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Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Trevethin and Oaksey
Main Page: Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Trevethin and Oaksey's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI declare that I am a shareholder in an SME. We need to be aware that there are various classes of shares. You could be a 5% shareholder in terms of owning the company, but an 80% shareholder in the voting shares. Whatever the outcome of these discussions, we need to be very clear which type of shares we are talking about.
I was going to make a similar point. Obviously, there are a number of different classes of shares; as it stands, the amendment is, with respect, a little unclear as to how it would operate in relation to voting shares, non-voting shares, preference shares, class A shares, class B shares and so forth. That would need to be tightened up.
On the amendment creating a dangerously onerous regime, it occurred to me that a further aspect of its onerousness relates to what the registrar is required to do pursuant to this amendment. It currently states that the registrar must
“verify the number of shares the person claims to control.”
If taken literally, that might require the registrar to look quite carefully at what is being said about the slightly tricky concept of control, which is not quite the same as ownership. That might need to be reconsidered in due course, or perhaps watered down or removed.
Noble Lords, including my noble friend Lady Bowles, have usefully teased out some of the principles that we need to adopt and the fact that we are not quite there in terms of trying to find a relatively simple formula that is not unduly onerous. They also point out that the current provisions are not adequate. Indeed, it is quite interesting that we have two separate groups here, in coming to government Amendment 42. This whole area of persons with significant control and what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, set out in terms of shareholders holding more than 5% of shares demonstrate that we need a greater level of transparency.
I very much hope that the Minister will come back in the spirit in which these proceedings have been conducted and say, “Yes, we think there is more to be done and that it is possible to get over the SME issue that has been raised by a number of noble Lords. However, we think in principle that it is desirable to go down this sort of route that has been suggested.” I hope that we will get a positive reply from the Minister and an undertaking to take this forward in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested.
Further to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the use of the phrase “false statements” rather than “inaccurate statements” is quite significant. A false statement carries with it the connotation of a deliberate inaccuracy, whereas simply getting something wrong is rather different. I agree with him that without reasonable excuse the prosecution would have to prove the absence of a reasonable excuse, which is contrary to the concept of a strict liability offence.
I agree with what the noble Lords say. It occurs to me that the intention of calling this a strict liability offence but including the concept of “reasonable excuse” might be to impose a burden on the person who is responsible for filing the misleading statement to demonstrate a reasonable excuse—shifting the presumption, as it were. That might work. It would not quite be a strict liability offence, but it would make it relatively easier to prosecute the matter where a false statement was filed, and it would cater for the rare case—like the person trying to persuade a committee in the other place a few days ago—where the person filing the statement was entirely blameless because they had acted honestly and reasonably in reliance on information supplied by someone else. In that rare case, where the person who had made an error and filed a false statement but was entirely blameless could demonstrate that, it seems right that they should avoid a conviction.
To echo a point made in relation to a different amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I am slightly troubled by the further subsection that talks about an offence being committed by
“every officer of the entity who is in default”.
At the moment I am not certain what that is getting at, and I simply seek clarification.
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Trevethin and Oaksey
Main Page: Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Trevethin and Oaksey's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendments 93 and 95. Amendment 95, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier—who, sadly, cannot be here—is closely related to Amendment 93 but has a key difference in that subsection (3) of the proposed new clause says that the annual report must detail how much money has been brought in and how much has been spent in securing it.
UWOs were introduced by the Criminal Finances Act 2017. At the time, I was Treasury spokesman in your Lordships’ House. I have no recollections of piloting this legislation through, but I have some memories of some of the statutory instruments that flowed from it. The background was that this had been tried in other countries with varying degrees of success. I do not think anyone can argue with the principle: an individual has at his or her disposal substantial sums of money for which there is no reasonable explanation—they may be an official working for, or who used to work for, some totalitarian Government, whose official salary in no way could support their standard of living. I see the case for UWOs but, as we just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, they have not been a stunning success.
When the Bill was going through, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, tabled some amendments to give the SFO more powers but also to understand the ambition of the Home Office with that legislation. A Home Office assessment in 2017 predicted that there would be about 20 UWO applications per annum. We just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that, to date, there have been nine applications against four individuals, with not a lot of money realised. In fact, in one case, the cost of failure against the Aliyev family was about £1.5 million. Since then, we have a cap on the costs that can be awarded against the SFO or the prosecuting authority, but I wonder whether that goes far enough and whether we should not provide that there should be no order for costs against the SFO unless the proceedings were brought maliciously or without any reasonable justification. That would place a burden on the person against whom the UWO was claimed to show, in effect, that the institution of proceedings was abusive.
Related to this, last year the register of overseas entities was introduced, following the invasion of Ukraine. A Joint Committee, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, looked into the register of overseas entities and to what extent it could relate to the UWOs. Can my noble friend the Minister update us on that? The register should provide some valuable information in seeking an UWO, and a failure to provide relevant details, or the provision of inadequate details, would clearly be of immense value.
However, at the heart of the problem is something that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, referred to in a previous debate: the inequality of arms in the firepower available to each side. The targets, by definition, will be well resourced, and the SFO considerably less so. This is not the first time in our debates on this Bill that we have emphasised the importance of resources in the fight against economic crime.
My final point is this: we have had two Bills in quick succession on economic crime, and I think we can now expect a legislative silence in this area while Governments of whatever complexion concentrate on other issues. Hence the importance of a provision to keep the Government up to the mark in telling Parliament how they are using the valuable powers that Parliament gave them with the UWOs. That, in effect, is what these two amendments seek to do.
My Lords, having spoken briefly to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who regrets that he is not able to speak to his amendment, I think I know broadly what he would have said, and I agree with him. I shall try to articulate it briefly.
The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cookham, about inequality of arms in this area, is critical. It is very strange and troubling that there have been so few applications of this nature since the jurisdiction came into existence, and the reason, unquestionably, is that the SFO, which is responsible for deciding whether to make these applications, is understandably very wary of the cost consequences of losing.
As the noble Lord, Lord Young, said, by definition, the respondents to these applications will be well resourced. They will retain City firms whose partners charge £600, £700 or £800 an hour or more—and, in responding to the applications, which will tend to raise quite tricky points of fact and complex issues of foreign law, they will swiftly run up legal bills that extend to hundreds of thousands, even millions, of pounds. If the principle that the loser pays applies to these applications without qualification, the cost consequences of losing, from the point of view of the regulator or prosecutor, will be a considerable deterrent to making applications, even when there is obviously a good reason to do so.
The points that I am considering in these short remarks may come into focus later on this afternoon when we discuss another amendment. The reason for me making them now is that it seems to me that the information that would be yielded by the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, would be of great value both to Parliament and to those who make decisions in this area in deciding how the regime needs to be restructured so that applications are made when they should be made.
My Lords, I will speak briefly because we have heard some excellent speeches from the noble Lords opposite.
I just want to say, observationally, that we have debated a number of different groups where inequality of arms has been at the centre. When we talked about SLAPPs, we talked about inequality of resources. We have just talked about whistleblowing, where it is the same issue, and here we are again. In a sense, the Government are in different places with different elements of this. We need to have some sort of integrated response on how all people can be equal before the law because they can afford to do it—in other words, they can afford not to win, which is the issue here. We have our law enforcement agencies, we have perfectly innocent people going about their businesses trying to blow a whistle, and we have people who are trying to report issues publicly but are being SLAPPed. All of these important elements are being blocked through the inequality in access to the courts.
To refer back to this group of amendments, it seems to me that, if this amendment is not the answer, there must be some other answer. I look forward to the response from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, because it is quite clear that unexplained wealth orders have failed to deliver on whatever promise they may have had. Perhaps the Minister can explain how many of them there have been and what exactly the barrier has been, as well as what the cost per prosecution would be; that is an interesting point of view.
In the end, this is about inequality of arms. The first point here is that the Government must recognise that this is an issue; they then have to settle down and find ways of working with people who understand the law in order to eliminate that inequality. Otherwise, most of what we are talking about here will not happen.
My Lords, I, too, added my name to this amendment, which is supported by these Benches. This issue gets us back to David versus Goliath, which we have mentioned in previous groups. Unfortunately, the culprits are Goliath, and our prosecutors are left having to face culprits with far deeper pockets than theirs. There are alternatives, such as creating larger budgets for prosecutors, that have already been dismissed.
Maybe within asset recovery there is some glimmer of attracting a better recompense, but that is not a perverse incentive because if the prosecuting authorities took actions improperly and overreached themselves, the safeguarding clause in this amendment would come into operation. In the way the amendment is drafted, there are not perverse incentives but good incentives to bring more actions that are presently not brought simply because they are unaffordable. It makes us a bit of a laughing stock that we have very strong laws in parts but cannot enforce them.
Everything else has been said. I commend this amendment and await with interest to see what excuses the Government come up with not to accept it when the precedent and the need are there and the amendment contains a safeguard and therefore it could be put into operation very effectively and swiftly.
My Lords, I will say a few brief words in support of this amendment and place it in its proper legal context. When it was mentioned at Second Reading, the Government’s response was simply to say that the principle that the loser pays the costs of unsuccessful litigation or an unsuccessful application was regarded as a valuable principle and that they did not see sufficient reason to move away from it in this field. It is a salutary principle and it operates in civil litigation for the most part, but there are exceptions. There are already statutory precedents for a regime of the type that this amendment seeks to create, namely a regime in which the enforcement agency will not invariably have to pay the costs if an application is unsuccessful.
I will say a few words about a different, but quite closely related, area of law in which a regime of the type that this amendment contemplates has been created by the judges. In the field of professional discipline and professional regulation, there has been for some time a well-established principle that the regulator will not automatically have to pay costs merely because the application or prosecution that it has commenced has proved to be unsuccessful. It is known as the Baxendale-Walker principle and works perfectly well in practice.
I shall explain shortly how it works in practice. The proceedings are initiated and the respondent, being a professional person, is expected to engage properly and conscientiously with the regulator and to respond candidly, or with a reasonable degree of candour, to the points being made against him or it. If the regulator then continues unreasonably with the prosecution or disciplinary action and fails, it will be made to pay the costs of the matter. However, if the regulator at all times acts reasonably, the presumption will be that it will not be made to pay the costs of the matter.
The reason why the law has created that regime is precisely the reason that is contemplated by this amendment—namely, that it is strongly in the public interest that regulators and enforcement agencies should not be deterred from bringing proper proceedings by the risk of paying exorbitant costs bills to respondents who manage to successfully resist the application in question.
I think I have said enough to convey the point. I really do not understand why the Government are so reluctant to consider introducing a regime of this sort more widely across the field of economic crime. It already exists in relation to certain types of economic crime, and it works well in the field that I have mentioned. I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I support this amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, said when he introduced it, cost exposure for prosecuting authorities can pose a real hurdle to their pursuing those prosecutions. As he also said, the Rubicon has been crossed in allowing cost capping, which the Government did in March 2022. This amendment has real legs—if I can use that phrase—and I hope the noble Lord presses the matter further, perhaps at later stages of the Bill.
I too was at the briefing with Bill Browder. I am currently reading his second book, having read his first, and it is compelling reading. He is a very brave man. I also agree with the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I think she said: the precedent and the need are there, and the solution is here. I agree with those sentiments.
Finally, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, who set out, interestingly, that some judges in the civil courts have developed their own law on this matter regarding the enforcement agencies not necessarily having to bear all their costs. He gave an interesting example of a further precedent, if you like. I too will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that. The matter will be considered very carefully with regard to the later stages of the Bill.