Crime and Policing Bill

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful that the Chief Whip will offer me the chance to speak for a couple of minutes. We have always agreed that this is an expert House, and it helps to make sure that legislation is best addressed by expertise where it can be. One of the things we might want to consider in this debate is that there are at least two Members of this House who have given at least 100 years in total to the management of people having terminations of pregnancy —so we do know quite a lot about it. There is also a large number of people who have not spoken who are fellows of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, who I think have been rather insulted by some of the things they have heard today because they do not represent the views of most members.

Having said that, I just want to say two things very simply. I firmly believe in decriminalisation. There is a great deal of misapprehension, as was just shown by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman. The fact of the matter is that you cannot induce a pregnancy close to term. In fact, I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will agree with me that it is virtually impossible to induce labour in a woman who does not have ruptured membranes at term with drugs. It just does not work. In fact, both he and I—numerous times, if I am not wrong—have been faced with caesarean sections that we did not want to do as the only way we could get a baby out of the womb when it was in danger. We could not use drugs to induce labour, because they do not work. That certainly applies to pills but even to drugs given intravenously. It is therefore important to understand that a termination of a pregnancy conducted by a woman herself will be an extremely rare event. It would be very difficult, and the idea that pills will work is nonsensical.

Moreover, we have heard a lot about pills, but nobody has told us yet what pills they are talking about. That is very important. The hormones that are usually used in early pregnancy would not work in late pregnancy. The other thing I have already mentioned is that pretty well all late terminations of pregnancy are done for very serious medical conditions. One of the commonest ones is where there is an extremely deformed baby in the womb. I described this during the earlier stages of the Bill, and I will not go through it again. The indications of these late pregnancies are always very carefully and scrupulously observed. They are not done lightly.

I should also add that, sadly, babies born much after 24 weeks still are very likely to be highly abnormal. Even though people often miscarry them when they do not want to, sometimes it can be the very best thing that can happen because these babies will eventually die early with very severe abnormalities.

Recently, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, chaired a committee on this very issue to see how we could reduce the number of premature births. It is a big problem in medicine because of the risks to the babies when they are born after 28 weeks. I shall say no more except that I firmly believe we should really try to understand this from the woman’s point of view. No woman tries to interrupt her pregnancy except with the deepest grief and the deepest unhappiness.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

We will have a short intervention, but we need to move on shortly to the Front Benches. That is what the House wants, I believe.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, throughout this debate Northern Ireland has been mentioned, yet not one Member from Northern Ireland has been allowed to speak until now. We have had to force the issue to be allowed to speak in this debate. When the new abortion laws, the most liberal and extreme laws in the United Kingdom, were forced on Northern Ireland, few across this House really cared. The lobby for abortion in Northern Ireland was on the basis that women there had fewer rights than in England and Wales. Now that same lobby is using the same arguments for a change in the law in England and Wales. In the previous debate, it was suggested that this would bring England and Wales into line with Northern Ireland, but that is misleading as, crucially, Northern Ireland does not have pills by post.

I genuinely believe that even many of those who support abortion know in their hearts that this is not the way to go about things. This hurried parliamentary process, the rewriting of one of the most sensitive and serious areas of criminal law, is surely unworthy of our democracy. A clause passed in the other House last summer was passed after 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate. Is that what our democracy has come to? If noble Lords think that this is a good idea, why are they not prepared to allow public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny, instead of rushing it through?

Clause 208 means no justice for the death of a full-term unborn child, even in the most grotesque circumstances. I ask supporters of Clause 208: what would you do if a woman told you that she was taking abortion pills, perhaps obtained from an NHS provider via telemedicine, in the 39th week of pregnancy because she had changed her mind about having a child? What would your conscience say to you, knowing that you made that possible through the support of this legislation?

We heard a great deal about unwelcome investigations, but what do supporters of Clause 208 think the police should do if they discover the dead body of a 39 week-old baby in a rubbish bin? The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, explained in Committee that investigations would often still be required even if Clause 208 passes, as police would need to investigate the circumstances if a deceased full-term baby body is found away from a clinical setting. Is that the option that supporters of Clause 208 really believe in?

To conclude, I could give many reasons why I support Amendments 425 and 426 but, because of time, I am not able to do so. Let us remember that when we are talking about the life of an unborn child, we are talking about not an it but a real, living person with the expectation of being born, being protected by a caring and loving society, and being held in loving arms. I do not think that is too much for a child to ask or expect.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

We need to move on to the Front Benches.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 13th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, if I may briefly answer that, I am saying that we have 3,000 years of a moral framework in which it is morally abhorrent. I am not here primarily to protect the sensitivities and feelings of doctors. I am saying what a violent novelty this is that we are embarking upon if we go down this route.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, there are a number of key objectives outlined in the amendments that we have been discussing for some time now, which are worthy of our most serious consideration. I suppose that the burden of the amendment is that doctors should be prohibited from initiating discussions about assisted dying because, if they were permitted to do so, it would fundamentally undermine the long-established patient-doctor contract and could expose vulnerable patients to undue pressure or influence at a time when they are fragile—at a fragile moment in their lives.

The raising of the issue of assisted dying surely must be strictly initiated by a patient and any discussion of the issue must be embedded in a manner that prioritises palliative or other support care over death. If doctors were permitted to initiate the issue of assisted dying, patients could rightly interpret this as an implicit recommendation on behalf of the medical profession and it could be seen as a choice influenced by authority, or even fear, and not a free choice. It must be acknowledged that, within society, doctors have an exceptional moral and social authority. A person who feels vulnerable, marginalised or devalued can easily be susceptible to pressure and influence if the recommendation or initiation of the issue of assisted dying comes from their doctor.

The moment of diagnosis of a terminal or life-limiting illness is an earth-shattering moment for most people within society. As a minister of religion for over 50 years, I have been with thousands of such people, who, when they have received the diagnosis that they have a terminal illness, feel shattered and absolutely broken. I can tell noble Lords that that leads to a multiplicity of emotions. I have also had many loved ones and friends who have faced that moment. The immediate shock of hearing those words can turn into depression and, even for a period, it can turn into suicidal thoughts and a feeling of “It’s all over anyhow; therefore, let me get out”.

However, we all know from personal experience—or many of us certainly know—that these thoughts at that earth-shattering moment can dissolve over time, whenever people are surrounded with love, aided by a loving conversation or their personal faith, or supported within the family or the community context. Indeed, the initial devastation I have seen turns dramatically into a quiet confidence: into a determination to fight for life and to live a fulfilling life, even though the person is in the midst of adversity. That is something to be cherished and praised. At the moment of despair, when a terminal diagnosis is given, how improper it would be for any doctor to raise or to suggest assisted dying as a more sympathetic way out of their pain or a free exit from life.

Sadly, the personal and deep doctor-patient relationship is no longer the reality that it used to be, and in multi-doctor practices, you may never see the same doctor again for months or even years. They do not really know you as they used to know you. To pretend that somehow it is the old way is not reality—it is living in a different world. Therefore, often no personal knowledge of that patient is held by a particular doctor. Any deep understanding of their mental health, their family life context, or societal or financial pressures that that person may be experiencing is negligible, yet it is the moment of crisis in a life.

During previous debates, some noble Lords and Baronesses have been rebuked for using the term “assisted suicide” instead of “assisted dying”. But does “assisted dying” terminology not mask the reality of what we are discussing? Normalising discussions about ending life before the natural-appointed, or God-appointed, time surely risks reframing suicide as a legitimate medical response to pain or distress, which is outside the scope of the Bill—at least, that is what we are told.

Allowing but not requiring doctors to raise assisted dying with their patient gives me no comfort, as I feel that it would lead to medical professionals being open to criticism or challenge. It will no doubt lead to inconsistency among professionals. Will patients seek to move from one general practice to another because the doctor they are moving to supports them in assisted dying? Will they have to move because their GP has a sincerely held conviction about the sanctity of life and will not participate in the practice of assisting a person to die?

A doctor permitted to discuss assisted dying with a patient surely cannot be just any registered medical practitioner. For clarification, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to confirm that the provision in Clause 5 is not limited to the patient’s GP, and that treating consultants, specialists or doctors who have a minimal relationship with the patient or none are not restricted from giving this advice. Can he also confirm that there are no restrictions on the setting in which a doctor might give this advice—a hospital ward, an out-patient clinic or elsewhere?

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

Order.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

I am finishing with this quotation, and it is just a couple of sentences:

“We also know that when you acquire disability, which most people do … it is absolutely frightening … If doctors are not on our side because they are thinking, ‘Should we mention the fact that they could have an assisted death?’, that poses a big cultural issue for the NHS, but also for us having confidence in the NHS”.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the probing Amendment 161 in my name. It asks the simple but profoundly important question of whether registered medical practitioners should be granted a blanket legal protection to raise the possibility of ending any person’s life or whether that protection should be carefully and responsibly limited to patients already in their care.

At the heart of this debate lies the issue of safety and trust. The relationship between a patient and their doctor is not a casual exchange. I hope it is a deeply personal, often vulnerable, bond built on confidence, continuity and professional responsibility. When someone receives a terminal diagnosis, they are not merely confronting medical facts; they are confronting fear, uncertainty and the fragility of their remaining time. In that moment, words matter immensely. To grant blanket legal protection to any registered medical practitioner, regardless of whether they have an established clinical relationship with the individual, risks undermining that trust. It risks introducing the possibility that a suggestion about ending life could come from a professional who does not know the patient’s history, values, mental state, family circumstances or vulnerabilities.

Amendment 161 does not seek to obstruct lawful medical practice or to deny terminally ill adults the autonomy that the Bill intends to provide. Rather, it seeks to ensure that conversations about assisted dying occur in the right context, within a relationship in which the doctor knows the patient, understands their condition and is responsible for their ongoing care.

We must consider the subtle power imbalance inherent in clinical settings. A doctor’s words carry authority. Look at the effect they have on the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, at times. For a patient who is elderly, disabled, isolated or feeling like a burden, even a carefully phrased suggestion can carry unintended weight. If such a conversation is initiated by a practitioner with no established duty of care, we risk normalising a culture in which ending life becomes a broadly available option rather than a carefully safeguarded patient-led request.

Limiting legal protection to practitioners involved in a patient’s care and case strengthens safeguards. It ensures that any discussion arises from clinical knowledge, not abstract eligibility; it reinforces accountability; it reduces the risk of inappropriate suggestion; and it protects vulnerable people feeling steered towards a decision at a moment of profound weakness.

Autonomy is meaningful only when it is protected from subtle coercion, even unintentional coercion. By supporting Amendment 161, we are not diminishing choice: we are strengthening the ethical framework in which that choice is exercised. In matters of life and death, precision, boundaries and safeguards matter. Amendment 161 offers a proportionate, reasonable and ethically sound safeguard. It preserves trust in the medical profession, protects vulnerable patients and ensures that, if such conversations occur, they do so within the context of established clinical responsibility. For those reasons, I urge the Committee seriously to consider the intent and spirit behind Amendment 161.

Assisted Dying Legislation: Isle of Man and Jersey

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, as my noble friend knows, the Government have been clear that we are neutral on the topic of assisted dying and the passage of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. It is a Private Member’s Bill and my noble friend the Chief Whip has made it clear that there will be no government time given to the Bill in your Lordships’ House. It is for your Lordships to determine the progress of the Bill.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, before Royal Assent has even been granted to Jersey’s Bill, a Deputy has tabled a Motion calling for assisted dying to be extended to non-terminally ill people with unbearable suffering. In reply, the Health Minister has said “Now is not the time, but it would be appropriate to consider extending the law as part of the three-year review of the Act”. Does the Minister not agree that this demonstrates that the terminal illness criterion is no cast-iron guarantee, but is simply the mission creep that many of us have warned against concerning our legislation?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

I draw attention to the part of my amendment that would require that the number of staff seconded into the organisation is recorded. I have seen this in other places; it is quite a smart way of making organisations look much smaller than they are. Again, this is about providing true transparency. Can the noble and learned Lord give an assurance that the size of the body will be recorded and that that will be transparent?

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, I follow the noble Baroness in speaking to the issue of the commissioner. The shift from the High Court to a commissioner has been compounded. The Bill originally proposed that a High Court judge would authorise every assisted death—a feature initially championed by the Bill’s sponsor in the other place to make the United Kingdom’s law the safest in the world, with robust safeguards. That has changed dramatically and we now have a new structure, with a commissioner appointed by a Prime Minister.

The voluntary assisted dying commissioner is an important role. They will be given powers both to run and monitor the service. This creates the obvious risks of inadequate public scrutiny and independent review. It is judicial in the broad sense of involving a judge, but it does not appear to have a judicial function. The commissioner will both run the service and monitor it, which means that a highly controversial and important service will be run with little proper oversight. The commissioner will be responsible for establishing the regime and overseeing appeals as well as monitoring and reviewing its operation. In effect, as others have said, this allows the commissioner to mark their own homework.

Dr Luke Geoghegan, policy lead of the British Association of Social Workers, told the Select Committee that an independent regulator for VAD was essential. He said:

“The other thing that I think would give assurance is that no public sector organisation should mark its own homework. The voluntary assisted dying service needs robust external inspection”.


In its written evidence, the Law Society said:

“We recommend the establishment of an Independent Monitor to review and report on the operation of the Act annually”.


The commissioner could be an assisted dying campaigner or someone linked to an advocacy group. Other countries have experienced problems when the assisted dying service is run by an advocate, yet nothing in the Bill prevents this risk of conflict of interest.

In the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, developed a new judicial appointments process designed to guarantee an independent, impartial judicial appointments process and an enshrined statutory duty requiring respect for the independence of the judiciary by Ministers. Yet in the office of the commissioner, we see a potential patronage office in the political gift of the Prime Minister without any internal or external safeguards. Can the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee how the commissioner’s impartiality will be guaranteed? Why has he changed his mind on the importance of statutory guarantees of independence? Will the public have any right to know the commissioner’s views?

Amendment 127, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, would

“make the Prime Minister’s choice for Commissioner subject to scrutiny and approval by the House of Commons’ Health and Social Care Select Committee”.

There is a lack of accountability and transparency around the commissioner’s appointment process, which is entirely in the gift of the Prime Minister. Therefore, I ask the Minister who will respond to this group: have the Government followed Cabinet Office guidelines regarding appointments? The Cabinet Office Guidance: Pre-appointment Scrutiny by House of Commons Select Committees, published in 2019, requires:

“When establishing a new public body, departments should ensure that they consider whether any public appointments to that body would meet the criteria”


for a pre-appointment hearing. It continues:

“They should seek guidance from the Cabinet Office and also discuss this with the relevant select committee Chair in a timely manner before establishment of the new body”.


Can the Minister confirm whether the Government have discussed the matter of a pre-appointment hearing with the Commons Health and Social Care Select Committee?

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I have a couple of points to make on this group of amendments. Let me start on a note of agreement with the Bill’s sponsor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, who has in this group Amendment 131A, which would require:

“Before making an appointment under this section, the Prime Minister must consult the Welsh Ministers”.


I think that is a sensible approach. We have had disagreements about whether the Bill should or should not apply to Wales but, given that it does, it is sensible that Welsh Ministers are consulted.

It is worth noting that Welsh Ministers have some views on this matter. Given that we are talking about consulting Welsh Ministers, this is probably the time to note them briefly. In the vote in the Senedd this week, Wales’s Health Minister, one of those who would be consulted, made two points clear. First, he said that the Motion in the Senedd was not a referendum on legalising assisted dying with only this Parliament able to make that decision. He also said—this is important, given that there are those outside this House who pretend that the only people who think this Bill has any flaws are a small number of Peers, when that is not the case—that he voted against the legislative consent Motion because:

“I’m also clear in my own mind that the fundamentals of the bill, as it’s going through Westminster, don’t provide sufficient safeguards for patients”.


The Welsh Health Minister, who would be one of those responsible for helping to implement it, thinks that the Bill currently does not have appropriate safeguards. He went on to say:

“Although the vote yesterday was on the devolved areas ... the net effect is to give powers in Wales to deliver a service that I don’t think I would support if I was operating over the border”.


For all sorts of reasons, it is helpful to consult Welsh Ministers. We have heard from them this week, and they are very clear that this Bill is currently flawed. Therefore, I think we are doing the right thing by scrutinising it, asking questions and putting forward amendments to improve it. We can see that it is not just Members of this House who have concerns; elected Members serving in the Welsh Government also have concerns, and it is worth getting that on the record.

The fundamental thing that I want to talk about is the prime ministerial appointment process in the Bill. I was quite surprised, not particularly that the Prime Minister was making the appointment, but that there was no other process around it. The Bill currently says that the commissioner is to be appointed by the Prime Minister. The one constraint is that:

“The person appointed must hold or have held office as a judge of … the Supreme Court … the Court of Appeal … the High Court”.


Other than that, there is no process set out that the Prime Minister has to follow.

There are two flaws with that. There is the one that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, set out, which is that, given that this is an area of policy, the Prime Minister may have their own views about the issue and that may influence the person they choose. My noble friend Lord Markham was quite right that the person would simply be implementing the law. The worry is that if you appoint somebody who has a very strong view about the issue and is prepared to use holding this office to prosecute advancing it, which is the concern my noble friend Lord Moylan set out, that is a problem. The concern I have with the Bill as drafted is that the Prime Minister could appoint such a person, and we would have no way of knowing in advance or of testing that person’s views before the appointment was made. We would find out about it only afterwards, and that is a real problem.

Secondly, I am afraid that we have seen examples of the current Prime Minister making staggeringly bad appointments, and the rather obvious one is Lord Mandelson. I see the Minister shaking her head, but it was a shockingly bad appointment. It is an example of a decision being made to appoint somebody and the process being circumvented in order to get the right result. The person appointed to this role is responsible for life and death issues, and as my noble friend Lord Deben said, it is extremely important that they command the confidence of the public—not just people who are in favour of assisted suicide, but those who are against it and who want to see a proper process with proper safeguards, so that that person holds public confidence.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 9th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, we really have to make a choice between court-based decisions and the panel, as the Bill provides for in its present form. There is merit in both. There is a strong case for the use of the expertise and skills of the Family Division of the High Court and designated family judges—I should declare that, until quite recently, I was one of them. However, as the noble and learned Lord said, the courts will be faced with an initial rush of applications. That tends to happen with any significant change in the law, and it is likely to happen in this situation. It will take some time for the procedures to settle down, whether they are in front of a panel or the court. As the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, we require some realistic assessment of the likely additional workload on the judiciary and the court system. The judiciary is of course well used to hard work and working under pressure, finding time when it is required. It should also be borne in mind that not all these cases will be complex or contested. In fairness to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, there is no question of cases being nodded through or rubber-stamped, whether by the court or the panel. Family judges are used to prioritising cases when urgency is required, and they do so by underpinning their decisions with focused and robust case management.

The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, is right, and I endorse what she said: judges are real people. I therefore endorse her call for consultation with the current President of the Family Division. I also suggest that one way through this might be an enhanced role for the independent advocate provided for in Clause 22, who will assume the role that guardians have in more conventional family cases—representing the interests of the person, whether a child or an adult, at the heart of the litigation.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, I want to draw the implications for Northern Ireland into the conversation on the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Clearly, Northern Ireland has its own family court system, which, incidentally, has its own issues and backlog. However, that does not mean that people in Northern Ireland are entirely unaffected by court decisions in England and Wales. Each year, the family court for England and Wales hears cases involving parties on both sides of the Irish Sea, perhaps most notably applications for a child arrangements order, where one parent is living in England and the other in Northern Ireland. In such cases, delays in the English court can result in parents and children in Northern Ireland being left in limbo, awaiting decisions, with all the connected anxiety and parental conflict that goes with it. I simply present that as an example of the sort of impacts that ought to be considered, if we want to make any claim to be engaging in serious policy work.

There is no doubt that there will be even more acute impacts in England and Wales, where the strain on the court will be more direct. Catherine Atkinson MP in the other place reminded Members that:

“More than two thirds of care proceedings involving the most vulnerable children in our society cannot be completed within six months”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/24; col. 1030.]


If that is the case at the moment, what can we expect if family court judges are increasingly swamped with assisted suicide cases instead?

The estimates from the former head of the Family Division, Sir James Munby, suggested that at least 34,000 hours of judicial involvement will be required each year for a proposal such as this to work, whereas the 20 judges in the Family Division of the High Court currently sit for only a total of 19,000 hours between them across all cases. Clearly, that is not something that we can ignore, and it is quite apparent that the bulk of the work will fall on circuit judges.

In saying that, I stress that I am not without sympathy for many of the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. In the words of the Medical Defence Union, the current approach leaves doctors “unduly exposed”, making assessments on coercion, capacity and—as we heard a few weeks ago— residency that they feel unqualified to make. In my opinion, the Bill, as drafted, is not fit for purpose.

I have to say that I am equally concerned about the prospect of attempting to legislate on the fly, which is what we seem to be doing. What level of resource would the family court proposal require? How many additional circuit judges will be designated family judges? What impact would this have on the principle that, ideally, judges should be specialists in the area in which they are engaged? Incidentally, I believe the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has previously supported that principle. What would be the cost for an already overstretched court system?

We have been left to do policy in the dark. As former Lord Chief Justice the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, warned in November,

“no one has grappled with the detail”

of the legislation’s impact on family courts. The legislative hokey-cokey on the issue of judicial involvement, which goes back much further than this Bill, has certainly not helped. It gives the impression that no one has worked out how to resolve the dilemma at the heart of the Bill—that the necessary level of safeguarding that such a Bill needs ultimately renders it unworkable. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said that this applies only to those who have six months to live, but no one can state categorically that a person has only six months to live. As a minister in the Church for 50 years, I have known numerous people who have been told that they have only six months to live, but they lived for years after that. Therefore, while it has been suggested that this applies only to those who have six months to live, we do not know that, and we cannot give that assurance.

In 2012, the Commission on Assisted Dying, chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, considered several models for approval of assisted suicide. Those included: a medical decision-making model where doctors are solely responsible for decision-making; an NGO or volunteer-based organisation model, as they have in Switzerland or—to a certain extent—in Oregon; a tribunal model; and a court model, with the question posed whether the court should be the family court, as in the amendment, or another, such as the Court Of Protection. In 2012, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, firmly backed the medical-only model, as his report reads:

“Our assessment of the body of evidence overall has convinced us that it is health and social care professionals who have the knowledge, skills and training structures that would be needed to implement a safeguarded system to permit assisted dying in the UK. Therefore, we do not consider that it would be necessary or desirable to involve a tribunal or other legal body in decision-making”.


However, just two years later, in Committee on the Assisted Dying Bill, the noble and learned Lord made an about-turn—the court model had become the silver bullet. He told the House that

“I do not think that one can leave it to doctors alone, in particular to form two views: first, on whether it is the voluntary, clear, settled and informed wish that somebody wishes to end their own life; and, secondly, whether they have the capacity”.

In fact, he was such a convert that he made it clear in that debate that it needed to be

“the highest-quality judges to decide these issues”,—[Official Report, 7/11/14; cols. 1880-81.]

and the role for the Family Division was added into the Bill.

That position briefly persisted when the noble and learned Lord’s co-sponsor introduced the Bill in the other place, announcing it as the safest in the world due to the High Court element. But then that idea fell apart too, and the tribunal-style model, combining medical and legal elements, was adopted instead, on the claim that it would be “more robust”. At first, I thought that this was the plan all along because Dignity in Dying—the real sponsor behind the Bill—indicated this as its preferred option to the Commission on Assisted Dying in 2012. But then I read a line in the commission’s report where Dignity in Dying said:

“If there was going to be a tribunal then you would expect it to be part of the tribunal service”,


which of course the panel process currently in the Bill does not do.

This flip-flopping does not inspire confidence, and I certainly think that we should bear this in mind if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, indicates shortly that he suddenly once again thinks that the High Court judge is the way to go. It is incumbent on us to consider the reason that the High Court judge was scrapped in the Commons—again, not because I think that it was better but because it raises those questions of workability.

When interviewed by the Select Committee, Ms Leadbeater in the other place claimed that the removal of the High Court was to ensure a more “patient-centred approach”. But I am not sure that this tells the full story. In February, the Guardian reported that senior officials in the Ministry of Justice were understood to have significant concerns about the sign-off from a High Court judge in the original Bill, given lengthy backlogs in the family court. Perhaps the Minister would like to confirm these reports when she replies.

To conclude, it is important to stress that decisions around Amendment 120 are not peripheral but a central policy consideration that touches the very heart of the Bill. Is the Bill about introducing a new so-called treatment option to be overseen principally by the healthcare professionals, like other end-of-life choices, or is it more about giving the courts extraordinary discretionary power to resolve concerns about the operation of the Suicide Act in extreme cases? It is astonishing that at this late stage in the process, with the Bill having passed through the Commons, we have still not resolved this important point of principle.

[Lord Gove (Con)]

My Lords, I speak because I was persuaded by the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but I recognise that there are inevitable questions that his case provokes, which have been reflected in the debate.

Of course, not everyone has been convinced. I am reassured by the strength of the noble Lord’s case, having spent four and a half years as an Education Minister and one and a half years as a Justice Minister with direct responsibility for liaising with the family courts, and so my respect for those who work in those courts and the judges in them is all the greater for it.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out, not everyone believes that judges would be the ideal people to make decisions in this case. I remind the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with respect, of the case that he made in his wonderful book, Judges, where he said:

“So long as men and women continue to wound, cheat, and damage each other, there will be a need for judges … Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid: make decisions”.


Each of us may consider either judges or a panel preferable, but there is one key question for those who agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in his current incarnation and believe that a panel is preferable. Can we know what the promoter of the Bill understands by “legal member”, and can we also understand what the Government believe the definition of “legal member” to be? What is the threshold, what qualification—