Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 22nd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 82, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord McAvoy, which allows some time for consultation about the implementation of Clause 50. That clause was a late addition to the Bill, which means there has not been the normal consultation with women’s groups, medics, lawyers, the health service or, indeed, ethicists and constitutional experts. Above all, there has been no discussion about the implication for the funding for abortion for women should they move between Scotland and England or Wales, should any differences emerge in the future between the laws on abortion either side of the border. We should consider the lessons of Northern Ireland before implementing this new provision.

Although the Smith commission reported that the parties favoured the devolution of abortion, regarding it as an anomalous health reservation, it recommended only that further serious consideration should be given to its devolution and a process established immediately to consider the matter further. However, that process has not happened and our amendment seeks to give the matter proper consideration before the clause is implemented. Indeed, because the Smith commission did not call for immediate devolution, the Government initially thought that an early change would pre-empt such discussions and there was, therefore, no reference to abortion in the original Bill. An amendment was tabled, but not voted on, in Committee in the Commons, by which stage women’s groups and the Scottish TUC began expressing their concerns, particularly that this could have a discriminatory impact on women in Scotland, just as in Northern Ireland.

The inclusion of the provision was announced by the Government on 14 October, with the amendment tabled on Report in the other place and with none of the debate that took place during the original devolution Bill. Looking back to 1998, there was quite a strong view that abortion, duly protected and regulated by law, was a human rights issue and not simply a medical or, indeed, a criminal matter. There were many voices of the view that a woman’s right to choose should be universal, not delimited by boundaries and borders.

It is this risk of cross-border differences, leading to women having to travel for an abortion, that concerns many, partly because it might undermine the notion of a UK citizenship, but also for the more prosaic but serious issue that there is a fairness dimension. Moving country for a termination is an option more open to the wealthy and well connected than to those without access to money, transport or friends in distant parts. We know the difficulties and trauma that such journeys involve for many Irish women. Indeed, because of the variation in law, some 5,000 Northern Irish women and 20,000 from the Republic of Ireland travelled to Great Britain for an abortion between 2010 and 2014. That is 12 Irish women crossing the Irish Sea every day.

This reflects the fact that when women are desperate for an abortion, whether as the result of rape, because of foetal abnormalities, because of incest or because the woman cannot handle a child due to her psychological state or her age—there are girls as young as 14 coming here for abortions—she will do whatever is needed. No border will prevent that. What is more, though a child in Northern Ireland can come over to be treated at Great Ormond Street on the NHS, her mother, needing an abortion, cannot get it on the NHS but has to go privately and pay, in addition to air fares. It is for these reasons that we need to consider how different rules in England and Scotland would be handled, should teenage girls have to make cross-border journeys to have the procedure, for example. For nearly 50 years, there have been the same rights across Great Britain, but this clause could alter that.

It is not that we anticipate any change in the Scottish law. Indeed, the First Minister said that her Government had no intention of changing the current law, but she cannot, of course, bind her successors. Given the demand for abortion to be devolved, there is surely the possibility of a change being made. It is better to think through the implications now rather than after any such decisions. Indeed we read suggestions that the new power will indeed be used to change Scottish law, with CARE for Scotland, a charity, saying that there should be a debate among MSPs about whether Scotland has the right laws. Lynn Murray of the Edinburgh branch of SPUC has said that devolving abortion would get people thinking about it and that it is time that we looked at it again, while the Scottish Secretary for Social Justice, Communities and Pensioners’ Rights, Alex Neil, has said that he personally favours reducing the 24-week limit.

That is of course a matter for the Scottish people, so we shall not resist or seek to remove Clause 50. However, we need time to consult on and possibly prepare for any impact that such a change could bring and how to respond, particularly as to whether women living in Scotland—be they English women, Welsh women or Scottish women—would be able to have an NHS-funded abortion, say in Newcastle or elsewhere, should they then fulfil our criteria for termination but not new criteria in Scotland. Whatever differences might emerge, some women will want or be forced to travel from England to Scotland or from Scotland to England to exercise their rights under one or other of the two laws. Amendment 82 allows for a 12-month consultation with relevant groups and representatives in Scotland and in the health service to ensure that the process is correct and to follow the wise advice of the Smith commission.

I turn to Amendments 80 and 81 in the names of the noble Earls, Lord Kinnoull and Lord Dundee. Amendment 80 provides that Clauses 13 to 68 would not come into force until the relevant Secretaries of State were satisfied that the Scottish Government had appropriate arrangements in place to exercise the relevant powers. That would mean that discretion remained with the UK Parliament on matters that will be devolved issues, undermining one of the most important principles of the devolution settlement. Your Lordships will not, therefore, be surprised that we oppose this amendment.

In a similar vein, Amendment 81 would delay the devolution of the Scottish Crown Estates until the Secretary of State had laid a report before Parliament regarding the Scottish Crown Estates commissioners and the arrangements to facilitate the transfer of assets. We do not consider it appropriate to delay the commencement of this clause. Furthermore, we understand that talks are taking place between officials on the transfers of assets and that those are still ongoing. It would perhaps be helpful if the Minister could indicate whether the issues included in the amendment are part of such discussions. We understand that the date for the transfer has yet to be decided or even much discussed. I do not know whether the Minister has any further update on this since the letter that he wrote to my noble friend Lord McAvoy on 12 February. We look forward to his comments on that.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I add a word in support of the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. It is remarkable that the provision in Clause 50 was not in the Scotland Bill of 1998. I am old enough to remember the debates that took place on that Bill and, as I recall, the provision was not part of the Bill for a very deliberate reason: it was regarded at that stage as undesirable that there should be any question of a difference in law between the laws of Scotland and those of England and Wales in relation to abortion. Things have moved on since then and the noble Baroness has made it clear that she is not opposing Clause 50. However, with great respect, the point that she makes is important given the way in which the clause has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage and the difficult and sensitive matters to which she drew attention in her speech. As I say, this was thought about carefully in the late 1990s when the original Scotland Bill was being considered and my recollection is that there was a deliberate decision to keep it out, for fear that it might give rise to undesirable consequences. That risk, which I think the noble Baroness was mentioning, makes her amendment one deserving of careful consideration.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, here again I express my gratitude to the Minister for bringing this amendment forward. He has explained very precisely the value which can be seen in the introduction of the additional word. I know from communications with the Charity Commission that it is delighted that this amendment is being made. As I endeavoured to explain in Committee, the wording in the Bill when it was introduced left it with a problem, which has now been solved. On behalf of the commission, I am extremely grateful.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I offer the same thanks to the Minister for having listened to the arguments and for moving this amendment, which we are happy to agree to.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Monday 29th June 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I shall add a few words based on the Joint Committee’s report. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is right that this is the clause which caused the committee most concern. We have before us, among other things, a very carefully worded memorandum from the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the meat of which is set out at pages 96 to 97 of the Joint Committee’s report. That Delegated Powers Committee draws attention to a number of problems that subsection (4) of new Section 178A gives rise to, including the risk of retrospective legislation bringing in offences that were not in the purview of the section when they were committed, without any provision for what would happen to people who were unaware that this might cause them to be disqualified. The committee considered various other aspects, but overall its conclusion was that subsection (4) of the new section should remain in the Bill.

Although the Joint Committee discussed this very fully, we reached the same conclusion, which was put in the report. We were content that the order-making power should be available in the form and subject of the procedures that were proposed, but I draw attention to paragraph 208, which contains the recommendation, that,

“when using the power, the Minister should be required to consult fully on whether it is appropriate and proportionate to include an offence within the list of disqualifying offences”.

The process of consultation would be directed to the variety of problems discussed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report. There is a question as to whether that requirement should be statutory, or whether it is enough that the Minister would be prepared to say that he would be content to follow what the Joint Committee recommended: that he would consult fully on whether it was appropriate and proportionate to include an offence within the list of qualifying offences. I speak only for myself, but if the Minister was prepared to give an assurance of that kind, that would go some way at least to meeting the noble Baroness’s concerns.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a sobering day even to discuss something with the word “terrorism” in it. I note that the House of Commons had a moment of silence at 3.30 pm, which maybe is a lesson for all of us.

On the amendment before us, the Committee will know that we have always been a bit jumpy about Henry VIII powers. However, it is very important to have this provision in the Bill because I did not move Amendment 7, which we dealt with on the first day of Committee last week, when we dealt with our attempt to include people on the sex offenders register on the list of those who are precluded—which, frankly, I take more seriously than someone who has got into a bit of debt and has an IVA. The Minister did not think that that was appropriate, and I hope very much that he is right and that we will not have a trustee who is on the sexual offenders register and then abuses someone, which would show that I was right and he was wrong. I do not want to be in that position, for fairly obvious reasons. However, if we find that the evidence is that we should have added those on the sex offenders register to those who are precluded from being a trustee, unless there is a waiver, this provision would allow the Minister, at that stage, to put right—unless we win the vote on Report—what would be an omission from the Bill.

There is always a problem with retrospective legislation, which would be the same now for people convicted for other things. Therefore, it will be important that the implementation date of any regulation is in good time to notify people so that they do not suddenly find themselves acting as a trustee and putting a charity at risk because of some new provision that then comes in. However, if it was something such as someone being on the sex offenders register, that is a known register and they would be able to be notified pretty easily that they could no longer act as a trustee. As a failsafe, albeit that any new measure should be by the affirmative procedure, we are content to see this power in the Bill.