Queen’s Speech

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Wednesday 11th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to focus on constitutional issues. For reasons of time, I do not propose to address those which have already been addressed today—we have had some outstanding speeches on the case for maintaining the union—and which we will be debating further during the Session. Rather, I wish to comment on two issues that are not scheduled for debate, but which I believe we should address. One derives from the overall legislative programme and the other from the consequences of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. The provisions of that Act determine that we are in a fifth Session, but they also raise wider constitutional questions. Both issues are core to the relationship between the Executive and Parliament.

The Government have been criticised for the fact that there is a light legislative load this Session. At the same time, we are variously told that there is too much legislation. Like my noble friend Lord Tyler, I prefer the emphasis to be on quality rather than quantity, and I therefore do not complain when there is not a heavy legislative programme. Where I think critics do have a point is in criticising the fact that the House does not sit so regularly when there is a light legislative agenda. The Government appear to think that when they have not got Bills to be considered then there is no point in either House sitting. Legislative scrutiny is a core function of Parliament but it is not the only one. Parliament gives expression to the views of the people. It serves, crucially, to call the Government to account for their actions. The Government need to accept that Parliament should sit even if there is not much legislation to discuss. As my noble friend Lord Tyler indicated, there is a great deal that we can and should be doing. One cannot rely on the Government to provide the time. We therefore need to address the issue of who determines the business and, more fundamentally, when we sit. The former issue was addressed by the Goodlad committee, but not endorsed by the House. The latter is a fundamental constitutional issue that has yet to be addressed.

I turn to a question of constitutional significance that has been neglected. The Constitution Committee’s report last Session on the constitutional implications of coalition government addressed the importance of collective responsibility. One feature of the doctrine is that the Government rest on the confidence of the House of Commons. It was a convention that if a Government were defeated on a vote of confidence, they either resigned or requested the dissolution of Parliament. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act translated the convention into statute, something that is very rarely done. If an explicit vote of no confidence is carried, an election is triggered unless within 14 days a new Government are formed and achieve a vote of confidence from the House.

The Constitution Committee report notes that a vote on the Queen’s Speech is often seen as a traditional means of expressing confidence in the Government. But what happens now if the Government are defeated on the Queen’s Speech or on a major issue of public policy? There cannot be an early election under the provisions of the 2011 Act. One presumes that the Opposition would move a Motion of no confidence, but it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a Government could be defeated on a substantive issue, but that the third party or dissident government Back-Benchers responsible for the defeat do not want an election and are not prepared to vote for a Motion of no confidence. What happens then? The Government could resign—the other option under the old convention. What if they do? No provision of the 2011 Act has been engaged. What does the Palace do?

I was going to develop the point but I am conscious of time. These are important issues. It is up to the House to take the initiative rather than simply responding to what the Government have placed before it. I hope that we will take the opportunity of using this Session to address issues that are fundamental to the relationship between Parliament and the Executive and deserve to be addressed sooner rather than later.

My comments are addressed to the House but I conclude with a question to the Minister: when will the long-awaited response of the Government to the Constitution Committee report on the constitutional implications of coalition government be published?