Subsidy Control Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I want to speak to these amendments because we have reached the point in the Bill when we are looking at the architecture for the future. Clause 2 sets out very clearly the fundamentals that we need to understand. I seek to ask the Government whether the subsidy regime proposed here is more or less permissive, and whether it is more or less bureaucratic, than what we have had before.

I am grateful to the Minister for letting us have more information and some draft regulations and draft guidance, but the problem that the devolved Administrations have is summed up in the statement in paragraph 5 of Streamlined Routes: Objectives, Operation and Next Steps:

“The Devolved Administrations have also had the opportunity to share their views on Streamlined Routes to support their development.”


I am often asked to share my views and very often I am told that the Government do not agree with them. I am sure that that is very common. Perhaps the Minister could tell us whether there has been any accommodation of these views when they have been shared and whether any changes have been made. It would be interesting to see that happen.

My fundamental point is whether the scheme’s architecture is more or less permissive than what we had before. The situation is very different for Wales, of course, because we received the largest amount of European money of anywhere in the United Kingdom over a sustained period. Only two things mattered in terms of the regime itself, as opposed to how it was dealt with: there were subsidies—money and cash—and there were rules on which the subsidies operated. The Government’s own words to us in the Chamber, if they are to believed, were that Wales would not suffer, pound for pound, any less in the money it received than from the European schemes. Clearly, that is not true yet.

My first question to the Minister is: when will the money be received? It clearly has not been yet. Can he repeat the commitment that, pound for pound, Wales will not suffer? We could get that side of the subsidy regime out of the way. However, I suspect that some of us might have been misled in our thinking over the promise that money would be available. I hope that the Minister, on a day when we have been told that we may have been misled about promises put to us, can set the record straight for us right now.

Leaving aside the subsidies themselves—we have heard a little bit but we do not yet know whether there will be cash on the table—we now turn to the rules for them. I had the opportunity to be deeply involved in setting up one six-year period of the European funding for Wales. The way in which it was brought about was interesting. We had to secure an operational programme with the European Union; that programme was broad but very detailed and extensive. When that happened, it gave us, for six years, the rules by which we could operate and understand how to deal with the problems in our country.

The direct comparison now is between the operational programmes, where the EU determined after extensive negotiation, and the other, streamlined schemes, several of which we have in front of us. That comparison includes how these might work and which is more permissive. The former was for six years. It was very broad. You knew where you were. The latter is a tighter constraint around a specific topic. One of the obvious criticisms from the documentation we have received is that there is going to be a whole lot of narrow, siloed regimes. It will be extremely difficult for public authorities and anybody else to find their way not only through those regimes but to the interconnecting places.

An obvious example of that concerns the general conditions in the innovation scheme. I do not think anybody would disagree that a UK subsidy regime should not compensate for costs that the beneficiary would have funded in the absence of any subsidy—that is a fundamental. So why is it in this document? It may also be slightly different in another one; we do not know because we do not have the extent of it before us. Essentially, what we needed was an overarching set of rules that were clear enough to be in the Bill or, alternatively, in any regulation that we see in advance. Perhaps the Minister could tell us, in saying what a regime should look like, where we can get the specifics of these overarching things and the subsidy regimes that will take place.

The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would return the decision-making clearly to the Welsh Government; it is quite clear that, under these powers, they will lose that. One of the suggestions that has been made—it will come up later in our debate, of course—is that we should have an agreed framework of activity within which there would be an ability to do things in a much more free-flowing way. It is absolutely essential that authorities intervene in areas of deprivation. If you do not do that, you certainly do not use the words that begin with an L and a U, which the Government are so keen on. We certainly cannot bring lifestyles to a better place if we do not target where public money should go.

Overlaid with the broad set of rules that I have just talked about, including on such things as displacement and the fact that people cannot be compensated where they would have done it for themselves, we need to understand whether these rules will provide a level playing field. The understanding I get from my reading of them is that we will continue to have an uneven playing field and one on which politics will play a far bigger role than the clear set of understandings that there were in the past between, for example, the Welsh Government and the European Commission, about what one could do. Can the Minister explain why this scheme is an improvement and why it is proportionate between the Governments of this country? The suspicion is that one Government are using their powers to disadvantage another.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak even more briefly than did the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, in expressing a modicum of support for him. It is up to the Minister to explain why equity is not included rather than for the noble Viscount to prove the case for including equity; it seems a bit of an omission. We read today about the failure of the British Business Bank to do well on some of its investments. We have also had the publicity about the Covid loans that have not been recovered. Why do I mention the British Business Bank? Because we have seen a whole series of equity injections by this Government that have not always had an overall rationale.

The noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, referred to the spread of returns from equity investment and how different investors would take a different view of the future, but the reason often advanced by government for direct investment is what is termed “market failure”, and I see that the phrase “market failure” is referred to in the Bill. Unfortunately, market failure is a convenient get-out for Governments wishing to subsidise a particular entity. The very fact that Governments provide direct investment, which I know the noble Viscount favours in a way that I would not, often disguises the fact that there is a subsidy. They say that it is because of market failure and they want it to be on market terms, but, too often, it turns out just to be an implicit subsidy. I agree with the noble Viscount that equity, particularly from a public sector grant-making organisation, can often conceal a degree of subsidy. I hope that careful consideration will be given to the point that he has rightly raised.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 2 and 3 and then Amendment 2A, as they seem to associate with each other.

In the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and my noble friend Lord German, the nub of the question is: what is a subsidy and what is it not? I see Amendment 2 from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, as trying to unearth that definition. Later, we will discuss Clause 11, which allows certain definitions to be defined by affirmative regulation rather than appearing in the Bill. These definitions are:

“subsidy, or subsidy scheme, of interest”,

and

“subsidy, or subsidy scheme, of particular interest”.

This is the Subsidy Control Bill and it would be enormously helpful if the Government would put in the Bill what they seek to control because, at this stage, they have not revealed their hand. In this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, seeks to delineate where a subsidy starts and finishes: the territory, as he puts it. This is a moot point and a key issue that we will talk about later. The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, talked about market failure. We need to understand what the Government understand as “the market” in the first place to delineate where a failure may or may not have occurred. Hereby lies the issue.

In a letter to my noble friend Lord Purvis, the Minister sought to help and, perhaps, to clarify. He replied:

“The geographic scope of a market depends on the goods, services and activity in question—which means geographic scope can vary.”


I think that that flies in the face of some of the words that we heard just now from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. The letter continues:

“A key factor is the distance over which these goods or services can be supplied”—


the sandwiches of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, perhaps—or

“the preference of customers”.

I understand the issue about distance—I can get that—but to include the preference of customers is potentially specious.

To take an international example rather than a Welsh one—although, of course, Welsh is international, if I am speaking from England—there was no market for Spanish-grown strawberries until such time as Spanish-grown strawberries were imported to this country. Then there was a market, because customers showed a market preference. So at the outset of a subsidy there may be no customer preference because there is no product for the customers to prefer. Some time after the six months have expired and the subsidy is open to challenge, the product appears on the market. How is customer preference to be applied retrospectively to subsidies as the market goes forward? I do not think that the issue of customer preference is easy to define, understand or control. If the Minister stands by the words in the letter to my noble friend, we need a much clearer understanding of how that customer preference role will play out. Not only do we need to understand geography, but we need to understand the customers.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I support these amendments, which are very welcome because they make up for what the Bill lacks. It is a very technocratic Bill, with lots of rules and principles, but it completely misses the opportunity to develop a grand strategy for what we want subsidies to achieve. The economic power of government finance is obviously huge; it can sway the economy for good or bad. Simply constraining subsidy-making powers, rather than planning what we want to achieve for those subsidies, indicates a huge lack of ambition on the part of the Government.

Part of that reflects an insurmountable tension within this Government, from those who are so free-marketing that they verge on being anarcho-capitalists to those who want to use the power of state finance as a way of sucking in voters and making a political legacy for themselves. Both those groups miss the point: that the Government should lead the economy into the future that we want to see and live in—one that would be comfortable for the majority of people. We need strategies for how we are going to deal with achieving net-zero carbon emissions and eliminate poverty. That would be a fantastic thing to want to achieve but, somehow, this Government actually increase poverty. Of course, this is not just about wealth; it is also about well-being. The Bill could be a chance to achieve all those things. However, the Government have to get back to the job they should be doing, which is improving the well-being of the population.

Before I sit down, I want to mention the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. He stood and spoke for five minutes without notes, apart from two scribbled sentences on a scrap of paper that I do not think he even looked at. We should all speak without notes. I am one of the biggest culprits; I cannot.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate; I hope that the Minister will forgive me. I know that the role of the Government Back Benches is to sit there and keep quiet. I apologise for giving way to temptation, but I do so in a genuine spirit of inquiry.

I was very interested in what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said about the question of a map. I have a personal reason for being interested because, dare I confess it, very many years ago—I try never to talk about the past—when I was a Minister in the Commons, for what was then the Department of Industry, I was responsible for radically altering the map that existed for assisted areas in the early 1980s. We decided that this needed doing partly because of the cost but also because the assisted areas map had grown so large that it covered most of the country. There had been pressure to add to it and successive Governments had given way, so the map had got bigger and bigger. Also, rather than being given as the noble and learned Lord implied it should be, the assistance was given automatically. It was thought that there was therefore a lot of deadweight cost in the subsidies system—that is, people got a subsidy if they went to area X simply because they went there. That is what persuaded us that we should radically curtail the map to make it more concentrated.

Over the years, I have reflected on whether that was the right decision because what has happened in this country is that regional inequalities seem to have grown rather worse, while many of the most deprived urban areas have got even worse. I spent many of my teenage years living in Grimsby, a town that has been devastated by industrial change and had huge problems. I do not think that the move away from automaticity and a map, looked at over decades, has perhaps had quite the benefits that we thought it had.

One argument, of course, was for moving to a more selective basis of help because you were more likely to satisfy the criterion of additionality. In the arguments put forward by the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, about equity we have already had a little discussion about additionality—that is, if the Government or a public body give assistance, is it assistance that would not have been given otherwise? That was an important criterion. However, as I say, when I look at the thing in the round, whatever the logic of a more selective approach, I am a bit sceptical as to whether a wholly discretionary and selective approach can work.

There is something to be said for looking at degrees of automaticity and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, having a map. He posed the question of how it would be done and what the criteria would be, which is a difficult question. It used to be done on the basis of unemployment combined with travel-to-work areas. I think you would not be able to do it without giving some such weight to unemployment; obviously, it would have to be in a travel-to-work area.

Subsidy Control Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Grand Committee

I fear that there will be ongoing concern, so suggest we find ways to reduce the tension, as much as possible, in some of these areas for the benefit of schemes that will operate within Northern Ireland or, in particular, for businesses which will operate within GB but have some form of economic relationship with Northern Ireland, including parent companies. Then they would be able to get clarity at the outset, to make sure that the schemes can be operable. I beg to move Amendment 22.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has raised a very relevant point; I appreciate that it is a rather awkward point for the Government. As the noble Lord said, it is not simply about the overlap of law and whether EU or UK law applies, but there is also—this is why this is absolutely relevant to this Bill—an issue about state aids, because subsidies are covered in the protocol. Many people in Northern Ireland are afraid that there will be a reach-back and that a subsidy that affects Northern Ireland businesses, even if it originates in the UK, will make that UK subsidy regime subject to EU state aid law. This is potentially a clash of regimes and is extremely important.

The Government’s view in the protocol has been that they think that the EU state aid regime should apply only to state aid that is given specifically in Northern Ireland and not to state aid that was designed for the rest of the UK, even if it reaches Northern Ireland businesses. That still leaves the very difficult issue of where the borderline is. You could imagine, for example, a scheme whereby the UK Government gave help to a motor plant in the north-east of England, which was manufacturing cars that were then transported to dealers in Northern Ireland, who then sold them on to southern Ireland. That is where the whole issue arises, because of the EU’s fear about the single market being undermined by the back door.

This issue is not going to go away. Somehow, the Government have to find a demarcation between state aids in the UK and state aids in Northern Ireland. As I have just tried to exemplify with the issue of the motor industry and motor cars, it is extremely difficult to draw a hard and fast line. I do not know whether the Minister can say anything about this. This Bill will pass, but regardless of what is finally enshrined in law when it becomes an Act, this issue will remain a very great problem.

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

We are extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for tabling these amendments and outlining his thoughts on this incredibly complex and very difficult issue, as the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, stressed. This needs huge sensitivity in dealing with it. I do not think that we have anything to add at this stage, but we welcome the fact that a light has been shone on this issue. The feeling we had was that it is surprising that more amendments have not been tabled on this topic, but we expect that there will be more as the groups progress. For now, having heard from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Lamont, we will be extremely interested to hear the Minister’s initial response to the matters being raised.

Subsidy Control Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 7th February 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a straightforward group of amendments and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, for signing them. My very first reading of these clauses left me with a real sense of confusion and, while I have tried my very best to get into the head of the Minister, or at least those drafting the Bill, I am not sure I have achieved that.

Amendment 40 would require subsidies or schemes to be entered in the database within three months of being made, rather than one year, if given in the form of a tax measure. Amendment 41 would require subsidies or schemes to be entered in the database within one month of being made, rather than six months, if given in any form other than a tax measure. Amendment 42 would require that modifications to subsidies or schemes entered into the database are made within three months of that modification, if given in the form of a tax measure. The final one, Amendment 43, would require that modifications to subsidies or schemes entered into the database are made within one month of that modification, if given in any form other than a tax measure.

This proposed new system is fundamentally different from the previous EU system of state aid and, more importantly, different from pre-authorisation of the subsidies. All parties have welcomed that change, and we do on these Benches; however, the proposed new system of post-award disclosures, monitoring and/or possible challenges will work only if there is complete transparency, or at least a nod towards transparency, be that, as we heard on the previous group, on the amount or, on this group, on timing, or, in future groups, under systems that are put in place to allow those challenges. These amendments are important as the balance in the Bill as it is written does not feel right—the balance between those being able to challenge or look at our businesses or organisations and see what is out there and those who will have already received those subsidies.

As it stands, authorities are being afforded between six months and a year to make their entries to the subsidies database, depending on the form of relief they are offering. Much of the public sector, as we heard in the previous debate, is accustomed to fulfilling transparency requirements within a month of the end of a quarter, so these amendments, similar to the financial ones, are already being adhered to. The financial management through local authorities already adheres to very similar systems to what we are looking to amend here. One might have some sympathy for the Government’s approach if they were equally as generous in the time given to refer matters to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the CAT, but as we will discuss later, this is not the case. The time limits on appealing are tighter.

Last Wednesday, the Minister rightly took pride in the number of changes being made to the subsidies database, arguing it was now simpler than ever for public authorities to meet their reporting requirements. If that is the case, why would somebody be given a full calendar year to upload their reporting of subsidies? We do not accept that reducing the time limit would place an unacceptable burden on authorities; we believe it would greatly assist efforts to improve transparency and ensure proper accountability for decision-making.

On 26 October, at the first witness session in Committee in the other place, Professor Rickard said on this issue:

“I think six months is too long. If it is a tax break for 12 months, after 12 months a competitor might be out of business”.—[Official Report, Commons, Subsidy Control Bill Committee, 26/10/21; col. 21.]


This group of amendments would rebalance a perceived or real inequality between those receiving the subsidy and those who may be affected by it, and their ability to challenge that subsidy. I beg to move.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McNicol. I shall not weary the Committee by repeating the points that he made, but I strongly agree with him. I added my name just because I was puzzled and regard as unfair the imbalance between the time given to public authorities to list subsidies and the very short timetable for people to object to them. I do not see why it should take six months to make public what has been done, while one month seems an extraordinarily short time for somebody to challenge it. As may have been said when I was unfortunately out of the room trying to get on PeerHub, one could easily imagine circumstances where perhaps the website was not working very well, and a few days were missed. “It never happens,” the Minister says. Well, we shall see. That would be a first in public sector computers.

There seems to be an imbalance here. What is sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for the gander—or is it the other way round? Six months is certainly far too long and one month is far too short. I agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, said.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, during the debate on the previous group, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, asked, “How will they know?” This amendment seeks the answer to the question: how will they know in time? As the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, said, because of the limits of reporting, we are talking about very sizeable subsidies that could exist with a competitor company for up to a year before a person is able to find out what their company is competing against. I am sure that the Minister would understand that that is not a fair situation, and it is within the gift of the Government to make it fairer.

Both noble Lords spoke about the imbalance; that is, a long time to report it and a short time to appeal it. One would almost think that the Government were seeking to discourage the process of challenging subsidies. I am sure that that is not the Minister’s aim and therefore the best way of expressing that aim is to redress that balance.

Reflecting on the last debate and this one, I think that we are in a bit of a mess around reporting—or, indeed, we are not but the Government are. On the one hand, we have the database with the six-month time limit and a very high ceiling; on the other hand, we have local authority websites with a three-month time statute and a much lower ceiling, and potentially we have FoIs—although the problem is that you need to know something exists before you can FoI it. The Government have therefore knowingly or unknowingly set up a multiple market for information.

If I am a business and I need to know what is happening in my sector, the Minister will say that this information is freely available. It is freely available on a pull basis. I shall have to employ someone to go out there regularly to check whether the information exists, where it is and what is happening in my sector. If I am a small business in a market where the receipt of subsidy could affect my business, I shall have to employ an extra person or part of an extra person to do that. This does not seem a sensible way of dealing with the issue. A central database with a shorter time span and a lower value ceiling would be the best way to help businesses thrive.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The figure I used was 74%, not 76%. I do not have that information, but I can certainly get it for the noble Lord—I will supply it in writing.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister was very persuasive about tax measures. I quite follow what he said about the uncertainties that would surround trying to calculate the cash value of tax subsidies, but he did not spend very much time talking about the one-month period, which is the one that seems a bit unreasonable. It seems as though they are paying more attention to the compliance costs of the public sector than to the costs of the challenger, which ought to be equally kept in mind. Surely one month is a very short period to challenge a subsidy which may have suddenly arrived out of the blue and may require a private sector company to take legal advice on whether it is challengeable. Four weeks to get legal advice, mount a challenge and go through all the formalities seems a very short period of time.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I understand the point that my noble friend is making. As I mentioned in my reply to the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, the limitation period is the subject of separate amendments, so we will have a further opportunity to discuss that in the next Committee session. Again, it is a balance between wanting to provide certainty so that the schemes can proceed and the beneficiary can proceed with some certainty, but I understand the point that my noble friend makes. The whole regime is designed to be as flexible as possible, and probably more permissive in many respects than the EU state aid regime. As I say, we will have a longer period to discuss the limitation period and the challenge on a future occasion.

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[Lord McNicol of West Kilbride (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and his detailed analysis, especially picking up and bringing back some of the issues from last week. With his contribution and the others, I will be short. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, for tabling this probing amendment and facilitating discussion on this hugely important topic. I will focus my short remarks on the bigger picture rather than the specific details, which I think have been covered well enough.

Regardless of where people stand on the Northern Ireland protocol and the Government’s negotiations to reform it, it is a part of international law, as we have heard. This legislation therefore needs to be consistent with it. There are different legal opinions on the matter and, while some are favourable to Her Majesty’s Government’s approach, others suggest that decisions relating to Northern Ireland will at best be complex but at worst be subject to challenge or litigation. Neither of these outcomes would be good for firms, businesses or the authorities operating in Northern Ireland.

When this Bill was in the Commons, the Government were asked if they would pause to allow room for negotiations to continue. The answer was no. Despite the passage of those months, we appear to be no closer.

With that, I will leave my comments and look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, without endorsing what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said, I think this is a very important issue—without going into the wider Brexit questions to which he referred—and it is extremely worrying.

I would like the Minister to confirm whether the Government’s position as stated in this Bill, and which was reaffirmed by my noble friend last week when she replied to the debate, is the final interpretation or is an interpretation that is subject to change. As the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, said, there are different legal interpretations of the protocol, and there certainly seem to be different interpretations between the European Union and the UK Government. Does that not therefore affect the assurances that Ministers can give? What certainty can be attributed to the opinion of Ministers as to what is the meaning of subsidies under Article 10 or subsidies under Article 138, and which subsidies are subject to European Union law and which are not?

Last time, I raised with my noble friend Lady Bloomfield the question of reach-back and what would happen if a subsidy was being given to a company in the north of England that was exporting goods to Northern Ireland and whether that would come under the EU regime or the UK regime. She replied by saying:

“The Commission’s … declaration of December 2020 made it clear that Article 10 could affect a subsidy in GB only”—


I stress the word “only—

“if there was a genuine and direct link in Northern Ireland. This would be the case if, for example, the beneficiary had a subsidiary in Northern Ireland.”—[Official Report, 2/2/22; col. GC 244.]

Is that the only case? If there were no subsidiary, would that be a different outcome?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, let me first thank the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for this amendment. I know that the noble Lord has strong feelings on the protocol and he and I have discussed it many times before. I have also discussed it with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, throughout the progress of our various pieces of Brexit legislation. I know the issues that are involved, and I will hopefully be able to update the noble Lord on our interpretation of the provisions and where I think we have got to—although there is a limit, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand, on what I can say.

I start by emphasising that preventing undue distortion or economic disadvantage to any part of the United Kingdom is one fundamental objective of this regime. Subsidies are inherently distorting, but this Subsidy Control Bill exists to ensure that public authorities minimise those distortions and economic disadvantage, ensuring that the benefits of the subsidy outweigh any negative effects.

Public authorities will need to consider this in making their decisions about whether the subsidy should be given and how it should be designed. That particularly affects any negative effects in parts of the United Kingdom other than the target area of the subsidy, but it also includes the effects on international trade or investment where the public authority may have less incentive to take those disadvantages into account in its ordinary decision-making processes.

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Moved by

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

55A: Clause 55, page 30, line 40, after “State” insert “or the CMA”

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[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 57A, 57B and 60A. The purpose of this group of amendments is to give the CMA the right to call in subsidies quite separately from the mandatory referral process, not just those referred by the Secretary of State. The amendments would not give the power of veto to the CMA and would still leave the Competition Appeal Tribunal as the final arbiter. They are designed to introduce some independent enforcement of the rules into the process. In recent years, we have seen more independence given to bodies such as the Bank of England or the OBR. These amendments try to give the CMA, in its new role, a degree of independence for enforcement.

The noble Lord, Lord McNicol, earlier drew a contrast between the position under this Bill and how it was under the EU, namely that no subsidy was legal until it was approved. This is a much more permissive regime which relies heavily on being policed by competitors and citizens who, for the reasons that we discussed earlier in the series of amendments about the thresholds and the timing, may not always spot the need to draw attention to a subsidy that has been granted.

Let me say that I fully accept that subsidies are necessary for social purposes, for areas of deprivation and for remote communities, sometimes just to soften the blow of industrial change. But we also know the reality that subsidies distort competition; there is sometimes a temptation for Governments to throw good money after bad; one can have the politicisation of subsidies; and one can have pork barrelling. The provisions in these amendments are designed to prevent that happening.

This country needs to improve productivity. We need to strengthen the competitiveness of the UK economy and one way in which that can be done is by having a Government who are disciplined and subject to an independent discipline in their use of subsidies. The Government have been spending a lot of money recently on subsidies, some of which I accept are well justified, but we have a list of areas into which money has been injected—electricity, airlines, train operators, OneWeb, the steel industry. When we were discussing this earlier, the noble Lord, Lord McNicol, referred to the absence of a strategy. I am not personally an enthusiast for an industrial strategy, but I find it difficult to see the rationale for all the subsidies that the Government have given.

I have referred before to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s future fund. In fairness, the Chancellor said he thought people would have a lot of fun with the investments into which he had put taxpayers’ money. More and more information has come out about it. It was recently revealed that millions have been ploughed into one online betting company. Large amounts of money have been deployed into a luxury Caribbean firm selling holidays on private islands, with some of the properties costing £400,000 a week to rent. There are also the cannabis producers, the dating agency—and Bolton Wanderers, which is also getting a direct injection from the Government.

I can understand that the Government want to help small businesses, but in that case help the generality of small businesses, not just one particular business. There may be lots of small Caribbean holiday companies that need help; why should this one be singled out? No doubt Bolton Wanderers needs help, but what about Scunthorpe and Grimsby Town? Why should one dating agency be favoured over another? If you are going to help small businesses then do it by a grant scheme to which small businesses can apply, or by tax relief, which they can benefit from—schemes that can apply to a generality of businesses.

On top of all that, we have had, as has been mentioned several times in this debate, the mysterious investment of £400 million into OneWeb, which required a directive to the Permanent Secretary before he would approve it. The Government really have been extraordinarily reticent about the purpose of that investment, and the amount of information that has been given to Parliament has been very meagre indeed. There is a cause and a need for explanation and investigation of many of these investments.

The words “market failure” are often mentioned; they were mentioned today and in our debate the other day. Market failure can be used to justify almost anything that Governments want to do: a firm cannot find money; the Government want to give it a subsidy, so they just label it “market failure”. But what exactly is market failure? The Minister referred to it the other day, and we have had it referred to several times. One might define market failure as barriers to entry or inadequate information being available to all market participants, but it is another reason why Governments can just slither off the hook and give money to someone for, perhaps, political reasons.

We need to have a careful look at what is called market failure. The British Business Bank was set up in order to cope with market failure but is itself now the subject of great criticism by the Public Accounts Committee for not overseeing the Covid loans properly. So much for its ability to correct market failure.

The whole point of my referring to these rather questionable subsidies, as I regard them, is that I do not think the Government ought to be able to mark their own homework on these issues. They need an enforcer and an independent view. I say that what is wrong with the Bill is that it is designed to give expression to the agreement that was struck with the European Union, the TCA; it is not really a rigorous enforcement of subsidy control at all. The regime is very permissive compared to what we had in Europe and relies far too much on individual citizens and competitors as enforcers. Those who are affected have to spot and know about the subsidies, and they have to do that within a very tight time limit. As I said earlier, what if the website is not working? All these things can make it very difficult for the competitor to take the action to control the subsidies being given to people with whom they are competing.

We need to have more independence in the process. We need the CMA to have the ability to investigate on its own initiative. We need a degree of independence, similar to that which is increasingly being given to government agencies. I hope the amendment will commend itself to Members of the Committee, and I beg to move.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

So shall we finish at this point and start again on Wednesday. Is my noble friend Lord Lamont available for the next Committee session on Wednesday afternoon? We are talking about suspending at this point, because we have run out of time, and returning to this group of amendments then.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

Yes.

Debate on Amendment 55A adjourned.

Subsidy Control Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 9th February 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

No, my understanding, on advice, is that it does not form a provision under the internal market Act.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

Again, before the Minister sits down, I have a couple of questions. I apologise to him for this, but we have had the benefit of actually seeing his words written down in Hansard. Some of the phrases he came out with were quite dense and intricate, and I was rather puzzled by two points. The first was when he talked about the functions of the SAU. He said that it was intended

“to support public authorities in giving the subsidies that are most likely to be distortive.”—[Official Report, 7/2/22; col. GC 383.]

I am puzzled by the word “support”, and puzzled that we would want to support the ones that are most distortive. I am sure I am misunderstanding it, but I would like the Minister to explain.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I will have to look back at those remarks myself. It is possible that I was misinterpreted at the time, but I will have a look and come back to the noble Lord.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

Let me also read out a second bit that I felt was particularly incomprehensible. If anybody in the Committee can understand it, I will be very impressed. I will read it slowly. The Minister said:

“I do not believe there is a contradiction in saying that a full assessment of compliance is light-touch regulation for the public authority but could prove arduous to replicate for the subsidy advice unit.”—[Official Report, 7/2/22; col. GC 383.]

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I think that speaks for itself. I stand by those words.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Yes. Subsidy is not a regulated provision within the scope of the UK provisions. We are debating this in a future grouping, so we will no doubt be able to come back to it, but my advice is that it is not.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those who spoke in the debate and supported my Amendments 55A, 57A and 57B. I am grateful in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, who made a very powerful speech about the need for an independent evaluation of subsidies. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, pointed out that, if we had an independent assessment, it would increase the possibility of consistency in the whole regime, which I thought was a very important point. The noble Lord, Lord McNicol, made the point that it was completely counterintuitive, after everything that had been said about the control of subsidies, not to have an independent evaluation. So I hope that there is quite a degree of support in the Committee for these amendments.

I do not think that the Minister today really explained why we could not have an independent regulator. He said that it would require a certain scaling up of resources. Well, obviously, it would. He said that it would become more like a regulator, rather than whatever else it is. Well, we want it to be a regulator—that is the whole point—with control of subsidies. But I really did not feel that he had made out a case against. He told us what the SAU does, but he did not explain why it would be wrong for it to do more things or to be scaled up and become a proper regulator.

The reason why I was particularly interested in the two passages that I put to the Minister—he is going to write to explain them to me—is that the more I listened to him, the more it became clear to me that the general line in this Bill is, “Public authorities know what they are doing, so let them, by and large, get on with it. Maybe somebody will object; they have 28 days. Don’t make it any longer because a lot of them might object; just give them 28 days. But by and large public authorities know what they are doing, so we want them just to get on with it”.

The Minister said that the SAU would not carry out its own assessment of compliance. Is that enough? It seems as though what it is going to do is extremely limited: it is just going to examine process. The Minister said:

“The SAU would be acting without the understanding and body of evidence that the public authority will have created in developing the subsidy”.


That is, the public authority will know more than the people who are checking the subsidy. Is that really the right way round? It seems to me a real Alice in Wonderland to call this control of subsidies, when those who have actually invented the subsidy and paid the money know more about it than the people who are regulating them—and this is admitted by the Minister at the same time. The Minister also said:

“There is no intention to build up an extensive monitoring function within my department or the CMA”.—[Official Report, 7/2/2022; cols. GC 383-4.]


Surely, that is exactly what we need. If we are talking about the control of subsidies, how can we have it without monitoring subsidies? That becomes even weaker when you consider what has been referred to again and again in Committee about the 28 days.

It seems to me that the SAU is far too weak for this really to be a Subsidy Control Bill; it ought to be renamed the “Support of Subsidies Bill”, because that is actually what it is. The reality of the Bill is that it is not attempting to control subsidies at all; it is just giving expression to the undertakings that the Government gave on Brexit in the TCA. I see the Minister smiling, although I shall not refer to that again. The Government gave assurances that were embodied in the TCA about not having subsidies that might distort competition with the European Union, so we have to have a control mechanism, and it is this Bill. But there is also a national interest in having proper competition and control of subsidies, and I do not think, frankly, that the Bill does that. It is far too weak. But having made my points and not persuaded the Minister, I look forward very much to the letter he is going to write to me explaining what he said. With that, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 55A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

There is a second consideration. Private individuals are not only influenced by money. They may be influenced by political or other considerations so that they do not want to challenge something that is obviously wrong. It must be in the public interest for an independent person—here, the CMA—to be able to challenge such a scheme.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

Would the noble and learned Lord make it clear that he envisages, through this mechanism—or route, as he describes it—that the CMA would be allowed to challenge the Government?

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Yes, indeed; that was my third point. The noble Lord has made it most eloquently in one sentence so I need not make it any further.

My last point on this is simply that the time limit is very short. It will be difficult for private litigants to decide that they want to bring a case. The CMA will be well aware and can act within the time limit. For all those reasons, I beg to move that this amendment be inserted into the Bill.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which was so powerfully and eloquently moved. Its purpose is to give the CMA standing to exercise enforcement powers through the CAT.

To some extent, this amendment overlaps with the amendment I moved earlier. I strongly agree with what was said about the limitations of relying on people who are affected by subsidy decisions to challenge them within the tight time limits that we have debated. I have already said, probably at too great length, that there needs to be much more independent enforcement.

I do not want to go over all the points I made earlier but, just in case some of the Committee thought I was overegging or inventing it, I want to refer to what the Financial Times said about this Bill. It carried an article on 2 July headed:

“The UK carves a risky new path on state aid.”


It went on to acknowledge what the Government have claimed as the great advantage of the new system—that it is speedier and more flexible—but commented:

“On the altar of speed, it”—


the Government—

“has sacrificed scrutiny. This is worrying from a government that has shied away from accountability and spent lavishly on contracts.”

It went on:

“The government envisages public bodies largely having a free hand in deciding whether subsidies comply with broad principles.”


I mentioned this point earlier: really, the regime seemed to amount to allowing public authorities to do whatever they wanted, and the assumption was that public authorities knew the law and would therefore observe it.

Finally, the FT said:

“The combination of a light-touch system and an interventionist government willing to spend lavishly on special projects creates dangers of a distortive spending spree—and of ministers becoming vulnerable to lobbying by vested interests.”


That is one of the problems. I am not in any way questioning the integrity or motives of the Government, but it is so easy for vested interests to have an undue influence on these decisions and it is a slippery road down to the politicisation of subsidies. I very much think that we need to move one way or another, whether it is by the route that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, so eloquently laid down or the one that I referred to earlier. We need to move to more arm’s-length, independent and effective enforcement.

When he spoke in reply to my earlier amendment, the Minister said the Government will not refer themselves to the CMA, as though that were perfectly obvious. It may be perfectly obvious that no one would do that, but in a sense they ought to. There ought to be a mechanism by which a Government are referred to the CMA.

When I first got into the House of Commons, I used to come and listen to debates here. People always gave Latin tags. I am sure that if Lord Boyd-Carpenter or Derek Walker-Smith, Lord Broxbourne, were examining this Bill today, their Latin tag would be “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”—who will guard the guards? I am sure everybody knew that already. That is the principle. Who is going to contain and limit the Government?

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 71 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for their support. I acknowledge that anything I say is unlikely to carry the weight of those two authoritative Peers, so your Lordships will be pleased to hear that I will be brief.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, raised the issue of private enforcement. It is intriguing to me that the Government should choose private enforcement to police something as important as a subsidy regime. They do not use private enforcement to police their income tax regime or all manner of important economic activity, yet they have chosen this route. They have explicitly decided to eliminate the devolved authorities, councils and LEPs from the process of enforcement and have added a 28-day deadline to that private enforcement process, which makes it almost impossible for private individuals to enforce in a timely manner. One would think that enforcement was perhaps not at the forefront of the Government’s objectives when looking at the Bill, and nothing so far has convinced me that the Government are interested in enforcing.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, let out the cri de cœur: who will enforce the Bill? The answer is clear: no one. There is an informal system of bringing to book that will ensure that very little enforcement goes on. Yet if we look somewhere else in the CMA, the Digital Markets Unit is pre-emptively calling the big techs in and dealing with issues under its orbit. It is not that the CMA cannot do it; it is that the Government have decided not to let it do it.

Both these amendments—the one in my name and the other—seek to give a role for the Competition Appeal Tribunal to pre-emptively deal with transgressions. What are the Government frightened of in this? I do not think that the Minister has so far articulated a valid reason as to what is wrong with enforcing the Bill. If the Government think it is important to have the Bill, why not enforce it?

I used one example: the CMA’s own digital markets unit. It is clear that regulators all over are acting pre-emptively. Look at the Pensions Regulator. It can proactively go in and do things, so it is not as if we do not do it in this country. Generally, the regulator can act pre-emptively, except in this case. It is not clear to me what is behind the Government’s decision to do that. My key objective for Amendment 71 is for the Minister to very clearly articulate to the Committee why this subsidy regime should not be policed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and my noble friend Lord Lamont for tabling Amendment 67. I also thank them and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for Amendment 71. Before addressing the two amendments in turn, I will offer some context. We have discussed at length the conception of the new domestic control regime as envisaged by the Government. We have heard criticism to the effect that the regime is, in the view of the protagonists, lacking in robust enforcement.

Of course, international comparisons are somewhat beside the point for our UK-specific approach. It is worth while bearing in mind, though, that the mere fact of establishing a coherent regime for the purposes of subsidy control would place the UK somewhere near the top of the list of the most comprehensive subsidy control regimes. Outside the European Union, no other international partner or competitor will enjoy such a comprehensive and transparent approach to the regulation of subsidies.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

Is the reason for that not that the EU insisted on it, and that is why the Bill is being brought forward—not to be effective but to strike agreement with the EU?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

This legislation was predicated in the TCA, as my noble friend points out. We are of course meeting our obligations. One of the purposes of this legislation is to meet our international obligations, not just under the TCA but with other trade agreements that we might strike as well.

In our view, an interventionist regulatory role is not necessary for the effective scrutiny of subsidies and would be detrimental to the smooth development and deployment of subsidies where they are needed. I have confidence that public authorities will take their statutory obligations under this regime very seriously and, in fulfilling those obligations, public authorities will be supported by comprehensive guidance. As a result, I do not anticipate that breaches will be by any means a common occurrence. My noble friend referred to the EU state aid regime, which is a different system, but it is revealing of public authorities’ attitudes to their obligations that since 1999, the European Commission has ordered UK public authorities to recover aid on only four occasions.