Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th May 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, added my name to this amendment, which is supported by these Benches. This issue gets us back to David versus Goliath, which we have mentioned in previous groups. Unfortunately, the culprits are Goliath, and our prosecutors are left having to face culprits with far deeper pockets than theirs. There are alternatives, such as creating larger budgets for prosecutors, that have already been dismissed.

Maybe within asset recovery there is some glimmer of attracting a better recompense, but that is not a perverse incentive because if the prosecuting authorities took actions improperly and overreached themselves, the safeguarding clause in this amendment would come into operation. In the way the amendment is drafted, there are not perverse incentives but good incentives to bring more actions that are presently not brought simply because they are unaffordable. It makes us a bit of a laughing stock that we have very strong laws in parts but cannot enforce them.

Everything else has been said. I commend this amendment and await with interest to see what excuses the Government come up with not to accept it when the precedent and the need are there and the amendment contains a safeguard and therefore it could be put into operation very effectively and swiftly.

[Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (CB)]

My Lords, I will say a few brief words in support of this amendment and place it in its proper legal context. When it was mentioned at Second Reading, the Government’s response was simply to say that the principle that the loser pays the costs of unsuccessful litigation or an unsuccessful application was regarded as a valuable principle and that they did not see sufficient reason to move away from it in this field. It is a salutary principle and it operates in civil litigation for the most part, but there are exceptions. There are already statutory precedents for a regime of the type that this amendment seeks to create, namely a regime in which the enforcement agency will not invariably have to pay the costs if an application is unsuccessful.

I will say a few words about a different, but quite closely related, area of law in which a regime of the type that this amendment contemplates has been created by the judges. In the field of professional discipline and professional regulation, there has been for some time a well-established principle that the regulator will not automatically have to pay costs merely because the application or prosecution that it has commenced has proved to be unsuccessful. It is known as the Baxendale-Walker principle and works perfectly well in practice.

I shall explain shortly how it works in practice. The proceedings are initiated and the respondent, being a professional person, is expected to engage properly and conscientiously with the regulator and to respond candidly, or with a reasonable degree of candour, to the points being made against him or it. If the regulator then continues unreasonably with the prosecution or disciplinary action and fails, it will be made to pay the costs of the matter. However, if the regulator at all times acts reasonably, the presumption will be that it will not be made to pay the costs of the matter.

The reason why the law has created that regime is precisely the reason that is contemplated by this amendment—namely, that it is strongly in the public interest that regulators and enforcement agencies should not be deterred from bringing proper proceedings by the risk of paying exorbitant costs bills to respondents who manage to successfully resist the application in question.

I think I have said enough to convey the point. I really do not understand why the Government are so reluctant to consider introducing a regime of this sort more widely across the field of economic crime. It already exists in relation to certain types of economic crime, and it works well in the field that I have mentioned. I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Agnew for tabling this amendment and all noble Lords for the points they have raised in this debate. Again, I reassure the Committee that the Government take economic crime very seriously and are taking the necessary steps to ensure that enforcement agencies can tackle illicit financial activities while upholding the fundamental principles that govern our entire civil justice system.

In civil legal proceedings the loser generally pays the legal costs of the winning party, as has been acknowledged. The “loser pays” principle is a fundamental pillar on which the whole basis of civil litigation operates. It helps to ensure that only stronger cases are brought and that the winning party is able to recover reasonable costs of vindicating their case, save for in exceptional circumstances, to ensure access to justice for individuals with very limited resources. While important, civil recovery proceedings brought by enforcement agencies are not so exceptional as to warrant undermining the “loser pays” principle.

Several noble Lords have raised with me, and during this debate, the changes made to the unexplained wealth order regime by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. These amended provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act—POCA—introduce “costs protection” for enforcement agencies in cases of UWOs, unless they act unreasonably. This aimed to remove barriers to the use of UWO powers by relevant law enforcement teams. This was done on the basis that they were exceptional and likely to be low in volume in comparison to other types of civil recovery and, furthermore, that the relevant cost rules would be positioned as a novel and unique proposal, thereby maintaining the overall integrity of the “loser pays” principle in all other civil recovery proceedings. In the last five years, agencies with civil recovery powers—the Crown Prosecution Service, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, the Financial Conduct Authority and HM Revenue and Customs—have not paid any adverse costs for civil recovery proceedings.

There is also no guarantee that the introduction of further costs protection would lead to enforcement agencies pursuing more cases, as they report that each case must be assessed on its own merits considering numerous factors independent of costs liability, including gathering sufficient evidence to pursue a case and internal resourcing capability.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the Civil Procedure Rules, which guide the courts in procedural matters—I think this goes some way to answering the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Oates—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

As I interpret what the Minister has said, if the regulator is taking the costs risk into account, that means it will take into account the question: am I up against a really wealthy opponent? Therefore, we will not have equal justice. You are saying that if the person from whom you are trying to recover the asset is particularly wealthy, they will be able to string out the process and do more appeals. That increases your costs risk and, therefore, the wealthy will not be pursued as much as the less wealthy. That is a very bad precedent and another reason why the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, is surely needed.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. I was talking about unexplained wealth orders in respect of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. To go over that again, it aimed to remove barriers to the use of UWO powers by relevant law enforcement teams, but it was done on the basis that these were exceptional and likely to be very low in volume in comparison to other types of civil recovery. I do not think that is inconsistent with the argument about this amendment.

Going back to the procedural rules, which guide the courts in procedural matters, these enable judges to use their discretion to limit legal costs in certain circumstances. In appropriate cases, they may be used by agencies when pursuing asset recovery cases and are therefore a more suitable way of limiting costs liability in the few circumstances where this may be needed rather than through wholesale reform of the loser pays principle in civil recovery.

The amendment would overturn the very basis on which the entirety of civil costs and funding is built. It would negatively affect every other category of civil litigation, all for minimal, if any, financial savings in a very limited number of cases—