears to me that, in choosing this drafting in the Bill, the Government have once again ignored a fundamental principle of political process. Any of us, whether we are in this House or have been involved in other organisations where some politics, with a big P or a small p, are going on among those who are taking part will recognise the circumstances perfectly well. I have found, as I suspect many noble Lords have done, that people occasionally welcome the chance to speak out and say that they do not like something. They like to be given the visible opportunity to fight their corner and, in the end, they find it far easier and a much more comfortable position to be seen to have been defeated in whatever it was they were arguing and to live with the result than to appear to have supported the issue in the first place. That, I think, is a commonplace in political life. I do not deny for a moment that I have enjoyed the fact that I have been able to present an argument and have lost it and that something else potentially more rational than anything I suggested has then happened. That occurs in the normal course of political life.

Unanimity, which could allow a slightly different process to occur in relation to enhanced co-operation, gives room for real politics in really difficult circumstances. Therefore, I say to the government Benches that, when they reply and explain to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, what Clause 7(4)(c) means—I, too, am quite keen to know what it means—perhaps they will tell us how they expect real politics to work. I refer not just to how they have locked out the possibility of it working but how they expect it to work and how they expect to give Ministers who are in senior, responsible and authoritative positions the ability to do the job that I think the people of the country expect of them individually and of Parliament.

[Lord Empey]

My Lords, before the Minister replies, perhaps I may take up the point which the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, has just made and which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made earlier regarding what he described as commonplace political processes in which someone would much rather be defeated on an issue than argue their case differently. In theory, that sounds perfectly reasonable. However, is that precisely because Ministers’ rhetoric and Governments’ rhetoric in the past has never quite matched the decisions that have emerged?

It is commonplace in politics for someone to put forward an argument, and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quoted the German case. To avoid a certain procedure within the German constitution, people would say, “A nod and a wink. I’ll do a bit of talking here. I’ll put up a good fight but at the end of the day I know perfectly well that I’m going to get beaten and therefore everything will be all right on the night”. In some senses, that can be seen as normal but others may see it as chicanery. People might see that as undermining the process in Brussels but some, and I am one of them, may argue that there was a prolonged period in history when cases were put in exactly that way with exactly that outcome, which led the people drafting this legislation to take measures—they may not be the most elegant but perhaps the Minister can confirm that they exist—to protect against that precise situation. Let us face it: if a parliamentary decision has to be taken on a particular proposal, a political argument develops in the media to try to influence it, and a Minister sitting at the table can play a major part in creating and framing the debate when it goes into the media and try to build support for it. There is nothing wrong with that. The idea that people are going there secretly with one particular agenda but in fact pretending to have another is precisely why the European Union is in so much trouble with the population of this country. I hope that the Minister can indicate whether that is part of the rationale behind this or whether our fears are unsupported.

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[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, the question of whether this clause should stand part of the Bill gives us an opportunity to keep up to date with the Government’s present intentions regarding Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the Lisbon treaty. Perhaps I may remind the Government of their great leader’s statement made in late 2009:

“We will want to prevent EU judges gaining steadily greater control over our criminal justice system by negotiating an arrangement which would protect it. That will mean limiting the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over criminal law”.

That is from the Prime Minister before he became so. The other quote I give the Government in probing this matter is from Mr David Lidington, made on 20 January this year:

“The UK has until 31 May 2014 to choose whether to accept the application of the Commission’s infringement powers and jurisdiction of the ECJ over this body of instruments or to opt out of them entirely, in which case they will cease to apply to the UK on 1 December 2014”.

More importantly—this is what I want to check up on—Mr Lidington went on to say that:

“Parliament should have the right to give its view on a decision of such importance. The Government therefore commit to a vote in both Houses of Parliament before they make a formal decision on whether they wish to opt-out”.

As I understand it, the provision in Protocol 21 allows the Government to opt out entirely from the whole justice and home affairs proceedings in Lisbon. It is true that if they accept an amendment to any of those provisions in the mean time, that provision then stands. Further, if in the mean time they opt in to anything, the 2014 deadline might not apply. I hope that your Lordships will feel it is helpful if the Government bring us up to date on how their decision is moving on opting out of the whole of the JHA provision. The last time I raised the matter was in Oral Questions, when I was told from the Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that this was all very difficult and sensitive and that the Government had not made up their mind. Have they made any progress?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I shall not repeat the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, because it would have gone by so fast that what I have to say would not register.

We understand that, broadly speaking, the Government have up till now opted in rather than opted out of the arrangements made under this clause. Is there anything that they identify on the horizon which might lead them in the opposite direction to that which they have taken thus far?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I have just spent the weekend in a part of France, the Dordogne, where English seemed to be spoken rather more often than French. I am conscious that the national interest in terms of co-operation in matters of civil and criminal law is a complex area given that there are now nearly 2 million British citizens living in other states of the European Union—in Spain, France, Portugal, Cyprus and elsewhere. I have to say in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, that we have not yet come to the point where we must take a final decision on opt-in and opt-out. I have say to the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, that Her Majesty's Government have opted in to the majority of measures which have come up since the last election, but perhaps I may quote holy writ, otherwise known as the coalition agreement, which states:

“We will approach forthcoming legislation in the area of criminal justice on a case-by-case basis, with a view to maximising our country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system”.

That is what we are doing.

Clause 9 deals in particular with the use of three passerelles specific to the area of justice and home affairs. These are in addition to the Government’s recent commitments to enhance current parliamentary scrutiny arrangements on the use of JHA Title V opt-in and Schengen opt-out decisions following the Written Ministerial Statement of my noble friend Lord Howell and that of the Minister for Europe on 20 January this year. As your Lordships' House will be aware, the details are subject to continuing discussions between Parliament and the Government, which is part of our commitment to enhancing parliamentary control over three key EU decisions.

I remind your Lordships that the passerelles are: Article 81(3) of the TFEU, which permits measures concerning family law with cross-border implications to be subject to the ordinary legislative procedure and therefore qualified majority voting; Article 82(2)(d) of the TFEU, which enables the Council to add to the list of criminal law procedures that can be subject to subsequent EU legislation under the ordinary legislative procedure; and Article 83(1) of the TFEU, which allows for additions to the list of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of serious cross-border crime on which the EU can set minimum standards. These are considered to be sufficiently serious and significant moves for this clause to stand part.

The parliamentary approval process for the three passerelles comprises two stages rather than one. This reflects the operation of our opt-in protocol on the area of freedom, security and justice annexed to the treaties and, more specifically, the arrangements governing our opt-in. It requires two decisions to be taken: first, the initial opt-in to negotiations and, secondly, the adoption of the final negotiated measure. Clause 9 affords Parliament control over both these decisions by requiring a positive vote in both Houses to approve the Government’s proposal to opt in to the negotiation, and then parliamentary approval through primary legislation once the UK has opted into the negotiation and that negotiation is complete.

Having said that, the clause helps to fulfil pledges made in the The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, in that the use of any passerelle clause will be subject to approval through an Act of Parliament and represents an enhanced level of control afforded to Parliament. Having reassured the Committee on that, I hope that it will accept that this clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

That would be just typical of the Eurocrats.

However, it is true that the Conservatives forced through the Maastricht treaty, so presumably they were quite pleased with it. Some of us resisted it in this House. In his defence, one has to say that Mr Major had discovered the error of his ways by 12 November 1996, when he wrote a letter to M Jacques Santer, who was then, whatever it was called at the time, the boss of the European Commission. The letter shows how Mr Major, and possibly the Conservative Administration at the time, realised how they had been deceived by the cunning and duplicitous octopus in Brussels. His letter is very brief, and I have read it to your Lordships before—in 1998, I think, so it bears repetition now. It reads:

“Dear Jacques,

My intention in agreeing to the Protocol on Social Policy at Maastricht was to ensure that social legislation which placed unnecessary burdens on businesses and damaged competitiveness could not be imposed on the United Kingdom. The other Heads of State and Government also agreed that arrangement, without which there would have been no agreement at all at Maastricht.

However, in its judgement today, the European Court of Justice has ruled that the scope of Article 118a”—

that is, health and safety at work, and things like that—

“is much broader than the United Kingdom envisaged when the article was originally agreed, as part of the Single European Act. This appears to mean that legislation which the United Kingdom had expected would be dealt with under the Protocol can in fact be adopted under Article 118a”.

The following is a good paragraph:

“This is contrary to the clear and express wishes of the United Kingdom Government, and goes directly counter to the spirit of what we agreed at Maastricht. It is unacceptable and must be remedied”.

He then says that he will table amendments and so on to it. His penultimate paragraph says:

“I attach the utmost importance to these amendments and I shall insist that they form part of the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference. I do not see how new agreements can be reached if earlier agreements are being undermined”.

That was in the run-up to the Amsterdam treaty. The Conservatives then lost the election and the new Labour Government signed up to the Social Chapter anyway, so we have the working week and so on.

That is the full picture behind the noble Lord’s intervention. At least we can see that, by the time he left office, Mr Major had understood the nature of the beast with which he was dealing, although of course when poor Mr Blair came along, he went back to the whole business of being at the heart of Europe—being nice to them and so on. We get everything that we want and that is why we are where we are today.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said that the reason the French voted against the Giscard constitution was that they wanted a more social Europe. My simple question to him is: why did the Dutch then vote in exactly the same way two days later? I support the amendment.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, obviously the past is made up of facts but, as today has illustrated richly, the retelling of history is made up of the view taken by those who look at the facts. Having listened to what has been said in this debate, I have to say that some of the accounts of the facts do very scant justice either to what took place or, indeed, to some other countries. To be told that people were made to vote again and that the referenda were enforced appears to give very little credit whatever to the determination of the peoples of Denmark, Ireland, France or Holland, and I do not see why we should spend our time here insulting them. They were perfectly capable of settling the first propositions put in front of them and they were perfectly capable of assessing the changes. If it is said that, for example, consent was finally achieved in Ireland because of the financial problems that the country was facing—bailed out, it was said, by the straitjacket of the euro—I find that an astonishing bit of history. The banking and liquidity collapse of the country appears to have had no role; the sub-prime derivatives in which the banks of that country were so heavily involved that it had to set up a “bad bank” to deal with the mass of debt that had been accumulated appears to have had no role; and the massive speculative forces in property, finally producing a major financial threat which arose from those kinds of difficulties, also apparently had no role.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Will the noble Lord give way? If he is quite comfortable about people voting in a referendum, saying no and then being asked again, what would he have said if the Irish had voted no twice? Would he have said that it was quite legitimate for them to be asked to vote a third time?

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[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, however many times the Irish people were asked to vote would have been a matter for the Government of Ireland. In the same sense, I hope that we would have sufficient sovereign pride to conclude such an issue ourselves, although I think it highly improbable. Perhaps I may add that the circumstances in which people might be asked to vote a third, fourth or subsequent time seem not at all likely.

[Lord Flight]

A problem for Ireland when it adopted the euro was that the inflation rate there was much higher than in Germany, which resulted in virtually negative interest rates in Ireland. That resulted in people borrowing as much as they could and putting the money into assets such as property. That produced the property bubble, and the bursting of the property bubble was the main cause of the banking system’s problems.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, anybody who looks at the difficulties that have been experienced in many mature economies, whether or not they are in the euro, will recognise that the financial problems created by property speculation and, in particular, by funding sub-prime derivatives in the property market have nothing whatever to do with the euro in most cases. It was a wave of mad speculation—it can only be described as madness—because it was possible to do it under the interest-rate conditions that obtained generally around the world. They are not so varied between countries in either hemisphere.

Of course it is true that in the referenda conducted in the countries that we are discussing, they concluded, as they were perfectly entitled to do, that what was being put in front of them was not good enough. We know, however, in part from the noble Lord, Lord Empey, in terms of the role of the Commissioner in Ireland, and the issues that came up in Denmark on whether the people would be compelled into defence propositions that they did not like, or whether people in Ireland would be compelled to change the abortion law or consider NATO membership, that all of those things produced circumstances in which there was a no vote. Those Governments negotiated again and got those terms changed. Protocols were introduced in almost every incidence to get those terms changed. They then went back and asked the people of their countries whether the changes in terms were sufficient to merit a change in the view that they had taken.

That seems to me to be completely legitimate. I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would say that it is a legitimate outcome if you vote no by, say, 52.5 per cent—that is plainly a no vote; I understand that completely—but when it is put again it is completely illegitimate if something like 65 per cent of the people in that vote say yes. What is the point of a sovereign decision by people when they are asked to take a vote if you do not accept the outcome in either direction—like it or dislike it; it is irrelevant? It is their decision and they have taken it. The idea that any country, least of all this one, should feel that it is bound to be strong-armed into taking a different decision if the first decision does not accord with perhaps the general sentiment in Europe is completely fanciful. It is disrespectful to the people of this country and this debate has been disrespectful to peoples of other countries, too.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, this debate has ranged a little wider than the amendment. We have had accusations of the European elite forcing the holding of second referendums. I wondered whether we were going to be told by the noble Lord, Lord Willoughby de Broke, that the European gendarmerie would be used to force second referendums. I recall him previously raising the question of what the European gendarmerie was for. We talked about EU bullying as if somehow Brussels is different and imposes itself on national governments. I simply remind noble Lords that the European Union is an association of states and that Brussels operates on behalf of those member states. It is the member states which agree on proposals of the sort likely to be put to referendums.

On Ireland, I would simply say that the situation may or may not have been to some extent associated with Irish membership of the euro. The situation in Iceland was an even greater financial bubble and can in no sense be blamed on Iceland’s membership of the euro since Iceland is neither a member of the euro nor of the European Union. We need to get away from that. On the question of financing the Irish referendums, I am not aware of how the second referendum was financed beyond the fact that I have three very good friends in Dublin who took out substantial loans on their houses to guarantee the basic funding for a second referendum. When my wife and I had dinner with them some months after the referendum, they were still very heavily in debt. That suggests to me that there were no sugar daddies, let alone external forces, providing funding.