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Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Thomas of Gresford
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Gresford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Gresford's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I have two very short points on this. First, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley. I do not think paragraph (a) in the amendment works: the registered address does not have to be the place of business, it often is not and there are often perfectly good reasons for that; but paragraph (b) is incredibly important, concerning this use of people’s addresses for, effectively, fraudulent purposes. Often, the first thing the person whose address it is knows about it is a letter from HMRC with a massive VAT demand: this is particularly used for VAT fraud. It is really important that Companies House works closely—a point discussed on a previous group—with other agencies, particularly HMRC, to make sure that this sort of thing is knocked on the head.
My Lords, the Companies Act says at Section 9(5) that an application
“must contain a statement of the intended address of the company’s registered office”.
That is all on registration. That opens up the sort of abuses that we have heard from the noble Baroness and the two noble Lords who have already spoken. I tend to agree with the two noble Lords, having been a solicitor myself, that it is perfectly responsible for a solicitor’s or accountant’s office to be used as a registered office, but nevertheless, the way in which the Government have attacked it does not cover the whole ground. It is very sensible, in addition to the way the Government have put it, to define an appropriate office in the negative sense. That would not include the solicitor’s or accountant’s office, for the reasons given.
My Lords, I have very little to add to what my noble friend said. This is clearly a bit of a curate’s egg and Amendment 23 is a good start, but there are objections to it, which were very well set out by the noble Lords, Lord Leigh and Lord Vaux. As my noble friend said, it is quite usual to use professional offices as a registered office. I hope the Minister will acknowledge that new subsection (2) in Clause 29(3) is not as good as it should be and that he will take on board some of the points made about Amendment 23. Then, we would be in a much better place.
My Lords, I do not really understand this provision. The purpose is to create a basic offence of strict liability—that is what the Minister and the Explanatory Notes say—but the wording that inserts the basic false statement offence says:
“A person commits an offence if, in purported compliance with a notice … or in purported compliance with a duty imposed… and without reasonable excuse, the person makes a statement that is misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.”
It is the words “without reasonable excuse” that bother me. I do not see how a strict liability offence can have an excuse. Last week it was well-publicised that someone in the other place said, “Yes, I misled, but I had a reasonable excuse because no one told me. Indeed, I was advised that there was nothing wrong.”
What is meant by a reasonable excuse? How can it be, as put forward, a strict liability offence in circumstances like that? This of course goes to officers who are in default, which is another contradiction within that proposed new paragraph. I ask the Minister to take this proposed new clause back to those advising him and ask whether it is correctly drafted. I do not think it is.
Further to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the use of the phrase “false statements” rather than “inaccurate statements” is quite significant. A false statement carries with it the connotation of a deliberate inaccuracy, whereas simply getting something wrong is rather different. I agree with him that without reasonable excuse the prosecution would have to prove the absence of a reasonable excuse, which is contrary to the concept of a strict liability offence.
My Lords, to add to the point that has been made, if the burden of proof is going to be changed so the defendant has to prove his innocence, it is essential that the clause be carefully drafted to make that clear. Otherwise a judge who is trying to direct a jury really does not know how to do it.
I am struggling, as are others, with the wording in subsection (2) about
“every officer of the entity who is in default”
because I do not know what “default” means. In most of these circumstances, this may be something that is filled in by the company secretary and they do not necessarily get the approval of everybody who might end up being in default. I would like to know more about that.
In his introduction, the Minister said this was bringing the Bill into line with what was in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. I am afraid I have been rather busy on other Bills so maybe I have not read everything that I should have about this one. I did the last economic crime Bill but I am not sure what is being referenced there, will the Minister elaborate on what this is being brought into line with because I am a bit confused? If what is said here is exactly the same as what has been said in that Act then we also have a mistake there that we need to correct if its wording is as ambiguous as this.
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Thomas of Gresford
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Gresford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Gresford's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 80, in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Cromwell and Lord Agnew, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, for whose support I am most grateful.
I will give a little background to set the amendment in context. In the 2021-22 Session, I drafted and introduced a Private Member’s Bill on the issue of SLAPPs, based on the Ontario model, as endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Obviously, I had modified that model to suit the procedures of the civil justice system in England and Wales. Through the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, I met with the Under-Secretary of State in the MoJ, James Cartlidge MP, and his officials, and had a very positive meeting with them.
My draft Bill was basically acceptable in principle, but there was one matter, they told me, it did not deal with: the scourge of pre-action threatening letters, designed to inhibit and intimidate journalistic or academic investigation. However, I was told that the Government were proposing a consultation on the issue, and indeed there was a call for evidence on 17 March 2022. It was wide-ranging; there were 48 questions asked of respondents. As it happens, not one referred to the issue of threatening letters prior to proceedings. However, one respondent suggested that any pre-action letter should require a statement of truth, so that any false allegations in the letter could be treated as a contempt of court.
The consultation finished in May of last year, and the MoJ published a full response in July. Dominic Raab said in the foreword:
“Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Protection, or SLAPPs, are a growing threat to freedom of speech and a free press – fundamental liberties that are the lifeblood of our democracy. Typically used by the super-rich, SLAPPs stifle legitimate reporting and debate”.
This is the point that I want to draw to your Lordships’ attention—he continued:
“They are at their most pernicious before cases ever reach a courtroom, with seemingly endless legal letters that threaten our journalists, academics, and campaigners with sky-high costs and damages”.
At the Second Reading of this Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, said:
“The Government are committed to tackling SLAPPs”
—I am sure that is right—
“but as the first country to pursue national legislation on such a complex issue”
—he ignored all the states of the United States, Canada and Australia, where such legislation exists, but never mind about that—
“it is right that we take the necessary time to consider this carefully and make sure we get it right. We will introduce primary legislation to tackle SLAPPs—this is where I am going to upset all noble Lords—as soon as parliamentary time allows”.
Now, I have to admit, I was upset. He continued:
“We are in the process of ensuring that we have anti-SLAPPs legislation which properly and comprehensively addresses the problem”.—[Official Report, 8/2/23; col. 1317]
So when will parliamentary time allow? Certainly not in this Session: it is highly unlikely that it will feature in a programme running up to a general election. So we are looking at years before this legislation can come to pass, although I guarantee that a Liberal Democrat-led Administration would deal with the matter as a priority.
I come to the substance of my amendment. I take the view that the endless stream of threatening letters—the “most pernicious” element, as Mr Raab described it, and really he should know—can be dealt with in the context of this Bill by criminalising their use in the investigation of the crimes set out in Schedule 9. I appreciate that may not cover the whole gamut of strategic litigation, and that a wider Bill will be necessary in due course, but investigative journalism is very much involved in turning over the stones of fraud, money laundering, bribery and the rest, and it is certainly in that area that SLAPPs have most frequently been used.
So the new offence that I propose could not be simpler:
“It is an offence for a person or entity without reasonable excuse to threaten civil litigation against another person or entity with intent to suppress the publication of any information likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime”.
I think that is fairly understandable. The prosecution would have to prove a threat; a solicitor’s letter will speak for itself, and it will be for the jury to decide and judge its contents. Evidence will be necessary, of course, to prove intent, but that raises no more problems than in any other case in which intent has to be proved. Again, it will be a matter for a jury. An evidential burden would be placed on the defendant to raise a reasonable excuse for the prosecution to disprove, and the ultimate burden of proof of guilt would, of course, rest with the prosecution.
I believe that an offence of this nature, simply stated, would immediately result in a change of culture among those reputation lawyers who profited from this type of litigation. Their collective response to the consultation to which I referred was, “Nothing happening here, guv. Threatening? Oh, it’s just the rough and tumble of ordinary litigation”. No longer would the young Turk in the office be able to dash out on his laptop ill-considered threats. He would know that he will have a responsibility to interrogate his client thoroughly before committing his firm to intimidating conduct which would land both him and his senior partners in the dock, with all the reputational consequences for themselves. Further, it would be a great relief to threatened investigative journalists if, instead of having to consult their lawyers at considerable expense, they could make a complaint to the police and allow the criminal law to take its course. We can make this change now and let the great stew of reform of the civil procedure system which is slowly cooking in the MoJ follow “when parliamentary time allows”.
I conclude by strongly supporting the other amendments in this group for the same reasons. These are creating the means to tackle the SLAPPs problem of imbalance, as described in paragraph 15 of the Government’s response to the consultation. This is how the Government put it:
“the extreme power imbalance and inequality of arms between, on the one hand, media organisations, advocacy groups, academics, and journalists and, on the other, Claimant corporations or wealthy individuals who typically bring these cases”.
This group of amendments is designed to do something now—action, as the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, called for on an earlier amendment. I beg to move.
Before the next contribution, I apologise to the Committee but I must be in two places at once. I hope the Committee will forgive me for not being here when other speeches are made and the Minister winds up. If that is thought to be very rude, I shall sit here, and there we are, but if I may, would it be—
It is unprecedented and very rude of me, but there seems to be rather a lot going on at the moment.
Absolutely. I will write to everybody after this debate and try to elaborate a little on what I have said. I hope noble Lords understand that in terms of my boss, I recently had a change of personnel, and it takes a little while to allow the dust to settle, if I may put it like that.
The only other thing I would respectfully draw noble Lords’ attention to, and I fully accept there is a certain amount of controversy as to how big this problem is, is that the Solicitors Regulation Authority issued a warning notice on 28 November 2022, which led to that authority undertaking investigations in relation to SLAPP complaints, so we are not without a regulatory instrument to at least hold the line until we are able to legislate. That, as far as one can tell, has had a salutary effect on the practical consequences of SLAPPs. It is not the case that nothing has been done.
My Lords, the Minister said that the amendment which I have put forward criminalises access to justice. It does not do that; it criminalises a threat of litigation that is unwarranted and known to be unwarranted without reasonable excuse. It is perfectly simple, but I would be very unhappy to leave this Room today with the thought that the Minister has in mind that my amendment is criminalising access to justice.
My Lords, perhaps I expressed myself a little loosely. Let me put it like this: in the Government’s view, this is not an area where we should introduce the criminal law, whether it is in relation to pre-litigation or in any other respect in terms of litigation. One is faced with a very basic question of when is something that is a robust and justifiable approach to litigation in a pre-action letter a threat. That is not straightforward, in the Government’s view. The Government’s view is that this is not a matter where the criminal law should intrude.
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee, I perhaps should have declared my position as co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong in my last intervention.
My Lords, I am grateful to Minister for his response and look forward to discussing these issues with him. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, and in particular to the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. I commend her and her committee for the work they have done in investigation and taking evidence on this issue. I admire the guts and determination of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and the fury of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, on this issue.
I do not want to speak for too long: we have had a very long debate. The only dissenting voice was that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. Your Lordships may recall that I said that, when the results of the consultation were looked at, the claimants’ lawyers were saying, “There’s nothing to see here, guv. It’s all the ordinary rough and tumble of litigation in this country”. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, referred to his experiences in the bear garden. I remember the bear gardens—I remember appearing in a bear garden for the leader of the Opposition in the Singapore Parliament; it was not an easy position. He was suing the Straits Times for libel, and the application to strike out was made on the grounds that he had no reputation in this country. When he died, some years later, he had obituaries in the Times, the Telegraph and the Guardian.
I know the games that these media lawyers play. They do not face up to some of the realities that we in the criminal courts perhaps have to face from time to time. But I have the highest regard for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, in his professional capacity, so nothing that I say should be taken as derogatory to him—otherwise, subject to professional privilege, I might find myself in court.
Just to clarify, as I said, the Government’s position is that it is not appropriate to introduce a criminal offence in relation to access to justice. It is not a question of just having another offence. Access to justice is a very important area, and we are on a slippery and possibly Orwellian slope if we start saying that it is criminal for someone to go to the law on some point. It is a very difficult area—that was all I said.
So, according to the Minister, it is not criminal for a person to threaten litigation, with all the expense and worry that that involves and the way that it crimps the investigation of crime. He is saying that it is not unlawful and should not be criminal. There are criminal offences that cover conduct far less morally bankrupt than that, which is what I hope we shall discuss with the Minister before Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Thomas of Gresford
Main Page: Lord Thomas of Gresford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Thomas of Gresford's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we now come a group of amendments about strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs. These were much debated at Second Reading and in Grand Committee. As noble Lords will be aware, SLAPPs is the rather ungainly acronym to describe the abusive threats of litigation and actual litigation by deep-pocketed individuals with the intention of preventing journalists or others from revealing the truth, very often about economic crime or, at the very least, economic activity which the claimant would much rather was not revealed at all, or certainly not to the general public. This is a worldwide problem which has received a variable response.
In a sense, there is nothing new about SLAPPs. Powerful men have often used litigation to try to silence their critics, but there have recently been some egregious examples. The difficulty always exists in separating out genuine complaints by powerful men or organisations and those which have been commenced for a collateral purpose. When SLAPPs were debated at Second Reading, it was thought that amendments to prevent or limit such lawsuits would be outside the scope of the Bill. I am glad to say that that has now proved not to be the case, although it is clear that the relevant amendments, either mine or the Government’s, are focused on economic crime as opposed to wider areas of criminal activity which might provoke a strategic lawsuit. The Government’s position at Second Reading appeared to be that they were sympathetic to the notion of legislation in this area. However, they thought that the whole issue needed separate and mature consideration and should not be part of any amendment to this Bill.
I am delighted that the Government have changed their mind and brought forward amendments in this group which we will debate. I understand that the new Lord Chancellor has had much to do with this, and I thank him and the Minister for tabling the amendments.
A number of noble Lords have spoken about SLAPPs, including the noble Lords, Lord Agnew and Lord Cromwell, who gave a graphic description of the mischief at which any change in the law should be directed. My difficulty with any potential amendment was always that the courts have powers already to strike out abusive proceedings, but they tend to be extremely cautious about doing so, on the basis that striking out is a somewhat draconian remedy. Courts tend to be persuaded that it is better to see how the evidence emerges before putting a case out of its misery, but that can be too late. Huge expenditure will have been incurred, often by relatively impecunious defendants. Sometimes they have no realistic alternative but to capitulate—delay is plainly the friend of those who use SLAPPs. The best chance, in my experience, of striking out a claim is when there is a clear point of law, but even then there can be appeals and further expense, which work in favour of an abusive claimant.
The government amendments are clearly aimed in the right direction, but I can already foresee a few difficulties. There will be significant arguments as to what does or does not constitute a SLAPP, for example. That issue of itself has a lot of litigation potential. I am also concerned about the process of making the relevant Civil Procedure Rules. This can be a lengthy process, and is always a carefully considered process. I have studied the recent minutes of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, so as to inform myself as to how the committee approaches rule changes. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the House how this amendment will make its way into the rules and the likely timescale.
Those reservations apart, my view is that we should go further. As pointed out at Second Reading by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who has put his name to this amendment, there is no obvious reason why there should not be a criminal offence in this area.
I invite the House to consider a client consulting his expensive lawyers. He wants to take every step he can through litigation to suppress and exhaust the funds of those who would expose him. He utters those words which lawyers tend to love: “I don’t mind how much it costs”. The advice that he will or should receive after the government amendments become law is that there is a risk that the courts might decide to stop the litigation if it is regarded as abusive. “But”, the litigant says, correctly, “It will surely still be a lengthy and expensive process before a court even gets to consider that option”. However, if the Government were to accept my amendment, then the advice he should receive is that he risks criminal prosecution if he, without reasonable excuse, threatens litigation with the intent to suppress the publication of any information likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime. This potential offence gives room for a defence, of course, but its very existence should act as a considerable deterrent against the sort of behaviour we want to stop. If this amendment becomes law then the hypothetical client might think much more carefully before threatening or embarking upon abusive litigation.
This amendment is particularly relevant to journalists, who have a huge role in tackling economic crime. I declare my interest as chair of the Independent Press Standards Organisation. It is also of importance to anyone who wants to reveal economic crime. It is entirely consistent with the aims of the Bill. Let us bear in mind that the opportunity to legislate in this space is unlikely to present itself again, or at least not for some time. I beg to move.
My Lords, I remind your Lordships that, at Second Reading of this Bill, on 8 February, I referred to a legal action brought by Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group, who has been somewhat in the news over the last weekend, against the journalist Eliot Higgins, who had investigated his activities. When his case was justly struck out last May, Prigozhin said that he brought court cases against journalists because
“in any issue there should be room for sport”.
The cost to Mr Higgins was in the region of £70,000, although he won his case. That is the sort of abuse of the English legal system that the current crop of so-called reputational lawyers have brought on behalf of Russian oligarchs and many other large co-operations that resent too close a look into their operations.