Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for his clear explanation of the content and purpose of the Bill. I congratulate him on this, in his fine maiden speech, which I know the House will have appreciated and enjoyed. The noble and learned Lord specialises in criminal law and has already had a distinguished legal career, being called to the Bar in 1993, appointed Queen’s Counsel in 2011 and, last month, being appointed Advocate-General for Scotland, succeeding the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie.

The noble and learned Lord’s title is, as I said, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Dirleton, near North Berwick, is, as he said, in one of the many beautiful and scenic parts of Scotland, by the coast and adjacent to one of the best-known golf courses in the world: Muirfield. I found his references to the village of Dirleton both interesting and moving.

The noble and learned Lord has joined the relatively small group who have made their maiden speech as a Minister at the Dispatch Box. We welcome him most warmly to this House and look forward to what I am sure will be many further thoughtful and compelling contributions from the Dispatch Box.

Security is a top priority for us. Our first responsibility is to keep this country and our citizens safe. We recognise the importance of our police and security services, including the National Crime Agency, and thank them for the vital work they undertake on our behalf. We also recognise the importance of covert human intelligence sources and the results they achieve. The director-general of MI5 has said:

“Since March 2017, MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Police have together thwarted 27 terror attacks. Without the contribution of human agents, be in no doubt, many of these attacks would not have been prevented”.


In other words, this kind of activity and operation is saving lives by stopping terrorist attacks on our citizens.

The data available also indicates that in 2018, for example, covert human intelligence operations disrupted threats to life, led to the seizure of thousands of kilograms of class A drugs, safeguarded more than 200 vulnerable people, and took firearms and rounds of ammunition off the streets. Covert human intelligence operations also play a significant role in stemming and preventing vile crimes such as child sexual exploitation, and organised black markets in, for example, vital medicine.

The activity the Bill deals with is not new: it has been taking place under existing practices for years. The Bill provides the statutory footing and increased oversight that have so far been missing.

It is well understood that in order to achieve their objective of protecting our citizens from acts of terrorism and vulnerable people from other awful crimes, covert human intelligence sources may need to commit criminal conduct. Being embedded in a proscribed organisation is, of course, an offence in itself. Such activity must be tightly controlled, but it is necessary to achieve the successful infiltration of the activities of criminal and terrorist organisations and networks to gather intelligence and to thwart or bring an end to their activities.

This vital and necessary activity cannot continue in the shadows without boundaries and safeguards. We acknowledge the importance and necessity of putting covert human intelligence sources activity on a proper statutory footing, and we strongly support that aim. This is not the first piece of legislation that brings activities that have been going on in the shadows into a statutory and regulated framework. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 had a similar purpose in relation to surveillance and phone tapping, and the Bribery Act 2010 also provided for the authorisation of criminal acts in pursuit of those involved in crimes covered by the terms of that Act.

The crucial issues for this Bill are those of safeguards and oversight. We will be pushing to introduce proper oversight, increased scrutiny and further legal protections into the Bill. The question of safeguards and checks on activity of this kind is a serious issue for any democratic society. It is vital, too, that there is public confidence in how our security services and other agencies that use covert human intelligence sources are exercising the power of authorised criminal conduct.

We also have to be clear about what we expect of those engaged in covert human intelligence activity, the standards we should set and how we expect them to be implemented. We recognise that the Human Rights Act is mentioned on the face of the Bill, and that no authorisation should be made in contravention of the European Convention on Human Rights. The accompanying memorandum to the Bill states:

“Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes it unlawful for public authorities to act in a way which is incompatible with Convention rights. Nothing in this Bill detracts from that fundamental position. Authorising authorities are not permitted by this Bill to authorise conduct which would constitute or entail a breach of those rights.”


We will, however, be pressing the Government to go further and will be tabling an amendment, based on the Canada model, to put explicit limits on what can be authorised by placing protections against the most serious crimes, including murder, torture, and sexual violence, in the Bill.

The Government need to make it clear beyond any doubt that the activities of covert human intelligence sources under this Bill are not, and will not ever be, free from Human Rights Act considerations and that there will not be any deliberate attempts to prevent the Human Rights Act from coming into play.

We will be seeking to strengthen both prior and post-authorisation oversight. As it stands, the Bill provides for self-authorisation by an agency of criminal conduct. There is no need to obtain a warrant, for example, beforehand. I am conscious of what the noble and learned Lord said, but we have areas of law at present where judges are available 24 hours a day, and we will pursue the issue of prior judicial oversight in respect of this Bill.

As drafted, the Bill requires the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to include information about public authorities’ use of criminal conduct authorisations in the annual report, including statistics on the use of the power, the operation of safeguards and errors.

It is not sufficient for this somewhat vague requirement to be on an annual basis. Every authorisation should be notified to the commissioner within a few days, and the Intelligence and Security Committee should have more detail about the use of the powers under the Bill, and in what context, if there is to be meaningful reassurance to the public on the operation of safeguards and the use of the powers. We will be tabling amendments on these issues.

The Bill provides that authorisations for participation in criminal conduct may be granted only if it is necessary in the interests of national security; for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder; or in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. We need to have clarity about what is within the scope of that framework of the necessity criteria, which cannot and should not encompass any lawful activity, including legitimate trade union activity. We will be pursuing this issue in Committee.

There is also a proportionality test in respect of authorisations for participation in criminal conduct. What must be considered before deciding if an authorisation would be proportionate is covered in the code of practice. There is a question, however, of whether those required considerations should not be strengthened by being written into the Bill—a point that might be relevant to other parts of the code of practice.

On the impact of the Bill on those affected by it, we will be pursuing the issue of the safety of juveniles and vulnerable people acting as covert human intelligence sources. We will also want to be satisfied that there are measures in place to prevent a disproportionate gendered impact, or impact on black, Asian and ethnic-minority communities, of the use of the powers under the Bill.

The issue of a route for redress and civil claims for wholly innocent victims is one we will also be raising in Committee. While those most likely to be affected by the criminal conduct of a covert human intelligence source are those with whom an agent is engaging in order to thwart criminality, there will inevitably be occasions when a wholly innocent person ends up with a material loss as a consequence of the actions of a covert human intelligence source. In addition, we will also want to be satisfied of the necessity for the non-security agencies covered by the Bill to have the power to authorise criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources.

This is not a retrospective Bill but it has to be made clear that those seeking justice for what has happened in the past can still do so. There is an ongoing inquiry into undercover policing chaired by Sir John Mitting. Its recommendations should be implemented and victims should not be denied access to justice. Likewise, we are committed to a full independent public inquiry into the events at the Orgreave coking plant in June 1984. There are also outstanding issues in relation to the unlawful blacklisting scandal and the finding of the Metropolitan Police’s internal investigation that,

“on the balance of probabilities, the allegation that the police or special branches supplied information is ‘proven’.”

The kind of powers that the Bill covers and their use need to be on the statute book and not, as now, be powers in the shadows.

We are committed to keeping our people and our country safe. To deliver that, law enforcement bodies and our security services have to be able to carry out their vital and necessary work, which includes the activities of covert human intelligence sources and the authorisation of criminal conduct to which the Bill relates. We are mindful that public confidence in our law enforcement and security agencies is dependent on their proven ability to protect us from acts of terrorism and other vile crimes

We will be seeking to improve the Bill, particularly on the vital issue of strengthening safeguards and oversight so that the public can also have full confidence in the covert human intelligence process and how it is being implemented, including the manner and purpose for which the powers are being used on behalf of all of us.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I can be very brief, because others have put the point so well and also because of the next debate to follow. I would simply say that this degree of micro-precision becomes particularly important because the Bill goes further than the status quo and creates these advanced criminal and civil immunities. I will leave it at that, because I think we are all really quite keen to hear the Minister’s response.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As drafted, the Bill refers to criminal conduct as conduct

“in the course of, or otherwise in connection with”

the conduct of a covert human intelligence source, and as

“conduct by or in relation to the person”

who is specified as the covert human intelligence source. As has been said, the amendments would establish that criminal conduct is conduct by the covert human intelligence source in the absence of any explanation as to why the additional words to which I have referred are needed, and what the consequences would be, and for whom, if they were not in the Bill. A further amendment in this group also puts on the face of the Bill that a criminal conduct authorisation cannot retrospectively give clearance for behaviour that has already happened before the date the authorisation is given.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights also raised these issues in its report on the Bill when it said that the definition of what amounts to “criminal conduct” for the purpose of an authorisation is wider than simply criminal activity by a covert human intelligence source, and referred to the wording which the amendments in this group would delete. The only explanation for this which the Joint Committee on Human Rights could find was in the draft code of practice, which states that

“a criminal conduct authorisation may authorise conduct by someone else ‘in relation to’ a

covert human intelligence source,

“namely those within a public authority that are involved in or affected by the authorisation.”

No doubt the Government will wish to respond in some detail setting out why the words “in connection with” and “in relation to” are essential, what exactly they mean and, giving examples, explaining why it is considered necessary to enable a public authority to authorise criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source, which some might feel is rather at odds with the title of the Bill.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, having made my maiden remarks at Second Reading, it is a pleasure now to assist the House in scrutinising the detail of this legislation. I hope to reassure noble Lords with regard to the scope, safeguards and limits to conduct that can be authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation. I recognise the feeling of the House on the last appearance of the Bill as a recognition of the complexities and difficulties which attach to this field of criminal investigation.

With regard to the remarks by my noble friend Lord Cormack, he will perhaps recollect that when I spoke at Second Reading I recognised the inelegance of the expression “CHIS”, and I fully share his concerns about it. However, until such time as we have evolved a suitable replacement, if that is possible, I trust I will not trespass on his patience if I continue to use the expression.

The Bill is drafted to allow things to be authorised which are certainly connected to the conduct of the CHIS but not the same thing as it: actions which are connected to the activities of the CHIS but which are not the CHIS activities themselves. This is deliberate and it is to allow for activity which facilitates and supports the core conduct of the CHIS, most obviously to allow the CHIS to avoid detection in order to remain in place and to provide the intelligence needed. The purpose of the expressions “in connection with” and “in relation to” is to ensure that such activity may be authorised. This language also serves the function of ensuring that the scope of a criminal conduct authorisation is properly limited. It helps to make it clear that it is not the case that any and all criminality by a CHIS may be authorised. It cannot be some private venture that the CHIS has involved himself or herself in. The criminal conduct to be authorised must be connected to the conduct of a CHIS and to the criminal conduct authority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and our amendment, are directed to the same issue; I can only think that I may have drafted ours before I had seen hers. RIPA allows for the use of CHIS outside the UK, and the noble Baroness, with her very particular perspective, must not be ignored. As has been said, that experience should inform all of what we are discussing.

Quite apart from the propriety and ethics, how would extraterritorial jurisdiction work in this case? We cannot legislate for what other countries regard as a crime or how decisions about whether to prosecute are taken. My noble friend Lord Thomas listed the offences where there is extraterritorial jurisdiction and where prosecutions can take place here. It struck me as I was listening to him reading them that they are very close to the crimes that noble Lords are seeking to take out of the scope of criminal authorisations, which we will come to later—except that I was interested to hear the reference to domestic abuse.

I had wondered whether minds in the Government had been directed to the military and intelligence services outside the UK on this issue; my noble friend also mentioned the Baha Mousa case. But this is not the Bill for that. As he said, we have other legislation that we will come to soon, when we will also no doubt be considering the issue of rendition. But to leave open any suggestion that anyone should have free rein anywhere in the world because they are acting on behalf of the state is certainly something we want to see quashed.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendment 7 in this group would ensure that criminal conduct authorisations are not covered by the provisions of Section 27(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which provides that:

“The conduct that may be authorised under this Part includes conduct outside the United Kingdom.”


Amendment 9 in this group specifies that conduct outside of the United Kingdom may not be authorised under this Act and amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to similar effect as Amendment 7.

As far as I can see, the code of—[Inaudible]—covert operations occurring in UK embassies, military bases and detention facilities where the subject of investigation is a UK national or is likely to become the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in the UK, or if the operation is likely to affect a UK national or give rise to material likely to be used in evidence before a UK court.

The noble—[Inaudible.]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)]

My Lords, I think we have managed to re-establish connection with the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Yes—I am in some difficulty, because I do not know how much of what I said was heard. I think the best thing I can do is to read the Minister’s response and see the extent to which it actually replied to the issues I raised. I think I had best leave it in that context.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)]

I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a lengthy and complex debate, and I blame the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for that; we tried to split this group to make it more manageable, but his will prevailed.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, amendments in this group are on prior authorisation by a judge; by an investigatory powers commissioner; by an investigatory powers commissioner unless it is urgent; by an investigatory powers commissioner if a criminal conduct authority is to be used to identify a journalistic source; and by a Secretary of State. Another amendment requires that an investigatory powers commissioner be notified

“as soon as … practicable, and in any event within seven days”

and that the police authority be involved in holding the chief constable to account as a result of the investigatory powers commissioner’s annual report on the use of CCAs.

It is understandable that noble Lords want prior notification—and why the police should not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, mark their own homework. On the advice of one noble Lord, I read the code of practice that goes with this Bill. I have held both ranks that could grant a criminal conduct authority under this Bill. In urgent cases, that is an inspector, who can not only grant a criminal conduct authority but also grant immunity from prosecution. I was an inspector at the age of 24. I was also, subsequently, a controller of covert human intelligence sources. I spent 18 years as a uniformed officer. On the Friday I left the office as a uniformed chief inspector and on the Monday morning I was a detective chief inspector in the role of a controller. The Government may say that all the people involved in the matters considered by this Bill will be experienced and highly trained, but that is not always the case in my experience.

We should listen very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated why prior authorisation is not practical, a point also made by the Minister for Security in another place and by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. From my experience I agree, although the description of MI5 handlers and agents as beyond reproach is not, in my experience, universally applicable to police handlers and informants.

Any prior authorisation would instruct CHIS to operate within strict parameters, which may no longer be necessary or proportionate once they are deployed, or may not be adequate once they are deployed, because they are being deployed into rapidly changing scenarios in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. The most common use of CHIS in policing, for example, is to counter drug dealing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has said, you cannot turn an agent on and off like you can a listening device.

Even the most experienced undercover officer may have to necessarily and proportionately go beyond the strict parameters of a CCA because the situation has dramatically changed in ways unforeseen by the handler. If he were to strictly adhere precisely to a CCA, he could put himself in danger of losing his life. As we will hear in later groups, children are increasingly being used as covert human intelligence sources, some of whom have chaotic lifestyles. Sometimes they are drug users or drug dealers. To expect such people to operate within the strict and precise boundaries of a CCA in such turbulent situations is not only unfair and unreasonable but completely unrealistic. To determine the strict parameters of a CCA to cover every possible scenario, in the middle of a rapidly changing situation, and when the legal immunity of both handler and CHIS depends on it, is unfair and unreasonable to both handler and CHIS.

Those proposing prior authorisation by judges, Investigatory Powers Commissioners and government Ministers may say that any conduct outside the strict parameters of a CCA will be looked at by the prosecuting authorities and a decision made whether to prosecute using the public interest test. In that case, why can the prosecuting authorities not look at all the actions of the CHIS and the handler and decide whether to prosecute?

Amendment 46, for which there seems to be a good deal of support around the House, suggests that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be given notice where a person grants a criminal conduct authorisation as soon as practicable and, in any event, within seven days—but, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, so what? What power does the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have to intervene? What happens if the handler corruptly tasks an informant to commit crime? As the authority has already been granted, both CHIS and handler have legal immunity, even if the handler informs the Investigatory Powers Commissioner six days later. A wronged party may be able to claim compensation from an Investigatory Powers Tribunal but criminal offences may have been committed for which the perpetrators should be prosecuted. That is why we have added to Amendment 46, to the effect that legal immunity is dependent on the CCA being approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the actions of the handler or the CHIS are not within the limits set out in the Bill, neither are immune from criminal prosecution or from being sued.

I understand completely why noble Lords do not want a criminal conduct authority to be granted without prior judicial or ministerial authorisation because of the potential for abuse. However, as others have said, it is not practical. We believe there is a way to prevent abuse without prior authorisation of a CCA, including protecting journalistic sources, which we will come to in a future group. We have listened very carefully to this debate and have come up with a new amendment; because we were part way through this debate we cannot debate that amendment in this group, but we will come to it in a couple of groups’ time. What must not happen in any circumstances is the granting of legal immunity without judicial oversight. That is what our Amendment 47 attempts to do.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendments 14 and 75 in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark provide that authorisations may not be granted under this section until a warrant has been issued by a judge. An application to a judge must be made in writing and provide details, including the reasons why it is required, who it covers, the length of time it will be active for, and previous applications covering the same individual. Our amendments also provide that a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. We seek to strengthen both prior and post-authorisation oversight.

Amendment 77 in the name of my noble friends Lady Clark of Kilwinning and Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, calls for prior judicial approval before an authorisation can be granted

“for the purposes of identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information”,

and is in line with our amendment providing that authorisations may not be granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Butler of Brockwell, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is very similar to our Amendment 75 requiring a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. However, all the amendments we have been discussing in this group reflect a strong feeling that the oversight arrangements set out in the Bill for the statutory power by public authorities to grant criminal conduct authorisations are inadequate and do not provide reassurance that the likelihood of this power being misused or exceeded is reduced to a minimum.

What exactly has been happening under the present arrangements is far from clear, although we are assured that they have enabled threatened terrorist atrocities and other serious crimes to be thwarted and our safety to be secured. We have no reason at all to doubt that. However, we do not know the extent to which powers have or have not been misused or exceeded since there is no means of that information consistently coming to light. Without proper oversight to act as a firm check there is a risk that some may become somewhat overzealous in how they exercise and interpret the powers they are given under the Bill, including what might be regarded as acceptable covert human intelligence activity, and against what and whom.

We believe there should be prior judicial authorisation, with authorisations not being granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Having to obtain a warrant before action can be taken is nothing new. Bearing in mind the potential gravity of the decision to authorise criminal conduct, the necessity to obtain a warrant beforehand seems even greater than it is in relation to other existing actions or activities requiring a warrant at present. It is a prior safeguard and check to minimise the likelihood, in what is self-authorisation by an agency or other body, of a potentially ill-judged or just plain wrong authorisation of criminal conduct, with all the consequences that might have.

Objections have been raised that sometimes authorisations are needed in a hurry but equally, access to a judge, as happens in some other spheres, can be arranged in a hurry—a point made by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Urgency can arise because of a rapidly developing situation that could not have reasonably been foreseen, but it can also arise because a public authority has left things later than it should have done before seeking the criminal conduct authorisation. Perhaps the Government can, in their response, give some indication of roughly how many such authorisations are currently granted on average each year, how many are needed urgently and what the definition is of urgently. Can the Government also give a general indication of the extent to which authority to commit criminal conduct is given, in a typical year, to those who have been previously involved in or who are currently engaged in unauthorised—[Inaudible]—said that all authorisations

“are granted by an experienced and highly trained authorising officer, who will ensure that the authorisation has strict parameters and is clearly communicated to the”,—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1045.]

covert human intelligence source. The phrase “experienced and highly trained” sounds fine, but what do the Government intend it to mean in practice in relation to the granting of criminal conduct authorisations under the Bill? What is the definition of an

“experienced and highly trained authorising officer”,

a description the Government were happy to use at Second Reading? How much experience is meant, and in what? How much training is meant, and in what? How many experienced and highly trained authorising officers will there be in each authority that will have the power to grant criminal conduct authorisations, and how frequently are they likely to determine whether to grant such authorisations?

--- Later in debate ---

In short, I hope that the Minister can give us examples justifying Clause 6(2) and Section 29B(4).

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the amendments in this group would variously remove the power for the Secretary of State to impose requirements restricting when a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted, require the Secretary of State to consult with such persons as are appropriate before imposing requirements, and require regulations in which the Secretary of State imposes additional requirements that must be satisfied before a criminal conduct authorisation is granted to be subject to the affirmative procedure. There is also an amendment in this group which would restrict the power of the Secretary of State to bring different provisions of the Bill into force at different times and in different areas, to ensure that all the safeguards provided in the Bill always apply.

We will await with interest more detail from the Government in their response as to the nature, extent, purpose, reasons for and frequency of the requirements that the Secretary of State might wish to impose by order before a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted, and why it would not have been possible to include this greater detail on the face of the Bill to reduce the possibility of this power being exercised at any time in the future in an inappropriate manner. We also want to hear the Government’s response to the concern about safeguards always being applicable, which has led to the amendment restricting the power to bring different provisions into force at different times.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, turning first to the order-making powers, addressed first by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the ability of Parliament to scrutinise statutory instruments is a broader topic than this debate permits me to go into. As to the order-making powers in this Bill, these powers allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited. I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards. I particularly seek to assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on that point. The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they be contained in secondary legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether there was a precedent for such powers to be subject to the negative procedure. The equivalent powers in Section 29 of RIPA are both subject to the negative procedure. Taking similar powers in respect of criminal conduct authorisations to those already contained in Section 29 will allow the Secretary of State to make equivalent provision for Section 29 authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations, where appropriate, so that similar arrangements are in place for both. There is a high degree of interrelationship between the two provisions. While the Government do not have any particular safeguards or limits in mind, such requirements may arise in the future that will need to be legislated for.

An example of the past use of the Section 29 powers is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Matters Subject to Legal Privilege) Order 2010, which imposes specific additional requirements that must be met regarding the authorisation of a CHIS in connection with material subject to legal professional privilege. Were any changes proposed in the future, the relevant persons would of course be consulted prior to those changes being made. Amendments 21 and 58 are therefore not considered necessary.

Turning to Amendment 81, the Bill contains provision to commence the Act for different areas on different days, to allow time to make any necessary secondary legislation, issue guidance, undertake appropriate training and put the necessary systems and procedures in place, as appropriate. I assure the Committee that this power will not be used to delay commencing those sections relating to safeguards. The power could not lawfully be used to frustrate the will of Parliament in this way.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

There are a number of amendments in this group relating to human rights. They variously provide that a criminal conduct authorisation: may not authorise activity that would be incompatible with convention rights; may not authorise murder, torture or rape, or a person under the age of 18 to engage in criminal conduct; cannot authorise causing death or grievous bodily harm, sexual violation or torture; and cannot authorise causing death or grievous bodily harm, perverting the course of justice, sexual offences, torture or depriving a person of their liberty.

There is also an amendment in my name and that of my noble friends Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Lord Judd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that would also put explicit limits in the Bill on the types of criminal behaviour that can be authorised. These limits cover causing death or bodily harm, sexual violation, perverting the course of justice, torture, detaining an individual or damaging property where it would put a person in danger. There is an amendment to my amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, the purpose of which, as he has explained, is to explore whether the proposed regulatory regime provides adequate safeguards for operations carried out overseas.

The amendments all follow a similar theme, namely, wanting to include in the Bill clearer and tighter wording in respect of the criminal conduct that can be authorised by a CCA, so that there can be no doubt over what is a permissible criminal conduct authorisation and, more significantly, what is not. The Government’s position appears to be that criminal offences that are contrary to the Human Rights Act are already precluded, given that all public authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act, and thus authorising authorities are not permitted by the Bill to authorise conduct that would constitute or entail a breach of those rights.

Interestingly, the Bill states in new Section 29B(7) in Clause 1(5), on criminal conduct authorisations:

“Subsection (6) is without prejudice to the need to take into account other matters so far as they are relevant (for example, the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998).”


But what are the words “to take into account” meant to mean in this context as regards adhering to the requirements of the Human Rights Act? One can, after all, take something into account and then decide that it should be ignored or minimised in whole or in part. What do the words,

“so far as they are relevant”,

mean in relation to the requirements of the Human Rights Act? In what circumstances are those requirements not relevant in relation to criminal conduct authorisations?

Turning to an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, addressed, the Government have maintained that specifying in the Bill offences that cannot be authorised places at risk undercover officers and agents on the grounds that to do so would place into the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of creating a checklist for suspected CHIS to be tested against. However, as has been said, the Canadian Security Intelligence Act authorises criminal conduct similar to that proposed in the Bill, and my amendment reflects the wording in the Canadian legislation on the type of serious criminal conduct that cannot be authorised.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has pointed out that the Bill gives the Secretary of State power to make orders prohibiting the authorisation of any specified criminal conduct and that, in line with the Government’s argument, whatever might be prohibited by such an order could presumably also be used by criminals as a checklist against which to test a covert human intelligence source. The JCHR comments in its report:

“If limits can be placed on authorised criminal conduct in publicly available secondary legislation without putting informants and undercover officers at undue risk, it is unclear why express limits cannot also be set out in primary legislation.”


The JCHR report also states:

“If a criminal gang or terrorist group was familiar enough with the relevant legislation to test a CHIS against it, they would presumably be equally able to test them against the guarantees and protections set out in the”


Human Rights Act.

Perhaps, in their response, the Government could say whether they are still committed to the Human Rights Act, since following their 2019 election manifesto commitment to ensuring that there is a proper balance between the rights of individuals, national security and effective government—which suggests that the Government do not think that is the present position—they have announced that there is to be a review into the operation of the Human Rights Act.

If the Government intend to argue that the Human Rights Act will provide protection in the years ahead against unacceptable use of the powers in this Bill, there needs at least to be a clear statement from the Government that they are committed to the Act and will not be altering its provisions.

It could be claimed with some justification, however, that the Human Rights Act has not prevented previous human rights violations connected to undercover investigations or covert human intelligence sources. I await the Government’s response to this group of amendments and to the contributions that seek more specific wording in the Bill, to put clear limits on the type of criminal behaviour that can be authorised.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their very thoughtful contributions to a discussion of the upper limit of what can be authorised by a criminal conduct authorisation.

I will first address comments—because they have been the most numerous—that propose to replicate on the face of the Bill the limits that the Canadians have set in the legislation governing their security service, and Amendment 42, from my noble friend Lord Cormack, which prohibits murder, torture or rape. I totally recognise why noble Lords want to ensure that this Bill does not provide authority for an undercover agent to commit any and all crime. It does not. I reiterate once more: there are already clear limits on the criminal activity that can be authorised and they can be found within the Human Rights Act—which, by the way, was not in place when some of the activities that noble Lords have described were carried out.

Nothing in this Bill undermines the need to comply with that Act, as is made clear by new Section 29B(7). Further limits are placed on the regime by the need for the authorising officer in all public authorities to confirm that there is a demonstrable need to authorise a CHIS by making a clear case for its necessity and proportionality. I understand questions about why we cannot place explicit limits in the Bill, as they do in other countries, notably including—as noble Lords have said—Canada, and I will explain our reasoning.

We think that placing express limits on the face of the Bill is not necessary. The Human Rights Act already provides these limits and the amendments that replicate the limits in Canadian legislation do not prohibit any criminal conduct which is not already prohibited by the ECHR and HRA, as encompassed by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made a point about undercover police who have sexual relationships: if gangs knew that that was unlawful, would they then test against it? I would say that although that behaviour would be unlawful in that context, it is very distinct from rape. I have been trying to talk to my noble friend who is a QC and perhaps I will set my answer out in more detail in writing.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about seeking clarity as to who is covered not just because a criminal conduct authorisation authorises somebody to commit a crime, but because they have, as a consequence, both civil and criminal legal immunity. As we and other noble Lords have argued, immunity from prosecution should be decided after the event by the independent prosecuting authority—disagreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. However, these amendments raise important questions, not least about legal immunity.

The first person covered, without doubt, is the agent or informant—the covert human intelligence source. If the CHIS is asked or ordered to participate in crime then if anyone is to be given legal immunity, it should be him. The question then becomes: is a handler who asks or orders a CHIS to commit crime, whether or not the request or order is legitimate, also covered by legal immunity? This arises from the fact that he can request or order a CHIS to commit crime only if he, in turn, has been given authority to issue such a request or order by the authorising officer. If the authorising officer has told the handler that he is permitted to request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the handler also have legal immunity, in that it is then the authorising officer’s decision, not that of the handler? Then, if the authorising officer has agreed that the handler can request or order a CHIS to commit crime, should the authorising officer too not be covered by legal immunity?

What the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was aiming at with his amendment came as something of a surprise. I do not understand how, under the terms of the Bill, a corporation can be authorised to carry out crime. Surely, it has to be an individual—the covert human intelligence source himself or herself—who is authorised, not a corporation. While I accept that some work of the police service, for example, or the security services may be outsourced, surely that corporation would have to be listed as an authorising authority in the Bill if that were the case.

There would be unintended consequences of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, if the only person who can be authorised to commit a crime is an undercover police officer or a James Bond-type character in the security services, and not a criminal who is helping the police or, indeed, somebody in a foreign country who is simply an employee of an organisation that interests the security services and who passes information back, not an employee of the security services. That would surely leave a big hole in what the Bill attempts to achieve. We cannot support Amendment 53. However, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response to my question, and that of other noble Lords: who is covered by the CCA? Is it the CHIS who commits the crime, the handler who tells him to commit the crime, the officer who authorises the handler to tell the CHIS to commit the crime, or all three?

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in the names of my noble friends Lady Massey of Darwen and Lord Dubs removes from the definition in the Bill of authorised criminal conduct the words

“by or in relation to”

the specified covert human intelligence source. It replaces those words with a more detailed definition; namely, that it is conduct by

“the covert human intelligence source”

or by a person who holds a rank, office, or position in the public authority that is granting the authorisation and is assisting in the behaviour of the covert human intelligence source. As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, this amendment was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Under the terms of the Bill, authorised conduct is not limited to the conduct of the covert human intelligence source. The code of practice says that a criminal conduct authorisation may also authorise conduct by someone else in relation to a covert human intelligence source, with that someone else being those within a public authority involved in or affected by the authorisation.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 39, they need to set out in their response the reasons why they consider it necessary to provide for the authorisation of criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source; the parameters of that criminal conduct by someone other than the CHIS that can be so authorised; and the safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the person authorised to commit criminal conduct—who is someone other than the covert human intelligence source—is not also involved in any way in the authorisation process to which that criminal conduct relates.

I shall listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 39 and to the pertinent questions raised by my noble friend Lord Sikka in speaking to his amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

Amendment 39 seeks clarification on who can be authorised under the Bill. The intention behind the Bill is to provide protection both to the CHIS themselves and to those involved in the authorisation process within the relevant public authority. There are a range of limitations on what can be authorised under the Bill, including the conduct being necessary and proportionate. This means that it would not be possible to grant an authorisation for criminal conduct unless that conduct was by a CHIS for a specific, identified purpose, or involved members of the public authority making, or giving effect to, the CHIS authorisation.

Amendment 53, from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to restrict those who can be granted a criminal conduct authorisation to employees of the public authority. The Government cannot support this amendment as it would significantly hamper our public authorities’ efforts to tackle crimes and terrorism. While CHIS are often employees of the public authority, they also can be members of the public. The real value of CHIS who are members of the public is in their connections to the criminal and terrorist groups that we are targeting. This is often the only means by which valuable intelligence can be gathered on the harmful activities which we are seeking to stop. Employees of a public authority will not have the same level of access. I reassure the noble Lord that the authorising officers within the public authority set out clearly the strict parameters of a criminal conduct authorisation. Were a CHIS to engage in criminality beyond their authorisation, that conduct could be considered for prosecution in the usual way.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether the CHIS and their handler could be prosecuted. Obviously, every situation will be different, but if the CHIS acted beyond their authorisation, they would have to answer for that. Equally, if the CHIS handler acted inappropriately or in a way that might endanger the CHIS, they could also be liable for that conduct.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, talked about security guards being undercover operatives. The noble Lord will know that we have published the list of bodies that can run undercover operatives. In addition to this, the criminal injuries compensation scheme is not undermined by this Bill, and I understand that anyone can approach the IPT if they feel they are due civil compensation. I think that is right, but I will write to noble Lords if that is wrong.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Lord decided to probe these two provisions. I have seen the correspondence published by the three committees. I was struck when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, in responding to the previous group, referred to the code of practice having the force of law. I do not dispute that, but it is of course law that can be changed by government Ministers without coming to Parliament.

The point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about forum shopping is interesting. As he said, I have asked for assistance on the meaning of some terms during the passage of the Bill. I questioned what is envisaged by the terms “conduct” and “requirements”. I read both to restrict, rather than expand, the scope of what may be done. I would be grateful to have that confirmed or, if not, to understand why not. In short, we should not be expanding opportunities for criminal conduct authorisations without, at the very least, understanding exactly what we are doing.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

First, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, well in his campaign against skeleton Bills, as that issue is getting worse, not better.

The Bill provides that the Secretary of State may, by order, prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given. As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, Amendments 57 and 74, in his name, would remove those provisions and, as he confirmed, their purpose is to probe the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation.

Earlier in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, stated that the order-making provisions in the Bill

“allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited.”

He continued:

“I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards ... The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they are contained in secondary legislation.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 676.]


When the noble and learned Lord said that the order-making powers could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards, did the Government mean that the wording in the Bill would make it contrary to law to do that, or did they mean only that the intention was not to use the order-making powers to remove any of the existing safeguards? That, of course, is a very different thing, as intentions can change.

No doubt in their response the Government will address that point and give specific examples of the purposes or intentions for which these order-making powers to prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given would—and, equally, would not—be used by the Secretary of State.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments have been tabled to discuss the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation.

As I set out in response to the amendments to the order-making powers tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, there are good reasons why these powers have been included. I do not wish to repeat the detail of what was said on group 7 of the amendments, other than to highlight again that the provisions have been drafted to resemble closely the terms of Section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which provides the underlying authorisation for CHIS use and conduct.

To answer the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I repeat what I said earlier and provide the Committee with reassurance that these powers could be used only to impose further safeguards and not to remove them. That point was raised also by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts posed the question of whether the Secretary of State can add bodies to, or remove them from, the list of authorising bodies. The addition of bodies can be accomplished only through the affirmative procedure. The changes to the bodies listed will reflect changes over time in investigative functions and the threats that the country faces. The rank of authorising officers is set by secondary legislation and will be dealt with in line with Section 29 authorisations.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, posed the question of whether the terms of the provision are such as to make it impossible for the powers to be extended rather than removed, or whether that is merely the intention of the Government. He correctly remarked on the fact that the persons occupying posts will change from time to time. As I see it, the legislation will not simply rely on the intention of the Government but will have force beyond that. I think that I also addressed the matter when answering the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. She focused on the meaning of the words “conduct” and “requirements”. I am able to confirm that her understanding was correct. Indeed, as a consequence of what I have said, the interpretation of those words restricts, and does not permit addition to, the provisions in the Bill.

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This is the Minister’s police force. The point I am trying to make here is: who do we believe? What is the problem that the Bill is trying to solve? What is the nature and extent of the problem? We have no idea, and with the greatest respect, I am sure that the Government have no idea either. We are relying on anecdote and subjective opinions because no one, not least the Government, knows the facts. Our Amendment 79 would establish the facts.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Two amendments in this group stipulate the action that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must take on becoming aware of unlawful or inappropriate conduct linked to a criminal conduct authorisation, or on becoming aware of an inappropriately granted or unlawful criminal conduct authorisation. I will listen with interest to the Government’s response to these two amendments.

A third amendment requires a review within six months by a High Court judge that would consider the grant of criminal conduct authorisations in relation to children or vulnerable people, the conduct of covert human intelligence sources, the oversight and monitoring of, and reporting on, such conduct, the oversight of persons allowed to authorise criminal conduct authorisations, and the sanctions available if they misuse those powers.

Under the terms of the Bill, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has the power to conduct investigations, inspections and audits, but would not appear—I will listen to what the Government say in response—to have the capacity to investigate every time a criminal conduct authorisation is used. The Commissioner also covers the use of the power to grant criminal conduct authorisations in the annual report, which must also be laid before Parliament but which may be redacted. Of course, we do not know how much the annual report will reveal in practice. As an annual report, it will be reporting a long time after any particular issues with criminal conduct authorisations may have arisen.

It is surely important to have as much transparency as possible in how, and in what kind of circumstances, covert human intelligence sources and criminal conduct authorisations are used and granted, since the powers and activities provided for in this Bill are considerable and potentially wide ranging. They have to be applied appropriately, and the greater the transparency that is possible, the more likely that is to be the case and the greater the public confidence in how the powers are being deployed, and with what objectives in mind.

The review referred to in Amendment 79, which would be laid before Parliament, would be one way of contributing to that transparency and ensuring public confidence. If the Government are not going to accept the amendment, I hope that in response they will indicate a willingness to look further at the powers, duties and role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to ensure that transparency in how and in what circumstances the powers given in the Bill are exercised is maximised as far as possible. I await the Government’s response.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would not expect me to respond to the case that he brought before the House this afternoon, but I would be happy to sit down and discuss it with him, if he would like. I think what he wants from Amendment 79 is to require a review of all criminal conduct authorisations to be undertaken by a High Court judge, with the review to be commenced six months after the Act has come into force.

The IPC, supported by judicial commissioners, already has oversight of all criminal conduct authorisations. He and his judicial commissioners have all held high judicial office and are entirely independent of the Government. The commissioners are supported by expert inspectors and others, such as technical experts, who are qualified to assist them in their work. They are responsible for inspecting the full range of agencies and departments that will use this power and will ensure that they are complying with the law and following good practice. This includes investigating systems and processes, checking records and paperwork, interviewing key staff and investigating any known errors.

The frequency of these inspections is decided by the Commissioner, and the inspectors must have unfettered access to documents and information to support the Commissioner’s functions. This allows inspectors to undertake thorough and robust investigations of each police authority’s use of the power, covering the entire chain of events and decision-making.

A report is issued after each inspection that sets out IPCO’s conclusions and recommendations and identifies any areas of vulnerability or non-compliance. It also identifies areas of good practice which may be of interest to other similar organisations. The report will enable organisations to take action on the basis of IPCO’s recommendations. This process provides for systemic review of all public authorities’ use of the power and allows for continuous improvement in the authorisation and management of the capability.

Amendments 75A and 75B seek to put obligations on the IPC to report conduct to other bodies. Criminal conduct authorisations will be subject to the existing error-reporting processes for investigatory powers, which require public authorities to report all relevant errors to the IPC. This would include situations where undercover operatives’ conduct has taken place without lawful authorisation or there has been a failure to adhere to the necessary safeguards. Where it amounts to a serious error, the IPC must inform the person of an error relating to them where it is in the public interest.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the horse will be out of the stable again in January: refreshed, I hope. I am sure that the Minister will welcome the pause after the marathon she has had to undergo. I am not for a moment suggesting she is anything like a horse—I am sorry, perhaps I should not have followed that simile.

My noble friend Lord Paddick recently spoke to Amendment 79, and it is clear that several noble Lords have concerns in this area, so we will come back to it. Noble Lords clearly agree on the importance of evaluating what goes on and of transparency, as has already been mentioned. However, I cannot help thinking in the context of the precise formulation of this amendment of what the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, talked about a week or two ago, to which my noble friend referred: the problem of the extent to which one can report in detail without endangering those who are protecting us and whom we, in turn, do not wish to endanger. I cannot help thinking that if a lot of the material listed in Amendment 75C were to be published, an awful lot of it might be redacted. However, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in spirit, and I think that his last point about material damage or civilian harm is an important one that we must not lose sight of. We still need to explore how best and to what extent we can achieve what is obviously troubling a number of us.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The purpose of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, is described as being to probe the adequacy of information provided to Parliament on criminal conduct authorisations and to probe the efficacy of the authorisations.

I think that this comes back to the issue of transparency. To be a little more particular, will we be told in advance, during the passage of the Bill, precisely what kind of information about criminal conduct authorisations will be provided to us and to the public by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the annual report or other reports? At the moment, I am not clear about what information will be provided and what it will cover, and whether it will give us a feel for what is happening over criminal conduct authorisations or whether we will be told that the information provided will be limited and that, on grounds of security, it cannot be disclosed.

I hope that, at least in their response either to this amendment or on Report, the Government will be prepared to spell out what information will and will not be provided so that we all know where we stand on this issue.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for the points they have made. To take the penultimate point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I hope that I can provide some of that clarity this afternoon.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson is interested in the information that will be included in the IPC’s annual report. The commissioner has a very clear mandate to inform Parliament and the public about the use of investigatory powers. He must provide a report to the Prime Minister, which the Prime Minister must publish and lay before Parliament. The Investigatory Powers Act already sets out, in detail, what should be included in that report, and I refer my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to Section 234(2).

I reassure my noble friend that there is already a requirement for the report to include statistics on the use of the power and information about the results of such use, including its impact. The report is therefore extensive but, as would be expected for such sensitive information, safeguards are in place to ensure that that information is protected where necessary. In consultation with the commissioner, the Prime Minister may exclude from publication information which could, for example, be prejudicial to national security. However, public authorities will receive this information and will respond to recommendations made by the IPC.

Turning to a matter that has nothing to do with the amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, asked: why go further than the status quo? The status quo is that there is legal uncertainty around undercover operatives, and this Bill creates that legal certainty.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who is next on the list, has been replaced by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, speaking for the Opposition, we support the essence of this Bill. As noble Lords from all sides of the House have said in earlier debates, this Bill addresses a necessary—if at times uncomfortable—reality, which prevents crime and keeps us safe. We pay tribute to those in our security services and elsewhere for the work they do on our behalf.

There has been much discussion in this House on the detail of what is before us. I very much respect the strongly felt concerns raised by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I take what she said, as I do all her contributions, in the constructive spirit in which I know it was intended. However, we have reservations about the effect of the amendments she has tabled. The current status quo is that criminal conduct authorisations are given without formal accountability, and prosecutorial discretion becomes a factor only if a CHIS is caught and arrested for the offence. For the overwhelming majority of cases, prosecutorial discretion never becomes relevant. In the circumstances that a CHIS, having been authorised, is caught carrying out that criminal act, the CPS will be made aware of the authorisation and will not prosecute, on the basis of overriding public interest. The CHIS does not now, and will not under this Bill, have immunity for committing an unauthorised offence.

We therefore believe that the Bill reflects the status quo in practice. We feel that putting this on a statutory footing, with authorisation conferring immunity—with appropriate safeguards—is the best way. We seek to add provisions into the Bill on immunity plus safeguards, including on the function of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, looking at every authorisation and possible prior judicial authorisation—to which my noble friend Lord Dubs referred—which will preserve the use of CHIS criminal conduct authorisations in the national interest while ensuring that there are safeguards for every authorisation.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 33, 37, 44 and 46, which are also signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Rosser, I first pay tribute to the Minister and the Bill team, who offered to co-operate with me on these amendments and have been as good as their word. They now give more complete effect, in language approved by parliamentary counsel, to the homemade amendments that I moved in Committee. The lead amendment is Amendment 33; Amendment 37 mirrors it for Scotland; and Amendments 44 and 46 are consequentials.

The amendments provide, in summary, not for prior judicial authorisation but for judicial scrutiny of another kind: the real-time notification of authorisations to a judicial commissioner, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within seven days. That should be seen very much as an outer limit for notification that should, so far as possible, be in real time. It will be open to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to encourage not only prompt notification but pre-notification for informal guidance, as already occurs in some other surveillance contexts. This might be particularly useful for bodies that do not make frequent use of the power.

The case for real-time notification, as I shall call it, has been put most persuasively by those who signed the equivalent amendments in Committee—the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Carlile. I shall summarise it as briefly as I can.

My immediate reaction to this Bill was to support prior judicial authorisation. I championed the use of prior judicial approval for other investigatory powers in my report A Question of Trust, and was delighted to see this in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I accept that it might also be feasible in this context, given sufficient judicial training, yet I have reservations about prior judicial approval in this Bill, not only for the pragmatic reason that the Government have so firmly set their face against it. Handling and authorising a CHIS is a highly specialised function that requires a close and dynamic understanding not only of the details of the operation but of the characters of those involved. That is not something that a judge, let alone a Secretary of State, will necessarily have the capacity to pick up. It differs considerably from the classic judicial exercise of weighing the benefits of tapping a phone or an undersea cable against the associated intrusion of privacy.

The person who tasks a CHIS, including by authorising criminality, effectively takes on a long-term duty of care, not only towards any potential victims of that crime but towards a CHIS for whom exposure could result in injury or death. Perhaps it is for that reason that the American and Canadian models of prior judicial authorisation, both of them inspirations for A Question of Trust, are not applied in either country to the tasking of a CHIS to commit crimes.

The main objection offered to these amendments in Committee was to the insufficient sharpness of their teeth. It is true that real-time notification may mean that the judicial commissioners are powerless to stop a particularly rapid deployment. It is also true that criminal deployments of this kind cannot just be turned on and off like a tap, but I say three things in response.

First, precisely the same result may arise under a system of prior judicial authorisation, for such a system, like its equivalents in other areas of investigatory powers, will inevitably involve an urgency procedure: deploy first, seek authorisation later.

Secondly, there is an existing precedent for real-time notification—the deployment of undercover police under the so-called relevant sources order of 2013, which, judging from IPCO’s annual reports, works well. The knowledge that a CCA will go straight before a senior judge is a useful discipline for authorising officers. My experience of IPCO, and my own work until last year as Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the Channel Islands, is that the prospect of an interrogation, investigation, recommendations and a possible serious error report are, from the police’s point of view, striking enough to encourage a high standard of conduct, but not so intimidating as to encourage the concealment of honest error. Further assurance would be given by Amendment 34 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which I will leave him to develop but which I support for making this explicit in the modern practice of undercover policing.

Thirdly, though the precise mechanism may still be in dispute, it is clear that neither RIPA nor this Bill provides for complete immunity from prosecution for those who authorise criminal conduct. I mentioned earlier the assurance of the Bill team, which the Minister repeated just now, that nothing in the statute prevents the prosecution of an authorising officer for misconduct in public office—for example, a corruptly obtained authorisation. She has also accepted that such immunity as provided by Section 27 of RIPA will be removed if an authorisation is found by a competent civil or criminal court to be either not necessary or not proportionate.

I propose to move these amendments on Wednesday, subject to one point on Amendment 37, the Scottish one. The Minister updated us on engagement with the Scottish Government during the first grouping. Were the Scottish Government to indicate before Wednesday’s debate that they would not recommend a legislative consent Motion, with the result that Scotland is carved out of the Bill, I would not wish to move Amendment 37.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendments 5 and 23, tabled by my noble friend Lord Dubs, provide for prior judicial oversight. They have the Opposition’s support. A criminal conduct authorisation would not have effect until approved by a judicial commissioner, unless it was urgent, in which case it would come into effect immediately but with the proviso that it must receive judicial approval within 48 hours.

Amendment 17 provides that, where a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be notified of certain details, including the purpose and extent of the deployment, before the CHIS can be deployed. In urgent cases, notification can be given afterwards—as soon as reasonably possible, but within seven days. We will support Amendment 17 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It provides a further form of prior oversight to help ensure that the criminal conduct authorisation will not be used in an inappropriate manner.

We support Amendment 33 in the lead name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which provides that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed of an authorisation as soon as reasonably practicable, and within seven days at the latest. It also represents a significant improvement in the Bill, in which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has played a key role. It enables an effective and powerful independent and impartial check on the use of criminal conduct authorisations, which will help to ensure that the bodies being given the power to authorise criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources use that power appropriately and lawfully, in the knowledge that they will be held to account, albeit probably afterwards, by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Amendment 34 would make it explicit in the Bill that, if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner thinks an authorisation should not have been granted, the authorisation will be cancelled. We support that. However, there are benefits from prior independent oversight that post-notification oversight does not provide: namely, the opportunity to prevent something out of order occurring before it happens. Prior judicial consideration is about approving or otherwise beforehand what is said needs to happen, and why. Post authorisation, it is about what actually happened and why. Both forms of consideration are important.

The absence of prior independent scrutiny for criminal conduct authorisations under this Bill is not in line with procedures that apply to other investigatory functions, although I appreciate that it has been argued that these investigatory functions are not similar to the authorisation of a CCA. Police search warrants require a magistrate to be satisfied that there are objective reasonable grounds for them. Targeted interception of communications or phone tapping must be approved by the Secretary of State and authorised by a judicial commissioner before being carried out—a double lock which the Investigatory Powers Commissioner says ensures that all investigatory powers warrants issued are necessary, proportionate and lawful. The power to require telecommunications operators to retain communication data for investigatory purposes can be used by the Secretary of State but must be approved by a judicial commissioner.

If these requirements for prior judicial approval, including in some instances a double lock of independent scrutiny, are needed for search warrants, phone tapping and retention of data, surely they are even more necessary for the potentially more damaging human rights violations, including physical violence, that could arise from the authorisation of criminal conduct by a covert human intelligence source.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has withdrawn. I call the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Before I comment on these amendments, I am told that there was a tweet earlier today from the Commons Minister on this Bill, James Brokenshire, saying that he has had a recurrence of a tumour in part of his lung and that he is taking leave for curative surgery. I am sure that I am not alone in wanting to extend best wishes to him for a full recovery.

I will be brief, because everything that needs to be said on Amendment 6 has already been said. It requires a person authorising a criminal conduct authorisation to reasonably believe that the tests for authorisation are met and are necessary and proportionate. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to what the Solicitor-General had said at Second Reading in the Commons, to the effect that the code of practice sets out that there does need to be a reasonable belief that an authorisation is necessary and proportionate. As we have heard, there is wording in part of the code of practice that is not—let us say—quite as strong as the words of the Solicitor-General in the Commons.

Crucially, once again, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said in Committee, the notion of reasonableness is completely absent from the Bill, which the courts would treat as the authoritative source. Like others, I see no reason why the Government are not prepared to put the word “reasonable” in the Bill. We certainly support Amendment 6.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I heard earlier today that my right honourable friend James Brokenshire had to go in for some more surgery; I pay tribute to him. He is one of the most decent people in politics and an extraordinarily capable Minister. He has never been far from my mind this afternoon, as not only has he mentored me but we discussed and worked closely on every aspect of the Bill. I wish him a very speedy recovery.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to add an explicit requirement for an authorising officer’s belief that the conduct is both necessary and proportionate to be a reasonable one. I have already explained why the Government cannot support this proposal. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, almost spelled out the reasons I was going to give, which are a bit of a repetition and with which I am not sure he will be entirely satisfied. However, since Committee I have updated the CHIS code of practice to make it clearer that it is expected that the belief should be a reasonable one.

I caution against an amendment seeking to include this wording in the Bill, as it would cast doubt on the test that is expected to apply to other authorisations. In particular, it could have unintended consequences for a Section 29 use and conduct authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Including the need for a reasonable belief here, creating an inconsistency in the legislation, would create uncertainty over whether the same requirement exists for the underlying Section 29 authorisation. As I mentioned earlier, as a matter of public law, a decision made subject to a discretionary power must be reasonable; that is, the decision must be rationally open to a reasonable decision-maker in possession of the facts in the case.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has also called for the length of authorisations to be reduced from 12 months to four months, with a formal requirement for a monthly review of the authorisation. As I have said, the current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities using it.

While the code of practice is clear that an authorisation must be relied on for as short a duration as possible, and in many cases an authorisation will not last longer than four months, reducing the maximum length risks unintended consequences; for example, a shorter duration could mean that activity is rushed through in a shorter period of time, to avoid renewal or to demonstrate the value of a deployment to support a renewal. This clearly may not be the most effective or safest way of carrying out that conduct. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness is sufficiently reassured to withdraw her amendment.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and to express my support for the amendment she has just moved.

I have to say that I am wholly unconvinced by the argument that adherence to the Human Rights Act is all that is needed. The fact is that the convention rights set out in the schedule to that Act were not designed for this situation at all. Their purpose is to define the rights of individuals against the state, as represented by public bodies. It is not a catalogue of what individuals may or may not do to each other. Of course, the sources that the police may use must have these protections against those who use them. But to use the convention rights in the Human Rights Act to define what the sources may do to other people or may be encouraged to do to other people is to take those rights completely out of context.

Furthermore, reference to these rights lacks the precision and clarity that is needed to deal with what a source may or may not be authorised to do. If you look at Article 2 of the list of convention rights—the right to life—what is really dealt with there is the right to life as against the things that a state may do: depriving the individual of his life except in circumstances where that may be absolutely necessary; and the circumstances are set out there. Article 3 deals with the prohibition of torture, although I notice that it omits the word “cruel” before “inhuman”, which is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the UN convention against torture. Therefore, if one was trying to define the prohibition or the control against the misuse of sources, one would want to put in the word “cruel”, which is more easily understood than the word “inhuman”. Article 4 deals with the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, which is drifting far away from what we need to have as reassurance in the matter we are dealing with here. So it is with Article 5, which is the right to liberty and security, and which really deals with the circumstances in which an individual may be arrested or detained by the police. Furthermore, there is no mention in the convention rights of rape or other sexual offences, no doubt because that is what people do to each other, not what public authorities do to their citizens.

That said, I have to confess, if the noble Baroness will forgive me, that some of the wording of amendment 15 troubles me. The criterion we must apply is that what we have asked to be set out in the statute should be clear and easily understood. Proposed new subsection (8A)(b), which is given in Amendment 15, refers to

“an attempt in any manner to obstruct or pervert the course of justice.”

That is a very wide-ranging crime, and I am not sure that it would be sensible to include it in this list because very often it may be a relatively minor thing to do, with no psychological or physical consequences to anybody; it is just obstructing the interests of justice. Paragraphs (d) and (e) refer to the Human Rights Act, but for the reasons I have given, I would prefer that that reference was omitted. The Canadian example to which the noble Baroness referred is clearer in its wording. For example, when dealing with obstructing or perverting the course of justice, it includes the word “wilfully”, which would be wise if one is trying to strike the right level of balance in dealing with these matters. It refers to the torture convention when defining what is meant by torture, which I would support, particularly because it includes the word “cruel”. As for paragraph (e), when the amendment refers to depriving a person of their liberty, it really means detaining an individual, which is what the Canadian example gives. The Canadian example adds another point: damaging property. It might be wise to think of including something along those lines too. To take the example of committing or participating in arson, that would give rise to a serious risk to individuals who are in the building and it would be as well to include that along the same lines and for the same reasons as the others in the list. I suggest that some matters might have to be looked at again if the amendment is to be taken further.

I wish to emphasise one thing, as I did at Second Reading, which is that great weight must be given to the obligation in the torture convention. That convention does not merely require states to abstain from torturing people. It requires them to do more than that; it requires them to do everything in their power to avoid torture in any circumstances. I would therefore support an amendment which particularly includes the reference to torture as something that would never be authorised in any circumstances whatever.

Despite these misgivings, and extending again my apology to the noble Baroness for criticising her carefully drafted amendment, and because I believe the Government must think again, I support Amendment 15.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Speaking for the Opposition, I reiterate our appreciation of the work that our police and security services do on our behalf to keep us safe and our country secure. We know only too well that what they do makes a real difference.

Amendment 15, so ably moved by my noble friend Lady Massey of Darwen and to which my name is also attached, would put limits in the Bill on the crimes that could be authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation. The serious crimes that could not be authorised would cover murder, grievous bodily harm, torture and degrading treatment, serious sexual offences, depriving someone of their liberty and perverting the course of justice.

The Government have given an assurance that the Bill

“would not allow the public authorities named in the Bill to grant CHIS unlimited authority to commit any and all crimes. To allow this would breach the Human Rights Act 1998”.

In that context, I note the comments that were just made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, about the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the Bill itself contains no explicit limit on the types of criminal conduct that can be authorised. The Government say that to have a list of offences excluded from being given a criminal conduct authorisation would lead to covert human intelligence sources being tested against that list. But placing no explicit limit on the types of crimes that can be authorised is not the approach that has been taken in other jurisdictions, where the same risks of CHIS being tested would apply. As my noble friend Lady Massey has said, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act contains a power to authorise criminal conduct similar to that proposed in the Bill, but the legislation provides that nothing in that Act justifies many of the serious crimes also excluded under this amendment.

The FBI in the USA operates under guidelines that do not permit an informant to participate in any act of violence, except in self-defence. In Australia, the legislation provides protection from criminal responsibility and indemnification for civil liability only where the conduct does not involve the participant engaging in anything likely to cause death or serious injury to, or involve the commission of a sexual offence against, any person. The Government maintain that countries which have lists of such offences do not have similar criminality to us, but it is not clear what the established basis is for that assertion.

The Government then say that such a list of serious offences is not necessary, because the Human Rights Act provides all the protection needed against such serious crimes being given a criminal conduct authorisation. But if a criminal or terrorist group was sufficiently conversant with the terms of legislation excluding specific offences from being authorised to be able to test a CHIS, it would almost certainly also be sufficiently conversant with the protections against serious crimes being authorised in the Human Rights Act to test a CHIS if, as the Government presumably believe, those protections are clear-cut.

However, the Bill does not preclude specific criminal conduct being prohibited through a list, since it gives the Secretary of State the power, through secondary legislation, to prohibit the authorisation of any specified criminal conduct. Since it would be secondary legislation, Parliament would not get the right to amend what was put forward by the Secretary of State, as it would with primary legislation. Since the Government, presumably, do not believe that whatever criminal conduct might be prohibited from being authorised through such publicly available secondary legislation could be used by criminals as a checklist against which to test a covert human intelligence source, and put such sources at risk, it is not clear why explicit limits cannot also be set out in primary legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

If other ways of identifying journalistic sources covered by the 2016 Act require this level of protection, there is no reason why the granting of criminal conduct authorisations should not also be covered. We will vote for this amendment if the noble Baroness divides the House.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As has been said, Amendment 42, moved so succinctly by my noble friend Baroness Whitaker, requires a judicial commissioner to give approval for authorisations that would identify or confirm journalistic sources. It also requires the commissioner to have regard to both the public interest in protecting a source of journalistic information and the need for there to be another overriding public interest before a public authority seeks to identify or confirm a journalistic source.

As others have commented, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 introduced a requirement for prior authorisation from a judicial commissioner when any application is made to identify confidential journalistic sources. The concern is that this Bill creates a means to access confidential journalistic material and sources without any prior judicial oversight. Statutory provisions in a Bill such as this on criminal conduct authorisations which might allow a way round the existing legal protection of journalistic sources would deter those sources from coming forward in future, at the potential expense of journalists being able to expose illegal, corrupt, exploitative or anti-social activity—a vital role in a democratic society.

The current Secretary of State for Justice has previously said that the ability of sources to provide anonymous information to journalists needs to be protected and preserved. That will not happen if those sources are liable to be exposed by the activities of covert human intelligence agents authorised to commit criminal conduct with no prior judicial oversight.

We need to ensure that the current protections for whistleblowers and journalists are maintained and cannot be weakened or compromised by this Bill. This amendment, requiring prior judicial approval for authorisations relating to journalistic sources, would achieve that objective. We support Amendment 42.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Clark, outlined by her noble friend Lady Whitaker, would require prior judicial approval for a criminal conduct authorisation seeking to identify or confirm a source of journalistic material. I set out earlier in the debate why the Government do not consider prior judicial approval to be a workable option for any CHIS authorisation, so I shall not repeat those arguments. However, I will say again that where an authorisation is likely to result in the acquisition of confidential journalistic material there are already greater safeguards in place which are set out in the CHIS code of practice.

There will also now be notification of every single authorisation to IPCO soon after they have been granted. That will of course include any authorisations that are likely to result in the acquisition of confidential journalistic material. Judicial commissioners will therefore be able to consider the necessity and proportionality of an authorisation and check that the proper safeguards have been followed. I hope that provides the noble Baroness with the necessary reassurance and that she can withdraw the amendment.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, of course, we do not intend to oppose the government amendments —the devolution settlement is to be respected. However, I have some questions, the answer to which at least one of which I can work out from the Minister’s introduction to the amendment. She has had my notes, so I will go through the points that occurred to me.

First, can the Government say anything about their assessment of the impact of what the Minister has just explained? In Committee, she referred to minimising the “immediate operational impact”. It appears to be acknowledged, therefore, that there is some impact. What happens if Scotland legislates differently? The Minister’s letter to noble Lords of 13 January explains one of the issues, which I take to be the major issue, about which the Scottish Government was concerned: an amendment to the limits to conduct that can be authorised; that is, whether specific listed crimes should be excluded. The House has debated that point and I am not seeking to reopen the matter.

In Committee, the Minister reminded us that national security and economic well-being are reserved, not devolved; she has just repeated that. In that case, could there be challenges—it seems to me that there could be—as to whether certain conduct is merely, if that is the right word, a crime? It is not merely a crime, but the House will understand that I am referring to a crime that does not fall within the other categories. The Minister also said that public authorities will continue to rely, in the immediate term, on the existing basis for an authorisation—which, I take it from what she said, is the non-statutory basis.

How, then, does Clause 8 work? That clause says that the Bill extends to Scotland and Northern Ireland, save that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are not amended. The Minister has introduced Amendment 7 —as well as Amendment 8—which amends Schedule 2, the list of consequential amendments. This provides that there may not be a criminal conduct authorisation if

“all or some of the conduct … is likely to take place in Scotland.”

If some of the conduct is in Scotland and the rest in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, does that mean there have to be parallel authorisations, one statutory and one non-statutory? Or do I understand from what the Minister said that the Government in England, Wales and Northern Ireland will proceed on the non-statutory basis so it will be aligned with the authorisation in Scotland? A criminal conduct authorisation prompted by an ordinary crime, if I can call it that, cannot extend across the border but, of course, the crime may well do so.

Finally, the Minister may or may not be able to say whether the issue is wider than the Bill. We will be in Committee next week on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill and I gather from government amendments that there is an issue there—but is it an even wider issue on legislation? I hope the Minister can help with my questions, which I have tabled in order to understand how the Bill will operate in this circumstance.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I thank the Minister for her explanation of the purpose of these government amendments and for her letter of 13 January explaining the position in the light of the confirmation from the Scottish Government that they are unable to recommend consent for devolved provisions within the Bill. We understand why the Government have brought forward these amendments today and accept the need for them. Our key concern is whether the situation that has now been reached will have any adverse impact at all on national security and economic well-being, UK-wide, and it would be helpful if the Government could confirm, as I think the Minister has sought to indicate, that there will be no such adverse impact.

The letter from the Minister of 13 January states that the Scottish Government

“require further amendment to the Bill in relation to limits to the conduct which can be authorised under the Bill.”

As this House has now added those limits to the Bill, are the Government minded to change their stance on that issue and accept the amendment concerned?

Finally—I appreciate that this is a matter to which the Minister has also made reference—will the Government say what the impact will be, first in Scotland, to which she referred, and also in the UK as a whole, if the present legal basis for authorising criminal conduct changes, based on the outcome of the current, ongoing court case?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for raising those points. On the final point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on what happens if the law changes in relation to the court case, clearly the court case is ongoing, we await the findings of it and, in a sense pre-empting the court case, the Government have seen fit to put on to a statutory footing that which was never on a statutory footing. So I hope that, without in any way pre-empting the court case, this will satisfy the courts.

Obviously, the Government are disappointed that we are having to bring forward these amendments. We made it clear that a UK Bill was and remains our preference, and we have worked hard to try to accommodate that. But we have to ensure the workability of the Bill as our primary consideration, and on those grounds we could not provide the amendment necessary to ensure the support of the Scottish Government. On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about limits, we will not accept any change to what we have put forward because it would completely undermine the operational capabilities that the Bill provides for. I have been through the arguments about the safeguards on human rights that are provided in the Bill and, of course, the Children Act when it comes to children.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about the Government’s assessment of impact. She will appreciate that we do not want to provide sensitive operational detail, but operational partners are considering how to manage any impact of the decision of the Scottish Government. In the immediate term, public authorities will need to consider any existing legal basis for an authorisation, but the noble Baroness is absolutely right to acknowledge that these organisations will not be able to rely on the clear statutory basis provided by the Bill. If there is operational or legal risk in the future, it will be for the Scottish Government to bring forward legislation for devolved activity. It will be in their gift to decide on the safeguards attached to that legislation, and I would hope and expect them to be driven by the expert advice of operational partners, as we have been.

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[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have a lot of respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and we support the spirit of her amendment to the Motion to the extent that we oppose the granting of legal immunity. We believe that the Bill undermines the rule of law—that is, the principle whereby all members of a society are considered equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. As a result of the Bill, that is called into question, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, have said.

Where a police officer or member of the security services tasks a covert human intelligence source to commit an act defined in law as a crime, the person tasked will no longer be subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. An existing system that has worked effectively for decades, whereby informants and agents are tasked to commit crime and the decision, almost without exception, not to prosecute is taken by the relevant prosecuting authority, after considering all the facts, will be swept aside.

It is to be replaced with what we consider an unsafe and undesirable power, vested in the hands of the police, the security services and numerous other public authorities, to grant legal immunity with no prior judicial authority. The main issue is not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, says in her amendment to the Motion, that there are insufficient safeguards or oversight, although this is arguably true. It is the fact that immunity can be granted at all, making the illegal legal. That is the fundamental issue for us on these Benches. I expect the legality of this aspect of the Bill to be challenged in the courts. That said, the House fully debated this aspect of the Bill, and without the support of the Labour Party leadership, we on these Benches were unable to remove it.

Contrary to the amendment to the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, this House has clarified the existing position and improved the Bill, to ensure that innocent victims of crimes committed by those instructed to do so by state agents can seek compensation. Contrary to her amendment to the Motion, undercover policing is not being expanded by the Bill, although the Bill has shone more light on this aspect of policing. The number of public authorities that can deploy covert human intelligence sources has been reduced by the Bill. The directed criminal activity of those informants and agents has been placed on a statutory footing, rather than the Bill enabling it to increase.

From the start, we recognised the need to place the tasking of covert human intelligence sources to commit crime on a statutory basis, which this Bill does. We have improved the Bill in some important respects—the safeguards for children and vulnerable adults, for example, despite our fundamental misgivings over immunity. Therefore, with regret, we cannot support the noble Baroness’s amendment to the Motion.

I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their work on the Bill; our Labour colleagues and their staff for their assistance and co-operation on those aspects that we were able to agree on; and those on the Cross Benches who have liaised with us. I also thank my staff and colleagues for their help with what has been a very difficult Bill for me, personally, because of my previous professional experience of this difficult area of policing and because of my knowledge of the very real opportunities that the Bill presents for corruption and malpractice. The amendments that this House has introduced are the very minimum required and we will resist any attempt to remove any of them.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we do not support the amendment to the Motion. This unelected House does not vote down Bills. Our role is that of a revising Chamber. Through making amendments to Bills, we invite the House of Commons to reconsider its position on specific aspects of legislation. That is what we have done with this Bill.

We have debated amendments to the Bill. Some have been agreed by this House, and some have not had its support. From our point of view, we have not won the support of this House for everything we wanted, but important amendments have been agreed and we want the Bill with those amendments to go back to the House of Commons for consideration. This amendment to the Motion, if carried, would thwart that objective and accordingly we shall vote against it.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I am not shy about admitting that I am critical of this Government, whose majority in the other place has made them quite shameless. They have, on occasion, asked your Lordships’ House to break the law, and this is another such occasion. Sometimes we are tough and we refuse; I hope that that is what will happen today.

It was superb listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Of course, both Greens will be voting for the amendments because this is about the rule of law and human rights. I do not very often agree with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis —probably never, in fact—but on this occasion I agreed with every single word he said, and I wish I had said it first.

On the enhanced protections for children, I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Young of Cookham, feel that something is better than nothing. But quite honestly, this is child abuse. It is child abuse by the Government—using children as spies. I cannot see how any Government who care about the rule of law could put this in legislation. It is obvious that this Government do not care about the rule of law; they protect their own while throwing others to the dogs.

This Bill provides blanket legal protection for undercover police and their informants—who could be criminals—for crimes with pre-authorised immunity. Similarly, the forthcoming overseas operations Bill creates new protections against prosecution for military personnel acting overseas. The Government have fought strongly for these protections against prosecution for the police and the military. They fought against any attempt by your Lordships’ House to reduce or check these protections.

Yet, having granted such broad protections to the police and military, even in cases of fundamental wrongdoing, the Government then refuse what is a comparatively far more limited legal defence for survivors of domestic abuse—usually women. A public inquiry is under way examining the 40-year history of government agents abusing their power while spying on trade unions, green campaigners and those in the black community fighting for justice. Police officers were using sexual relations with women as a deliberate strategy, although we are now told that it was unlawful all the time. We see this Government protecting their own from the law while allowing the abuse of vulnerable people and women. That is what this Government do.

I do not want to pile in on the noble Lord, Lord West, who said that the safety of CHIS should be paramount, but quite honestly, I thought the rule of law and the safety of the realm were meant to be paramount. If you continue to break the law as a Government, you are not increasing the safety of the realm; you are actually making it more dangerous for us all. I very much hope that noble Lords will vote for these amendments today and refuse again to let the Government abuse the law.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

I thank the Minister for her opening statement setting out the Government’s position on these motions. I also thank her for the helpful meetings that have taken place throughout the passage of this Bill.

On Motion A on Lords Amendment 1, we welcome the Government’s willingness to address this issue in the code of practice by including in the code the words, “that the person granting the authorisation must hold a reasonable belief that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”

On Motion B and Lords Amendment 2, we note that the Commons disagreed with the Lords amendment on the basis, as has been said, that it would place sources and the wider public at risk. The Minister repeated that view when she said that the Government would not support the amendment and implored this House to accept the advice of operational experts and do the same. We are disappointed that the Lords amendment has not been accepted. As my colleague, the Member for St Helens North, said in the Commons:

“if countries that are our allies, with similar criminal justice systems and with whom we co-operate on security matters, can do this, the Government need to set out a little more forcefully why we should not.”—[Official Report, Commons, 27/1/21; col. 431.]

I thank noble Lords who have raised their concerns today.

The Lords amendment was originally carried in this House by a small majority. We have already asked the elected House to think again on this issue, and it has not accepted the view we expressed. There was no indication, when it was debated and voted upon in the Commons, that our amendment had sufficient support to lead to a change in the Government’s position. We do not believe that sending the same amendment back a further time will produce any change in the legislation. For these reasons, we will not support the amendment to Motion B should the House divide, as it appears it will.

Motion C in respect of Lords Amendment 3 relates to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. We welcome the fact that on Report, the Government listened to the views of this House on redress for victims and have brought forward an amendment in lieu making it clear that an individual can access the scheme where appropriate. I pay tribute to the work done on the issue of redress for victims by the Joint Committee on Human Rights during its consideration of the Bill, and, in particular, by my noble friends Lord Dubs and Lady Massey of Darwen.

Motion D on Lords Amendment 4 relates to the authorisation of juveniles and vulnerable adults. I endorse the Minister’s comments on the involvement of noble Lords who have been particularly engaged with this issue—including my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Stella Creasy MP—and pay particular tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Young of Hornsey and Lady Kidron, who tabled amendments that we supported throughout the Bill. The Minister will have heard the remaining concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. On this issue, we have not achieved everything that was asked for but we welcome the government amendments in lieu, which go further than previous government amendments on this issue.