Lord Norton of Louth
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Lord Norton of Louth
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, Clause 3 is straightforward. It disqualifies Members of the House of Commons from sitting as Members of the National Assembly for Wales. The provision implements recommendation 40 of the 2009 report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, MPs’ Expenses and Allowances. The committee’s recommendation derived from consideration of the position in Northern Ireland, where all the parties with representatives at Westminster wanted to bring multiple mandates to an end.
The clause also appears to be supported by the main parties at Westminster. At Second Reading in the other place Owen Smith, speaking for the Opposition, said that the Labour Party welcomed the provision, as the party had,
“always had an internal party position whereby it does not support people having dual mandates”.—[Official Report, Commons, 31/3/14; col. 618.]
What, then, is the basis for outlawing dual mandates? The argument appears to be that one cannot do the job of an MP while also holding another mandate. It was that conceit of the European Parliament that led to the EU prohibiting members of national legislatures from serving as Members of the European Parliament. We had to legislate to exclude Members of this House who were elected as MEPs.
The Committee on Standards in Public Life also contended that a dual mandate did not meet the conditions it prescribed for MPs holding other jobs—namely that it did not interfere with the primary role of the MP, was completely transparent to electors, and did not present a conflict of interest. The committee conceded that the second of these did not apply to a dual mandate. There is obvious transparency.
I am not persuaded that the other two conflict with holding the dual mandate either. I do not see a conflict of interest—not, at least, if one is representing the same constituents. The point about interfering with the primary role of the MP brings us, in essence, back to the practical argument. I am not clear that a case has been made that it interferes with the primary role of the MP. One could argue that it introduces an element of cross-fertilisation of benefit to both bodies.
Last week I had the honour of attending, indeed of chairing, the Speaker’s Lecture, given by Nick Raynsford, a former Minister for Local Government, who drew attention to the decline, which he regretted, in the number of MPs who serve concurrently as local councillors. The numbers have decreased significantly in recent decades, to the point where there are now virtually no MPs who also sit as local councillors. As he pointed out, this is in stark contrast to what happens in a number of our European neighbours.
Supporters of the clause will doubtless argue that it is no longer possible to do justice to the job of an MP while also serving as a local councillor. Some seem to manage—but that is not my point. The argument ignores a fundamental issue of principle. If one is to have a public office filled by election, one should not infringe the freedom of choice of the electors. If electors wish for a particular candidate to serve them in more than one assembly, that is a matter for them. It may be difficult or near impossible to serve in both, but that is not a sufficient basis for prohibiting voters by law from electing whoever they wish to represent them.
The late Lord Bannside was well known for having a triple mandate, never mind a dual mandate. Fulfilling all three roles may have been overly demanding. He may not have served his constituents effectively—although I am not saying he did not. My point is that it was a matter for him, and for those who elected him. His constituents put him in those positions. They knew what to do if they felt he was not representing them effectively.
I have a principled objection to restricting by law the choice of electors. I do not regard it as our role to say who electors should or should not elect. It is for that reason that I supported lowering the age at which one could stand for election to public office. I have no problem with that age being lower than the voting age; it used to be the other way round. If you lower the voting age to 16, you empower 16 year-olds. If you lower the age at which someone can stand for election to 16, you empower electors. My view is that we should be widening the choice of electors, not restricting it.
There are some positions that are incompatible with elected office. Those are generally already provided for, but we should keep them to a minimum. I see that in Amendment 10 my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford wishes to exclude any,
“member of the legislature of any country or territory outside the Commonwealth (other than Ireland),
from being eligible to be elected to the National Assembly. I suspect the chances of any member of such a legislature standing are pretty slim, but why should we legislate to prevent that? If political parties wish to have internal rules to limit such dual candidatures, that is a matter for them, but we should not be using the statute book to forbid it. If an AM wants to stand for election to the House of Commons or an MP seeks election to the National Assembly, that should be a matter for them and for the judgment of electors.
As I said, my objection to the clause is one of principle. We should apply stringent standards of scrutiny to measures of constitutional significance, not least those that place a restriction on electors. That is what, in effect, the clause does. It is important to get this on the record. We are in danger of creating a patchwork quilt of restrictions through bans on a dual mandate. We need to be more alert to the implications. If we are to proceed with the clause, we need to have on record a clear, principled justification for it. I invite both Front Benches to address the issue of principle engaged by the provision. There is no need to address the practical implications; we know what those are. We need to have the principle underpinning the ban that trumps the right of electors to elect the candidates of their choice. I beg to move.
Lord Anderson of Swansea
My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, says. He argues on a point of principle that the choice of the electorate should not be channelled in any way in respect of dual candidacy. He mentioned the position on the continent. He will know that the stream is moving strongly against an accumulation of mandates on the continent—certainly in France, which I know reasonably well. When I represented Swansea, I would have loved to be the Mayor of Swansea at the same time and, perhaps, to have had another mandate. That would have been very useful in cross-fertilisation and no doubt added to my local standing. I work on the simple principle of practicality. People tend to vote for the party, which stands against the principled point which the noble Lord enunciated. Also, no person can serve two masters. My experience in the other place was that, if done properly, it was a full-time job. Equally, as we add to the responsibilities of the Assembly, if an Assembly Member is to do the job properly, that is also a full-time job, and the electorate should not be short-changed by allowing a person to do the two jobs. They will do one well and the other not.
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for his amendment, which allows us to discuss a clause in the Bill that we have not touched on in our previous discussions. I should also say that this is an additional matter that was not covered in the Silk report. The noble Lord comes to this debate on Report with an enviable and well deserved reputation on constitutional issues. I listened very carefully to what he said.
The noble Lord touched on the 2009 report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which did indeed recommend that the practice of Members of the House of Commons holding a dual mandate with a devolved legislature should be brought to an end by 2015 at the latest. As my noble friend has set out, that has so far prompted action additionally in relation to Northern Ireland.
The committee questioned whether it was possible for someone sitting in two legislatures simultaneously to do justice to both roles. The Government share the committee’s concern, and listening to noble Lords across the Chamber, it seems that this is a widely shared concern. I very much agree with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, that this is not just about serving the needs of constituents, although, of course, that is important; it is also about the ground rules and the practicalities of what is going on in the institutions concerned.
No Assembly Member is currently an MP but, historically, a number have been so. Indeed, we have two distinguished ones here today who could probably speak to the difficulty—near impossibility, I think—of doing both roles, certainly on a sustained basis. In the Government’s 2012 Green Paper, Future Electoral Arrangements for the National Assembly for Wales, the Government consulted on whether the practice of having multiple mandates should be brought to an end. A large majority of respondents—this time a reliable sample, I think, and a very large majority of respondents—agreed that it should, including opposition parties in the Assembly and the Electoral Reform Society.
Although the Welsh Government did not consider legislation to be necessary, at the Bill’s Second Reading in the Commons the shadow Secretary of State agreed with the proposal, as my noble friend Lord Norton affirmed. Following consultation, in March 2013 the Government announced that we would introduce legislation to prohibit multiple mandates between the House of Commons and the National Assembly at the earliest opportunity. This clause provides that membership of the House of Commons automatically disqualifies someone from sitting in the Assembly, subject to specific exceptions.
If a sitting Member of Parliament is subsequently elected as an Assembly Member, they are given eight days’ grace in which to vacate their seat in the House of Commons, by requesting appointment to a disqualifying office such as the Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The eight-day period also applies if parliamentary and Assembly elections are held in close proximity and a candidate is elected to both legislatures. This is to allow them to decide which post to take up. Similar provisions apply in Northern Ireland.
No grace period is given to an Assembly Member who is elected as an MP except where a scheduled Assembly election is expected to take place within a year, the maximum possible period actually being 372 days between parliamentary and Assembly elections. In this instance, an individual will be able to retain both seats for that limited period of time to avoid a costly Assembly by-election when a scheduled Assembly general election is relatively imminent. The draft Wales Bill allowed for a six-month grace period, but following pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Welsh Affairs Committee recommended that the period be extended to one year, and the Government have accepted this recommendation. This clause does not apply to the House of Lords, where there are no constituency interests to represent.
This clause will ensure that an Assembly Member will be able to concentrate on representing the constituents and can contribute significantly to the institution. There was cross-party agreement on these proposals in the House of Commons, and I would therefore ask my noble friend Lord Norton to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, it is precisely because there was cross-party agreement that there is a valuable case for raising the issue. I am grateful to those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, invites me to digress somewhat on to the proposal for a senate of the regions and nations—the words “back of an envelope” come to mind. In terms of the principle that would apply, it would be that which I have enunciated. He talked about caution, but I think that caution should apply to the very proposal for such a senate, rather than the method by which its members should be chosen.
On the points that have been raised, the principal argument deployed from both Front Benches against the amendment is, in essence, that being an MP is a full-time job. There are two problems with that. It was not accepted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its report, where the challenge was a conflict with the primary role, not an argument about its being a full-time job. It is also belied by the fact that the House of Commons is not unable to function because MPs are doing other jobs. It is quite possible for an MP to fulfil the functions of a Member of Parliament while being a Minister of the Crown, for example. I really do not see the argument that—
Lord Anderson of Swansea
While there is a difference between being a Minister and a Member of Parliament, they are in the same building at the same time. I invite the noble Lord to consider the example of someone who is a Member of the Assembly and yet is called to vote in the House of Commons—as the Prime Minister was yesterday, in full evening dress—and therefore neglects what might also be an important vote in the Assembly. A number of conflicts will arise in that way and a Member of Parliament or a Member of the Assembly will have to choose which he would prefer.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I recall that, particularly pre-devolution, we had Ministers who were responsible for different parts of the United Kingdom and who had to spend an awful lot of time not being in London. If there are challenges from being in both assemblies, that is a matter for the Members. Certainly, at times Members have managed to achieve that. Let us not forget that when we talk about a dual mandate, we are referring only to the House of Commons. There are Members of this Chamber who have a dual mandate, including one who is present at the moment.
Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth
Perhaps I could remind the House that, after the Minister has spoken, it is only the mover of the amendment who can speak.
Lord Norton of Louth
In that case, I will not be able to anticipate what my noble friend Lord Crickhowell may have been about to raise with me. My point is that the objection to what I am bringing forward is one of practice. I am challenging whether, in effect, one can really do that. Essentially, when your Lordships think about it, those who are making that case are saying: “We know best”. That is not an argument for restricting the freedom of electors. The task may be difficult. It may be close to impossible, which is the point being put forward, in which case it is open to those people not to stand and put themselves up to fulfil those dual roles and it would be open to the electors to make the decision not to elect them. As the Committee on Standards in Public Life made absolutely clear, there is at least transparency in this respect. You know what you are getting into, at least on whom you are electing, because of the positions that they hold, so I think that that principle holds.
The other argument put by the Committee on Standards in Public Life is that of a conflict of interest. However, I do not regard that as being persuasive either, because Members of Parliament have at times a conflict of interest between what their party wants and what they see as the interests of their constituencies. I suppose that the logic of that would be to ban MPs from being elected on a party label, which I think is not what the parties particularly want.
In response to the arguments put forward, there is a practical argument, but I do not think that it is sufficient to overcome what is a fundamental issue of principle. We are restricting the right of electors and it is important to get that on the record. That may not suffice today to prevent such rights from being restricted but I hope that it may help to give thought and prevent such incursions in the future. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Rowe-Beddoe (CB)
My Lords, I support the amendment most warmly. I do not wish to rehearse the Committee stage of the Bill, but I moved a very similar amendment at that time, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Richard. I now have a mnemonic for the situation, PRAT. It works something like this: increased powers—which is what I focused on in Committee—brings increased accountability; increased accountability produces a necessity for greater transparency. I think those are totally linked. It is therefore important that we put a marker in the Bill. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, that this may well be determined in future by the National Assembly for Wales. In the mean time, a marker should be put down to recognise that we all feel—I think there is consensus in the House at this moment—that there are not enough Assembly Members to do the work that will be put on them by the powers they will be given by the Bill. I strongly support the amendment.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I, too, have sympathy with the amendment. I was recently in Cardiff Bay, speaking at a conference organised by the Welsh Government centre looking at the challenges facing the National Assembly. I focused on the challenges that derive from the fact that it is devolved, relatively new and small. Size does matter; it is especially important in a parliamentary system. As we have already heard, it affects the committees that are operating, not least because, with the small number of Members, there are problems setting up a comprehensive series of investigative committees where Members are not stretched by having to serve on several. That limits the capacity of the legislature to effectively scrutinise the Executive.
The other point about size is that the proportion of the Assembly that forms the Executive tends to be somewhat greater than with larger assemblies. The National Assembly is nowhere near the position in Gibraltar, where there are actually no Back-Benchers at all. However, the proportion of Ministers in the National Assembly is greater than it is in the House of Commons. In order for it to fulfil its functions effectively, you need members who can do that and to ensure that the Executive are not too prominent as a proportion of the Chamber itself. For these reasons, I have considerable sympathy with this amendment.
Lord Bew (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 12 in the name of my noble friend Lord Elystan-Morgan and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I am compelled to do so as a matter of natural justice because I come from a region of the United Kingdom where the local Assembly has 108 members on the basis of a significantly lower population than that of Wales. Even if it is the case, which is widely rumoured in Belfast, that the Assembly will be reduced in size to 90 before too long, there will still be a significant anomaly in relation to Wales.
I have never been an uncritical admirer of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I am currently the chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. As has been referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth and Lord Norton, that committee has made significant criticisms of some of the practices of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Those criticisms are nothing to do with its size. The better features of the Northern Ireland Assembly are its greater size and, I submit, a greater variety of opinion and debate. It also has a greater representation of parties and politicians who would not normally find their way to that Assembly in the face of the large battalions of local politics.
The argument has been eloquently made in favour of the need for the Welsh Assembly to have more members in order for it to deal with the volume of business in a more effective way. That is not the only argument, although I fully support it. There is also the argument that the larger Assembly will contain more variety of opinion—and therefore more vitality—and that can only be to the benefit of the people of Wales.