Crime: Rape
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(5 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I fear that the drop in the number of rape cases being referred to trial is even greater than the noble Lord suggests. Current figures indicate that approximately half the number of cases is reaching court, from a peak in 2015. That is a matter of real and material concern and is why we have set up a cross-government working group—a sub-group of the Criminal Justice Board—to bring forward an action plan as soon as possible. We hope to have that plan in place by the spring of 2020.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, whether or not the Government’s review leads to a change in the law on rape, does the noble and learned Lord nevertheless agree that there is much more to be done to support and counsel victims at every stage of the criminal process, particularly in collecting and disclosing personal data, and in supporting victims giving their evidence, through to verdict and thereafter? Would such comprehensive support not encourage more victims to report rape and support prosecutions?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, we recognise the significant importance of support for those who make complaints of all sexual offences, and rape in particular. It is necessary to look at taking forward further the scheme for the giving of evidence under Section 28. It is also appropriate to have in mind the use and application of Section 41 in relation to the potential for examining complainants about their sexual history. These matters have been under fairly constant review since Dame Vera Baird’s study in 2017, followed by the CPS study the following year and, more recently, in work done by the Criminal Bar Association. We do recognise the need for support and consideration in these cases.
Bailiff Reforms
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(5 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, there are regulations in place and there are those—a minority—who do not comply with those regulations. The position at present is that there are about 2,500 civil enforcement agents. They have to appear before a county court judge every two years, where their conduct will be the subject of consideration. We are looking at further regulation and at the means of ensuring that a small minority of enforcement agents do not break the law. Clearly, we do not condone aggressive and inappropriate behaviour, no matter what the circumstances may be.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the Government are publicly committed to ensuring that enforcement agents treat debtors fairly, responsibly and proportionately. The proposed breathing space scheme, the Government’s civil enforcement project and, indeed, the Minister’s answers so far suggest that they also agree on the need for a sympathetic approach to problem debt. Will the Government therefore now consider requiring enforcement agents to advise debtors of the availability of the breathing space scheme and of debt management assistance more generally? Are the Government now more receptive to the call of many for independent regulation of all enforcement agencies?
Lord Keen of Elie
It would be premature to commit on a matter still under consideration by the ministry. We have proposed as a manifesto commitment to introduce the breathing space scheme, which will give debtors 60 days in which interest charges on their debts are frozen and in which they can seek further advice. We also established the Money and Pensions Service in January 2019, merging three former organisations to provide free-to-use financial guidance for those who find themselves in debt.
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Legal Aid for Separated Children) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2019
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I, too, welcome this order and thank the Minister for introducing and explaining it. I also welcome the comments made initially by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, regarding the position of care leavers and new adults, those points being echoed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, pointed out, the credit for this SI is due to the Children’s Society, for the judicial review it brought last year challenging the lawfulness of the exclusion of legal aid in these cases. Credit is also due to members of the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, who worked with the Children’s Society and the Government to ensure that this SI came into being, making good on the Government’s promise, given by Lucy Frazer MP, which was the basis on which the Government settled the Children’s Society’s case.
I can do no better in summarising the existing position and the reason for change than to quote from the statement of facts and grounds submitted by the Children’s Society’s legal team, led by Paul Bowen QC, with the consent of Mr Bowen:
He says:
“Where such children are involved in non-asylum immigration matters, with the very limited exceptions, these matters are currently considered ‘out of scope’ for the purposes of Section 9 of LASPO, and so will only be funded if an Exceptional Case Funding … determination has been made pursuant to Section 10 of LASPO.
These children are among the most vulnerable individuals in the country. They are at a heightened risk of abuse and exploitation as a result of their immigration status. The potential immigration processes and proceedings they face in an attempt to regularise their status in the UK are extremely complex. The consequences for these children if they do not or are unable to negotiate these processes and/or proceedings are fundamental and life-changing, ranging from a lack of access to further education, social services and healthcare to deportation. They have a consequent need for legal advice and assistance. That need is not currently being met by the ECF system nor by any other means. This is unlawful for the reasons summarized in the argument”.
The Children’s Society rightly claims that it securing this change was,
“a significant achievement as so far it is the only cohort the government has agreed to bring back into scope for legal aid”.
It wrote that:
“The change all our supporters and partners helped bring about will have huge implications for thousands of children who need this vital support”—
I repeat the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, about the numbers affected—and that:
“It will ensure they can once again access the legal aid they so desperately need to live full and settled lives”.
I also quote from paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Government’s impact assessment, which state that:
“Separated migrant children have distinct vulnerabilities and needs, which can be made worse by uncertainty in their immigration status. This includes the risk of going missing from local authority care, and being subject to exploitation in private foster care arrangements. Further, if children do not resolve their immigration status during childhood, they can become ineligible for certain public services (like being able to work, find housing or continue with education) when they turn 18 … It is expected that professional legal advice from legal aid immigration solicitors on non-asylum immigration matters will help to ensure more robust initial decision making because the original application should make the best possible case, improving the quality of applications and appeals to the Home Office”.
This case is absolutely overwhelming, so the Government must acknowledge that this change was long overdue and that the litigation should never have been contested, as it was for some time.
In welcoming this SI unreservedly, I remind the House that it is significant that this crucial reform was forced on the Government by judicial review. The review involved the courts considering a decision on judicial review as to whether the power in Section 9(2) of the LASPO Act should be used so as to bring unaccompanied and separated children’s immigration cases into the scope of LASPO. I also remind the House and the Government that the LASPO Act includes the power to bring claims of different types back within scope. That was a power for which we argued before the Act was enacted.
As we now know, the LASPO Act has caused great hardship in denying legal aid to a number of vulnerable groups, who cannot afford legal advice or representation and are left unable to understand or take advantage of their legal rights and protections without it. We have argued for restoration within the scope of legal aid of much social welfare law, more housing law and more cases of debt, for easier access to legal aid in domestic violence cases and for a wider exceptional case funding scheme. I hope that with the precedent of this statutory instrument, itself of limited but very important application, we may see an approach to the scope of legal aid more generally that is fairer, more generous and more progressive.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, like others, I unreservedly and wholeheartedly support the order before us today. However, I have to say that the congratulations should go not to the Minister but to the Children’s Society. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle made similar comments. I was pleased to see the Government recognise this in their impact assessment, which refers to the justification of their preferred option going forward:
“In order to meet the commitments made following litigation”.
It is quite clear there and later on, in paragraph 4, why these have been brought forward:
“Following litigation from The Children’s Society, the government agreed to bring civil legal services for separated migrant children’s non-asylum immigration matters back within the scope of the legal aid scheme”.
It should never have been taken out of the scheme.
It is in some ways an embarrassing—but I can tell that the Minister was not embarrassed—U-turn for the Government. We cannot hold the Minister responsible in this case for having found that he was wrong on this issue because it was before the noble and learned Lord entered your Lordships’ House. Some of us will recall what were at the time very heated, at times unpleasant, debates during this legislation. It was coalition government legislation. Numerous votes took place. It was one of those Acts that many of us found very difficult. I am pleased to see that we are now addressing some of the injustices that were taken forward at that point.
To have taken legal aid away from some of the most vulnerable people—this was not the only case. I remember going home one evening extraordinarily upset because the Government had taken away legal aid from women who were victims of domestic violence. It was taken away from women who were contesting child custody cases as well. There were a lot of injustices, and I welcome the fact that this is one injustice that is being corrected. I hope we shall see many more.
The Minister already has a number of questions to address. Do the Government have any idea how many children have been affected negatively by losing the right to legal aid? It would be helpful to know how many got exceptional case funding. I think there were a few instances of that. How many children may have been deported because they were unable to get legal aid? How many children went missing from care because they were unable to get the support they needed? I think those are the kinds of figures the Government need to provide to fully understand the impact the legislation had at this time.
Does the Minister know how many separated migrant children are in local authority care, and could be expected to benefit from the change? I think that the noble Earl, Earl Listowel, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle made very powerful points about the position of children when they turn 18. This is a problem for any care leaver, but I think it is particularly relevant to separated migrant children.
The Children’s Society estimates that there are 144,000 undocumented migrant children living in England and Wales. The Government obviously have a responsibility now to make this change known to those children. How is this possible? What plans do the Government have to ensure that those who can benefit from this change will know about it?
There is a welcome point in the order, that, if there is a case going through, and a child turns 18 during the process of that application, they will continue to get legal aid until that application has been completed. I am looking at the Minister to see whether or not he understands the point I am making—he does. That is welcome, I am grateful for that, but if that separated migrant child is reunited with a relative during the process of that application, will the case be able to continue with legal aid?
This year is the 70th anniversary of legal aid, something that we in the Labour Party are very proud of, but the Government have been rather quiet during the anniversary. I think it would be a welcome opportunity to have a look back at other provisions in this legislation and see what other injustices have been done. This one has been a long, hard fight. I pay enormous tribute to the Children’s Society and other children’s charities which have ensured that this change has come about, but perhaps there is an opportunity now to look at other injustices in the legislation and see what more can be done, particularly with the spending commitments being made by the Conservative Party this week. This is a real opportunity to see whether we can address further injustices.
Sentencing (Pre-consolidation Amendments) Bill [HL]
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames ExcerptsThursday 5th September 2019
(5 years, 2 months ago)
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The Earl of Courtown (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie on the Order Paper.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we support the carryover of this Bill. We regard the handling of the Bill in accordance with the Law Commission’s fast-track procedure a model of its kind. It has had a good opportunity for an airing. Nevertheless, there has been no substantial opposition to it, and it is plainly a necessary, though fairly technical, Bill.
Prosecutions and Sentencing
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, we are of course concerned to ensure that the criminal justice system is adequately funded. We do not consider that we are in the midst of a crisis so far as that is concerned. Indeed, we engage with both the CPS and counsel and solicitors engaged in criminal defence work to ensure that they are properly resourced.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, given the Prime Minister’s recent pronouncements on tackling crime more generally, are the Government abandoning previous policy on rehabilitation—of using prison less rather than more, reducing short sentences and increasing release on licence and home detention curfews? Are we moving towards a policy of harsher sentences based on the frankly false notion that prison works and, if so, on what evidence, particularly given the more liberal, evidenced-based policies on imprisonment and rehabilitation pursued by David Gauke, David Lidington and even Michael Gove as Justice Secretaries, and Rory Stewart and the present Justice Secretary as Prisons Ministers?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the Government recognise that prison alone is not the answer to crime. Prison must go hand in hand with rehabilitation and our policies are always pointed in that direction.
Crown Prosecution Service: Rape and Sexual Offences
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(5 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on securing this debate, which responds to widespread and justified public concern about the failure to prosecute and convict rapists, and the delays involved.
The first focus of this question is on delays in processing rape cases. I do not believe that the serious and increasing delays are the result of CPS policy. I believe that they reflect the underfunding of the CPS and the criminal justice system generally—a point ably made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Anyone who has read The Secret Barrister will appreciate the degree to which the system in general and the CPS in particular have been damaged to breaking point by repeated and unacceptable cuts in resources. Staff throughout the system are overworked and forced to cut corners. Morale is at an all-time low. Good, public-spirited staff are leaving in all areas and at all levels. It is therefore no wonder that inefficiencies and delays are endemic, wasting what limited resources there are. Anyone who has spoken to criminal barristers, solicitors, court staff, judges or CPS staff recognises that the depiction of the system in The Secret Barrister is no exaggeration. It is at least well-balanced; if anything, it is an understatement.
We know that a very high number of rapes go unreported, understandably. Yet underreporting of rape encourages perpetrators to believe that they can force victims into sex without fear of the consequences. The fall in the number of reported cases leading to prosecution makes matters worse. The brave and very public accounts of rape given by so many in the #MeToo movement have brought home to us all the prevalence of these abhorrent attitudes and the offences that go with them.
There are many reasons why victims do not report rape. Embarrassment, the prospect of the ordeal of giving evidence and being cross-examined and the fear of not being believed all play their part. Many victims fear disruption to their lives, particularly when they are in a relationship with the offender. The widely publicised failure of reports of rape to lead to convictions is another deterrent. Delay, and the prospect of victims having to put their life on hold and being forced to hang around, with the threat of a trial hanging over them for months or even years, is a major reason for victims’ reluctance to report rapes which they desperately wish to put behind them. Yet there is not a word about delay in the entire CPS policy document, the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, or even in the Prosecutors’ Pledge. These omissions are highly significant.
Last Friday, we debated the Private Member’s Bill on victim support proposed by my noble friend Lady Brinton. Her Bill calls for a legal right for victims not to be subjected to unnecessary delays. It should become law, and the Government should provide the resources to implement the pledge. Victims have been greatly encouraged by the support they received from the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, when she was in office.
The second focus of this debate is the CPS guidance. The Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Rape was published in 2004, and updated just once, in 2012. Yet public attitudes to rape have been changing rapidly. Traditional but wholly unacceptable—and, bluntly, sexist—views of rape, as highlighted by the noble Baronesses, Lady Newlove and Lady Bryan, have rightly been challenged, exposed and jettisoned. I accept from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that, very largely, on decisions to prosecute as well as on delay, the policy is not the problem. The problem lies with its implementation, and failures there are largely attributable to the problems within the CPS that I identified in relation to delay. However, there is considerable room for updating the policy as well. Perhaps I may pick up a few discrete points where specific changes might encourage victims to report rape.
The policy still countenances continuing with a rape prosecution against the wishes of the victim, who might still be compelled to give evidence. The threat that a victim’s choice can be overborne in this way is unacceptable and may inhibit reporting. In practice, I suspect that prosecutions are rarely pursued against the victim’s wishes. Can the Minister tell us how often this happens?
The disclosure obligation threatens victims with embarrassment, distress and humiliation. Of course, the prosecution must comply with its duty to disclose relevant evidence to the defence. However, prosecutors and police must be sensitive about the collection and disclosure of evidence on victims’ mobile phones and devices. I reach no conclusion as to whether current national police consent forms are unlawful, as was asserted by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but they certainly do not meet this need for sensitivity. The noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Newlove, both used the graphic phrase “digital strip-searching”. It is an accurate description of victims being effectively required to hand over their mobile phones for the police to trawl through all their data, otherwise no prosecution will ensue. Police must understand that a mobile phone is part of its owner’s identity, and that their invasion is very personal. Of course, mobile phone downloads may help test a defence of consent and have sometimes led to just acquittals. The rape trial of Liam Allen, a psychology student at Greenwich, collapsed last year, after a two-year delay, when the complainant’s mobile phone records corroborated his defence of consent. The prosecution, however, must be selective and seek, and disclose, only material likely to be relevant. Even then, surely phones can be quickly handed back to victims.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made an important suggestion on this issue: namely, that trawling through records could be limited by a requirement for the defence to obtain production orders. He also made important points about the need for resources, in view of the proliferation of digital evidence.
I turn to special measures—measures that protect victims from the unpleasantness of giving evidence, particularly that of having to face their assailants—such as giving evidence from behind a screen or from a remote location by video link. Yet the guidance and the code contain no right to special measures, only the possibility of permission for them on application by the Crown. The Bill introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, would give children or adults who are vulnerable—as rape victims generally are—a statutory right to give evidence from a remote location or from behind a protective screen. Such a right would remove from rape victims one of the horrors of a trial. The possibility that special measures might be awarded does not fit that bill.
Finally, in sexual offence cases victims are entitled to anonymity in the media. Yet the policy document states as a fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to know the name of their accuser and that only in exceptional circumstances may a court allow witnesses not to give their name in open court. Is that right today, in cases where the victim is not known to the defendant and when, in the age of the internet, tracing people by their name is so easy? Why should the right of the victim to privacy not prevail? This is yet another area for rethinking.
Further changes are needed, but time is short. My essential point is that we need to update our procedures to remove those features that inhibit the reporting of rape, and encourage a drive to make rape prosecutions less difficult and more humane for victims—without reducing their fairness for the accused—with the ultimate aim of reducing the incidence of this horrible crime.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
I am sorry to interrupt the noble and learned Lord, but the problem that most of us have been concerned with on these consent forms is, first, the blanket nature of their use—the noble and learned Lord said something to respond to that—and, secondly, the implied threat that, if the consent form is not signed, no prosecution can proceed. That aspect of it is particularly worrying, and it is a matter that has been aired in the media quite heavily.
Lord Keen of Elie
As far as I am concerned, neither the DPP nor the CPS would endorse the implied threat that, if there was a reason for not signing a consent form for the disclosure of digital material, they would simply refuse to contemplate a charge on a case such as this, or indeed in any other case. I believe that the problem stems from the use of language, and that such terms as “digital strip search” merely seek to underline how it is possible for parties to misunderstand the scope of the inquiry that is being carried out here. What has to be emphasised is the need to secure justice for the complainant and for the accused.
Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames ExcerptsTuesday 2nd July 2019
(5 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I join noble Lords who have spoken in this very short debate in thanking the noble and learned Lord for the way he has approached the Bill. He has sought very clearly to achieve consensus; he has been open to discussion; and he has obviously been persuaded to make important changes. It is something he might like to have a word with other ministerial colleagues about, because it has not always been the case that Ministers have responded so constructively to debates in the Chamber. On this occasion, I am sure that the House will unanimously agree these amendments. Certainly we on these Benches—such as we are this afternoon—will do so.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I wish simply to join in the unanimous praise and gratitude for the Government’s acceptance of those amendments that they have accepted, and their tabling of these amendments today. The Online Procedure Rules are intended to introduce a new and simplified procedure. We were concerned to ensure that litigants who were going to find it difficult to use that procedure, particularly in so far as it was a digital procedure and they would not be using paper means to conduct proceedings, should not be excluded by difficulty from approaching the procedure and should have afforded to them the kind of assistance they would need to handle litigation, without the need for lawyers, under the Online Procedure Rules.
We are particularly grateful for the Government’s acceptance of Amendment 4, which imposes a duty on the Lord Chancellor, as the Minister has explained, to provide assistance or support for digitally excluded people, and these amendments tie in the obligation to have regard to the needs of those people in conducting that litigation. I was particularly concerned about the use of the word “technical” in relation to that assistance, because it seemed to us that that might be unduly restrictive. I am grateful for the excision of that word from the amendments.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I too thank the Minister very much, even in relation to a Bill which, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has just said, seeks to reduce the role and importance of lawyers in litigation. I want to add two points. The first is to remind the House that the concerns which the Minister has so satisfactorily addressed arise from the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, under the distinguished chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. This confirms the value of the committees that serve this House—I am of course a member of that committee—and reinforces the importance of the non-partisan nature of these committees and the value of the work they do.
Secondly, without in any way undermining the sense of unanimity and gratitude to the Minister, I just remind him that there is one contentious issue which goes to the other place. Your Lordships’ House insisted on amendments, against the wishes of the Government, to what are now Clauses 9(4) and 10(3), requiring the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to use his good efforts to ensure a satisfactory resolution of that issue, as well as all the other issues. The Minister’s role in this Bill has been quite exemplary, and he has done a great deal to ensure that it will leave this House in a much better state than when we started it.
Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames ExcerptsMonday 24th June 2019
(5 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group that I have anything to do with. I welcome the Government’s Amendment 1 requiring that, in the context of making the rules accessible and fair,
“regard must be had to the needs of those who require technical support in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means”.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the time that he and his Bill team have spent and the trouble that they have taken to incorporate provisions in the Bill to assist those who may find it difficult to access online proceedings, and to discuss with me and others the amendments that we proposed. Our original amendments, proposed in Committee, went further than the provisions now agreed by the Government, but we are satisfied that the needs of the so-called digitally excluded will be protected by the new provisions, with the benefit of the amendments tabled in this group, which are, as I understand it, largely agreed by the Government.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am most obliged to the noble Lord for that.
Perhaps I may turn to manuscript Amendment 9A, as distinct from Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Again, I thank him for his extensive engagement with me and the Bill team over the last few days to address these matters. As I have sought to underline, we are committed to providing support to those people who cannot easily access online services. We share the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others about the importance of this issue. In these circumstances, we are prepared to accept manuscript Amendment 9A, as tabled by the noble Lord. However, it has an impact on the two other amendments that were tabled; first, in the use of the words “providing for”. If we accept manuscript Amendment 9A, it appears we are making explicit provision—indeed, we will have an explicit duty to provide—for these services. It therefore appears unnecessary to move that further amendment in these circumstances.
I have discussed the removal of the word “technical” with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. At this stage, I am not in a position to accept that amendment. Again, I would like an opportunity to discuss further what to do with the precise wording, in the light of our accepting manuscript Amendment 9A. It is in that context that I would like to resolve the matter, because we are concerned about the width of the obligation in those circumstances. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Marks, appreciates that and understands that, in accepting manuscript Amendment 9A, it is necessary for me to give further consideration to the two minor amendments he referred to. I understand where he is coming from and am content to address with him how we can ensure that the width of that provision is appropriate and sufficient as we go forward to Third Reading.
I am also content to commit on the Floor of the House that the Government will lay in Parliament a report on the provision of support, every two years. That report will be on the levels of assisted digital support being provided, and will give noble Lords the opportunity to request a debate on the topic and test the availability of support. Again, I had the opportunity to discuss that matter with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I hope he accepts that that commitment meets the further concerns he had about the implementation of these provisions.
I turn to Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I am obliged to him for his remarks and observations. We do not feel able to accept the amendment. I notice the reference to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights but, as the noble Lord is well aware—as is the Law Society, no doubt—there is an established common-law right of access to the courts and to a fair public hearing. More recently, that was included in Article 6 of the convention, which is part of our domestic law by virtue of the Human Rights Act. The effect is that these matters are already available and in train. We do not see that it is necessary to make explicit reference in the Bill to those established and fundamental rights. To make a specific reference to Article 6 of the convention without making reference to, for example, the common-law right of access to justice could simply sow the seeds of uncertainty or confusion.
The second part of Amendment 7 would remove, from the appropriate Minister, the power to determine the circumstances in which proceedings should not be governed by the Online Procedure Rules. It would instead leave the matter to be determined by a court or tribunal in cases where the parties to the proceedings disagree. We consider that not to be appropriate at present. The present balance, as indicated in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is the appropriate way forward in these circumstances. I therefore invite the noble Lord to not move Amendment 7.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I will briefly address the Minister’s comments on my amendments. I had understood that Amendments 2 and 3 were accepted, but that discussion was before my Amendment 9A was drafted or accepted. I can see the point that having “providing for” in Amendment 1 may be rendered otiose by the acceptance of Amendment 9A. However, I will discuss it between now and Third Reading with the noble and learned Lord, as he suggests. However, I take the view that the word “technical” is important, for precisely the reason given by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, so I will be urging that on him in our discussions.
I should also say, which I did not mention in opening, that the agreement to have a biennial review and have that report laid in the way the noble and learned Lord said is very welcome and, I suggest, important for ensuring that digitally excluded people are always receiving the assistance to which they are entitled. As I said, I intend not to move Amendment 9 and to move Amendment 9A when the time comes. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.
Lord Garnier
My noble friend has reminded me that I should have declared an interest as a practising barrister, given that that may not always be clear.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has reminded me that perhaps I should make the same declaration—so I do so now.
We support Amendments 22 to 24, not only for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Beith but for those given earlier in the debate, in particular by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. We regard it as very important that these rules should ensure a proper balance between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice: between the Executive and the legislature. I also take the two points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. First, there are of course equivalent provisions in the existing rules, but I agree entirely with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who pointed out that that should not be treated as a precedent, and that if there is anything wrong with the earlier rules, perhaps they should be changed. If the 2005 Act overlooked those changes, perhaps it should not have done so, because that was the point at which the changes should have been made; that is, when the balance between the Lord Chancellor and the administration of justice changed.
I also suggest that what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said was telling. He said that the difference between consultation and concurrence is that where you have consultation, the Lord Chancellor will go to the Lord Chief Justice and check that the change in the rules is okay with him—or that is what he hopes he would do—and then he would go back to make the rule. However, it seems to me that the need for concurrence in these rules is dependent on the Lord Chancellor finding out that the rules are okay with the Lord Chief Justice and the requirement for concurrence is to determine the position where they are not okay with the Lord Chief Justice, and that is why we have the concurrence requirement. I will give way to the noble and learned Lord.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
We are talking about Clause 9, which is to do with regulations, not the making of the rules. It is the effect of existing law in relation to the rules that has to be dealt with.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Again, I am not sure about that. I do not accept what I understand to be the Government’s argument against the amendments.
Clause 8 includes a rule-requiring power, and Clause 9 allows for the amendment or revocation of provisions made under an Act, which include the rules. Overall, it seems that Clauses 8 and 9 give the Government a rule-making or rule-requiring power. As I understand it, the Government’s argument is that Amendment 6 to Clause 2 and Amendment 8 to Clause 3 remove the need for a concurrence requirement in respect of Clauses 8 and 9; they also argue that, through those amendments, the concurrence requirement will govern the designation of proceedings of a specified kind and, similarly, will govern whether the Online Procedure Rules or conventional rules will govern proceedings which are of a specified kind. They go on to argue that, therefore, Clauses 8 and 9 will operate within that framework, and the concurrence requirement is therefore unnecessary in relation to the powers requiring rules to be made or requiring amendments to the rules. I disagree; I simply do not see the nexus.
Under Clauses 8 and 9, any number of rules—or changes or amendments to existing rules—might be made or required within the framework of the Online Procedure Rules. Such rules or amendments might well offend against the principles that the Lord Chief Justice would wish to impose on them. That could occur even in the context of existing designated specified proceedings. It follows that the concurrence requirement should be applicable to the rule-requiring, rule-amending or rule-repealing powers under Clauses 8 and 9—perhaps only as a safeguard and possibly in the hope that they will not be needed—and that the consultation preceding the concurrence requirement should be effective but, against the danger that it is not, I suggest that the amendments are required. We support them.
Baroness Drake
My Lords, I support Amendment 22 to Clause 8. I will steer clear of debate on Clause 9, being neither a judge nor a barrister or solicitor.
In Committee, deep concerns were expressed about the extent of the ministerial powers in the Bill, which could result in rules that set digital engagement and participation in online courts as compulsory conditions for access to justice in civil proceedings. In effect, the ministerial powers in the Bill have the potential to require people to choose between online proceedings or not pursuing legal claims. The Constitution Committee shared those concerns. The Minister sought to mitigate those concerns by giving assurances as to the Government’s intentions. In Committee, in response to my noble friend Lady Corston, the Minister commented:
“We intend to appoint a committee of experts to formulate these rules, including judicial members. They will have regard to the need for access to justice. Certainly, we have confidence in the ability of such a committee to formulate rules that reflect the need for all members of the community to have access, not only those who are perhaps more digitally alert and astute than the minority. We lay our confidence in the fact that there will be such a committee, that it will make regulations and that it will do it under the aegis of not only the Executive but the judiciary, and the Lord Chief Justice in particular”.
However, Clause 8 explicitly allows Ministers to both instruct and overrule that committee of experts.
On a further occasion, the Minister gave an assurance that,
“judicial discretion … ultimately, is paramount, and nothing in the Bill or that we would anticipate in the regulations to be made pursuant to the powers under the Bill would undermine that judicial discretion, which ultimately has be exercised in the interests of justice”.
However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, so acutely observed in Committee:
“It is not judicial discretion but rules that may require the parties to participate in the hearing by means of electronic devices. Therefore, it is not a question of the judge in charge of the case making that decision; the preliminary rules will require it, and the judge will be bound by that”.—[Official Report, 10/6/19; cols. 287-89.]
In summary, notwithstanding ministerial assurances, Clause 8 confers powers on Ministers to require specific provisions to be included in the Online Procedure Rules which the Online Procedure Rule Committee must comply with. Clause 8 also requires that the rules that the committee is required to make must be in accordance with Clause 7, but that clause gives the Minister explicit powers to disallow rules made by the Online Procedure Rule Committee of experts. Clause 8 gives Ministers considerable scope but fails to frame those powers in a way that ensures access to justice and does not give rise to the potential of a person having to choose between online court proceedings or not pursuing their case.
There are real concerns across the House about the potential of the powers given to Ministers in Clause 7, and I will not replay them here, but the case for Amendment 22, which introduces a degree of control over the exercise of those powers by requiring the Minister to secure the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, who is the head of the judiciary and is ultimately responsible for the delivery of justice, is, I believe, compelling.
Lord Keen of Elie
With great respect to the noble Lord, I do not consider that I am dealing with an implied limitation. If one construes the Bill as a whole, one begins with Clauses 2 and 3, which set out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee will be able to operate. That framework is subject to the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice; that is quite clear. To read Clause 8 as though it stands entirely alone and independently of the rest of the Bill is not, I submit, at all appropriate. The circumstances in which Clause 8 directions may be given clearly apply to the rule-making power of the committee. The committee has no rule-making power except in respect of proceedings of a specified kind as provided for by Clauses 2 and 3. I do not suggest that an implication is necessary there; it is simply a matter of statutory construction. I hear what the noble Lord says and will give further consideration to the point he makes in light of it, but that is my position at present.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Accepting what the Minister says about the framework, there is nothing in Clause 8 as I read it—he will no doubt correct me if I am wrong—that prevents the Lord Chancellor giving a Clause 8 direction in the context of rules already within specified proceedings, where the rules required to be made by the Lord Chancellor’s direction are offensive to the Lord Chief Justice.
Lord Keen of Elie
If they were offensive to the Lord Chief Justice, that would emerge in the course of consultation. I am glad that the noble Lord accepts my point about the proper construction of the statutory provisions as between Clauses 2 and 3 and Clause 8. What he is concerned about is an entirely distinct issue: that the Minister gives a direction for the making of rules in respect of proceedings of a specified kind, pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, which the Lord Chief Justice might not like. If he does not like it, he can express that view during the consultation. If he is deeply disturbed by what is proposed, he can have recourse to Section 5(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to make a report to Parliament, but that will not arise. One has to see these powers in their proper context.
I would add that, in the course of looking at the proposed amendments to the Bill, we have engaged with the Judicial Office to try to ensure that the Bill reflects constitutional arrangements consistent with those of the existing civil committees. That is precisely what Clauses 8 and 9 do and I am not aware of any objection from that source to the way in which those committees already operate, and in which it is intended that this committee should operate in respect of the same matter. I will come on to explain why, constitutionally as well as with reference to precedent, we consider that appropriate. I underline the point that the existing proposal in Clause 8 in no way takes away from or abrogates the provisions in Clauses 2 and 3, which establish quite clearly those proceedings, and only those proceedings, in respect of which the committee itself can make rules. It cannot make rules for something else entirely.
“Duty to make support available for digitally excluded people
The Lord Chancellor must arrange for the provision of such support as the Lord Chancellor considers to be appropriate and proportionate, for the purpose of assisting persons to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means, in accordance with Online Procedure Rules.”
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, regarding Amendments 11 and 12, let me restate the point I sought to outline in Committee. In his final review of the civil justice system in 2016, Lord Briggs—or Lord Justice Briggs as he then was—anticipated a committee of experts from across various disciplines that would reflect the needs of users. Amendments 11 and 12 seek to increase the size of the committee to include respectively four more legal members and one additional other member. Combined with Amendment 13, which has the effect of adding a further member who must have experience of representing the views of people who are digitally excluded, this would add four members to the committee.
We have been clear all along that we want an Online Procedure Rule Committee that is small and agile. This will mean that it has the flexibility to make and adapt rules quickly to meet circumstances that might change rapidly. As Clause 7 makes clear, before making or amending rules the committee must consult such persons as they consider appropriate. The committee will therefore be able to benefit from the contributions of people with expertise relevant to specific matters, rules and proceedings as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. This would include people with specific legal experience in a particular area, such as that of the disabled.
One consequence of adopting these amendments would be creating not only a much larger committee, but a much greater imbalance in the number of members appointed by the Lord Chancellor in comparison to the number appointed by the Lord Chief Justice. It would therefore defeat the very purpose of the amendments we have sought to move. At present, we have a committee of six on which there are three judicial appointees made by the Lord Chief Justice, one of whom is the chair. In the event of a rule being signed off by a majority, with three judicial appointees wishing to sign off the rule, the chair would have what is in effect a casting vote. These amendments would therefore take away entirely from the very force of the amendments the Government are moving.
Amendment 13 would add a member of the rule committee capable of representing the views of people who are digitally excluded. As I have already sought to explain, we consider that there are significant advantages in a small committee. Where it requires expert input, it has the power to seek that. Since we have brought forward amendments to ensure that all members of the committee always consider the needs of those who struggle to engage digitally—the amendments we dealt with earlier—and while I fully agree that digital support for those who want to access online services is absolutely paramount to the effectiveness of this system, we do not consider it necessary to achieve those objectives to have this addition to the committee. It is also important to remember that Clause 6 provides a power to vary the membership of the committee as and when required.
Finally, on Amendment 14 and the matter of gender balance, as I sought to emphasise in Committee, the Government of course support the wider aim of ensuring diversity among senior appointees to public bodies. When appointing members to the committee, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice are already bound by guidelines and statute relating to matters of diversity. Appointments to various procedure rule committees are governed by the Governance Code on Public Appointments, which sets out the principles that underpin public appointments, including openness, ministerial responsibility and integrity. It also includes a commitment to diversity:
“Public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live, and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds”.
Additionally, public appointments are regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. He or she, in turn, may make audits of departments to see that they are complying with the principles.
Furthermore, Ministers are subject to the public sector equality duty set out in the Equality Act 2010. We therefore consider the matter of diversity to be well dealt with. It does not have to be brought within the four walls of this Bill; it is already addressed in statute and by other means. Also, as I have mentioned before, applying this specific statutory duty to this committee would differentiate it from the other civil committees—the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Family Procedure Committee and the Civil Procedure Committee—and there is no compelling reason to do so. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Can the Minister clarify a point he made in relation to Amendments 11 to 13? Having regard to the amendments which have already been accepted, the balance of the committee at the moment is three judicial appointments and three appointed by the Lord Chancellor, with the Lord Chief Justice having the power to appoint the chairman from the judicial appointments, and that chairman having a casting vote. The Minister commented on the effect of the proposed Amendments 11 to 13 on that balance. Is that right?
Lord Keen of Elie
The noble Lord is entirely correct in his summary of the position if we apply the government amendments that have been moved. The result is that, in light of the government amendments, we will have a committee constituted as he indicated. That balance would be removed by the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.
Justice: Private Sector
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts(5 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
The noble Lord raises a pertinent point. One of the objectives of the recent publications is to ensure that there is sufficient expertise to review and consider such contracts. Examples are: the need for pilots when the Government are outsourcing a service for the first time; the production of assessments of should-be costs; the need to produce resolution planning information lest a private contractor fail; the need to publish key performance indicators so that we have an objective means of determining the delivery of these services; and the requirement for the Civil Service and the Government to understand financial distress guidance when entering into these contracts. These are all being addressed in the light of the recent work done in the Cabinet Office.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, can the noble and learned Lord assure us that in future contracts, in view of the failures there have been, far more attention will be given to specifying requirements for service providers in terms of the numbers and professional qualifications of the personnel involved in delivering those services?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, of course we will carefully review the ability of any proposed private contractor to deliver the services they are being contracted to provide. I shall not go into the minute detail of that examination but, as I say, it will include the need, first of all, to identify key performance indicators and ensure that they are adhered to.
Sentencing (Pre-consolidation Amendments) Bill [HL]
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames ExcerptsWednesday 12th June 2019
(5 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, it is a particular pleasure to speak because I have rarely attended any debate where there has been quite such unanimity. We of course also welcome the Bill and the intention to introduce the proposed code. The Bill is an essential pre-consolidation measure—or, more accurately, set of measures. I join the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and others in praising the work of the Law Commission and of Professor Ormerod in particular. I only wish that the Government and other Governments would take more notice of other Law Commission reports that have been shelved rather than enacted over the years.
The Bill loyally applies a number of important legal principles which our sentencing law has spectacularly lost sight of in recent decades. The first is that legislation should be accessible: easy to find, in one place, and possible to develop as one body of readable law. In sentencing in particular, where the liberty of the subject is at stake, there should be an end to the draftsmen’s nasty habit of defining words and phrases by reference to other legislation—where, for instance, such and such a phrase “shall have the meaning ascribed to it” in another piece of hardly or only vaguely linked legislation using the same phrase. This means that the reader, who may not necessarily be a lawyer but a lay member of the public trying to find out what the law actually is, has to go scrabbling around in other pieces of legislation to find the meaning he seeks. In some legislation double cross-referencing is not uncommon. I agree with every word that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said on this subject.
Consolidation is generally to be welcomed because it makes legislation more accessible. It is important not only that lawyers and judges can find the law on a topic in one place—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, illustrated this when he spoke of how often adjournments of the Crown Court are required while everyone rushes around trying to check the legal powers of criminal courts; having seen that many times, I know it is an extraordinarily undignified and unedifying sight—but that members of the public can understand sentencing, not least to enable them to know the actual and potential consequences of illegal behaviour. It is also important that the press can access the law and write about it accurately. The fact that the press so frequently gets the law on sentencing wrong is just as much a reflection on overcomplicated law as it is on careless reporting. The production of a sentencing code will address these issues.
The second principle that this legislation embodies is that legislation should be as simple as possible. The elimination of anomalies and redundant legislation of the kind mentioned by the Minister in opening and by other noble and learned Lords, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will remove the cause of many of the mistakes made in sentencing and reduce the number of appeals where the sentencing process has gone wrong. The law in this area has become ridiculously complex, as the example given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made very clear. It is extraordinary that the Law Commission found that no less than 36% of sample criminal cases randomly selected from the Court of Appeal workload involved sentences that the court below should not have passed as a matter of law. The Law Commission also commented on the delays in sentencing and in sentencing appeals caused by complexity in the law. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, referred to the huge estimated savings of more than £0.25 billion over 10 years as a result of the proposed implementation of the code. I echo her hope that these savings may be applied to making improvements elsewhere in the criminal justice system.
The third principle, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that legislation should not be retroactive. While it is sensible and welcome that, by virtue of the clean sweep, when the code comes into force all offenders will be sentenced in accordance with the code whenever their offences were committed, it is right that the Bill provides for an exception to this principle to ensure that an offender will not be liable to a greater penalty under the code than was applicable to his offence when it was committed. That is made clear in the Explanatory Notes and was mentioned by the Minister in opening. I understand that that is the effect of Clause 1(4), but it is an important guarantee and it is essential that it is watertight. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, also made this point.
The code will not, of course, make new substantive sentencing law. That is not the function of a consolidating statute. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made that point clearly, and I thought almost with strictures for following speakers. However, future sentencing reforms will, one hopes, be made by amendment of the code, which can then be kept up to date and developed as a single and accessible but dynamic body of law.
While discussing sentencing, I mention that we want to see a more wide-ranging reform of sentencing policy incorporated in the code in due course. In its welcome briefing, the Prison Reform Trust calls for a review of the sentencing framework as a whole, which we would support. Our aim throughout is to increase the life chances of offenders by achieving their rehabilitation, thus turning lives around, reducing reoffending rates and cutting the cost to society of crime, not only financially but in terms of disruption and human misery. We hope that the code develops in that direction as time goes on.
As is well known, we want to see an end to short prison sentences of less than 12 months. The evidence suggests that they are very damaging. Apart from that, we also need to end sentence inflation occurring through statutes permitting incremental increases in maximum sentences or new offences with ever greater sentences. Public and media pressure on courts is another source of sentence inflation. Indeed, the present Lord Chief Justice has spoken in the past about the dangers of sentence inflation. I very much hope that the presence of a comprehensive code will help to reduce that danger. In passing, we want to see sentencing judges much more involved in how both their custodial and community sentences for particular offenders will be implemented.
We welcome the Bill and the proposed introduction of a comprehensive and more accessible sentencing code, but we see this as an important step on the way to reforming our entire system of sentencing, punishment and rehabilitation so as genuinely to put rehabilitation first.