Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I add support to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness’s amendment in this regard. It was Baldwin who said that democracy was government by explanation but, as we discussed in the previous debate, there has not been much explanation of the development of the fiscal agreement. We need to ensure that when it comes to two broadly competing interests—the Scottish Government and the UK Treasury—there are mechanisms for the agreements and their operation to be reviewed in future.
I was a member of the finance committee in Holyrood for five years when it did not have the role of scrutinising the revenue powers of the Scottish Parliament, and I think it will be a positive thing for it to have those powers. In many regards, though, the processes that exist in Holyrood are not fit for the purpose of the powers that are coming its way. The operation of this power, especially and most importantly in the first five years of operation, will therefore be critical. That is why the amendment is of value.
Of course, I agree with the noble Earl about the benefit of building longer-term structures; my party has proposed one potential option for that, which is what the Canadians would recognise as a federal fiscal commission. When there has been a protracted process of discussions between the Scottish Government and the Treasury, not wholly because of a difference in fiscal policy or a different approach to budgetary discipline but because of a political imperative, that is not going to disappear once agreement has been reached. Indeed, it may be compounded once it is in operation, given the difficult situations that may arise.
This afternoon we have all been reading at pace from the Chief Secretary’s letter, and I think we have all registered with the Minister our complaint that we should not be having to do that as well as discussing the relevant legislation. However, the recommendation to take forward the Scottish Fiscal Commission into a more independent body is worth while, and I would be interested to hear what the Scottish Government’s position is. The problem is that it has already been legislated for in Holyrood, and we will be asking the Scottish Parliament to go back on what it has just agreed to establish a structure that this Parliament will perhaps argue is not fit for purpose. It makes for an interesting dynamic that the SNP chair of the Scottish Affairs Select Committee is proposing this to the SNP chair of the Holyrood committee, which has a different view on this, but that is for them to resolve and we will be interested in their conclusion. Ultimately, as has been referred to before, the experience of the referendum is that the people are asked to believe figures and facts that are put forward by one Government and those that are put forward by a competing one. That puts civil society and the public in an invidious position. If we are locking this into a long-term approach, that does not bode well for the future.
My final comment is that I know it has been hard to separate the politics from the constitutional practice in this. It has been very hard for those who argue for independence, because this is the final aspect of their arguments. They have lost their argument through the people of Scotland voting for Scotland to stay part of the UK, and in many respects they have lost the argument for full fiscal autonomy. The only argument that is left on the table is the long-term form of devo-plus that we have with this Bill. It is quite hard for those who are passionately in favour of independence to recognise that there are structures that could be long-term and stable and could work for the union, because if they accept it then they are undermining their own fundamental approach, so we are asking them to do something that is exceptionally hard for them. So I am not surprised that, to some extent, there has been this to-and-fro.
However, do we want that to be a permanent feature of our constitution and of the relationship with the Scottish Parliament, of which taxpayers on both sides of the border will be the victim? In common with all colleagues in this House who are resident in Scotland, I have received my letter from the Inland Revenue saying that we are now designated Scottish taxpayers and that this is now a real process that is under way. If we want to move away from the situation where the two blocs perpetuate this interest, then we need a regular review mechanism, combined with joint working between the Parliaments, not the Governments—the critical part of my noble and learned friend’s amendment. In addition, by taking out the only bodies that are responsible for making the forecasts for revenue and population growth being the two respective Governments, we will be locking in the kind of difficulties that we have been seeing over the past nine months. I hope that the House endorses my noble and learned friend’s amendment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Scotland Office (Lord Dunlop) (Con)
My Lords, we have had a detailed debate with many authoritative contributions, and I welcome the contributions from all parts of the House. We have covered a lot of ground. I will try to do justice to all the issues that have been raised. No detriment, block grant indexation, borrowing, review, scrutiny, commencement—there is a plethora of them, and I hope that the House will bear with me as I try to cover each one. I shall pick up on the points that individual Peers have made on each of those issues.
To start off, I shall remind us of what we are trying to achieve here. We are trying to rebalance the devolution settlement and to give the Scottish Parliament greater responsibility for raising more of what it spends. Currently that is around 10% of the Scottish budget and, once the Bill is in operation, it will be over 50%. That will lead to a Scottish Parliament that is more financially accountable to the people who elect it. The Scottish Government should be able to reap the rewards, and bear the risks and costs, of the policy choices that they make. That is something that the UK Government think is important, and something that John Swinney, the Deputy First Minister of the Scottish Government, has publicly accepted. The noble Lord, Lord McFall, talked about grievance politics. This is an opportunity to move Scottish politics on from the familiar blame game.
Why does the fiscal framework matter? A lot of noble Lords have said that this is central. I certainly agree with the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, which said:
“The fiscal framework will be central to future devolution arrangements”.
It is the fiscal framework that provides the financial tools and controls to support the operation of the Scottish Government’s new powers. As with the Smith agreement as a whole, this is about striking the right balance: giving the flexibility to the Scottish Government to take their own decisions, while retaining those fundamental UK strengths. That is what the people in Scotland voted for in September 2014 by a clear and decisive majority. Therefore, it is our duty to deliver a Scottish fiscal framework that is sustainable and consistent, as the Smith agreement says, with the overall UK fiscal framework.
I am sure that noble Lords are on the edge of their seats because we have talked a lot about my next topic: the no-detriment principles. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said that he had no idea of what the UK Government’s view was of no detriment. Other Peers—the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and my noble friend Lord Forsyth—raised the no-detriment principles. The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee highlights the importance of principles, and the Smith agreement sets out a range of principles against which the fiscal framework must deliver. I would be the first to recognise that these principles set out in the Smith agreement are high level, and it is for the two Governments to agree on how to apply them in practice. Central to the negotiations that have been taking place is how the Scottish block grant adjusts to account for new tax and welfare powers and meets these no-detriment principles.
The first no-detriment principle is that the Scottish Government and the UK Government budgets should be no larger or smaller simply as a result of the initial transfer of tax and spending powers. As the noble Lord, Lord Darling, said, in many ways this is a very straightforward calculation. We have the data, use actual figures for the final year prior to devolution and apply whatever indexation method is finally chosen.
The second no-detriment principle is that there should be no detriment as a result of Scottish Government and UK Government policy decisions post-devolution. There are two legs to this no-detriment principle. The first is that decisions by one Government that directly affect the revenues or spending of the other should be compensated. What does that mean in practice? It means direct effects: so if the UK Government were to increase the personal allowance, that would obviously have an impact on the tax revenues of the Scottish Government that was totally outwith their control. Looking at it in another perspective, if the Scottish Government used their welfare powers in a way that automatically and in a direct way affected benefit passporting in the reserved welfare system, that would be a direct effect. However, the principle is explicitly not to compensate the Scottish Government for the economic consequences of the policy choices that they make: so, for example, if higher tax rates lead to an increase in net migration from Scotland, that would be a consequence of the decisions that the Scottish Government had taken.
The Smith report is very clear about economic responsibility, saying that,
“the revised funding framework should result in the devolved Scottish budget benefiting in full from policy decisions by the Scottish Government—”
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
If there was migration from Scotland as a result of higher tax rates, clearly the population ratio would change, and we are being told that there was much discussion around the concept of per capita. How would the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government agree on how many of those who have left Scotland have left as a result of higher taxation as opposed to having to look after elderly parents?
Lord Dunlop
As I was saying, that is an indirect, or behavioural effect. It is not a direct effect: that is the point that I was making. What the adjustment mechanism takes into account is these direct effects. They are things that can actually be calculated, but I will come on to talk about behavioural or spillover effects, which is what I think the noble and learned Lord is talking about.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Before my noble friend does that, will he actually answer the question? It was: how do you tell which is a direct effect and which is an indirect effect?
Lord Dunlop
One is a direct consequence of a policy decision, so in the example I gave of personal allowances, that is a direct consequence of a policy decision that is outwith the control of the other Government. It is not the behavioural or indirect effect, which is about how people react to a decision that is taken. That is the distinction that we are making.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am most grateful to my noble friend. May we just take the example that he gave—that was raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace—of people leaving Scotland? If we have an SNP Government who decide to put the top rate of tax up to 60% and a lot of the WILLIEs and other people decide, “We are going to move south” and they tell their neighbours, “Actually we are moving south because we want to be closer to our children”, how will the Government know how much of the tax base has been reduced as a result of the Scottish Government putting up tax and how much as a result of domestic or other normal movement? There is no way that you can tell that effect. Why would it be appropriate to compensate in those circumstances?
Lord Dunlop
My noble friend misunderstands what I am saying. I am not necessarily saying that those should be compensated for. In the evidence that the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave to the Treasury Select Committee, he said:
“My personal view is that tax competition is something that we should allow”.
He is effectively saying that if there are different tax rates north and south of the border, that is something that we should not automatically try to compensate for. Another example relates to childcare. We all remember that at the time of the independence referendum White Paper, central to the retail offer being made by the SNP was its childcare policy. It was a matter of complaint that, were that policy to be successful and increase income tax revenues, the benefit of that would actually flow to the Treasury and not to the Scottish Government. Under the Smith package, if such a policy succeeded in increasing participation by women in the labour market, the benefits of that would flow to the Scottish Government.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Teasing this out, may I give an example that is hypothetical in one sense, because it is historic? During the 1990s, the Conservative Government privatised the water industry in England, and, I think, in Wales. Clearly, the decision was taken by the then Conservative Government not to do so in Scotland. However, after that privatisation had taken place, there were no further consequentials under the Barnett formula for Scotland. The money had to be found to fund the water industry in Scotland in public hands. If the arrangements that we are now talking about had been in place then, and the UK Government had decided to take the water sector into private ownership in England and Wales, which would have led to a decrease in the funding for Scotland, would that have been a detriment for which the Scottish Parliament would have had to be compensated?
Lord Dunlop
No, I do not believe that that would be a detriment in the sense that the UK Government would have to compensate the Scottish Government. The situation would apply; the Barnett formula would apply; the equivalent departmental spending from England would flow through to Scotland. I do not think that this package changes that at all. Although the ownership structure north and south of the border is different, the cost of this on both sides of the border is met in water bills.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
The Smith commission report says in paragraph 4a:
“Where either the UK or the Scottish Governments makes policy decisions that affect the tax receipts or expenditure of the other, the decision-making government will either reimburse the other if there is an additional cost, or receive a transfer from the other if there is a saving. There should be a shared understanding of the evidence to support any adjustments”.
On my understanding of what these words mean, with the precise example of the water industry, which I have repeatedly asked about in the past, how can my noble friend say what he has just said from the Dispatch Box when the words have a different meaning? Are we to understand that the Government are departing from the meaning of the no-detriment principle as set out there?
Lord Dunlop
No; we are not departing from the Smith agreement at all. It is the function of the negotiations. As I say, these are high-level principles, and the two Governments have to work out how these principles are applied in practice. That is what we are doing. The Barnett formula will continue to operate and determine departmental spending and how that flows through in Barnett consequentials. That will not change.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
The noble Lord mentioned the issue of WILLIEs—people who work in London but live in Edinburgh. If the Scottish Parliament put up the rate of tax and these individuals then decide to pay themselves in dividends, that would be tax competition, and therefore the Scottish Government would not be compensated. Am I correct?
Lord Dunlop
As I said, as regards tax competition, that would not be counted for in terms of compensation. I hope that I have made that clear.
Lord McCluskey
May I ask about a point on the language used by the Minister? He drew a distinction between direct and indirect detriment but I look in vain in the Smith commission report for these adjectives. I know that my noble and learned friend has a copy here, as do I. What is the basis for the Minister drawing a distinction between direct and indirect detriment?
Lord Dunlop
As I said, the Smith agreement is a set of high-level principles. The negotiations are about how the two Governments apply those principles in practice. When, as I hope, the fiscal framework is agreed shortly, the noble and learned Lord will see how the two Governments have reached an agreement as to how these principles will apply in practice. That is what the discussions that have been going on for the past months have been all about.
Lord McCluskey
Is that expression “high-level principle” a euphemism for low-level politics?
Lord Dunlop
No; it is the responsibility of the two Governments to work out this package of powers and how the fiscal framework will work in practice, which is what we are doing.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
I am anxious to make time before the Minister moves on from this specific aspect of indirect detriment—I know that he will come on to behavioural aspects soon. Will there be one body which will define what these indirect impacts are, with choices north and south of the border, or will we see a perpetual process of two Governments having disputes about how they will define what the indirect consequences are of policy choices north and south of the border?
Lord Dunlop
No; we will not see disputes, because that is the process we are involved in at the moment, which is to reach an agreement on how all these aspects operate. That is what we are doing. When I say that I am optimistic that we will reach an agreement, that is on the basis of the discussions we have had so far and the issues that remain outstanding.
I will move on to the second leg of the second no-detriment principle, which is to do with taxpayer fairness. Changes in devolved Scottish taxes—for example, income tax—should affect public spending only in Scotland, and vice versa for equivalent taxes in the rest of the UK. What does that mean in practice? It means that taxpayers in Newcastle and Liverpool will not fund even higher levels of public services in Scotland not available to them. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, touched on some of these issues in his recent Herald article, which has already been referred to. The other aspect is that Scotland does not inadvertently gain a double benefit, via Barnett consequentials and a fixed proportion of any growth in tax revenues from the rest of the UK.
In conclusion, therefore, in this part of what I intend to say, some block grant adjustment mechanisms work better against different principles, and the UK Government’s approach is to find a mechanism that performs well against all of them. Each principle is not perfectly met in every respect, which is what we are trying to deal with in the negotiations that are going on at the moment.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
Has the Minister looked at that bit of the Economic Affairs Committee report, where the committee comes to the view that it is easy to understand the first no-detriment principle at the outset—the ab initio principle—but that the attempt to legislate for or to operate a no-detriment principle down the years is a will-o’-the-wisp: it cannot work? If this is what is holding up the fiscal framework, call it off—it will not work. You cannot distinguish over time whether the tax take went down because of the tax measure, a change in the Scottish economy or in the world economy, or in the oil price, so you have a recipe for a continued debate, with the argument going round every time if you are trying to say that there must be no detriment down the years. Abandon it—it will not work. The Smith commission did not say how it would work, and I do not for a moment believe that it thought it would work. It is a lovely principle to get people to agree and then they can go home, but we are doing something different now.
Lord Dunlop
We very much recognise what that report says, which is that if you interpret the no-detriment principle as applying absolutely literally to all effects, whether behavioural or indirect, it is very difficult to arrive at a single solution. However, these are the issues that are being addressed in the negotiations, and when the framework agreement is published the noble Lord will see how the two Governments have addressed those issues.
On the block grant indexation mechanism, Smith says that,
“future growth in the reduction to the block grant should be indexed appropriately”.
There has been much talk about the need to avoid endless wrangling. We are therefore trying to make this process as mechanical as possible. The issue is how much of the growth in relevant taxes in the rest of the UK will benefit Scotland post-devolution.
With new powers come new responsibilities, and, as has already been mentioned this evening, the debate is around appropriate allocation of responsibilities between the UK and Scottish Governments and what is a fair division. The UK Government continue to manage UK-wide risks and the Scottish Government manage marginal Scotland-specific risks. To give an example, if there is a UK-wide recession, there will be a smaller block grant deduction to shield Scotland from UK-wide impacts because the growth in UK taxes will be lower. We have achieved agreement before with the Scottish Government for the Scottish rate of income tax, which is indexed against movements in corresponding UK Government tax.
The key issue, which has been raised in the debate by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and other noble Lords, is how population change is managed. The UK Government will continue to manage the impact of UK-wide population change in all devolved areas. We are looking for the Scottish Government to manage marginal Scotland-specific changes. The Scottish Government already manage these changes within Barnett, and John Swinney, when he appeared before the Scottish Parliament Finance Committee last summer, accepted this.
The UK Government’s proposal, which is contained in the Chief Secretary’s letter, addresses this population concern and we are prepared to share the risk. The model we have tabled recognises that Scotland’s share of income tax revenue is less than its population share and it ensures that, like Barnett, the tax adjustment takes account of changes in Scotland’s population. So if Scotland’s population share falls then so will the tax deduction.
However, let me be clear: we cannot agree something where the Scottish Government are not accepting their fair share of population risk. Why? If it is right that Scotland retains all the growth in its own tax revenues, then it is difficult to explain as fair that a fixed proportion of growth in the rest of the UK’s own devolved tax revenues is added to the Scottish budget irrespective of how good or bad are the policy choices of the Scottish Government and the relative performance of the Scottish economy as a result.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
This is the point I was trying to get at before. The Minister has just said it; he may correct me, and I apologise as it is complex. He said that, if the Scottish population falls and is a lower proportionate share of the population, there would be a lower tax deduction. But if that population has fallen because of the tax policies of the Scottish Government, why should there be a lower tax reduction?
Lord Dunlop
I think we are reflecting at the outset that Scotland produces a lower proportion of total UK income tax. We are applying that comparability factor from the outset. The Scottish Government will still bear population risk. If there is deviation from that initial situation—whether it is a result of their policy choices—that is how they would bear the population risk.
Lord Darling of Roulanish
Can the Minister explain another point he raised? I am puzzled how it will ever be possible within a reasonable timescale to properly assess whether a measure taken by either the UK Government or the Scottish Government resulted in higher growth and therefore a higher tax rate or the other way round. The Minister must know that most of these matters are in dispute, sometimes for years, because no one can be really sure why a tax take went up or down. There can be a hunch or a feeling, but these things are contested maybe even decades after they happen. Given that this is a settlement that has to fix the grant every year, I am just wondering how you do it.
Lord Dunlop
As I said, the agreement will set out the mechanism by which these matters are determined, so in that sense we will have reached agreement. That will avoid the perpetual wrangling. If you like, that is one of the complexities that we have been wrestling with and why it is taking time—
Lord Darling of Roulanish
I have one more observation. I am just wondering how, in the case of the SNP, perpetual wrangling can be written out of the script.
Lord Dunlop
A good start is if we actually get an agreement that, I hope, we can announce in the not too distant future.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
Can I press the Minister on this? We have three models in front of us—the per capita index deduction, the index deduction and the levels deduction. Do I take it that the Minister has ruled out the per capita index deduction because there is too much of a bias to Scotland in terms of its population going down and it being rewarded excessively? Looking at the Chief Secretary’s letter, it would seem that the Government from paragraph 13 onwards have looked at the levels model and the index model and decided to provide another hybrid model to the negotiations for the SNP. Is that what the Government are doing? Given paragraph 13, I asked earlier what the response of the Scottish Government has been. Are they warm to that hybrid model now?
Lord Dunlop
The Committee will understand that at a very delicate time in the negotiations I do not want to comment on the state of the negotiations in detail. It is clear from the Chief Secretary’s letter that we have indeed tabled what the noble Lord described as a hybrid model.
I shall pick up on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. We are seeking to avoid—I think the Secretary of State for Scotland put it this way in a recent debate—the Scottish Government wanting to have their cake and eat it and have a slice of everyone else’s cake while they are at it.
I now turn to borrowing, which was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr, Lord Darling and Lord Turnbull. I should say at the outset that we have a lot of sympathy with what this amendment seeks to achieve.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I have a question before my noble friend moves on. I accept we have had a good go on this but I am still—perhaps I am just not smart enough to understand this—struggling to understand the Government’s position. It once was that, if Scotland is responsible for particular services, it should be responsible for raising the money and have direct accountability. What appears to be happening now is that the Government are trying to find some kind of Barnett-like top-up to the tax base. How is that going to go down with people in England? How will it take account of changes in England? For example, suppose a large number of migrants come into the country and live in the south-east of England and increase tax revenues and the tax base relative to Scotland, will that mean that there has to be money sent north of the border to maintain some kind of parity? I just do not understand how this will work. Can my noble friend explain?
Lord Dunlop
If there is faster population growth in the rest of the UK, that obviously will not just increase tax revenues. It will also increase demand for public services. This negotiation is all about a fair allocation of risk. As I said, at this delicate time of the negotiations I do not want to comment in detail about particular aspects. We will publish this agreement if and when we can get it and I will be very happy at that point to discuss and debate with my noble friend on these matters.
I have great sympathy with what the amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Turnbull, seeks to achieve. It is centred on the Scottish Government’s resource and capital borrowing powers and this is an important part of the negotiations. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, asked whether this is a matter of great controversy. I do not anticipate—if we can reach agreement soon—that this issue will cause great controversy. In detail on resource borrowing, Smith talks about sufficient and additional powers to,
“ensure budgetary stability and provide safeguards to smooth … public spending in the event of economic shocks”.
The current powers of the Scottish Government are that they can borrow up to a total cap of £500 million for this purpose and an annual limit of £200 million for cash management and forecasting error in devolved tax revenues. The rationale for more in this area is the increased risk and volatility from a greater scale of tax devolution, although I again stress that this is a marginal Scotland-specific risk. This needs to be proportionate. Mindful of the need to deliver sustainable UK public finances, as the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, said, Scottish borrowing is included in UK borrowing.
When we look at these borrowing powers, we need to look at the other tools that are available to help manage the risks—the possibility of building up a rainy-day fund and the block grant adjustment mechanism itself. We also need to cater for Scotland-specific shocks if the Scottish economy is in recession while the UK economy continues to grow. That is a relatively rare event—I think it has happened three times in the last 20 years. We need to do this to protect against relative underperformance leading to worse economic outcomes through higher taxes or lower spending during recession. I pick up on a point that the noble Lord, Lord Darling, made: it is explicitly not a facility for the Scottish Government to borrow to fund current spending in normal times. That would absolutely undermine fiscal responsibility and accountability.
On capital borrowing, Smith talks about sufficient borrowing powers to support capital investment. He asked the two Governments to look at a similar prudential borrowing regime used by local authorities. The current powers involve a total cap of £2.2 billion and an annual limit of 10% of the capital grant, which is currently about £3 billion, so we are talking about £300 million per annum. All borrowing needs to be complemented by fiscal rules to ensure consistency with the overall UK fiscal framework.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, specifically asked about legislation. The Scottish Government’s existing borrowing powers are provided for in the Scotland Act 1998 as amended by the Scotland Act 2012. Any changes to the purposes and circumstances for which the Scottish Government have permission to borrow to reflect the transferred risks may require amendments to primary legislation. I assure noble Lords that we will review further what primary and secondary legislative changes may be needed in the light of a fiscal framework agreement, including additional independent scrutiny of the Scottish Government’s public finances, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, referred. Both Houses of the UK Parliament will have an important scrutiny role.
Lord Turnbull
Will the Minister clarify a matter for me? When he talks about additional primary legislation, is he talking about bringing forward an amendment to this Bill or about a new Bill to be brought forward on some other occasion? It really belongs in this Bill.
Lord Dunlop
As I said, it depends on the timing of an agreement. Obviously it would be preferable, if possible, to provide amendments for this Bill, but that depends on our reaching an agreement and the timing of that agreement.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
The noble Lord said that this is not the most controversial element. In fact, he implied that it was not controversial at all. In that case, do we have to wait for all the difficult bits of the fiscal framework to be agreed before we see the easy bits coming out if there are outcomes there? My noble friend Lord Turnbull is right that this Bill would be better if there were a provision in it on borrowing. I do not know whether my language is correct but this is different from the 1998 Act. We are explicitly laying down the mechanism for settling these limits because it is a reasonable assumption that there will be much more borrowing. I think it is desirable to amend the 1998 Act and, if we are going to do that, why not do it in this Bill?
Lord Dunlop
The difficulty is that you cannot separate out one element of what is an overall package. Both Governments have agreed that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Therefore, I do not think it is possible to pluck out just one aspect and to move ahead with it on a different timescale.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Perhaps I might get the politics of this right. The proposal is that we absolutely have to get this Bill on the statute book before the Scottish elections but, come those elections, we will be able to say that there is another Bill coming down the track to deal with these matters, and we may or may not have the detail on that. Is that not going to defeat the object? Was not the position of both Front Benches earlier this afternoon that we had to deliver the vow and say that we had delivered it? If another piece of primary legislation is coming and as yet we do not know what it is going to say, does that not undermine the whole strategy?
Lord Dunlop
No, I do not believe that it does. My noble friend is asking me to comment on hypotheticals. We are engaged in trying to reach an agreement in as timely a fashion as we can to ensure that we have proper scrutiny of the fiscal framework in the context of the passage of this Bill.
I am conscious that time has been moving on and I shall be very happy to return to some of these topics on another occasion. However, I just want to pick up on a couple of points.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
There does not seem to me to be a need for separate legislation on borrowing. It is very important that the Minister clarifies that point now, otherwise we will just be chasing shadows afterwards.
Lord Dunlop
As I said, what we require in terms of legislation for borrowing depends on the final agreement. I do not think I can say more than that at the moment.
I shall conclude on a couple of points. Smith calls for a review and the Government support that idea. We are in a new world and it is right to assess how the fiscal framework and fiscal devolution work in practice and whether they impact fairly and equitably on the finances of Scotland and the rest of the UK.
I have already mentioned independent fiscal scrutiny, and the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, addresses this. It is certainly the case that the UK Government strongly support a robust independent Scottish Fiscal Commission. That would include the capacity for that body to undertake independent forecasts—it would not just, as it were, be marking the Scottish Government’s homework. That is one of the key issues in the fiscal framework negotiations.
Finally, on commencement, my noble friend’s amendment is relevant in proposing a sunrise clause if we are unable to agree a fiscal framework. As we have already discussed, we are working hard to agree a fiscal framework. As I said earlier, I do not think that it is helpful to speculate what options would be open to us if an agreement cannot be reached. My noble friend suggested one option, and other options have been suggested as well. We will take those ideas away and set out our conclusions on Report. I therefore ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Dunlop
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, for raising the amendments in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, for setting out the areas where he hopes for clarification. I will try to address the points that have been raised.
Turning first to the definition of disability, the purpose of Clause 20 is to devolve the policy space and to provide financial support to meet the extra costs arising from disability. The clause is designed to give flexibility to the Scottish Government to design their own approach with regard to policy, the criteria that are applied and the scope. The way we have done this, and implemented what Smith called for, is to define the main common features of existing benefits and the circumstances in which benefits are “normally payable”. To give the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, the assurance he seeks, this is not intended to impose restrictions or obligations on the Scottish Government; they should be free to set their own agenda.
I understand that stakeholders are concerned that Scottish Ministers will interpret this clause more narrowly—for example, with regard to whether it covers terminal or fluctuating conditions such as cancer or MS. I assure the noble Lord that there is sufficient flexibility in the clause to address exceptional cases—for example, to relax conditions for the terminally ill. The term “significant adverse effect” is designed to be a very broad definition. It is not completely limitless but does not include something that is minor, trivial or negligible, and will be for the Scottish Government to determine. The clause is also drafted to prevent payment of benefit where a person is in receipt of fully funded care in a care home, for example.
Amendment 79 seeks to expand the Scottish Parliament’s employment support powers to include discretionary awards under the Access to Work scheme. The UK Government do not support this amendment for two principal reasons. Access to Work is one of the key tools available to Jobcentre Plus to provide practical support to overcome work-related obstacles arising from disability and is not a centrally contracted programme. As a result of changes made in the last spending review, there will be a real increase in the Access to Work budget that will allow support for an additional 25,000 disabled people nationally.
I will address one of the noble Lord’s further questions and get back to him in writing on some of the others. Access to Work is integral to the Jobcentre Plus offer. It is a grant scheme assisting disabled people in paid employment or with a job or work trial and is awarded for a period of three years. In some cases, the DWP and employers share costs. It is important to have consistency of treatment where big employers have employees receiving support under the scheme in different parts of the country. There is, of course, nothing to stop the Scottish Government choosing to introduce similar forms of support for disabled people in addition to Access to Work, should they wish to do so.
Amendments 77C, 77D, 77E and 77F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, concern the topping up of reserved benefits. Again, I recognise the concern that has been expressed that Scottish Ministers will interpret the term “discretionary” too narrowly and apply it on a case-by-case basis rather than this being left to the discretion of the Scottish Parliament. I stress that the Scottish Parliament will have discretion with regard to these payments. As the noble Lord mentioned, this issue applies in the context of a whole range of measures where the Scottish Government are able to fill in any perceived gaps in UK provision and to tailor welfare to specific Scottish circumstances. The range includes top-ups to reserved benefits, discretionary housing payments, other discretionary assistance and the power to create new benefits in devolved areas.
Clause 22 gives the Scottish Parliament power to legislate for top-up payments to people in Scotland entitled to any reserved benefits, including universal credit, tax credits and child benefit. These payments are outwith the UK social security system and all that that entails. The Scottish Parliament does not need to obtain prior permission from the UK Government to make these top-up payments. However, in accordance with the Smith agreement, conditionality and sanctions within universal credit will remain reserved, so the Scottish Parliament will not be able to legislate for top-ups to offset a reserved benefits reduction as a result of an individual’s conduct, whether that is non-compliance with work-related requirements or recovery of benefit overpayment.
I can reassure the noble Lord that just because someone is sanctioned it does not mean they cannot get a payment for other reasons, such as emergencies. That is absolutely clear from what this clause is trying to do. I can also reassure the noble Lord that there is no automatic offsetting of top-up payments with reductions to reserved benefits, as per paragraph 55 of the Smith agreement. The Secretary of State for Scotland has written on this matter and said that,
“the UK Government agrees with the principle of not automatically off-setting new benefits with reductions elsewhere, as set out in para. 55 of the Smith Commission Agreement”.
I turn to Amendments 77J and 77K, about other discretionary payments and assistance. The purpose of Clause 24 is to broaden the exception of the 1998 Act to the social security reservation governing how the social welfare fund operates. There are two new exceptions here: Exception 7, relating to discretionary payments, gives short-term financial or other assistance to avoid risk to an individual’s well-being. Exception 8 gives occasional payments to help vulnerable people establish and maintain a settled home. The difference from the existing exception is that the requirement is only short-term. It does not also have to be immediate and arising from an exceptional event or circumstance. However, the payment could be to meet an immediate need. This is not intended to reduce the powers of the Scottish Parliament. To give a practical example, if a cooker breaks then this would cover the immediate food vouchers that might be required as well as help for repair of the cooker itself. However, the term “short-term” is needed to ensure that this provision does not stray into reserved territory in providing an ongoing entitlement.
I turn to the power to create new benefits in devolved areas, covered by Amendments 77L and 77M. The purpose of Clause 26 is that, under the 1998 Act, the Scottish Parliament has wide powers to legislate in any area of devolved responsibility, including the provision of new benefits. Examples of how this has been used include the provision of educational maintenance grants, free school meals, free prescriptions and the council tax reduction scheme. However, the Scottish Government would have to engage with the UK Government if they wished to create new benefits that strayed into the reservation under F1 of Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998. Clause 26 inserts a new Exception 10 into F1 of the 1998 Act to put it beyond doubt that the Scottish Parliament can create new benefits in areas of devolved responsibility without the need to engage the UK Government. So the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government will have freedom to design and deliver welfare provision tailored to meet the needs of the people of Scotland.
Amendments 77N and 77R relate to the operation of concurrent universal credit regulation-making powers. Smith was very clear that universal credit remains reserved. It is, after all, a key part—with pensions—of the social union. However, it provides the Scottish Government with limited powers to vary certain aspects. Therefore Clause 27 gives the Scottish Government regulation-making powers to vary housing costs within universal credit for claimants who rent and to allow payments direct to landlords. Clause 28 gives Scottish Ministers regulation-making powers to change the frequency of universal credit payments to claimants, usually once a month, otherwise twice or four times a month and also to decide in what circumstances a single payment to a claimant couple could be split, for example if one partner has a drink or a gambling problem.
Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope
The Minister is being helpful but this is important. I do not see any escalation mechanism. I supported some of these universal credit changes that the Scottish Government are now seeking to win back—flexibilities in Clauses 27 and 28. However, if we are to use this mechanism, there needs to be some way of resolving disputes in situations where agreements simply cannot be reached. Postponing the introduction of changes indefinitely is not an answer to that question.
Lord Dunlop
The first thing to say is that we do not anticipate problems. That is why I go back to this being a backstop power. The powers to vary are discrete. We shall come on to talk about the amendments regarding a welfare commission, but already close intergovernmental working has been established both at ministerial and official level and a lot of work is going on through visits and teach-ins and the like. Given where we are with universal credit rollout—it is already fully rolled out in Musselburgh; by June it will be rolled out in Inverness and by autumn in another five centres across Scotland—there is an opportunity to look at how these changes and the flexibilities that the Scottish Government have got might actually work in practice. There is a good dialogue between the two Governments to establish what the Scottish Government want to do with these powers and what draft Scottish Parliament universal credit regulations might look like. In terms of dispute resolution, we have already established a joint ministerial group on welfare. That has already proved an effective mechanism for resolving any issues between the two Governments.
I turn to the government amendments. Amendment 77B is technical in nature and ensures that executive competence will be transferred to the Scottish Ministers so that they can make payments of Sure Start, maternity grants, funeral payments, cold weather payments and winter fuel payments when Clause 21 is commenced. Clause 21 provides the Scottish Parliament with legislative competence to create a scheme that would allow it to make payments or provide other assistance for funeral and maternity expenses, and expenses incurred due to cold weather. Without the amendment to Clause 21, executive competence would not be transferred to Scottish Ministers when the clause is commenced. This would prevent Scottish Ministers being able to make payments in respect of Sure Start, maternity grants and all the other payments to which I have referred. This amendment therefore ensures that people in Scotland can be paid these benefits by Scottish Ministers and that payments will be made out of Scottish funds.
Our amendments between Amendment 77P and Amendment 79ZB are again technical amendments. They deal with the way in which existing social security legislation will apply after the transfer of powers under the Bill. The amendments to Clauses 27 and 28 relate to universal credit and put beyond doubt the intention that where regulations are made by Scottish Ministers under the new powers, the Scottish Parliament’s procedure for negative instruments applies. Clause 31 is a technical provision that requires legislation to universal credit to be read as if references to the Secretary of State were references to Scottish Ministers. After careful consideration and since universal credit will remain a reserved benefit administered by the DWP, this clause is not required.
The noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, mentioned the Social Security Advisory Committee and its role to advise the Secretary of State on relevant matters relating to social security. The Industrial Injuries Advisory Council advises the Secretary of State on matters relating to industrial injuries benefit and its administration. The roles of the SSAC and IIAC are to remain unchanged. Scottish Ministers, however, will not be able to refer their draft regulations to these bodies for consideration. Once legislative competence has been given to the Scottish Parliament it may, if it wishes, put in place separate scrutiny bodies to consider legislative proposals made by the Scottish Government within the scope of the legislative competence and report back to Scottish Ministers. It is for this reason that we do not support Amendment 79ZC, which seeks to change the role of the SSAC to give it a duty to advise Scottish Ministers. We would of course want to put in place arrangements to facilitate information and co-operation between the two Governments.
Finally, Amendments 79ZE, 79ZF and 79ZG will ensure that UK Parliament procedure is converted into Scottish Parliament procedure in relation to the secondary legislation that Scottish Ministers will be able to make in relation to welfare foods. I will move these government amendments and I ask noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments.
Lord Davidson of Glen Clova
I express my gratitude to the Minister for the clarifications that he has given in relation to disability benefit and its definition. In relation to access to work, I will reflect on the answer he has given and eagerly await the Written Answers. In these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Dunlop
“( ) In section 138 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (payments out of the social fund) after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) This section has effect in or as regards Scotland as if—
(a) references in subsections (1)(a) and (2) to the making of payments out of the social fund were to the making of payments by the Scottish Ministers,(b) the reference in subsection (2) to the Secretary of State were to the Scottish Ministers, and(c) the reference in subsection (4) to regulations were to regulations made by the Scottish Ministers.(4B) Where regulations are made by the Scottish Ministers under this section—
(a) sections 175(2) and (7) and 176 do not apply, and(b) the regulations are subject to the negative procedure (see section 28 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010). (4C) The power to make an Order in Council under section 30(3) of the Scotland Act 1998 is exercisable for the purposes of this section as it is exercisable for the purposes of that Act.””
Lord Dunlop
Lord Dunlop
Lord Dunlop
I thank the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, for his amendment. With this Bill we are moving into a new world of two parallel systems, and it is absolutely the responsibility of both the UK Government and the Scottish Government to ensure that there is a seamless transition from the current situation to that new world and that there are no cracks for people to fall between. We have an important duty in that regard. There is very much a common interest in the UK Government and the Scottish Government working together.
The Government are very sympathetic to the intent behind the amendment but we argue that it is unnecessary because there are existing arrangements in place. However, I agree with the noble Lord on the principle of co-operation, and there is a good level of intergovernmental co-operation in this space already.
The first example of that is the joint ministerial group on welfare, which was proposed by the Prime Minister to the First Minister when they first met after she was elected to her post in November 2014. This body is jointly chaired by the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Scottish Government Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice, Communities & Pensioners’ Rights. Its membership includes not just Scotland Office and Scottish Government Ministers, but is also attended by DWP and Treasury Ministers as required and their Scottish equivalents: for example, the Finance Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary for Fair Work, Skills & Training.
Since February 2015, the ministerial group on welfare has met four times and its agenda covered very practical issues that one would expect as a part of inter-governmental co-operation: information sharing, policy issues, operational and transitional issues and, crucially, dispute resolution. To give some examples, two issues that were resolved through this mechanism were the Work Programme contract extensions and the facilitation of the early introduction of UC flexibilities.
Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope
That is an important group; I confess that I did not know that it met and dealt with those things. How do people find out about this? Are there minutes on websites of decisions taken? If people are trying to find out about this important work that the Minister is telling us about, how do we find out about it?
Lord Dunlop
The noble Lord raises a good point. One thing that I will take away from this debate is to see how we can promote a better understanding of how this group works and the issues that are being discussed. If I can give him this reassurance, I will certainly take that away.
Along with the ministerial group, there is also a senior officials’ group, which covers very much the same agenda of issues as the ministerial group. It is jointly chaired by the DWP director of devolution and the Scottish Government director of welfare, housing and regeneration. It has a remit to meet quarterly; I think that the next meeting is coming up very shortly, on 1 March. As other examples of co-operation, the DWP has seconded officials to the Scottish Government and, as I mentioned earlier, there is a programme to brief Scottish Government officials and get them up to speed on how the existing system works, so that the Scottish Government are in a much better position to determine how they are going to develop the powers that are coming to them.
In terms of parliamentary scrutiny, DWP Ministers and officials obviously appear before the Scottish Parliament Welfare Reform Committee and are available to appear before the committees of this Parliament. On local authority and other stakeholder engagement, the DWP runs three stakeholder forums in Scotland per year to provide operational updates and improve joint working. It engages with a range of stakeholders from CoSLA, Citizens Advice Scotland, the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, the Prince’s Trust and the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations. CoSLA and the Scottish Government are both represented on the universal credit partnerships forum, chaired jointly by the DWP and the Local Government Association.
As to reporting, I am happy to take on board and explore with the Scottish Government how we can improve reporting on the working of the joint ministerial working group on welfare, and our intent would be to provide annual reports on implementation.
Therefore, we regard the amendment tabled by the noble Lord as unnecessary, but it also confuses executive and scrutiny functions and perhaps lacks a clear objective—what outcome are we looking for here? One difficulty is that there is no precedent that I am aware of to fall back on. To whom will this body report? As I have explained, there are better ways to achieve the intent behind this amendment, to which, as I say, I am sympathetic. Therefore I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord McAvoy
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his positive response, particularly with regard to his response to the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope. I share the Minister’s surprise that he was not aware of it, because he seems to know everything else about social security. However, I am pleased, not by the concession—it is not a case of wanting concessions—but by the confirmation from the Minister that he will look at ways at following up the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood.
As the Minister was outlining all the ministerial and civil servant involvement, I thought that something was glaringly missing, which was the users, the public—some sort of public consultation and representation. He then went on to list a whole host of organisations that the Government have some kind of link with. However, I still feel that there is a case for more direct involvement by users groups and local organisations. I get the feeling that the links with the organisations are perhaps a bit perfunctory. I hope that I am wrong about that but nevertheless there is still a bit of a case for more direct users’ involvement. The system always needs to hear what went wrong and what went right, and so on. Nevertheless, with that little prevarication, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Dunlop
“Social Security Advisory Committee and Industrial Injuries Advisory Council
(1) Section 53 of the Scotland Act 1998 does not apply in relation to any function of a Minister of the Crown under the legislation relating to social security and industrial injuries advisory bodies.
(2) Section 117 of that Act does not apply in relation to any reference to a Minister of the Crown in that legislation.
(3) In this section—
“the legislation relating to social security and industrial injuries advisory bodies” means any provision of sections 170 to 174 of, and Schedules 5 to 7 to, the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (Social Security Advisory Committee and Industrial Injuries Advisory Council);“Minister of the Crown” includes the Treasury.”
Lord Dunlop
Lord McAvoy
My Lords, I join in the debate and fully endorse all of the speeches made, particularly by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness. As most of my comments have already been made as quotes from the Delegated Powers Committee, I will concentrate on one aspect of this, although I also completely endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean. It gives me such pleasure to do so.
The comments about scrutiny were made far more eloquently than I could make, so I will just endorse those comments of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. I want to concentrate particularly on the provision-making policy because it affects a significant amount of social security legislation, which can be of an extremely complicated nature.
In a letter, the Minister said:
“Although extensive checks have been carried out as to the effect of the provisions of this Bill and the interaction with social security legislation, it is possible that, in implementing the provisions of the Bill, consequential amendments are found to be necessary to fulfil Parliamentary intention”.
As the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, mentioned, there is an important constitutional role for the House, even at this time of night.
The memorandum concerning the delegated powers in the Bill states:
“Furthermore, Social security has, until now, broadly remained reserved across Great Britain and delivered on a GB-wide basis by the UK Government. In operating a system where responsibility for the different social security benefits paid in Scotland is split between the UK and Scottish Parliament there may be some areas where the respective Governments may wish to make mutually beneficial agreements relating to delivery which may require consequential amendments to existing legislation—for example to facilitate fraud investigations, debt recovery and compliance issues arising out of overpayments in respect of both reserved and devolved benefits”.
I conclude by joining the comments made by many Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken tonight. There has got to be a reason—is it laziness, bad draftsmanship or is there a purpose behind it? Were they thought out, were they put down specifically? I join other noble Lords in asking why it was felt these powers were necessary.
Lord Dunlop
First, I thank noble and learned Lords for their contribution to the debate about Clause 68. These provisions have been well scrutinised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and I am grateful for the Committee’s examination and subsequent report. Of course, Bills of this nature do require necessary powers to ensure that the powers that are transferring to the Scottish Parliament transfer effectively. That is one point that the committee recognised in its report; it is therefore to retain those aspects of Clause 68. However, having considered the report, the Government accept that the ability to amend future enactments and prerogative instruments, and any other future instruments or documents, and Welsh and Northern Ireland legislation whether made in the future or the past, is unlikely to be required for Parts 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the Scotland Bill. Therefore, we intend to bring forward an appropriate amendment on Report, amending the provisions.
More broadly, powers to make consequential provision are commonly found in primary legislation. Section 105, read with Section 113 of the Scotland Act, provides similar powers. The Bill contains consequential amendments identified as necessary during the course of its preparation. However, given the nature of the Scotland Bill and the significant devolution of legislative and Executive powers, it is difficult to anticipate the full extent of the consequential amendments required once the Bill has been commenced. Further, the nature of the Bill means that it effects both Westminster and Scottish Parliament legislation and it is possible that officials in either Administration may in future identify additional necessary amendments to either primary or secondary legislation.
I turn specifically to the use of the consequential power in relation to welfare provisions:
“In operating a system where responsibility for the different social security benefits paid in Scotland is split between the UK and Scottish Parliament there may be some areas where the respective Governments may wish to make mutually beneficial agreements relating to delivery which may require consequential amendments to existing legislation—for example to facilitate fraud investigations, debt recovery and compliance issues arising out of overpayments in respect of both reserved and devolved benefits”.
How feasible it is to make such arrangements will depend,
“to some degree on the provision that the Scottish Parliament puts in place and any agreements would need to be considered and agreed between both the UK and Scottish Governments”.
Therefore, it is necessary to have appropriate consequential provision in the Bill. However, as I said, the Government intend to bring forward an appropriate amendment on the basis that I have set out.
Next I would like to address the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, related to,
“any other instrument or document”,
which I think has been proposed by the Law Society. The Government intend to retain the power to amend current instruments or documents. Let me offer the rationale for that. Section 117 of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that, so far as may be necessary for the purpose of or in consequence of an exercise of a function by a Member of the Scottish Government in devolved competence, any pre-commencement enactment or prerogative instrument and any other instrument or document shall be read as if references to a Minister of the Crown were or included references to Scottish Ministers. The effect of the gloss by Clause 30 of the Bill of references to pre-commencement enactment in the Scotland Act 1998 is that instruments or documents such as the contracts entered into by the UK Government for the provision of welfare that refer to a Minister of the Crown will be glossed appropriately to refer to Scottish Ministers.
However, other amendments or transitional arrangements may be required to ensure the efficient and effective transfer of contracts. For example, the gloss converts references only to a Minister of the Crown to Scottish Ministers. There may be other references that need to be amended. Accordingly, a power to amend, repeal, revoke or modify any other instruments or documents whenever passed or made is required for Part 3. We accept that the power to amend any other future instruments or documents is unlikely to be required, as I have said, in relation to Parts 1, 4, 5 and 6, and we will be bringing forward an amendment to address this issue. We are retaining the power to amend existing instruments and documents on the basis that that is likely to be required, given the scale of the powers being devolved to the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
It is welcome to hear the Government’s view as regards potential amendments on Report. However, in light of the Minister’s remarks, how does Clause 68 sit with Clause 2 when it comes to areas where the Government may have the power to amend Acts of the Scottish Parliament and devolved legislation? Would a legislative consent Motion mechanism be required for that, and equally for the National Assembly for Wales?
Lord Dunlop
I am happy to take the noble Lord’s point away and reflect on it, and I shall either write to him or discuss it.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Can I take my noble friend back to the debate we had earlier when the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, argued that it was important to have in the Bill specific provisions relating to borrowing powers? I think that my noble friend indicated that more primary legislation would be required; he used the phrase “primary legislation”. Can we take it that these powers would not be used, for example, to put in place a borrowing regime for the Scottish Parliament, taking into account what he has just said now with what he said earlier this evening?
Lord Dunlop
I absolutely stand by what I said earlier. There may be some aspects of borrowing that could be done through secondary legislation, and that will be made clear when we agree and publish the fiscal framework.
Lord Hope of Craighead
Before the Minister sits down yet again, I am not quite sure from his explanation that he has fully taken on board the points made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and me about the nature of this legislation—in other words, that the purpose of the legislation is to give effect to the Smith commission report. What concerns us is the opportunity that the provisions as framed—and, indeed, as forecast by the Minister—would give for straying outside the scope of the commission. I do not know whether the Minister’s brief has really addressed that point. If not, perhaps he will be kind enough to say that he will give further thought to it. It is an important matter because we really need to keep faith with the Government’s undertaking when they introduce legislation as to what it is all about.
Lord Dunlop
I will certainly give further thought to what the noble and learned Lord has said and come back to him on it.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
On the important point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, about having to table amendments again to maintain the sequence, and, indeed, in relation to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on the last group of amendments, perhaps the Minister will take this opportunity to clarify whether, when we come to Report, the order of consideration will be as in Committee; in other words, that Parts 2 and 3 will be taken at the end—I think next Monday is the day currently set down for that—and the other parts will be debated on Wednesday.
Lord Hope of Craighead
I am sorry to intervene on the same point but we have today debated Part 7, in which Clause 68 appears. I am not quite sure in which order it will appear on Report. That affects what we do in terms of tabling further amendments. Will it be in the first stage of Report or the second?
Lord Dunlop
This obviously has to be discussed through the usual channels but my understanding is that we will consider the Bill on Report in the same order that we have considered it in Committee.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, now wish to withdraw his amendment?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, it certainly had not been my intention to take part but I do so given the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, because I took part in the debates in the other place on the 1998 legislation. Indeed, I tabled an amendment to devolve abortion—the argument being that abortion law is a matter of health and the criminal law, both of which are themselves devolved. It therefore seemed anomalous that abortion should not be. The noble and learned Lord may correct me if I am wrong but I think that prior to 1967, the criminal law in relation to abortion was different in Scotland from what it was in England. So there have been many years, probably decades, in which there were differences on different sides of the border.
Having spoken for the devolution of abortion in debates in the other place in 1998, I recall that when the then Secretary of State spoke, there was a conscious decision that the Government’s position was that abortion should not be devolved. So the late Donald Dewar spoke very coherently, as your Lordships would expect, putting the case for a continued reservation of abortion. However, when we came out of the Chamber later he said to me, “I’m glad you did not read my speech during the debates on the 1978 legislation”. So before Committee on this Bill, I went back and looked at Donald Dewar’s speech when he advocated the devolution of abortion during the passage of the 1978 legislation. It made a compelling case for its devolution.
Lord Dunlop
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, for the amendments that they have tabled. I hope that the Committee will indulge me if, given this late hour, I am relatively brief in responding to them.
As has already been explained, Amendment 80 would require the Secretary of State to lay a statement before Parliament stating that the Scottish Government and Scottish authorities have made appropriate arrangements in relation to the exercise of the powers which have been devolved to them before parts of the Bill are commenced. The Government regard this amendment as against the spirit of how devolution operates. Moreover, this is an enabling Bill: constitutional legislation which transfers legislative competence to the Scottish Parliament and executive competence to the Scottish Ministers. There will be no change in law until such time as the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers use the powers devolved to them. It will therefore be for them to decide whether they have made appropriate arrangements before doing so. I have discussed this point with the noble Earl—namely, how we ensure an effective transition. It requires the co-operation of the two Governments to discuss those issues. A number of mechanisms are in place to support a smooth transfer of powers and joint working. We have already debated how that works in relation to welfare and I expect similar joint working with regard to the Crown Estate.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
Before the Minister sits down, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who I thank for his intervention, made clear that we were not at all questioning the Scottish Parliament’s ability to take this decision. I very much trust Scottish women to get their views heard strongly, although, as the Minister says, it has been officers, officials and Ministers having those debates so far, not the people who are mostly involved, who are of course women.
The question that I asked is one that we all need answers to, regarding funding: should there be a difference in whether the NHS funding will cover women who travel between the two jurisdictions when those jurisdictions have different laws on this? I do not expect the Minister to be able to answer that tonight but, given our experience in Northern Ireland, I think that this is a really big issue. If he cannot answer tonight, I hope that he will write to us before we reach this part of the Bill on Report.
The Earl of Kinnoull
I thank the Minister for what he said. I was rather ungracious earlier on: he spent a lot of time with me on this issue, and has gone a long way to giving lots of assurances about my essential concern, which is the private citizen as opposed to political expediency. I am grateful to him and I note that he has organised a drop-in on the issue of the British Transport Police tomorrow afternoon; I shall be dropping in for sure. That said, and putting down a marker that I feel that the interests of the private citizen as opposed to political expediency is something that this House should have regard to, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.