Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

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Department: Scotland Office

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts
Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 View all Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 144(Corr)-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee - (7 Dec 2020)
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Portrait Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con) [V]
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My Lords, in moving Amendment 57, I will also speak to Amendment 74.

These two probing amendments are designed to explore how the Government plan to use their regulatory powers in the Bill. I am informed on this because I am the chairman of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House. Along with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra—my committee has been concerned by the increasing use of skeleton Bills, where only the broadest frameworks are set out in primary legislation and all the practical details are left to regulation.

As a result, Parliament too often has only a general idea of what it may be approving when it passes the primary legislation. The Government may—they probably will—argue that all regulations have to be approved by Parliament, but Members of your Lordships’ House are well aware of the weakness of the scrutiny of regulations, which is that they are unamendable. The House is left with only what I call the nuclear option of complete rejection. Unsurprisingly, in these circumstances, neither House has felt able to press the button, except in the most exceptional circumstances.

Our two committees—my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s and mine—have written to Jacob Rees-Mogg, as Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, to express our concern and make suggestions for improvement. Let me take an example from earlier debates in Committee. My noble friend the Minister and other noble Lords—notably my noble friend Lord King and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew—referred Members to the revised code of practice as providing a reassurance against bad behaviour in the operation of CCAs. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, urged every Member of the Committee to read through the code. I followed the noble Lord’s advice and read it, all 73 pages of it. I agree that, at least to my untutored and inexperienced eye, it appears extensive and comprehensive, but its weakness is that it is made by regulation—in this case, Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. So its contents depend on ministerial policy decisions and can be changed, at any time, by the tabling of an unamendable regulation.

I do not doubt for a moment the good intentions of my noble friends on the Front Bench, nor the good intentions of the Front Benches of the other parties in this House or the other place, but none of them will be in their seat for ever. Amendment 57 is designed to explore the risk of what I described in my remarks at Second Reading as “mission creep”, or, more specifically, how wide the room for manoeuvre is for a future Secretary of State using the powers available under Clause 1(5)(10) on page 3 of the Bill.

I pose three simple questions for my noble friend the Minister to answer when he replies. First, can the Secretary of State, under this clause, add to or remove bodies from the list of relevant authorities given on page 4 of the Bill? Secondly, is there any limit to the changes that the Secretary of State may make, under this clause, to the authorisation levels for CCAs, given in annexes A and B of the draft revised code of practice? This issue has been raised on a number of occasions, notably by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. Thirdly, is there any limit to the changes that the Secretary of State may make to the purposes for which a CCA is sought? That was a discussion on Amendment 22. In particular, what is meant by “impose requirements” in line 13? That issue was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Before I finish, I turn briefly to Amendment 74. This poses the same questions for Scotland as Amendment 57 does for the rest of the United Kingdom, but there is one additional point of concern: whether, as a result of two systems existing, what is known as forum shopping can take place. Historically, in cases involving extradition, prosecuting authorities were in the habit of surveying the legal options open to them and picking the route, courts and jurisdiction that, on past experience and record, were most likely to give them a favourable result. As I see it, the two CHIS systems begin in identical form but, over time, can and probably must be expected to diverge. How far that will be is impossible to predict now, but the possibility of forum shopping emerges. Can my noble friend comment on the interchangeability of CCAs granted under Scottish law being used in the rest of the United Kingdom, and vice versa? I beg to move Amendment 57.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
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My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Lord decided to probe these two provisions. I have seen the correspondence published by the three committees. I was struck when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, in responding to the previous group, referred to the code of practice having the force of law. I do not dispute that, but it is of course law that can be changed by government Ministers without coming to Parliament.

The point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about forum shopping is interesting. As he said, I have asked for assistance on the meaning of some terms during the passage of the Bill. I questioned what is envisaged by the terms “conduct” and “requirements”. I read both to restrict, rather than expand, the scope of what may be done. I would be grateful to have that confirmed or, if not, to understand why not. In short, we should not be expanding opportunities for criminal conduct authorisations without, at the very least, understanding exactly what we are doing.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
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First, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, well in his campaign against skeleton Bills, as that issue is getting worse, not better.

The Bill provides that the Secretary of State may, by order, prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given. As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, Amendments 57 and 74, in his name, would remove those provisions and, as he confirmed, their purpose is to probe the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation.

Earlier in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, stated that the order-making provisions in the Bill

“allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited.”

He continued:

“I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards ... The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they are contained in secondary legislation.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 676.]


When the noble and learned Lord said that the order-making powers could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards, did the Government mean that the wording in the Bill would make it contrary to law to do that, or did they mean only that the intention was not to use the order-making powers to remove any of the existing safeguards? That, of course, is a very different thing, as intentions can change.

No doubt in their response the Government will address that point and give specific examples of the purposes or intentions for which these order-making powers to prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given would—and, equally, would not—be used by the Secretary of State.

--- Later in debate ---
Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
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My Lords, the horse will be out of the stable again in January: refreshed, I hope. I am sure that the Minister will welcome the pause after the marathon she has had to undergo. I am not for a moment suggesting she is anything like a horse—I am sorry, perhaps I should not have followed that simile.

My noble friend Lord Paddick recently spoke to Amendment 79, and it is clear that several noble Lords have concerns in this area, so we will come back to it. Noble Lords clearly agree on the importance of evaluating what goes on and of transparency, as has already been mentioned. However, I cannot help thinking in the context of the precise formulation of this amendment of what the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, talked about a week or two ago, to which my noble friend referred: the problem of the extent to which one can report in detail without endangering those who are protecting us and whom we, in turn, do not wish to endanger. I cannot help thinking that if a lot of the material listed in Amendment 75C were to be published, an awful lot of it might be redacted. However, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in spirit, and I think that his last point about material damage or civilian harm is an important one that we must not lose sight of. We still need to explore how best and to what extent we can achieve what is obviously troubling a number of us.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
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The purpose of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, is described as being to probe the adequacy of information provided to Parliament on criminal conduct authorisations and to probe the efficacy of the authorisations.

I think that this comes back to the issue of transparency. To be a little more particular, will we be told in advance, during the passage of the Bill, precisely what kind of information about criminal conduct authorisations will be provided to us and to the public by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the annual report or other reports? At the moment, I am not clear about what information will be provided and what it will cover, and whether it will give us a feel for what is happening over criminal conduct authorisations or whether we will be told that the information provided will be limited and that, on grounds of security, it cannot be disclosed.

I hope that, at least in their response either to this amendment or on Report, the Government will be prepared to spell out what information will and will not be provided so that we all know where we stand on this issue.