Sentencing (Pre-consolidation Amendments) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Second reading committee (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 12th June 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, it is a particular pleasure to speak because I have rarely attended any debate where there has been quite such unanimity. We of course also welcome the Bill and the intention to introduce the proposed code. The Bill is an essential pre-consolidation measure—or, more accurately, set of measures. I join the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and others in praising the work of the Law Commission and of Professor Ormerod in particular. I only wish that the Government and other Governments would take more notice of other Law Commission reports that have been shelved rather than enacted over the years.

The Bill loyally applies a number of important legal principles which our sentencing law has spectacularly lost sight of in recent decades. The first is that legislation should be accessible: easy to find, in one place, and possible to develop as one body of readable law. In sentencing in particular, where the liberty of the subject is at stake, there should be an end to the draftsmen’s nasty habit of defining words and phrases by reference to other legislation—where, for instance, such and such a phrase “shall have the meaning ascribed to it” in another piece of hardly or only vaguely linked legislation using the same phrase. This means that the reader, who may not necessarily be a lawyer but a lay member of the public trying to find out what the law actually is, has to go scrabbling around in other pieces of legislation to find the meaning he seeks. In some legislation double cross-referencing is not uncommon. I agree with every word that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said on this subject.

Consolidation is generally to be welcomed because it makes legislation more accessible. It is important not only that lawyers and judges can find the law on a topic in one place—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, illustrated this when he spoke of how often adjournments of the Crown Court are required while everyone rushes around trying to check the legal powers of criminal courts; having seen that many times, I know it is an extraordinarily undignified and unedifying sight—but that members of the public can understand sentencing, not least to enable them to know the actual and potential consequences of illegal behaviour. It is also important that the press can access the law and write about it accurately. The fact that the press so frequently gets the law on sentencing wrong is just as much a reflection on overcomplicated law as it is on careless reporting. The production of a sentencing code will address these issues.

The second principle that this legislation embodies is that legislation should be as simple as possible. The elimination of anomalies and redundant legislation of the kind mentioned by the Minister in opening and by other noble and learned Lords, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will remove the cause of many of the mistakes made in sentencing and reduce the number of appeals where the sentencing process has gone wrong. The law in this area has become ridiculously complex, as the example given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made very clear. It is extraordinary that the Law Commission found that no less than 36% of sample criminal cases randomly selected from the Court of Appeal workload involved sentences that the court below should not have passed as a matter of law. The Law Commission also commented on the delays in sentencing and in sentencing appeals caused by complexity in the law. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, referred to the huge estimated savings of more than £0.25 billion over 10 years as a result of the proposed implementation of the code. I echo her hope that these savings may be applied to making improvements elsewhere in the criminal justice system.

The third principle, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that legislation should not be retroactive. While it is sensible and welcome that, by virtue of the clean sweep, when the code comes into force all offenders will be sentenced in accordance with the code whenever their offences were committed, it is right that the Bill provides for an exception to this principle to ensure that an offender will not be liable to a greater penalty under the code than was applicable to his offence when it was committed. That is made clear in the Explanatory Notes and was mentioned by the Minister in opening. I understand that that is the effect of Clause 1(4), but it is an important guarantee and it is essential that it is watertight. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, also made this point.

The code will not, of course, make new substantive sentencing law. That is not the function of a consolidating statute. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made that point clearly, and I thought almost with strictures for following speakers. However, future sentencing reforms will, one hopes, be made by amendment of the code, which can then be kept up to date and developed as a single and accessible but dynamic body of law.

While discussing sentencing, I mention that we want to see a more wide-ranging reform of sentencing policy incorporated in the code in due course. In its welcome briefing, the Prison Reform Trust calls for a review of the sentencing framework as a whole, which we would support. Our aim throughout is to increase the life chances of offenders by achieving their rehabilitation, thus turning lives around, reducing reoffending rates and cutting the cost to society of crime, not only financially but in terms of disruption and human misery. We hope that the code develops in that direction as time goes on.

As is well known, we want to see an end to short prison sentences of less than 12 months. The evidence suggests that they are very damaging. Apart from that, we also need to end sentence inflation occurring through statutes permitting incremental increases in maximum sentences or new offences with ever greater sentences. Public and media pressure on courts is another source of sentence inflation. Indeed, the present Lord Chief Justice has spoken in the past about the dangers of sentence inflation. I very much hope that the presence of a comprehensive code will help to reduce that danger. In passing, we want to see sentencing judges much more involved in how both their custodial and community sentences for particular offenders will be implemented.

We welcome the Bill and the proposed introduction of a comprehensive and more accessible sentencing code, but we see this as an important step on the way to reforming our entire system of sentencing, punishment and rehabilitation so as genuinely to put rehabilitation first.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 6, which is in the first grouping. On Amendment 1, HMCTS has acknowledged that its assisted digital programme will not be sufficient to support everybody to engage with online processes and has therefore made a commitment that digital services will not be mandated. In relation to the reform agenda, it has been stated that HMCTS will continue to make provision for litigants to continue to use paper documents in accessing family court proceedings. It is therefore concerning that Clause 1(1)(a) would allow the Online Procedure Rule Committee to make rules requiring certain proceedings to be initiated electronically, and that Clause 1(1)(c) would allow rules requiring parties to participate electronically.

The purpose of this amendment is to make it crystal clear that people with particular vulnerabilities will not be required to participate in court proceedings, particularly family proceedings, in a digital way. I think the Government have been too optimistic when looking at the proportion of the population that is digitally excluded. The figure they have is that 18% of the population do not use computing equipment, but I would argue that that number is far too low. When one looks, for example, at the population using internet banking or similar sensitive issues, it is only 56%. I believe it would be helpful if it were clearly stated in the Bill that there will not be an expectation for parties to engage with any family court proceedings online and that paper channels will always be available to anyone who chooses to use them.

Amendment 6 is also part of this group. Clause 1(6) would allow the Online Procedure Rule Committee to set out circumstances under which proceedings should be transferred to a full court hearing, and therefore no longer come under the OPR. Although it may be useful to provide some clarity as to when cases can be transferred, I would be concerned if this resulted in any restriction of judicial discretion, and that any individual case could be transferred to a court hearing if it was required. The purpose of Amendment 6 is to make this point explicit in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 3 is in my name and in the names of my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. This amendment seeks to have the Bill offer a choice to parties between filing forms and other documents under the Online Procedure Rules by electronic means or submitting them on paper. At Second Reading, the Minister said that the Government recognised,

“that not all court and tribunal users will be able to engage online and so paper routes will continue to be available for those who need them”.—[Official Report, 14/5/19; col. 1506.]

The noble and learned Lord has repeatedly said that litigants will have a choice between filing documents electronically and filing paper documents, the intention being that paper documents will be scanned into the online file and available thereafter to be accessed online if desired. That promises a perfectly acceptable arrangement, but I suggest that we need a guarantee that it is going to happen.

For many, this is a matter of considerable importance. While no doubt the electronically literate with access to computers and the internet will choose to produce and file documents online, Lord Justice Briggs, as he then was, recognised in his review the difficulties that would face litigants who are unable to use or access computers. Such difficulties are compounded by the facts that for many there are serious financial challenges in accessing online resources, and that in many areas of the country access to acceptably fast broadband is unavailable. In spite of some progress in this area, I interpose that our inability to guarantee fast broadband across the United Kingdom is shocking.

If the Government intend to ensure a choice for parties between online and paper documents, there can be no good reason for them failing to spell that out in this legislation. Whatever the Government’s good intentions may be, there is no guarantee that a future Government will honour a commitment that is not on the face of the statute. This is not a matter where a statement of intent by the Minister will satisfactorily safeguard future litigants. There can be no downside to incorporating the choice in the Bill.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am afraid I cannot accept that. There is nothing in the Bill that would prohibit the employment of such a paper process once the online procedure is up and running. Indeed, the noble Lord will appreciate that, when it comes to the making of rules by the relevant committee, the process will involve the judiciary as well as the Executive.

We have heard reference already to the idea of consultation, and we will in due course look at amendments to the Bill that seek to shift the question of consultation to one of concurrence. Therefore, we will be in a position to rely on not only any decision-making on the part of the Executive but also the contribution of the judiciary to how it sees that these processes should best be applied in the interest of all litigants. I emphasise “all litigants” because, when we seek to simplify the court process and reduce its potential cost, we are doing so for the benefit of litigants in general. We will come to concurrence and consultation later.

We must bear in mind that this is not a case of Ministers dictating what the relevant rules will be. It is a case of the Executive setting out the machinery by which a rule committee can come into place and set out appropriate rules and regulations for the online procedure, in consultation with the judiciary and with its input, and potentially with its concurrence.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I am sorry to press the point, but does the Minister accept that without the guarantee in the Bill of his intention, we could lose this procedure at some stage in the future, and that this House may well wish to see that guarantee entrenched in the Bill, so that primary legislation would be necessary to remove the procedure?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I quite see that this House might wish to see it in primary legislation, but the position is this: a committee will be formed to put forward appropriate rules and regulations for the online procedure, under the essential supervision not only of the Executive but of the judiciary. There may come a point, at some unforeseeable time in the future, where the judiciary is of the view that it is no longer necessary to employ paper as a form of application or entry into the judicial process. I do not anticipate that happening—there is nothing here to suggest it will happen—and I do not see that there is a requirement for such a guarantee in the form of primary legislation. We intend to form an Online Procedure Rule Committee that will be well qualified to determine the appropriate routes into the online procedure for all parties concerned, including those perhaps not digitally competent or confident. That remains the position.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

5: Clause 1, page 1, line 22, at end insert—
“( ) Online Procedure Rules must provide that a party or potential party to proceedings governed or to be governed by Online Procedure Rules is entitled to assistance, to be known as “Designated Assistance”, with the conduct or progress of such proceedings, to be made available in accordance with section (Designated Assistance).”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, Amendments 5 and 13 in this group are in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Beith, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Our amendments would incorporate in the Bill a requirement that the Government provide necessary assistance for parties or potential parties to online proceedings, both claimants and defendants, who need help navigating them.

At Second Reading, the Minister promised:

“All our online services will be accompanied by appropriate and robust safeguards to protect and support users and to ensure that access to justice is maintained. In pursuing this approach, we recognise that there will be people who will need help accessing a new digital system”.—[Official Report, 14/5/19; col. 1506.]


He promised that the Government would put in place a comprehensive programme of support, which he described as “assisted digital”, which would include help for court users by telephone, online or by other electronic means or face to face. I pointed out in that debate that the Briggs review had stressed the importance of ensuring that access to justice was not compromised by the introduction of Online Procedure Rules. The Briggs report described the success of the online court as “critically dependent” on providing digital assistance for those who could not cope with computerised procedures.

The Constitution Committee, under the section of its report headed “Access to Justice”, argued eloquently that, with 5.3 million adults in the UK who could be characterised as “internet non-users” and with 29% of people over 65 having “zero digital skills”, not including those with limited digital skills or limited access to computers or broadband, the Bill makes no provision to safeguard access to justice in the way promised by the Minister at Second Reading. The committee recommended that,

“the Bill places a duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that adequate provision is made to enable access to online proceedings for those with limited digital means, digital literacy, or general literacy”.

We agree. At Second Reading, not only the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, called for a statutory commitment to digital assistance.

Once again in this group of amendments, I reject the assurance that it is safe to rely on an extra statutory statement of intention by the Government. That is especially true on a matter of such importance to the success of this reform in terms both of access to justice and of the rule of law. This commitment could and should be clearly expressed in the Bill in a way that would make it much more difficult for future Governments to resile from it. I make no apology for putting forward a similar point in relation to designated assistance to that which I made in relation to filing documents on paper.

Our amendments are comprehensive but flexible. Amendment 5 would introduce the general duty to provide assistance to a party or potential party to proceedings under Online Procedure Rules in accordance with the detailed provisions set out in Amendment 13. That amendment would give the Government flexibility on who should provide assistance and how. Designated assistance could be provided either directly through HM Courts & Tribunals Service, under contract with outside organisations, or through the voluntary sector. It would be for the Minister to determine what assistance could be provided by telephone, what by electronic means and what in person or by other reasonable means.

Our amendments are concerned with outcomes rather than structure; different providers might provide assistance in different but complimentary ways. However, in determining what assistance must be provided, and by what means, the appropriate Minister is to be subject to an overriding requirement that he or she should consider that assistance sufficient to enable the party receiving it to have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the proceedings, of the procedure under the Online Procedure Rules, and of how to access that procedure. The assistance will have to cover the completion of online forms—easy for lawyers and officials, perhaps, but often a nightmare for lay litigants. It will also have to cover the kinds of evidence that may be necessary to support or establish a claim or defence. Designated assistance should also be available about the requirements and meaning of the Online Procedure Rules. The requirement for assistance on the kinds of evidence required to establish a litigant’s case is particularly important and will save parties, and ultimately the courts, considerable time and trouble. Far too often, proceedings fail or are delayed because litigants in person are unaware of the kinds of evidence they are likely to need to establish their cases. Assistance with this aspect at an early stage of online proceedings may do much to help reduce costs, delays and frustration.

Those who may say that this is a step too far in favour of the courts service providing legal advice are missing the point of these reforms. The days are over when the court office tells litigants to go and seek the advice of a solicitor on generic issues such as this, for precisely the reasons expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, in relation to hiring expensive lawyers. If online proceedings are to work well and improve rather than stifle access to justice, they have to be targeted on enabling litigants without lawyers to use the courts successfully. Perhaps at this stage I should declare the same interest as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in relation to my being a lawyer in offline courts. That is the point of these reforms. It will be achieved only if parties are provided with the kind of help our amendments would require.

An important further point is that for litigants whose first language is not English and who have no familiarity with English, interpretation or translation should be available to enable them to understand proceedings in a language familiar to them. Far too often, the need for lawyers arises even in relatively simple cases where intelligent and capable litigants whose command of English is limited are obliged to instruct lawyers simply because they receive no help in understanding proceedings in their own languages. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Listowel]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I am a patron of the charity Best Beginnings, which has produced an application that can be downloaded from the NHS store for mothers around the births of their children. We are finding that it is tremendously effective in reaching black and minority-ethnic mothers in particular, and mothers on the lowest incomes. This has been developed with all the royal colleges, and it has taken time, money and a real strong effort from the charity over many years to develop such a good product that reaches out particularly to families for whom English is not the first language. One of the key selling points of this app is the videos attached to it. Mothers will see people like themselves talking about what it was like to experience depression or how to breastfeed and communicate with your infant. They can identify with those parents.

There is a tremendous opportunity here to make something which is really effective and helps litigants in person and people whose first language is not English to understand how to approach these matters. The noble Lord’s amendments are very important to ensure that there is a commitment up front to producing the best possible means for families and others to engage with the digital technology available and to get the best outcomes for them and their families.

Of course, with a product such as this—I am not pushing this one specifically—there are back-end analytics through which one can tell in an anonymous way exactly how often it is used and who uses it, so there would be plenty of feedback on how well it is working. I hope that the Minister can give a reassuring answer to the noble Lord.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin by saying that I entirely agree with noble Lords that digital support for those who want to access online services will be paramount to the effectiveness of the proposed changes in civil procedure. We are of course conscious that not all court and tribunal users have the confidence or ability to use digital channels unaided.

On the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, HMCTS already has an assisted digital strategy in place quite independent of the Bill. For simple support needs, HMCTS staff will talk users through queries over the telephone. In cases of more complex needs, there is provision for face-to-face support, currently being piloted by the Good Things Foundation, which is a charity that specialises in digital inclusion. That means that people can be taken through a digital process step by step. As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, noted, that support is being piloted in 18 locations throughout England and Wales, and in fact will now be rolled out across the country, in order that there is general access to it. We have that digital assistance in place and want to see it developed. We understand the need to ensure that such assistance is available.

We are also seeking to simplify some online forms, essentially by way of a “save and return” process. One frustration encountered by some users of online forms has been that, when they find themselves half way through a form, they decide to consult an appropriate oracle about how to complete the second half of the form but, by that time, the first half has disappeared. Simple steps like that can enable people to use these systems far more easily. We are entirely conscious of the need for such assistance.

I hear what noble Lords say about wanting to see some expression of willingness or intent in the Bill; I would be happy to discuss that further with them before Report. I cannot accept the proposed amendments in their present form—I will not seek to detail why at this stage—but we are willing to discuss an expression of intent that may appear in the Bill. I will leave the matter there at this stage.

Amendment 14, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, concerns fraudulent activity from persons perhaps pretending to act on behalf of the court. Of course, we take cybersecurity and online fraud extremely serious across all government services. We have cybersecurity professionals involved in the development of all our systems, including new digital services. Those are assessed by the Government Digital Service before they are ever rolled out for public access, so we have a means of ensuring that these systems are fit for purpose. Of course, we understand the importance of building appropriate data security and privacy measures into all such technological systems. Indeed, our systems are subjected to regular checks to ensure that there is no improper access or misuse. HMCTS has developed a risk assessment framework aligned to Government Digital Service standards. My understanding is that, on the basis of the present offerings online, it is unaware of any fraudulent websites claiming to offer access to such sites. Of course, we will maintain vigilance in that regard.

There is perhaps a distinction to be drawn here between some scams and the sort of online scam where somebody claims to be from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and invites you to send them your bank account details so that you may be the happy recipient of a tax rebate, but you then discover that your bank has inadvertently been emptied rather than credited. In the context of the court process, we are vigilant against fraud but there is no scope there for that sort of fraud. As I said, we have not encountered fraudulent use, or attempts at fraudulent use, of the websites in so far as we already have certain online channels with HMCTS, so we would not consider it appropriate to accept the noble and learned Lord’s amendment at this stage. That said, I would be happy to discuss further the other amendments in the group. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. It appears that we are all committed to seeing a modernised and simple online procedure that enhances, rather than damages, access to justice. We regard it as essential that there should be a statutory commitment to designated assistance for the parties. For that reason, I am extremely gratified to hear the Minister say that he will discuss such a commitment in some form with myself and other noble Lords between now and Report. Of course, we welcome that invitation and will accept it.

I will just say one further thing in answer to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about the providers of such assistance. As the Minister said and as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, pointed out, we have in place not only the service provided currently by HM Courts & Tribunals Service but also by such law centres as still exist and by charities such as the Good Things Foundation and the charity mentioned by the noble Earl. I am wary of being too dogmatic about the providers that could by agreement with HM Courts & Tribunals Service provide designated assistance in the future. I hope that, when the Bill leaves this House, we have an acceptable commitment to designated assistance to help litigants in the future. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, there are two or three amendments in this group that look to the Government to pilot the processes embodied in the Bill. That seems a sensible way of dealing with these changes. Amendment 24 would require the Minister to publish a written statement on the progress and findings of the pilot scheme. These are major changes in our legal system, so it is necessary to look carefully at how they are working before deciding that they will remain part of the system. This is a major change, and it would help if the Government accepted the notion that progress will be reviewed and an opportunity given to consider how it is working. Further, the procedure should be an affirmative resolution.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, our Amendments 31 to 33 in this group require a statutory review between three and four years from the date on which the Bill becomes law. They also require a report to Parliament from the appropriate Minister, prepared in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, both of whom will be able to contribute independently to the report, should they wish to. The Minister’s answer to these suggestions to date has been that the Government will carry out a post-legislative review, so there is no need to incorporate a requirement for such a review into the Bill. Once again, I regret that we do not agree. Non-statutory promises have a nasty habit of being fulfilled well outside the time limits promised. Indeed, such reviews often seem to have as many delays as Crossrail. Statutory time limits, while not fool-proof, at least concentrate the minds of Ministers and officials. Furthermore, without further primary legislation, they do not bind future Governments. In any case, the requirement to review and report guarantees a certain thoroughness to the review and resulting report that might not otherwise have existed.

We regard as particularly important the requirement for the Government to consult the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals in preparing the report and to have the opportunity to report to Parliament. That will guarantee that a judicial perspective is brought to bear on the review and formal report to Parliament. In this case, we regard the combination of judicial and political input as very important. Reviewing the operation of the legislation makes that combination important, as with making the changes and decisions that we discussed in the group of the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. We also support the amendments in this group on further piloting these online procedures. Careful piloting and a staged introduction could avoid costly mistakes and improve the procedures as they are developed. Both providers and users will be able to see and report on what works and does not.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I first turn to Amendments 22 to 24, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and address the issue that the rules should be piloted by the Online Procedure Rule Committee before they come into effect. I will then come on to Amendments 31 to 33, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.

I assure the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that when services are introduced, they are already subject to ongoing testing. HMCTS is rapidly testing and adapting new online services, based on user feedback and service data. That is important because it ensures flexibility and improvements in practice and procedures that enhance access to justice. Piloted online services cannot be rolled out to the public more widely without such rigorous independent assessment carried out by the Government Digital Service, and then confirmation that they are fit for purpose. In addition, some projects are also being more formally evaluated through their development by HMCTS itself.

Reference was made to a number of piloted measures in the existing digital portal for debt actions. The difficulty is that, if we accept measures of the kind proposed in these amendments, we will add a layer of bureaucracy to the rule-making process beyond current practice, thereby reducing the flexibility to respond to user needs and technological changes. The Bill permits the use of practice directions, which can support projects through development before formal rules are set out in statute, so one does not have to go to a formal set of rules immediately; one can simply have a practice direction that assists the piloting of particular projects.

I mentioned before the example of online civil money claims and the pilot that went live in March 2019, which is underpinned by practice directions that require the consent of the Master of the Rolls and the appropriate Minister. Such a project worked closely with the judicial sub-committee to develop the pilot. I emphasise that there is already a clear process in place through which such proposed rules are tested, piloted and reviewed. To that extent, we consider Amendment 22 unnecessary.

Amendment 23 would again limit the flexibility of the OPRC to make the small, minor changes required to respond quickly to changes in user needs or perhaps new technology. It would add time and consequently cost to the development of the online process. We do not consider it appropriate to go down that route.

Amendment 24 would require us to publish six-monthly reports. We regard that as simply unmanageable given the number of pilots across the services that we are in the course of transforming. Again, there is the issue of cost, so we are not persuaded of the need for such steps to be taken.

Amendments 31, 32 and 33 would place in the Bill a requirement for a formal review of the Act to which the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals were able to contribute independently. Clearly, reviewing legislation which has been passed by this House is of great importance. That is precisely why the Government already require departments to carry out post-legislative scrutiny of all Acts within three to five years after Royal Assent. We therefore consider this amendment unnecessary because post-legislative scrutiny of this legislation will be conducted—I emphasise, will be conducted—within that timescale.

Regarding the reference to the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals, of course, their views are incredibly important and are taken seriously. There would be no question of us laying a report on this or other courts legislation without taking account of their opinions. Again, we consider the amendments unnecessary, understanding the importance of what underpins and has prompted them. I hope that, with these assurances, noble Lords will accept that the amendments are unnecessary and I invite them not to press them.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches I echo the broad welcome given to the Bill from all around the House, and to the Government’s wider commitment to implement the recommendations of the 2016 review of civil court structures by Lord Justice Briggs, as he then was. We regard online procedures for commencing and pursuing proceedings in appropriate cases as a welcome innovation that has the potential to make justice more accessible, more efficient and less expensive. We too are encouraged by the success, mentioned by the Minister and my noble friend Lord Beith, of the online divorce service and online money claims, with their very low error rates and high rates of user satisfaction. Small businesses in particular, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, will welcome the improved efficiency and lower expense of online cases. Indeed, in many ways it is a shame that the Bill has taken so long to reach us after the loss of the Prisons and Courts Bill when the 2017 election was called. That said, I believe that the Bill’s success will be measured by the degree to which it improves access to justice. In this, I echo the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and I agree with him that reducing costs along with simplifying and unifying procedures are central to achieving this aim.

For me, one of the most significant provisions in the Bill is the requirement in Clause 1(3)(a),

“that practice and procedure under the rules are accessible and fair”.

That is complemented and supported by the requirement in paragraph (b) that the rules must be,

“both simple and simply expressed”,

emphasised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, who sought the strengthening of those words. However, the very helpful briefing provided by the Library says much about the challenge of ensuring accessibility. Lord Justice Briggs said that he was concerned to get beyond the,

“lawyerish culture and procedure of the civil courts”,

but he recognised that barriers might be raised by court users’ lack of understanding of or access to IT. He noted:

“Much the largest concern has been about the need to cater for those who would be challenged by the need to communicate with the court by computer”.


He said in the conclusions to his report in paragraph 12.8:

“The success of the Online Court will also be critically dependent upon digital assistance for all those challenged by the use of computers and upon continuing improvement in public legal education”.


I would go further. My concern, acknowledged in the HMCTS document on the court reform agenda, is with all those people who find it difficult enough to deal with court proceedings on paper and may face even greater difficulties with IT-based solutions. I question whether sufficient attention has been given to the problems likely to face potential litigants—probably defendants as much as or more than claimants—who lack the understanding to handle what is likely to seem a very impersonal system online. I am particularly concerned about the difficulties confronting those whose first language is not English; those who find all legal documents, however simplified, nightmarishly difficult to understand, particularly older people; and those whose ability to engage with officialdom is limited. These points were powerfully made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the difficulties go far further than unfamiliarity with IT.

I recognise that the court reform agenda document commits to a number of genuinely helpful measures. These include functions to enable users to pause and take advice part way through any process without losing the work they have already undertaken on online forms, which would address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, about the danger of users being sent back by the computer to start again. There is to be signposting to online or in-person advice services; a commitment to maintaining and simplifying paper forms, enabling them to be used in parallel with online services; and, most importantly, what is called—in what I suggest is unacceptable jargon—“assisted digital”, by which is meant telephone, web chat and face-to-face services to help users make sense of and use the online processes. I understand that telephone support will be provided by HMCTS, whereas face-to-face support will be delivered through the voluntary sector. The charity Good Things Foundation, already established in a number of areas of interaction with government, will through community networks engage directly with users needing support and assistance.

I welcome the commitment to measures of assistance that the Minister outlined in opening the debate, but I cannot understand why the Government cannot commit in the Bill to ensuring not only that practice and procedure under the rules are accessible and fair but that users will be able to secure adequate help in handling the new online procedures. I believe it would give the House and the wider public greater confidence that the introduction of online procedures is more about broadening public access to justice than about achieving efficiency savings if the Bill incorporated a commitment to help users access, navigate and manage their cases online. The risk of the Bill being perceived primarily as a cost-saving measure was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I invite the Minister, with whom I have canvassed this possibility, to consider introducing or accepting an amendment requiring the Government to make support available. I was very pleased to hear powerful suggestions that such a statutory requirement be included from the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Thomas.

Turning to the detail of the Bill, I share the concern expressed by my noble friend Lord Beith at the plight of those who may not wish to use online procedures facing opponents who do, and about the interface between online and paper proceedings generally. I also share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, about the Henry VIII power in Clause 9. I understand the reason for that power but agree with him that before amending legislation using it, the Lord Chancellor should be required to agree any amendment with the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, rather than merely consulting them. I also agree with him that the same principle should apply to appointments to the Online Procedure Rules Committee. It seems to me that he is also right to say that the principle should apply to other areas where the Bill requires only consultation at present but where agreement between the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor seems not just desirable but essential. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, directed attention to the danger of the Lord Chancellor having the power to require changes to the rules. I accept that that is a problem, but there is a parallel provision in the CPR to similar effect.

On a different point, I am also concerned that the commitment in the Bill and its supporting documents to piloting the new procedures before extending them nationally may be insufficient. The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee described the programme as a,

“hugely ambitious programme to bring the court system into the modern age”,

but had little confidence that HMCTS could deliver it successfully. In particular, it voiced the criticism that:

“The intended pace of the reforms did not allow for meaningful consultations or evaluation, and could lead to unintended results”.


I suggest that a careful programme of graduated piloting of all these reforms would help meet that criticism and enable pitfalls of the kind mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, to be addressed when encountered on a manageable scale, before their wholesale introduction to an unready public by a largely guinea pig staff. The history of large IT projects in government departments strongly suggests a cautious and carefully staged approach, which this is not.

In this context, it is very important that there should be a statutory commitment to post-legislative review of how the implementation of these online procedures is working after perhaps three years. I believe the Minister may be sympathetic to that aim. It is also important that the introduction of new online procedures should not be used to justify further court closures, which make courts much more difficult to access and damage the local administration of justice.

We have had a helpful recent response to consultation on the court estate, but I am not sure that it is sufficiently flexible. Everyone accepts that we will continue to need court premises in cases where hearings are necessary, but I would argue that the way to respond to any reduction in the need for court premises is by imaginative and innovative use of existing buildings, not by court closures. I thought I detected some support from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on that matter. It is wrong to send litigants to distant court centres that are inconvenient and expensive to reach and I do not agree with the Government that accepting a 12-hour day, from 7.30 am to 7.30 pm, often in cases lasting more than one day, is an appropriate response.

In summary, we on these Benches welcome the Bill, we welcome online courts, we welcome the new procedures and we hope they will be successful. But we shall strive in the further proceedings on the Bill to ensure that at its heart is a commitment to increased access to justice.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement. Sadly, I am not grateful for its content, which offers very little very late. The Government wasted two years investigating their own devastating cuts, perpetrated by the coalition Government on so many ordinary people in this country, for whom access to justice is no longer a reality. The review is a missed opportunity to restore legal support to people facing rogue landlords, debilitating family breakups and the Government’s hostile environment to not just migrants but poor people and people living on benefits.

There have been 99% cuts to benefits legal aid for some of the most vulnerable people in our society, which is completely unacceptable. The Statement’s accompanying documents include an action plan that is incredibly disappointing, in many cases offering just more reviews rather than the action that the term “action plan” would normally suggest. Legal aid has been slashed by hundreds of millions of pounds. Even the Government’s target of saving £410 million was exceeded by £200 million. Is that a record of which the Ministry of Justice can be proud?

On many occasions technology, as with the Northern Ireland border, is offered as a panacea to replace real lawyers offering people early advice and subsequent representation where necessary. That is what anyone would want when dealing with a difficult dispute in their life, and it should be available to everyone—rich or poor.

Cuts to public services and austerity are always political choices, but when the cuts are to the legal advice and representation at the heart of our rule of law, they become particularly ideological. All the exquisite legislation brought forward and scrutinised in your Lordships’ House remains a dead letter in a closed book without adequate legal aid. That is the situation in the United Kingdom—one of the wealthiest countries on earth—at this moment in the 21st century. To my mind, this is a national disgrace.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. That piece of Labour legislation, of which we are proud, was as important in the post-war settlement as healthcare or universal education. I am sad to say this because I think that matters concerning the rule of law should be cross-party and bipartisan, but I have come to the view that only a Labour Government will restore access to justice, advice and representation for all.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, after a delayed process that took an entire year, we now have the post-implementation review of LASPO. I will focus on legal aid.

Of its four stated objectives, the MoJ claims success in just one: significant savings have been made. Well, we know that. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out, the savings wildly exceeded what was expected. However, on each of the other three objectives—discouraging unnecessary and adversarial litigation at public expense; targeting legal aid at those who need it most; and delivering better overall value for money for the taxpayer—the answer is an unimpressive “Don’t know”, dressed up in weasel words such as, “It is impossible to say with certainty”. I suspect that an independent review would have come to clearer conclusions.

The review identifies six themes echoing the experiences of all of us involved in the justice system. First, these changes in the scope of legal aid undermine value for money, particularly by preventing early intervention. Secondly, financial eligibility and operational requirements limit access to legal aid too harshly. Thirdly, the exceptional case funding scheme is not working well. Fourthly, legal aid fees are now so low that future provision by practitioners is at risk. Fifthly, increasing numbers of litigants in person increase costs and risk the perception of a two-tier justice system. Finally, advice deserts across our country threaten access to justice.

The legal support action plan seeks to address those issues, at least in part. I am more hopeful than the noble Baroness in saying that the action plan is welcome. Among the Government’s pledges, some of which were mentioned in the Statement, they promised to review eligibility requirements, increase public awareness of how to access legal aid, broaden the scope of legal aid in some immigration and family cases—that will not go nearly far enough—improve the exceptional case funding scheme, review criminal legal aid, widen access to the telephone gateway, increase support for litigants in person and examine complementary ways of providing legal support. Both those pledges and the others made must be kept and implemented soon. We will have further demands for improved support. We will hold the Government’s feet to the fire.

Can the Minister do two things today on this vital topic? Together, the four documents represent a massive report. Will he please use his influence to secure a debate, with adequate time and soon, on the reports and the action plan? Secondly, will he reassure us that where the promises in the action plan are not backed up by implementation dates—and some are—the MoJ will treat them with urgency?

Notwithstanding the warnings in the paper and in the Statement that all this cannot be delivered overnight and is the first step in the process, the rescue of our legal aid system and the improvement of our legal support system needs more urgency than was ever accorded to this review.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for their contributions. I am a little disappointed by the response of the noble Baroness. These reports have been welcomed in many quarters, although not universally and not without qualification. However, that is hardly a surprise because, let us be clear, this is a difficult and controversial area.

Let us look for a moment to the background. We had a financial crash in 2008. It is easy to say that austerity is a political choice but essentially it is not; austerity is a consequence. Furthermore, after that financial crash, which impacted right across our society, we had the party manifestos for the election in 2010. The Labour manifesto said explicitly that it would be necessary to address the cost of legal aid provision, and that was its intent—the cost was too high. That was recognised by other parties and indeed by the coalition Government themselves, who brought forward the LASPO Act to try to bring some degree of control over the ever-spiralling actual financial cost of legal aid. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, acknowledged this.

We not talking just about the immediate cost of legal aid but about the wider issue of access to justice and the means by which we can ensure that there is legal assistance as well as legal aid for all in our society, but particularly for the most vulnerable, who truly require it. That is why I am thankful that the noble Lord has welcomed the action plan which is designed to look not only at the provision of financial resources for legal advice and assistance but the manner in which we can deliver legal support for people at the right time and in the right place. To do that, we want to see the development of web-based products, for example. We want to see proper signposting and advice for people. Moreover, we want to encourage that sort of advice and signposting at an early stage because there is a belief that if we can do that, we can help resolve people’s issues before they develop into major and costly litigation. All of that is to be considered.

In addition, we are going to test the impact of early legal advice by promoting certain pilots, particularly in the area of social welfare law, to see what results can be secured. I note the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the need for implementation at pace, and indeed we are committed to the implementation of all of these recommendations as soon as we can. For example, we will be looking at the financial levels for qualification for legal aid and we intend to bring that to a conclusion by summer 2020 so that these matters can be addressed as soon as possible.

There are areas where we face difficulties with regard to the provision of legal advice. The noble Lord referred to legal advice deserts. In fact, in the areas of housing and debt, we are generally well covered across England and Wales so far as advice is concerned, but I accept that there are still gaps which have to be filled by, for example, telephone advice, which is not the ideal. Indeed, one of the reasons we want to roll out the web-based access that I mentioned earlier is to address the demand for legal advice and assistance in rural areas and other areas outside urban centres where that is more readily to hand. That is certainly part of our proposed action plan,

On the assurances the noble Lord sought, he readily appreciates that it is not in my power to secure a debate in this House, but no doubt the usual channels will have heard his observations. I concur with his reference to the depth and breadth of these reports, and perhaps the need to look at them in more detail to figure out just where we are going forward and how quickly we should go forward on these issues. As I sought to reassure him earlier, we are concerned to ensure that there is implementation of these proposals as soon as it is possible to secure it.

Mutual Recognition of Protection Measures in Civil Matters (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I broadly welcome this measure and that the Government has in this case taken a humane approach and decided unilaterally to accord recognition to the question of reciprocity, other than the state’s protective measures for the safety of parties, particularly for domestic proceedings and vulnerable citizens. We understand the limited exceptions where such measures being enforced here would be manifestly contrary to public policy or inconsistent with a subsisting United Kingdom judgment.

However, I take the opening point made by the noble and learned Lord that it is important to consider what can be negotiated. What contact has there been at Secretary of State level to see whether some reciprocity of consideration could be given to enforcing protective measures granted by United Kingdom courts in the rest of Europe? Why was that not done a great deal of time ago and outside the context of the other negotiations?

I do not agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that we should worry about the cost in the United Kingdom of enforcing protective measures from other member states which we have agreed humanely to enforce. That is a cost we have to absorb. In areas such as this, I believe that accepting that a degree of reciprocity is not essential to achieving a satisfactory outcome for both sides is helpful. I hope that we will get unilateral action the other way in due course. It will certainly make negotiation a great deal easier.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I agree entirely with my noble friend. Oddly enough, we had not consulted each other beforehand, but we reached the same conclusion from the same basic principles: where people are particularly vulnerable, when the arrangements we make in this country can afford them some protection, we should do so without regard to the reciprocity we would prefer, which we might not be able to have.

It is particularly depressing to have to see through this statutory instrument which says to people in desperate family situations threatened with violence, “Sorry, but, whereas we have been able to issue a procedure in the past which gives you some protection, even if you are going elsewhere in the European Union”—which they may be doing because there are grandparents or aunts and uncles for their children to see—“we can no longer offer you that, and you are that much more vulnerable as a consequence”. We really must negotiate our way to a better position. Like my noble friend, I think it is right that the Government should continue to offer protection when a court elsewhere in the European Union has deemed it necessary.

Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

I should make it clear that I and other Members understand that the Minister and staff at the Ministry of Justice had a hugely difficult task in drafting the important secondary legislation in which Parliament will be drowning for months, if not years, to come. This is a consequence of the Government rushing into a decision to enact massive legislative changes in an absurdly short time without adequate consultation. It is devoutly to be hoped that at least we will not end up with a no-deal Brexit which makes such legislative provision necessary, even if that requires us to undergo another round of secondary legislation to accord with a further and better change of circumstances.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I do not propose to address the same matters of detail that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has done. I said a great deal of what I wanted to say about the general impact on judicial co-operation and co-operation in legal matters in the debate on the first of these statutory instruments. But let the Minister and the Government be in no doubt that the issue of co-operation in family justice, and the replacement of the system we have now by the bitty and only partial system he has outlined, is the substitution of a much less satisfactory and much less smooth step backwards—which is to be deplored—from the extremely well-respected and widely understood system that we have now across the European Union.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentioned 16 million cross-border family disputes. The European Parliament estimates that 10% of European citizens are married to people of a different citizenship, and a very large number of those are married to other European citizens. I am one of them; many in your Lordships’ House and the other place are also married to other EU citizens. Even Nigel Farage is—or was—married to an EU citizen of another state.

We have a system now that works well and is widely respected across the whole gamut of domestic law. Jurisdiction is the area where I think there has been the most difficulty because the first court is the place of jurisdiction in divorce rulings, which was difficult to accept but is now widely understood. Recognition and enforcement are absolutely crucial. Going back to the Hague rules will be unhelpful by comparison with what we have now. The system of child abduction goes back to the Hague convention of 1980. Yes, it was there but the override that we have under Brussels IIa makes the system work far better, far more effectively, far more cheaply and with far more co-operation.

Judicial co-operation across the European Union has generally been helpful and beneficial and we have all gained immeasurably from the co-operation across different jurisdictions. Legal aid is available in respect of cross-border disputes within the European Union, which will not be available after we leave it. The new arrangements for the maintenance regulations are absolutely hopeless compared with what we currently enjoy for intra-European disputes, as anybody who is involved with divorces between, for instance, UK and US or other third-country litigants well knows.

I entirely accept the Government’s argument that we simply could not insist on losing reciprocity and nevertheless maintain unilateral arrangements in the case of these convention advantages, the reason being that we would put UK citizens at severe disadvantages when their relationships with other EU citizens broke down. Nevertheless, the Minister and the Government should not rest on the consultation that they have had by discussion with some family lawyers. The Government should be in no doubt that family lawyers generally deplore the loss of the European regime, which is what would face us if we went through with a no-deal exit.

The Explanatory Memorandum produced by the Government is in similar terms to, and shares the faults of, that in respect of civil and commercial cases. It says at paragraph 12.2 on page 6:

“In the event of a no deal EU Exit, the impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies (being those that advise, represent and support individuals and families engaged in cross-border family law matters) of this instrument will, on balance, be positive. The amendments provide a basis for continued reciprocal cooperation with most EU Member States through the UK’s participation with those Member States”.


It then goes through the Hague conventions that will be available. That is a comparison with the prospect that we would enjoy if we had no statutory instrument to cover this position. The Explanatory Memorandum faces reality later on in that paragraph, where it says:

“However, the change to Hague Convention rules and the new domestic rules on divorce etc jurisdiction, maintenance jurisdiction and parental responsibility legal aid will require relevant businesses, charities and voluntary bodies to familiarise themselves and adjust their administrative arrangements to deal with the new rules. In some cases (especially divorce etc jurisdiction) the new rules could lead to greater disputation and complexity”.


Greater disputation and complexity always means greater cost. In family cases it is greater stress, unhappiness and mental health issues, and severe damage to children. One sees in so many of these cross-border cases the added damage to children, even with the present benign arrangements, because their parents are in different jurisdictions. The Explanatory Memorandum goes on:

“In the event of a no deal EU Exit, the impact on the public sector is expected to be an increase in case volume and complexity of cases before the family court due to the changes in divorce and maintenance jurisdiction rules. However, this instrument will have positive impacts on the family court as it ensures there will be workable rules governing cross-border family law disputes”.


Once again, this is confusing the two issues. Yes, there will be workable rules and, yes, that is better than no rules at all, but it is far worse than what we have now.

Of course, I accept the other statutory instrument that same-sex marriage and civil partnerships should be put on the same basis as opposite-sex relationships, but we are once again facing a situation where it is my view—and, I suggest, a view that ought to be taken seriously by the Government—that the loss of co-operation in family law and relationship law generally would be very serious, and that those prepared to countenance no deal should take that into consideration far more than they do at present. I know that the noble and learned Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, take these matters seriously. I wish other members of the Government would do the same.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions. I reiterate what the relevant comparators are for impact assessments in consideration of these instruments. This Parliament determined to make a law by reason of which we leave the EU on 29 March 2019. The Executive not only have to respect that law, as made by this Parliament, but have to make appropriate plans and arrangements to allow for that in the event that no withdrawal agreement is in place as at 29 March. So, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, we are carrying out a relevant comparison within the impact assessments in that context.

I will not gainsay the comments about the benefits we have enjoyed from the Brussels regime, whether in the context of divorce, maintenance, child abduction or the wider issues we have already discussed today of commercial and civil cases. We have all benefited from that regime, but we cease to be a party to it because this Parliament has made a law determining that that would be the consequence on 29 March 2019.

On the issues of family law, fortunately we have, in essence, the foundations for all that we find in Brussels IIa. We have the 1970 Hague convention on recognition of divorce and separation and the 1980 Hague convention on child abduction. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is quite right that it does not contain the override, but then it cannot because we will not be in a position to make an order overriding an order of an EU state court when we have left the EU. We simply cannot do that unilaterally, so we have to accept that. We have the 1996 Hague convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and co-operation in family matters. In the context of maintenance, we have the 2007 Hague convention. All of that will be in place and, as I indicated earlier, we are also applying to be a party to the Lugano Convention, although my understanding is that the Lugano Convention is on civil and commercial rather than family matters. Nevertheless, we are taking all the steps we can at this stage to cover all bases.

On the question of future co-operation, the political declaration refers to the intention to negotiate these matters, but it takes two to tango—as is sometimes observed—and therefore the pace at which we can negotiate these issues is dictated not only by us but by the EU, and we have to take that on board.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to the European protection order. That is a particularly difficult issue because the European protection order is in the form of a directive, which is quite specific in its terms. It says that an EU court can issue an EPO only to another EU jurisdiction, and that an EU court can recognise an EPO only from another EU jurisdiction. It is simply not possible even to apply a unilateral aspect of the EPO, but we have done that with regard to the civil protection orders that I referred to earlier.

We have done as much as we can in preparation for a no-deal exit—a no-deal exit of which no one, as far as I am aware, is truly in favour. But we have to plan for that contingency given the state of the law as it has been determined by Parliament. It is in these circumstances that I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I am most grateful to my noble friend. I take great exception to what the noble Baroness said. I am surprised that she knows a lot about convention, as she has not been here very long, but obviously she has picked it up from somewhere. Conventions are conventions, not rules that need to be and must be obeyed. I understand that one of the conventions is that when Ministers are explaining something and are asked a question, they normally give way and answer it. In all the Grand Committees that I have been in, throughout the years—I have been in a number—the Minister has given way. Of course, we are getting used to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, by now.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, it is not often that I confess to feeling sorry for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, but on this occasion I do, and in the presence of a number of other distinguished lawyers, who have considerable experience of commercial litigation involving cross-border and cross-European border disputes. It is almost impossible to overestimate the importance of the regime that we have built up across the European Union for the resolution of issues of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in civil and commercial disputes. We have been promised so many times, in debate after debate on the Brexit issue, that we would not be in this position. The Government were going to get a deal, and one of the first things they would insist on in getting it is that we would preserve the cross-border jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement issues, or rules that we have built up with Brussels Ia.

We are in this position now; I entirely accept that the Minister opened this debate on these regulations on the basis that the Government are still hoping for a deal and that if there is a deal, we will continue along the course of resolving this issue. But it was with horror that many of us heard the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, last night refuse to accede to the Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, because it ruled out no deal—which it did not—and for him and the Government to be so prepared to countenance no deal.

In our view and that of almost every commercial lawyer with whom I speak, the issues surrounding cross-border litigation are being given far too little prominence and importance. What we are losing is clearly defined in the Explanatory Memorandum as,

“a system of uniform jurisdictional rules to identify the appropriate court in which to bring a civil law or commercial claim”—

that is the first bullet point on page 2—and,

“a simplified mechanism to recognise and enforce the judgment EU Member State/EFTA state courts in civil and commercial cases, with a view to reducing costs for litigants and increasing efficiency. The possibility for such simplified and almost automatic treatment of the judgment of one such state in another is based on the ‘mutual trust’ that each state will have applied the uniform rules of jurisdiction”.

This statutory instrument, subject to some relatively minor exceptions, effectively revokes Brussels Ia, which is at the heart of the Brussels regime. It is also significant that it abandons the European Judicial Network, which has been a forum for judicial co-operation of great use throughout the European Union, and does so with no replacement. The very limited exceptions that I mentioned were mentioned by the Minister: some consumer and employment cases—in British courts, of course—transitional cases and the choice of courts arrangements under the Hague Convention. That is, to coin a phrase used by some Brexiteers in the past, thin gruel indeed compared with the widespread benefits that we get from the system of judicial co-operation and our current arrangements.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, the noble Lord is making an extremely powerful case. For those of us who are not lawyers and are struggling to understand precisely what we are losing as a result of this no-deal regulation and the preparations, can he tell us what we as a country would lose by not being part of the European Judicial Network? It was not mentioned at all by the Minister.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I shall move on to that in the course of what I have to say. I do not propose to deal with the detail of it, because the detail is all spelled out.

What we have at the moment is a common system for arranging which court will have jurisdiction, recognising the judgment of courts throughout the European Union and the other convention states and the enforcement of judgments across the European Union. The point of that, and what we will be losing, is the capacity for citizens and businesses to know that they can sue, wherever they are in the European Union, in the appropriate court and that that judgment will be enforced across the Union. That was not the case before the convention and will not be the case thereafter. We will effectively be thrown back on to the rules that pertained before the EU. Those rules are those we have with third countries and in many cases involve satellite litigation, duplication of litigation and duplication of costs. That means that our citizens and businesses will be left weaker and less protected. Notably, totally uncosted in the documentation surrounding this statutory instrument is that commercial disadvantage costs money.

The fact that Britain has become so successful and so attractive within the European Union owes not a little to the fact that its system of law and the mutual recognition and enforcement that it enjoys with other European countries has made it attractive as a gateway to the European Union for those outside the European Union, as well as an attractive forum in which to deal for other member states. Losing that advantage is important and will largely offset some other advantages that we have by having a stable, effective and well-respected legal system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, if the noble Lord will forgive me, both he and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, have referred to the first sentence of paragraph 12.1, which I think is highly misleading to the lay reader until you have read it twice and understand what it says:

“The impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies of this instrument is, on balance, expected to be positive when compared to making no changes to retained EU law”.


That is very different from saying “when compared to the status quo”. The ordinary reader would expect the impact being compared to be that of this new regime compared to the status quo, whereas what the Government are doing, which is seriously misleading to the House and to the public, is claiming that, in comparison with exiting the EU and then making no changes to retained EU law, we are no worse off. That misses the massive elephant in the room: we are leaving the EU in the first place and so losing all the benefits, as he and other noble Lords have mentioned, that come from being in the EU and being part of this reciprocal regime in the first place. Could he tell me whether I have understood this issue correctly?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The noble Lord has understood it absolutely correctly and has plainly made the point more eloquently than I did. It was the point I made when I mentioned that the noble and learned Lord had accepted that that was how the Government’s impact statement worked. The noble Lord is right to draw the distinction between the,

“impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies of this instrument is, on balance, expected to be positive when compared to making no changes to retained EU law”,

and the real meat of this, which is in the last part of the paragraph:

“However, as compared to the pre-Exit position, common law rules on jurisdiction provide for a discretionary rather than mandatory stay in the case of parallel proceedings. This creates an increased risk of parallel proceedings”—


precisely the point I was making—

“whether the court in the United Kingdom is seised first or second. This could increase the number and complexity of disputes before the courts and the cost of litigation for parties. Common law rules also involve a less efficient mechanism for recognising and enforcing judgments than using existing EU rules deriving from the Brussels regime, which will cost those seeking to have their judgment recognised in the UK more money and time”.

Addressing the Committee, I attempted to add my further point that it is not just the cost to litigants who go through all this but the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a location for doing business that suffers from the fact that you cannot rely on a uniform system.

Before closing, I simply ask this. We are in this dreadful position of being a very short time away from the risk of a no-deal Brexit. As Sabine Weyand put it yesterday—I make no apology for her being blunt, because I think she was right to be—we could fall into it “by accident” rather than on purpose. What a travesty for a Parliament almost entirely opposed to a no-deal Brexit to be at risk of forcing our country into this calamitous outcome by accident—but that is where we are. So I ask the noble and learned Lord: in the circumstances, given that almost everybody accepts that this reciprocal set of arrangements for the justice system is of such crucial importance to our functioning legal system, what talks have there been at Secretary of State for Justice level with other members of the European Union to try to preserve some element of a reciprocal system that will replace what we have, even if we walk into this catastrophe by mistake?

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I seek your Lordships’ indulgence. I was a little late to this sitting of the Committee because I was detained listening to the wonderful oration of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in the Chamber. He made a number of interventions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Garnier]

We are not only in danger of talking about forum non conveniens but interventus illicitus. I will advance one simple point. I entirely accept what my good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said on the unfortunate state of affairs we are in, and would be in were we to have a no-deal departure from the European Union. Surely the whole point of today’s exercise is to anticipate that and to ensure we have mechanisms in place to mitigate the consequences he has so correctly spelled out. Yes, it is all very sad and much to be regretted, but it would be even more to be regretted if my noble and learned friend Lord Keen were unable to move this Motion to its sensible conclusion.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I will simply respond to that, because in a sense it is an intervention on me. I accept that this is conditional in the sense that the noble Lord mentions. However, my fundamental point was that the importance of this aspect of no deal has been woefully underestimated in considering how dangerous the concept of no deal is. To that extent, I regard the points I have made in highlighting that danger as valid, because no deal is profoundly to be shunned.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

In fairness there is an EU sub-committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—I cannot remember which sub-committee it is.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Justice.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Thank you. The Justice Sub-Committee prepared a detailed report drawing attention to exactly what the noble Lord has referred to. There was an impassioned debate—I do not know whether the noble Lord was present—at which these points were made. The criticism is not against us, as it were, because in this House we have been taking our responsibilities seriously. However, I understand the point the noble Lord makes about the effect of leaving the EU and the distress he feels.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

It is when you are litigating about two issues at once. You are litigating in a principal case and you have another case going on to decide one aspect.

[Lord Adonis]

In different jurisdictions?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

In this case, it is two jurisdictions. There is one case and you are having an argument, in another court, about whether it should be proceeding in court 1 or a court in another jurisdiction.

[Lord Adonis]

That is a very helpful elucidation, because I thought that it might be litigation that took place on a satellite.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

That is for the future.

[Lord Adonis]

I did not understand the concept. There are more absurd things. Given that the Government are now preparing for martial law, we are told, if there is a no-deal Brexit, litigating in relation to satellites would be a far less absurd proposition. I take the key point to mean that, under the existing Brussels regime in which we operate as part of the EU, you do not need to undertake satellite litigation, because proceedings in one jurisdiction count as proceedings in all jurisdictions. As a non-lawyer, I hope I have understood that point correctly. The satellite litigation to which the noble Lord refers is a considerable loss of benefit to people seeking to litigate. Not only is that the case, but it also makes this jurisdiction considerably less attractive to people to bring cases in, which I took to be the noble Lord’s other point. These are huge issues about the whole future of our legal system and the rights of redress that people have in it, all of which the Government are trying to hustle through in a statutory instrument subject to limited debate and with the Minister not prepared to take any interventions whatever.

The other key point that arises relates, as the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Marks, said, to the final sentences in the long and highly convoluted paragraph 12. Those sentences, which completely contradict the earlier sentences, say that,

“as compared to the pre-Exit position, common law rules on jurisdiction provide for a discretionary rather than mandatory stay in the case of parallel proceedings. This creates an increased risk of parallel proceedings whether the court in the United Kingdom is seised first or second. This could increase the number and complexity of disputes before the courts and the cost of litigation for parties. Common law rules also involve a less efficient mechanism for recognising and enforcing judgments than using existing EU rules deriving from the Brussels regime, which will cost those seeking to have their judgment recognised in the UK more money and time”.

I do not understand why no assessment has been made in any quantified way of the impact of all those significant losses, as set out in the final sentences of paragraph 12.1. Perhaps the Minister will tell us why. Could he offer the Grand Committee some assessment? It is important before we agree to this statutory instrument that we have some assessment of its impact.

I am also surprised because some of the noble Lords present are members of the relevant EU committees and the Delegated Powers Committee. Why did they not ask for such an assessment to be conducted before the statutory instrument came to the House?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The noble Lord may have noticed that in the impact assessment, among the business assessments, it just says “not applicable”. That seems a dereliction of duty.

[Lord Adonis]

I take the noble Lord’s point. Is he saying that he believes that they are applicable?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

They certainly are.

[Lord Adonis]

So why does it say that they are not applicable? These issues are significant.

The final issue in the debate, to which I hope the noble and learned Lord will respond, was raised by my noble friend Lord Beecham and other noble Lords. It is about the losses to this country of not being part of the European Judicial Network. My understanding is that there is nothing statutory about the network. Am I wrong? Is the network a formal institution of the European Union? If it is an informal body, and if belonging to it brings us great benefits, why can we not continue to be members of it even after we leave the European Union? Indeed, to the lay man, being part of the network would seem positively beneficial because, presumably, the network co-ordinates and promotes joint understandings. If we will be separate jurisdictions, with neither wanting, as far as possible, to operate in parallel, is that not all the more reason for us to be part of the network and not seek to leave it? If we crash out with no deal and all losses as set out or implied in the Explanatory Memorandum, why we are not seeking to remain part of the European Judicial Network? Might it be in the country’s best interests for the Government to seek to keep us in the network?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this Parliament decided that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 29 March this year. That is the determination that has been made. That date has been set in law. The Executive must respect the law as determined by Parliament and respond responsibly to it, as laid down by Parliament. Therefore, they must address the implications of us leaving on 29 March if, as at present, we do not have a withdrawal agreement concluded with the European Union. That is what this statutory instrument seeks to address.

In that context, we must address the difference between leaving on 29 March and doing nothing about the existing state of the law—with regard to judicial recognition, identity of choice of court and law, the enforcement of judgment and so on—and doing something about it. I quite understand the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of our being in the Brussels Ia system, but we can be in the Brussels regime only as a member of the European Union. According to Parliament and the law it made, we will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019. Although the Brussels regime can be dated back to 1968, it was in that context a regime for existing European Union members and not open to non-members, to clarify a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.

The first point is that we have to consider the impact of us leaving on the date I have mentioned if we make no change to the existing law, and the impact if we change the existing law. I quite understand the point repeatedly made, that in many ways we would prefer the cake analogy: we would like to have our cake and eat it. We would like to remain within the regime, even if, as Parliament has determined as a matter of law, we are leaving on 29 March 2019. But we cannot have it, because Parliament has made that determination. Many may regret it now, and many may regret it later, but that is the law as determined by this Parliament, and we have to accept that. We can seek to change the law—of course we can—and no doubt there are many who may, even now, seek to change it. However, the law is as determined by this Parliament.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I hope that the noble and learned Lord will at least address my question on what consideration has been given to applying to join the Brussels regime entirely separately. Although he says that it is a creature of the European Union, and by and large of course it is, there do not seem to be insuperable obstacles to negotiating reciprocity around the context of the Brussels regime but outside the European Union.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I take the noble Lord’s point when he says “negotiate”; that is the whole point. If he looks at the political declaration, there is a reference to the desire of all parties to negotiate on this among other issues so that we may be part of a regime perhaps similar to Lugano. Let us be clear: we have not only applied to become an individual signatory to Hague 2005, which involves reciprocity between the convention members and ourselves—although I say, quite candidly, that it is not as perfect as Brussels Ia, being more akin to Brussels I. That is why it is in many ways a second best to that extent, but that is as far as we can go. We have also applied to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to the Lugano convention—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. That will of course require the consent of the EFTA parties and of the EU, and it will be subject to negotiation, but we hope also to be a member of the Lugano convention.

If noble Lords have regard to the impact assessment, they will see that under option two we looked at simply leaving the UK law as it is—in other words, embracing all those relevant terms of Brussels Ia without any right to reciprocity from the EU 27. The difficulty there is that in the absence of reciprocity, people would not know what they were going to get from those provisions. Furthermore, it would raise two obvious difficulties. First, corporations, companies and associations within Europe could secure a decree there and automatically seek to secure enforcement in the UK, but companies, corporations and associations in the UK that secured a judgment from a UK court could not expect to enforce it in the EU 27 countries. That is why I stressed the concept of reciprocity. Yes, we want to negotiate and to secure reciprocity, but until we do, we have to make sure that the statute book is in some sort of order for a no-deal exit—which, as far as I am aware, no one truly wishes for.

Secondly, if we embrace the Brussels Ia regime without being a member of the EU, we would be discriminating between the EU 27 jurisdiction and all the other third-party countries. We would be giving some benefits to the EU 27 under Brussels Ia, albeit without reciprocity, but we would not be giving the same benefit to third-party countries such as the United States, India and China, and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand. That raises real issues about discrimination in the context of wider issues on services and so on.

Child Sexual Exploitation: Grooming Gangs

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, Operation Stovewood is now operating in respect of Rotherham. To support women such as Caitlin, the National Crime Agency has a dedicated team of independent sexual violence advisers working with investigators and service providers in Rotherham to create a bespoke survivor pathway for victims and their families. The Department for Education is providing additional funding of up to £2 million to children’s social care. The Ministry of Justice has also provided £1.6 million to the police and crime commissioner for the commissioning of local victims’ services, and additional funding for specialist support.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Can the Minister say a little more about what lessons may have been learned to help victims of grooming through the prosecution process? Are any further steps planned to help support victims through those very difficult cases?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, Operation Stovewood is a victim-focused investigation carried out under a strategy known as the survivor pathway, with a dedicated team of independent sexual violence advisers. In addition, when taking forward the consideration of prosecution, the CPS has regard to the victims’ code and to guidance on how it should approach and deal with victims in that context. Over and above that, we have the statutory provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, whereby victims and other witnesses who are vulnerable or potentially intimidated can have their evidence taken by video recording and be cross-examined via a television link.

Central Courts IT System

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I rather fear that the noble Lord’s inquiry has taken sail. The position is that the issue that arose recently had nothing whatever to do with the development of the common platform system for the Ministry of Justice, which is still in its testing phase. It was entirely unaffected by the issue that arose, which was in fact attributable to the corruption of a routing server that has now been replaced.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the Answer repeated by the Minister is welcome, but expressions of frustration and an apology are, frankly, not enough. The reported consequences of this IT failure include: the adjournment and collapse of criminal trials; lawyers and litigants unable to access court documents; probation workers unable to provide courts with pre-sentence information; and even the farce of courts asking driving offenders to check their own DVLA records for past offences. The chair of the Criminal Bar Association, Chris Henley QC, describes the system as being “on its knees”.

We appreciate that the MoJ needs time to understand these failures, but they come at a time when the department is rightly further digitalising courts and tribunals to increase efficiency and save time and money. Will the Minister promise us an urgent, full and detailed inquiry to cover what has gone wrong, any failures of contract management within the MoJ, other weaknesses in the IT system, what updating and replacement is necessary and what it will all cost?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the reported effects narrated by the noble Lord are not accurate; let us be clear about that. There is no evidence of any cases being adjourned in either courts or tribunals with respect to this issue. In addition, it is not true that defendants have had to do their own DVLA checks. Furthermore, the probation service was affected by the outage but no offender appointments were missed, and the service reverted to paper processes where necessary. The IT systems are back up and working as of this morning with respect to the probation service. There was no impact on the Prison Service, which is in fact dependent on entirely separate computer system.

The cause of the outage was identified as a routing server that had become corrupted, and that has been replaced. It fell within one of our contractors’ systems and, as I indicated earlier, we are going to be speaking to our contractors with regard to that matter. At this stage we do not intend to institute the sort of inquiry that the noble Lord alluded to.

Prisoners: Imprisonment for Public Protection Sentences

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 20th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I emphasise that the number of prisoners held under IPP sentences continues to decrease at an accelerating rate. However, I regret to observe that that leaves behind a serious core of sometimes incorrigible individuals, which presents real difficulties for the Parole Board when it addresses the question of release. Indeed, it is noticeable that as we have increased the rate of release of IPP prisoners, the rate of those being recalled under licence for serious breaches of it has also increased.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, we abolished these sentences under LAPSO. The continuing rate of release is extremely low. This injustice cries out to be cured, and that can be done by changing the test under Section 128 of LASPO, as was always intended. Does the noble and learned Lord appreciate that the number of incidents of self-harm among IPP prisoners is more than double that for the rest of the prison population? Is that not evidence of the despair these sentences cause?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, it is regrettable that the number of incidents of self-harm is both as high as it is and higher for IPP prisoners. However, many of these prisoners suffer from serious psychological issues, which is one reason for that unfortunate statistic. There is no intention at present to change the onus under Section 128 of the Act, but as the Supreme Court observed in a recent decision:

“Although the default position is that detention will continue ‘unless … the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary’ … the Parole Board is an investigative body which will make up its own mind on all the material before it”.