Lord McCluskey
Main Page: Lord McCluskey (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord McCluskey's debates with the Scotland Office
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 79F and 79G. I have in my hands substantial notes. They were designed to enable me to present an elegant speech full of witticisms, insights and—though I did not realise I needed the permission of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth—even some political comments. I took part in 1978, from the Front Bench, then occupied by a Government of a different hue, in the first Scotland Bill. I have had a long and lasting interest in these matters. Since I prepared this speech on 13 January much has happened. The field which I hoped to plough has become a dustbowl—so many people have walked through it, including in these debates today.
I shall try to keep my comments short, in light of the well-developed arguments, but clearly the fiscal framework has not been resolved. People have alleged that that is because of the complications. I do not believe that for one second. The civil servants involved are highly skilled and competent and have resolved all the complications. The difficulty is that there is a chasm between the UK Government and the Scottish Government in relation to a simple matter: how much? How much is the UK taxpayer going to have to provide to win the approval of the Scottish Government and, secondarily—the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr—in relation to borrowing powers? That is also very important.
As has been pointed out, the Smith commission report recorded that the representatives of five Scottish Holyrood parties had agreed the devolution of certain powers. Very well. It also said, at paragraph 95:
“Barnett Formula: the block grant from the UK Government to Scotland will continue to be determined via the operation of the Barnett Formula”.
That is not entirely surprising, considering the make-up of the Smith commission. Turkeys do not vote for Christmas. The members were voting for a continuation of the Barnett formula. The report also contained what was plainly a compromise, namely the so-called no-detriment principle in two manifestations, the first of which is vaguely comprehensible and the second of which is certainly not.
The Scottish representatives on the commission—and they were all Scots—were voting in favour because the Barnett formula was plainly very favourable to Scotland and everyone was afraid of the needs test. In fact, noble Lords who have read John Swinney’s evidence to the committee of this House on the Barnett formula in 2009 will know that that committee tried to pin him down on that. He would not answer, but simply kept repeating, “We want full fiscal autonomy”.
Yes—that was, of course, part of the purpose of the article I wrote for the Herald, which the noble Lord, Lord McFall, was good enough to refer to.
Plainly, the Scottish Government were perfectly entitled to try to secure the most favourable deal they could. It was they who created this timetable that we are being asked to stick to. The timetable was to enable them to go to the electorate in May and present themselves as having achieved a great victory. They created the timetable and we are all supposed to bow to it. I just wonder about that. In relation to the rush to get it through, it also puzzles me that John Swinney is so anxious to get his hands on extra tax powers because, when the Labour Party in Scotland proposed an extra penny on income tax, he replied, “Over my dead body”. Now, we would not wish any harm to the Deputy First Minister, but he has obviously no intention of exercising these tax powers, so what is the rush? It is all to do with the electoral process of the Scottish Government.
Even the devolution of a minor thing, such as the introduction of air passenger duty, could turn out to be worth nothing because, as was pointed out very widely at an earlier stage of the passage of the Bill, Newcastle Airport is going to suffer considerable detriment if all the Scots in the north of England flock to Prestwick, Glasgow, Edinburgh or even further north to take advantage of reduced prices. They are going to suffer a detriment and that detriment is going to have to be met by whom? By the Scottish taxpayer. In other words, the Scottish taxpayer is going to have to find the money to send to Newcastle that has been saved by whom? By the airlines. It is bizarre. The whole thing is slightly mad.
If I remember correctly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared before the Treasury Committee in January 2015 and, asked about the no-detriment principle for Newcastle and Manchester airports, said it did not apply to them. He pointed to the fact that in the previous year Newcastle Airport had increased its traffic by 12% and Manchester Airport had increased its traffic by 3%, so there was no problem whatever. So we are all in the dark yet.
I fully accept what the noble Lord says; however I argue that there is room for argument as to whether there is a detriment to Newcastle. I just do not know. The Select Committee on Economic Affairs said, as has been quoted already by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth:
“We agree … that the second no detriment principle is unworkable. It is a recipe for future disagreement”.
The only problem is the word “future”. It is a recipe for constant disagreement, including future disagreement.
My Amendment 79F includes the provision that the new fiscal framework should be published in full. That is very important. The noble Lord, Lord McFall, mentioned that we have to face political reality: I would not challenge his judgment on that, but I add something else. We also have to face the truth—not just the truth but the whole truth—in relation to the fiscal agreement. We need to know the background and I am sure that if it is not published in full, as it should be, then various means can be found, whether in debate here, by means of questions or by freedom of information requests, to discover the full background. What were the people bargaining about? What was the cause of the delay? My guess is that the cause of the delay was what I suggested before—namely, that they could not agree on amounts of money, so the complications are not real complications but deep disagreements.
As I mentioned in the article to which the noble Lord was kind enough to refer, lying behind these discussions and the problem for the Scottish Government is the following. If the present discussions about the fiscal framework reveal, as I suspect they will, that Scotland needs a substantial subsidy from the taxpayers in the rest of the UK—or at least in the rest of Great Britain—that is a demonstration that Scotland cannot exist without such a subsidy. Therefore, the economic case for independence, which was so bizarre in the original White Paper by the Scottish Government, disappears. In other words, we now know, because of the discussions going on—although we do not know the detail—that the economic base in Scotland is such that the tax yield will be very disappointing. The Barnett formula would, of course, disappear on independence and the oil bonanza confidently predicted at the time of the referendum campaign will continue to prove to be a mirage.
As I say, events have perhaps rather overtaken this amendment but it is time that the Scottish electorate were told the whole truth about the Barnett formula. That is part of this amendment. I have read with great care, and more than once, the proceedings of the Lords committee on the Barnett formula. It was a very powerful committee and the questioning was extremely good. The witnesses who gave evidence were of the highest quality and the lesson of that has to be that if we want to move to a just and fair system, we ought to move to one which is not based on a formula that was never invented for the long term but rather as a device to get through a problem existing in the midst of an economic crisis. We should move to a system based on need in terms of welfare and other things. It is time we were told the truth about that. That is the purpose of the second part of this amendment—proposed new subsection (2).
Detriment is said to be a principle in the Smith commission report. I am afraid that I do not recognise it as a principle. The principle that underlies public expenditure should in my view be the question of need. Public expenditure in different regions should be determined largely in relation to need. It is not a straightforward matter and I need not discuss the difficulties involved in that; we are all well aware of them. Therefore, the information that I seek is to give people the truth. The truth is more important than the political reality.
I can deal briefly with the other matter relating to Amendment 79G. The noble Lord, Lord McFall, has already referred to this and I simply adopt what he said. It is vital in Scotland that we have independent scrutiny of, and reports on, economic forecasts. One of the problems with the referendum campaign was that the government White Paper had some very dodgy statistics and forecasts and the Opposition did not question it sufficiently. In a sense, the Government got away with what they said. We need an independent body. I have suggested the model of the Office for Budget Responsibility. It is not ideal but it is the best model that we have. I deal with the question of independence in the way set out in the amendment. I do not pretend that this is an ideal way to amend the Bill, but the ideas here are such that the draftsmen could with ease convert this into a workable amendment.
The Smith commission talked repeatedly about strengthening the Scottish Parliament. One of its principles was strengthening the Scottish devolution settlement and the Scottish Parliament within the UK, including parliaments’ levels of financial accountability. The commission referred repeatedly to independence. I need not quote all the relevant paragraphs. As the noble Lord, Lord McFall, pointed out, the Bill which was before the Scottish Parliament—the Scottish Fiscal Commission Bill—contains a clause which states:
“In performing its functions, the Commission is not subject to the direction or control of any member of the Scottish Government”.
However, the Bill declines to give the commission responsibility for providing independent assessments and forecasts for the Scottish economy. So if they are not made by an independent commission, who makes them? The Scottish Government make them.
Kenny Gibson was cited, but it is worth doing so again. He was the SNP chairman who expressed the unanimous view of the committee:
“We are strongly of the view that not only should the Scottish Fiscal Commission be independent, but it is vital that it is perceived to be independent. That is why we are calling for the Bill to be amended to strengthen the Commission’s role”.
Those who want to read the detail of this will find it in an article in the Scotsman of 11 February by Bill Jamieson. When the vote came, the SNP people voted down that proposal by four votes to three. Bill Jamieson’s article in the Scotsman drew attention to North Korea. I think the SNP is more like a North Korean drill squad: if a commander says, “Do a backward somersault”, the words are hardly out of his mouth before they are back on their feet, having done a backward somersault. It is a classic example of the exercise of this rigid discipline within the SNP. If we do not have an independent fiscal commission, we are in trouble.
We have had enough talk of dodgy dossiers and I have had enough of reading out my notes. I hope that I shall move these amendments in due course.
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly to my Amendment 79H, which I hope provides a way out for my noble friend on the discussions which we have had this afternoon, in so far as it suggests that the Bill, when enacted, should not commence until we have had the fiscal framework laid before both Houses of Parliament and there has been an opportunity to debate it. If I were the Minister, I would grab that because the prospect of moving another amendment proposing that we should not proceed to Report but should reconvene the Committee stage on Wednesday is something that I do not relish, as I am sure he does not either. However, if we get the fiscal framework tomorrow, there will be an opportunity for us to discuss it and therefore there will no need for this amendment. I very much hope that we will have it.
When I was Secretary of State and the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, was a very distinguished judge, he gave me a bit of a hard time on the reforms which we planned for the criminal law, which I am delighted to say the Labour Party subsequently implemented when it was in power in the Scottish Parliament. He said that I chided him about getting involved in politics—however, I would encourage him to get involved in politics. He has made a brilliant case for why we need clarity on the fiscal framework. I am prepared to support all the amendments that have been suggested because I have no idea what the Government’s position is on what the fiscal framework will be. As regards the proposal to have no detriment, it is the only time in 30 years in Parliament that I have seen witnesses reduced to laughter in giving evidence when they tried to explain what the no detriment principle actually means. Ministers cannot tell us what it means. The noble Lord, Lord Smith, cannot tell us what it means. My noble friend Lady Goldie was on the Smith commission. Perhaps she could tell us what she thinks the no detriment principle means. Without having the fiscal framework and without having a definition of that no detriment principle, it is meaningless.
However, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland hit the nail on the head when he said that the Scottish Government want to have their cake and eat it. Perhaps that is what the no-detriment principle means. Perhaps during the recess, instead of negotiating and getting agreement in time for us to discuss it, they have all been off to see Mary Berry so that they can produce more than one cake. The difficulty is that you cannot produce more than one cake. When we were in government a long time ago and, faced with an onslaught from the Labour Party, we struggled to find a way of making devolution work, I had two problems. The first was that I could not solve the West Lothian question. I could not find a way of doing English votes for English laws that would not threaten the union and create all kinds of problems about voting on income tax and the Barnett formula. My second problem was that my officials said that if we were to create a Scottish Parliament and give it these powers, it would have to be responsible for raising its own money. That would mean it would have to be funded on a fair basis, compared to the rest of the United Kingdom, which would mean having a means-based system of funding of the same kind that we use to distribute money to local government, the health service and so on. That would mean the Secretary of State’s budget being cut by £4.5 billion.
We were pretty unpopular in Scotland, thanks to the efforts of the Labour Party, which presented us as anglicising Scottish education et cetera—but we will not go there. I thought that coming up with proposals which gave Scotland the ability to pass its own laws and raise its own revenue, but which would result in a reduction in the budget of 25% or so—£4.5 million—would not be particularly popular. I think the Smith commission and others have played around with ideas which seem politically attractive but they have not actually done their homework on the impact these would have. Amidst the language of fiscal frameworks and everything else, it is all very simple: the tax base in Scotland is slightly lower than that in England. Therefore, if you are going to raise your money from the tax base in Scotland you are going to have less to spend. The Barnett formula provides 20% more per head for Scotland than England. It was 25% in my day, but there has been some narrowing. If you take a grant that is 20% higher and replace it with a tax which is 20% lower, there will be a gap. It has suddenly dawned on the Scottish nationalists that their proposal will actually result in less money for services.
It has also dawned on the nationalists that if you give welfare services and the like to Scotland, they have to administer them. They are demanding £600 million to administer welfare services. My goodness, the Labour Party wants to get rid of the bedroom tax; so do the nationalists. There are all kinds of welfare benefits that people would like to see improved. The plan is to spend £600 million on administration, instead of on the benefits. That is crazy, and for what? So that we can say that it is misery made in Scotland because we are spending it on civil servants and a bureaucracy. That is what is being proposed here.
I hope the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, will forgive me for interrupting him. It sometimes happens the other way round. Does he appreciate that the £600 million is more than twice the amount that the Scottish Government indicated, in the White Paper, as the cost of running the whole of Scotland after independence on 24 March 2016?
I do love the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, as a politician making these penetrating points. He is absolutely right; it is real. I am relying on what I read in the newspapers, but that is what they are asking for welfare, behind closed doors. They would rather spend the money on superannuated civil servants, just for the sake of saying, “This is being done in Scotland”. The money is the issue.
By the way, why is the Secretary of State not doing these negotiations? I was going to ring him up last week to talk to him and he was in Africa on Friday while these negotiations were going on. They are being run by the Treasury. If you are in a spending department like Scotland, the very last thing you want is the Treasury running your negotiations. Unusually, the Treasury appears to be being very generous. It is suggesting that the Barnett formula, which gives Scotland 10% of any increase in expenditure in England, should be extended to income tax and that Scotland should get, as of right, 10% of any increase of income tax that is raised in England. How is that going to go down in England? While the Scottish nationalist Government—who want to put up the top rates of tax—force all these top-rate taxpayers to move south and reduce the size of the tax base, the English are expected to send them a cheque to compensate them for the loss of revenue resulting from people moving out of Scotland. They run the benefit system for the disabled and unemployed. If they fail to get people back into jobs or to provide the support, England has to pick up the cost because those benefits are based on performance. No wonder they cannot reach agreement on no detriment or a fiscal framework. This is an argument about having a cake and eating it.
As the noble and learned Lord pointed out, if it agrees the fiscal framework, the SNP is now faced with the horrible prospect of going into a Scottish election and saying either, “We are going to have a bit more independence but we are going to have to make cuts in public services and put up taxes”, or, “We could not get these terrible people at Westminster to give Scotland a fair deal”. The truth is that there were years of lies when people said that Scotland got a bad deal out of the union and that the Barnett formula was unfair: those same critics now cling to that formula like a life-raft. All those people said that Scotland would be better off if it had more powers. By the way, that is not everyone in the Labour Party or elsewhere. All those people turned a deaf ear when people like Gordon Brown and the noble Lord, Lord Darling, who is in his place, warned that if you move to a system which is completely dependent on income tax—an idea which was, incidentally, produced by the Tories to overstep the Labour Party and the Liberals, but was not thought through—you create a situation where you are dependent on a lower tax base and there is no real electoral connection with defence and other UK-based expenditure. Throw in English votes for English laws and you are damaging the United Kingdom.
The fiscal framework, and how it is agreed, is central to whether or not we get a glue, a cement—a fair and balanced system. That is why the Bill should not become an Act and come into force until both Houses have had an opportunity to discuss it openly and fairly, with people in Scotland—who are entitled to fair dealing—seeing what the realities are and being able to make their choice. It is utterly wrong to go into an election pretending it will be all right on the night. If, at the end of the day, the SNP is able to say, “We got a fantastic deal out of Mr Greg Hands. We got extra money over and above Barnett. Vote for us again”, when what matters is long-term future stability, I do not know how long that deal will last; I do not know how it will operate. The Barnett committee, which I served on, and to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has referred, suggested that, because there is a gap, there should be a 10-year transitional relief and we should move to a needs-based system of funding. I do not know whether that is being proposed or not, but it is essential that we have the opportunity to discuss it.
Why would my noble friend not agree to Amendment 79H, which prevents the commencement of the Bill until we have agreement? What possible reason could he have? The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, will say that it will be misinterpreted in Scotland and we will be presented as wrecking the Bill. I say to him that it will be proceeding in parallel with the consideration by the Scottish Parliament which is, quite rightly, insisting that it should look at the Bill in the context of the fiscal framework. What is wrong with us proceeding in parallel with it and having a proper debate on both sides of the border? I beg to move.
My Lords, in the earlier procedural debate we touched on many of the issues regarding whether we should consider the proposals of the fiscal commission. In some ways I am surprised that a number of your Lordships who have spoken tonight have talked almost favourably of the Barnett formula. There is something notable about the Barnett formula. One of the reasons that no one has ever touched it, from 1978 when it was first conceived until now, is that, despite its imperfections and despite the fact that many people in different parts of the UK might have said that it was unfair, it actually worked, because it was designed to pool and share resources across the United Kingdom. One of the major arguments that I and others made during the referendum campaign over the last few years is that one of the strengths of the United Kingdom is that you could make sure that when things turned against one part of the UK, because of its workings, in particular the Barnett formula, you could compensate for that. The Bill, which is soon to be an Act, will fundamentally change that because devolving to the Scottish Parliament the power to raise income tax will require a major adjustment to how Barnett has worked in the past.
One of the problems of reaching an agreement between the parties to change the constitution of our country over a four or five-day period is that it will inevitably result in unforeseen consequences as well as the foreseeable ones. One of the reasons that I want to see this fiscal framework as quickly as possible is that we are going into a completely new era. The Scottish Parliament will have more powers than most other devolved parliaments anywhere in the world. However, in many ways we are going into this new era with our eyes closed, because the debate that ought to be taking place about the consequences of what we are doing in Scotland as well as in other parts of the United Kingdom is simply not taking place. Part of the reason that it is not taking place is that the very framework on which all this will hang will not be published until possibly later this week, or possibly next week, when, as I said earlier, we will be in the equivalent of the 11th hour of the debate here.
I will touch on three areas covered by the amendments. One is income tax. I can see that in year one you can do a calculation that shows how much money will be raised by income tax in Scotland and therefore by how much the block grant is reduced. That is easy, give or take £1 million or £2 million. I pose the obvious question: what happens in five or 10 years’ time? How do you apply this no-detriment rule, or try to work out to whose credit it is or whose fault it is that the tax take was not quite what was expected, because Scotland collected either more or less? Any idea, such as that suggested in the White Paper published last year by the previous Government, that somehow you could do this mechanistically and it would not be subject to any politics or anything nasty like that is just for the birds. If we are not careful, what we produce will provide fodder for all those who want to feed off grievances and find grudges for years to come. As I said earlier, I struggle to see how that is going to be resolved.
The noble Lord who will reply for the Government will probably know the answer to this because presumably he has seen the fiscal document. The rest of us have not seen it. This is pretty fundamental. If you are going to say, as we have agreed, that the Scottish Parliament should have all the money that it raises by income tax and there is a consequence on the ground, what is that consequence?
I make one further point. I do not know the ins and outs of this argument about indexation for ageing. I have every sympathy with concerns about the fact that Scotland’s population is ageing faster. Being a supporter of the United Kingdom, I believe that we should pool and share resources. If the Scottish population is ageing more quickly than that of the rest of the UK, the whole point of the United Kingdom is that you can compensate for that. I hope the present Conservative Government are not taking the view that they will devolve and Scotland can live with the consequences.
If you had complete independence, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said would have happened in about three weeks’ time if we believed in the nationalist timetable, then we should be in a situation where Scotland was cut off from the rest of the UK and consequences would follow. However, we have not left the United Kingdom. That is why it is important that we continue to maintain the principle that we pool and share resources, but we should be clear as to the basis on which that is done.
This brings me to the point on borrowing on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, touched. I agree with him that we need to be clear about under what circumstances and in what amount the Scottish Parliament can borrow. There is a further point. Borrowing to invest is well understood. That is not problematic. The Scottish Government have the power to do that at the moment if they want to. It is borrowing to fund a shortfall in current expenditure that will cause a problem. There is nothing wrong with the Government borrowing when there is an economic downturn, as I know. The present Government know that as well, since they have had to do exactly the same thing. However, suppose the situation was that the Scottish Government had the power to borrow and, as now, there was a shock to the oil price system. If you believe the shock to be temporary—if it is only going last for a year—as the nationalists maintain when you ask them why oil is not, as they told us it would be in the White Paper, $113 a barrel but around $30 or $40 a barrel, it makes perfect economic sense to borrow to make up that shortfall. That is what you would do. However, if it is a structural change—and many people believe that it is a structural change that will go on for maybe five or 10 years—does borrowing then make sense? Under what conditions could the Scottish Government continue to borrow to cover that shortfall as opposed to making other more difficult decisions, such as putting up taxes or cutting spending?
This also begs the question that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, raised, as to on whose account do you borrow? Are you borrowing on your own account? With the best will in the world, a new Scottish Government are bound to start with a lesser credit rating than the UK simply because they are a new kid on the block and have no track record. Again, being in favour of the United Kingdom I am quite happy that borrowing ought to be done on a UK basis, but if that is to be the case the consequences need to be spelled out. None of these things can be left in the hope that it will all work out okay on the night.
The White Paper published last year assumed that there was good will. You have to bear in mind here that the Scottish National Party exists to make Scotland independent. That is what it is for. That is what it is looking at all the time. Therefore, if you have something that is opaque, where there will inevitably be difficulties, you are simply storing up problems—I should like to say for the future, but no, it is not for the future; they will be there from day one.
Exactly the same points are being made on welfare. As I said during the referendum, I have never understood the argument that Scottish taxpayers, of whom I am one, would want to pay money to people to administer a benefit system, a lot of which is, ironically, being administered in Scotland for the rest of the United Kingdom and providing useful employment. Why do I want to pay more for someone to do that or, for that matter, to collect my taxes?
Leaving aside the collection cost, if you take the actual expenditure on mainstream benefits, a lot of benefits have been devolved to the Scottish Government and that is absolutely fine. However, again, it is unclear to me who in five or 10 years’ time would bear the cost if, for example, the policies north and south of the border were different. It is entirely acceptable that they should be different. We are bound to have, as we do now, Governments of different political complexions. However, if, for example, you have an ageing population, all other things being equal, your disability benefits will start to go up. Is that okay? Is that built into the settlement or will taxpayers in other parts of the United Kingdom have something to say about it? I am sure these problems are resolvable, although I note that Professor Bell of Stirling University said recently that no one else in the world has done this.
As an aside, my own preference, having got to the stage that we have, is that we should look at countries such as Canada—big countries that have a federal settlement in many senses but have provinces with different powers. One of the advantages is that when you pay your income tax you can see that some of your tax is going to pay for things such as health and education, but you pay tax to the federal Government for things such as pensions or defence and so on. It is then easier for other things to slot into place—borrowing to fund various activities and so on. We have not looked at that.
It is often said that the British are good at compromising, but what we have here is not devolution being done to any overall template—it is being done on the hoof. When you do things on the hoof, sooner or later you trip up. As I said earlier, this is not just a matter between one political party and another. If this fiscal framework had been published, others from outside could have looked at it and said, “There is a better way of doing this”, or, “Have you thought of the consequences of that?”. Instead, the public north and south of the border have been kept largely in the dark. That is simply going to cause considerable difficulties.
Other issues have been raised as well, such as bailouts and the question of no detriment, which we will need to come to. Equally, the White Paper published last year had examples of what would happen if the UK Government were to raise or decrease expenditure. What would the consequences be? Could you have a situation where more taxes are being paid in one part of the United Kingdom to fund expenditure somewhere else? Again, these are problems to which I have not yet seen the answers.
I heard people say in the earlier exchanges that having an EU referendum campaign lasting some four months was an awfully long time. Having lived through a referendum campaign that lasted some two and a half years, frankly, I would have killed for four months. I fully accept the right of the Scottish National Party to campaign for independence but what I bear in mind is that the majority of people in Scotland were clear that they wanted to stay as part of the United Kingdom. What worries me about this, and until I have seen the fiscal framework I cannot pass a final judgment on it, is that rather than resolving the matter and saying, “That is the settled will of the Scottish people”, we have put something in place here that will lead to opacity, confusion and eventually grievance. That is not a way to get a secure settlement. Perhaps the Minister will have words that reassure us on all these points. So far I have not heard them but I look forward with great interest to what he has to say.
The noble Lord said that the Barnett formula works. I doubt that anyone would contradict that. It works, and does so from the point of view of the Treasury for the reasons given: it is simple and clear, and so on. First, does the noble Lord suggest that it works fairly throughout the United Kingdom? Secondly, because of the future governed by this Bill, does he support subsection (2) of the new clause that I propose in Amendment 79F? It calls for the Secretary of State to publish,
“a full description of any agreement whatsoever reached between the … Governments relating to the future of the Barnett Formula or its application, amendment or replacement in the future”.
We need to know not whether it worked in the past but whether it worked fairly and how it will work in the future. Does he support that amendment?
In relation to the Barnett formula, I chose my words carefully. I said that it worked; I did not go on to say “terribly well” or “extremely well” or “without any complaint”. If you look at the north-west of England, there is a legitimate complaint there that Barnett treats it the same as it does the south-east of England, when their economies are clearly very different. I know that successive Chancellors looked at the Barnett formula. I looked at it in the halcyon period of the three weeks between taking office and discovering that Northern Rock was on the horizon, which presented me with rather more pressing problems that I had to deal with. But I can see why, it having been there for so long, no one has touched it. I am sure that others in this House will know that the late Joel Barnett often said that he never intended it to last. It was a fix but it worked. However, where I agree with the noble and learned Lord—I will confess to not having studied his proposed new subsection (2) in the detail I perhaps should have done—is that if we are having a new system, we really need to know how it works. What we do not want is what happened in the aftermath of the Smith commission, when everybody signed up to it and the next day it was denounced. That will not work. If we have something that does not work, let us find out now rather than coming to that awful realisation over several months and years to come.
As I said, as regards tax competition, that would not be counted for in terms of compensation. I hope that I have made that clear.
May I ask about a point on the language used by the Minister? He drew a distinction between direct and indirect detriment but I look in vain in the Smith commission report for these adjectives. I know that my noble and learned friend has a copy here, as do I. What is the basis for the Minister drawing a distinction between direct and indirect detriment?
As I said, the Smith agreement is a set of high-level principles. The negotiations are about how the two Governments apply those principles in practice. When, as I hope, the fiscal framework is agreed shortly, the noble and learned Lord will see how the two Governments have reached an agreement as to how these principles will apply in practice. That is what the discussions that have been going on for the past months have been all about.
Is that expression “high-level principle” a euphemism for low-level politics?
No; it is the responsibility of the two Governments to work out this package of powers and how the fiscal framework will work in practice, which is what we are doing.
My Lords, amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stephen are in this group. Basically, the arguments are very similar to those just advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. The powers in Clause 68 are extremely wide. We are coming to the end of the Bill and people will think that these are technical amendments but in fact they are of profound constitutional importance. In its report on the Bill, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has already drawn the House’s attention to the extent of the powers conferred by Clause 68, and therefore it is important that the Government take these points seriously.
Our Amendment 79AA is very similar to the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, with one difference, which is that we allow the powers to apply in respect of Part 3 because of the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Paragraphs 24 to 28 of the committee’s 15th report of this Session deal with this clause.
The noble and learned Lord gave a number of reasons why he thought that this provision was exceptional but I think that he may have missed one out. He said that there was no limit to when these powers could be used but in fact there is no time limit on the legislation that it can apply to. Subsection (2) says:
“Regulations under this section may amend, repeal, revoke or otherwise modify any of the following (whenever passed or made)”.
I emphasise the last four words, which mean that future legislation could be affected by these powers. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said in paragraph 25 of its report that the memorandum from the Government,
“acknowledges that the power to amend or repeal future enactments is exceptional. Reasons are given as to why this is needed in connection with Part 3 of the Bill which deals with welfare benefits: the commencement of Part 3 is expected to take place over a period of time and, because of the complexity of the area, it may be necessary to make changes to legislation enacted between the date on which the Bill is passed and the date on which the functions to which Part 3 applies are transferred to Scottish Ministers. We consider this provides a reasonable explanation for needing the power to amend future enactments in relation to Part 3 of the Bill”.
But the report goes on to say that that,
“does not justify the extension of this power to the other Parts of the Bill. It may be that similar considerations apply, but because nothing is said about this in the memorandum it is impossible to know”.
In other words, the Government are not only trying to take these powers but they have given the appropriate committee of your Lordships’ House that is scrutinising the Bill no reason whatsoever for such wide powers, including the exceptional power to amend or repeal future enactments. They did provide an explanation in respect of Part 3, which the committee found to be a reasonable one, and that is why we have not sought to remove it. Amendment 79AB is consequential.
As was also picked up on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, Amendment 79BA refers to the provision that talks about,
“any other instrument or document”.
Our amendment would remove those words from subsection (2), as it is thought that it is extremely wide. Again, the 15th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee commented on this at paragraph 27, noting its exceptionally wide effect without any compelling reason—that no justification has been given for a power to revoke any instrument or document, whenever made. Therefore, we believe that it should be removed from the Bill.
The other point is one touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. We deal with it in Amendment 79EA, which would remove references to Acts of the National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland legislation from this regulation-making power. Again, no substantive reason has been provided for extending the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power under Clause 68 to legislation made by either the National Assembly for Wales or the Northern Ireland Assembly. It seems very wide and raises the interesting question of whether legislative consent Motions were required in the Northern Ireland Assembly or the National Assembly for Wales before including these provisions in the Bill or whether, indeed, if these powers are ever wished to be used, doing so would require legislative consent Motions. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us when he comes to reply.
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him a question on that point that I meant to ask my noble and learned friend Lord Hope? The particular measure in subsection (7) refers to, as the noble Lord said, Wales and Northern Ireland legislation. Is that within the Long Title of the Bill? The Long Title is:
“To amend the Scotland Act 1998 and make provision about the functions of the Scottish Ministers”,
not the Secretary of State, “and for connected purposes”. I am not very good at reading Long Titles, but when I read this I cannot see how the subsection objected to fits within it.
The noble and learned Lord makes a very important and perceptive point, and I am glad it is not me who has to reply to it from the Dispatch Box. I certainly see his point that it is a very stark, simple Long Title. To actually extend the ambit of the Bill to Measures or Acts of the National Assembly for Wales or legislation of the Northern Ireland Assembly does seem a bit of a stretch. No doubt the Minister can enlighten us when he comes to reply.
The important point is that we do take seriously the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. At the heart of it, these are extremely wide powers and, in some respects, exceptional powers. With the one exception relating to Part 3, no explanation or justification has been provided by the Government for taking these wide powers.
I am not sure whether I moved Amendment 79F originally, but if I did, I would want to withdraw it. The same applies to Amendments 79G, 81A and 82A. What I want to do is return to these matters on Report. For the benefit of my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead and others, it is possible to make those amendments known tonight. Officials are meeting at the end of this debate to discuss what is to go into the list of amendments for Report and I have put mine in by dint of simply asking them to repeat certain numbered ones which appeared in the Marshalled List. They accept that that is a method they can use to proceed.
The other point is a matter for the Committee. It appears quite silly in a way for the Committee to group Amendments 75 to 82, and then not allow those to be dealt with when the discussion on all these amendments is completed. We ought at that stage to be able to say, “I am not going to move Amendment 82A”, or whatever it may be, instead of which we have to go through the sequence. Therefore, I have been sitting here for approximately two and a half hours, waiting to stand up and say, “Not moved”. I am happy to say it now.
As the noble and learned Lord has spoken to the amendment, I think he will have to move it, after which it can be withdrawn.
On the important point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, about having to table amendments again to maintain the sequence, and, indeed, in relation to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on the last group of amendments, perhaps the Minister will take this opportunity to clarify whether, when we come to Report, the order of consideration will be as in Committee; in other words, that Parts 2 and 3 will be taken at the end—I think next Monday is the day currently set down for that—and the other parts will be debated on Wednesday.
Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, now wish to withdraw his amendment?
With the leave of the Committee, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.