Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, we have not had time yet for all of us to read the report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee or, for that matter, that of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, whose paper is entitled Democracy Denied? The Urgent Need to Rebalance Power between Parliament and the Executive. I have read that, but I did not get round to the first.

We have to support our committees—that is why we have them; they are cross party. This is a tiny amendment of significance. The amendment does not propose any interference with the power to address the problem of serious disruption. It is not intended to address that. The submission is that the way in which the legislation is drafted, in Clause 55(4) and Clause 56(6), is completely unnecessary to enable justice to be done in whichever way the Government think it is appropriate for justice to be done.

Secondly—this is a bit naughty of me—I think the provision reflects a growing constitutional wheeze, what I call the “blank cheque wheeze”. It is this: the Executive tell the legislature to please legislate, and the legislature legislates—and, when it legislates, the Executive then tell the legislature what the legislation means. That is a blank cheque that we are being asked to give in these clauses.

As to the words, I know that it is quite late at night and so I shall be short, but do any of us here not understand two simple English words—“severe disruption”? I mean, come on, even the lawyers among us cannot think of a lot of differences. “Severe”, “serious”—get out your thesaurus. They are simple English words, and the two words put together make a perfectly clear picture of what is being addressed and sought to be protected.

This is unnecessary and a wheeze. We really must not allow the Executive to start treating this way of legislating—called in more elegant terms tertiary legislation —by saying, “We’ll tell you what it means when we get around to it”. The Secretary of State has started to tell us what it means. The place where we should be told what it means, if it does not mean what it says—and I think that it does mean what it says—is in a definition clause within the primary legislation.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 308 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and shall say a few words in support of what he has just said. It was quite clear from the reply by the Minister to the previous group that these words, “serious disruption”, are the key to the proportionality of the clauses that we are considering. They are absolutely central to the whole proportionality of the scheme. Of course, if something does not amount to a serious disruption, the police take no action; if it does amount to that, within the ordinary meaning of the word, the police have authority to do so.

I mention that because, while I support entirely what my noble and learned friend has just said, there is an element of risk here, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, hinted at in his comments in the last group. It is the risk of lowering the threshold. Why else is the power being taken? If it is not in the present Home Secretary’s mind to lower the threshold, the risk is there. It is for that reason that I suggest there is a risk here that should be avoided.

There is also the point about the clarity of the legislation. One element of the rule of law is that the law should be accessible, and the more you attempt to define words by regulation and not in primary legislation, the more inaccessible the true meaning of the words becomes. It is not a way to go down—it is unnecessary, as my noble and learned friend said—and I hope very much that the Government do not proceed with this scheme.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble and learned Lord is exactly right about this constitutional problem, but there is a further point to be made. In this context, it is not just the usual problem of allegedly unclear legislation that is then going to be sorted out by regulation later, and the relationship between the Executive and the legislature not as it should be. It is also in danger of interfering with police operational independence. To be explicit about this, my fear is that the police will take whatever view they take of what this legislation means in certain circumstances and do their best—and if a Home Secretary of the day, even well into the future, thinks that the police are being too lenient towards protesters, or perhaps there is a commotion in the media, regulations will be used further to define what “serious” and “disruption” mean so as to mandate the police effectively to be more heavy-handed than the natural meaning of the words would suggest.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

Finally, Amendment 292T proposes that where somebody, A, kills another person, B, in the course of, or with the motive of, sexual gratification, if A intended the action that led to the death of B, that should be an offence that has a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. This is to ensure that the “rough sex” defence cannot be deployed. It means that where that does happen there is an offence, punishable up to life, available to the prosecutors to prosecute and for the jury to find the person guilty of. I would be very interested to hear the Government’s reaction to that. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 284 for all the reasons that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has explained. However, I respectfully suggest to him that there is a slight mismatch between that amendment and Amendment 285. Amendment 284 is so broadly defined, for the reasons that have been very well expressed, that it would include the conduct that is described in Amendment 285. Indeed, if we look at the wording of Amendment 285, harassment is an essential element of that offence.

I raise the point because there is a difference between the penalties. The value of the kerb-crawling clause is that it introduces a possibility of disqualification, and I see the force of that, but the fine is only level 3, whereas the fine in Amendment 284 is level 5. If I was a prosecutor, having to decide which charge to bring, I would probably go for the offence in Amendment 284 and forget about the disqualification. I wonder whether, if the noble and learned Lord is thinking of bringing the matter back, he might try to amalgamate these two and perhaps put a subsection into Amendment 284 to cover the situation that if the harassment offence is conducted from a motorcar, in the way broadly described in Amendment 285, it would attract the additional penalty of disqualification. It would then be brought into Amendment 284’s sanctions, which are imprisonment, which might well be appropriate in a kerb-crawling offence, and also the level 5 fine. That is a refinement of drafting, but I am very much in favour of Amendment 284 as it stands, particularly in view of the broad way in which it is expressed.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I offer Green support for all these amendments. Some of my questions have just been answered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and his suggestion that some of the amendments be combined is positive, because retaining the opportunity to take away the right to a vehicle in an offence involving a vehicle is very useful.

I am aware of the time and the pressure to make progress, but it is a great pity that we are discussing such an important group of amendments, all put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, so late at night and in this rather rushed way. I will just draw some comparisons and links between them.

One thing to highlight is how much these amendments come from community campaigning from the grass roots up. I imagine that the campaign for the offence of harassment draws, in large part, from the group called Our Streets Now, set up by sisters Gemma and Maya Tutton, aged 16 and 22, who are working with the charity Plan International UK. Their hashtag is #CrimeNotCompliment. I suspect that the noble and learned Lord might have drawn on their ready-made Bill and I note that this has had strong cross-party support in the other place. I draw on the words of the women’s rights campaigner Nimco Ali, who said it is “bizarre” that street sexual harassment is still legal. Littering and smoking are banned, but this kind of behaviour is not.

On Amendment 285, I briefly highlight that Generation Rent, another grass-roots campaign group, has been pushing for action here. A report by Shelter in January found that, between March and September 2020, around 30,000 women had been offered housing in exchange for sex. This is a function of the extreme dysfunction of our current housing system.

I have to address Amendment 292M personally because, as I suspect is the case for many people, particularly women, it is something I have personally experienced. I was 11 years old in another country, out in the centre of Sydney on my own, when I was subjected to this offence. I was taught, as lots of young girls were then and probably still are now, to laugh, turn around and walk away. But that I can still vividly remember that street scene shows that it had an impact on me. When I look back now, I felt as an 11 year-old that this was a threat to my right to be on the streets. I did not tell my mother, because I was worried that she would think I should not be allowed out on my own to exercise the freedom that I wanted and continued to exercise. It is crucial that we see a change in attitude here and a review is a good way to address that.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has covered Amendment 292T very well, but we must note that Femicide Census, campaigning on this and broader issues, reports no sign of a reduction in the rate of femicide. That study covered a 10-year span from 2009 to 2018. We are not making progress on this, but we need to. I hope the Government will go away and look at this important group of amendments very seriously, and come back to us with proposals covering—I like to be an optimist—all of them.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I like many elements of the proposal from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. We all know that the youth justice system, in theory if not in practice, is focused on diverting young people from criminal justice towards a better life. At 18 years of age, however, this sort of falls off a cliff as young adults get dropped into the mainstream criminal justice system and are left to fend for themselves. This leaves a huge population of young adults stuck in the adult prison system and missing out on essential learning and the foundations for developing work, family and social lives. These young people are also often illiterate.

Those important years of young adulthood—when one is no longer a child but lacks experience and wisdom—are lost in prison, and can never be retrieved. I like the aspect of this amendment, therefore, that would create a structured system of personal development and rehabilitation for those too old for young offender institutions but too young to be written off by society as lifelong criminals. There are issues about the tuition they would be given, because many of them might have problems such as autism or dyspraxia: they would need specialist help. That they would, however, be leaving better informed and educated than they went in is a positive for them as individuals and for society.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have some sympathy for the noble Earl’s amendment because of two experiences of mine. First, I had to undergo 10 weeks of basic compliance training when I did my National Service. It had many of the elements listed here. Hope for the future was there. Certainly, a lot of attention was paid to dress and bearing, teamwork, first aid training, conduct and anger management, fieldcraft and so on. I underwent that for 10 weeks as a recruit. Later in my national service, having become a commissioned officer, I was responsible for training recruits, and I noticed a remarkable difference in their behaviour and appearance between the beginning and the end of the 10 weeks. That impressed on me the value of the training that the Army was then able to provide.

At a later stage in my life, when I was prosecuting criminals, usually in Glasgow High Court, a lot of those who were being prosecuted I could see in my mind’s eye as people who might have been among my platoons of people undergoing training. My great regret was that we had not been able to get hold of them before the gang fights took place that led them to being prosecuted and ultimately going to prison. There is a lot of force in what the noble Earl has suggested. In those days—I am talking about my national service days—there was an enormous force available within the Army to conduct all these procedures. This is not easily managed. You are required to train the trainers and you must have the facilities. However, the philosophy and thinking behind the noble Earl’s amendment has a great deal to recommend it. He is talking about people who have already been convicted, but it would be lovely if one could intercept them before they got into the criminal system in the beginning. We cannot do that but, at least if they have been convicted, we can do something to prevent reoffending, which is what I think his amendment is driving at.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may respond to what noble Lords have said. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, mentioned young offender institutions. When I was getting educated by Frances Crook, I asked her, “How often do inmates at a YOI get taken out on camp?” She said to me, “John, you should ask how often they are taken out of their cells.”

In response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, I am not proposing conscription or a national service-type solution. However, the points that he makes are absolutely what is informing my thinking. He made a valid point about the need for instructors and I am not proposing the use of the military to provide that function. Prison officers ought to be taking up that role and I envisage, among other things, youngsters who trained as Outward Bound instructors who cannot necessarily get particularly well-paid employment then training as prison officers and being double-hatted. There are a lot of things that we could do if we wanted to do them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I ask the Committee to forgive me for using legal language. Some years ago, I had a case in Newport. It was a murder trial in which the victim was profoundly deaf, the defendant was profoundly deaf and four or five of the witnesses were profoundly deaf. This trial proceeded with three sign language interpreters always in the courtroom: one for the defendant, one for the witness and one behind the judge, positioned so that everybody, including the many profoundly deaf people in the public gallery, could see what was happening.

When I first looked at this provision, I thought, like everyone else would, that surely a person who is profoundly deaf should be entitled to carry out their public duty. But the practicalities of it make that an impossible idea. For a deaf juror, there has to be a succession of people interpreting what is going on in the court in sign language. First of all, that is an immense burden on him—he is different from everyone else; and, secondly, while what is said in the court can be heard by everyone else, we do not know whether the person doing the signing gets it right. Nobody can really tell if that is the case, unless, as in my case, you have someone familiar with sign language in the box with the defendant.

How can we be sure that that juror understands the nuances of a summing-up, in which the judge sets out the law that the jury is to apply? Can it be the case that some other person who knows sign language checks that the proper interpretation is being made of what may be very technical language? As I learned, the sign language interpreter is not translating word for word but is conveying ideas. During that case I also discovered that sign language interpreters and witnesses who give their evidence by signing are quicker than people using ordinary speech. It is not a slower procedure, rather it actually speeds things up; the rest of the court have to hold the sign language interpreters back.

However, in the jury room, there is no way in which a profoundly deaf person can follow the arguments being made—passionate and otherwise: nobody can be sure that every nuance of what the other jurors are saying is being transmitted, and nobody can be sure that an interruption or question from a profoundly deaf person is being accurately translated and represents his thoughts.

I take the argument of principle that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, put forward, but from a practical point of view, and from my experience of that trial, it is impossible for a fair trial to take place.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I do not think I can add very much to the points that have already been made on the difficulties which this proposal is likely to give rise to, except to say that one has to remember that hearings in criminal trials take a very long time. I do not know whether we, who have never had to be instructed in sign language, are able to tell whether a deaf juror can maintain concentration by that method throughout the entire day that the trial goes on, and indeed whether the interpreter can conduct that process throughout the entire day without relief. Maybe you would have to have another interpreter to come and take over after a reasonable interval, as you often had to do with shorthand writers in the days when they were used.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that what works well in Scotland should necessarily be applied in England and Wales, but I think I am right in saying that there has been some attempt in Scotland to allow juries to be remote. The problem one has is that a judge cannot be in two places at once. I think it was thought more appropriate that the judge should be close to the place where the evidence was being taken, with the juries remote in some other room because of the need for social distancing and so on. My point is simply this: I suggest once again, with great respect, that the Minister should find out what has been happening in Scotland and what the experience has been. They may have decided, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it should not be continued. I simply do not know, but it is worth exploring to find out exactly what the position is.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, despite Covid—I know it is not over yet, but despite the 18 months we have had—I have not heard it suggested that one solution to the problems that the courts face is that juries should act remotely. We have trial by judge and jury. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but I want to be just a bit more down to the realities of it. What happens in court when the jury is unhappy with itself or with some of its members? The judge has a most delicate task to perform. On my old circuit—I am sorry to say that the Midlands circuit has this—one juror smelled; he stank, and the jury were extremely unhappy about it. Can all that be done remotely, when the judge is responsible for looking after the interests and needs of the jury as a whole? Do we send messages down the line? How is it accommodated? It requires huge tact, skill and, I think, the personal touch.

My other concern about this provision was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—it is the usual one, I am afraid; you have all heard me talk about it. Why should we give these huge powers when we do not need to give them?

--- Later in debate ---

The last thing I have to say is that I, too, do not like general powers taken without a very good reason. There are too many examples of this Government doing things they should not do, without the powers. Give them the powers and we have no idea what they might do. So, as far as I am concerned, the fewer powers they have, the better protected we are.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is a great deal to be said for the need for justice to be done, as the noble Lord has been saying, but there is another side to the coin, which is a trial within a reasonable time. That factor has been exercising the minds of those who have been trying to progress trials through the desperately difficult situation created by the Covid epidemic. I hope those times have passed but, in the defence of those who have been setting out remote proceedings, they have been doing so under great pressure. People have been languishing in custody for far longer than they should have been, awaiting trial, and that factor has to be taken into account in deciding what is the right thing to do. The noble Lord is absolutely right, of course, that the worst option is the one they were driven to—but they were driven to it for very good reasons.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 25th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support the principle behind the amendments but will make two short points to elaborate on what has already been said. First, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said about balance. This has been referred to as a common-law duty, but the common law does not strike hard edges in such matters; it leaves room for balance to take account of particular circumstances.

At one stage in my career, when I was a senior judge in Scotland, I needed to know the state of health of one of my judges, who I knew was terminally ill with cancer. I was able to persuade his doctor, his skilled adviser, to let me know the truth when the judge himself was not prepared to do that. I felt that was the right thing to do; he thought it was the right thing to do; and it was an illustration of balance. The information remained entirely confidential between ourselves, but I had to take a decision as to the extent to which I could trust that judge to continue to sit in open court. The advice I received was very welcome: I was able to allow him to sit in certain conditions, in the light of the information I was given. I give that as an illustration of the way in which balance can operate in practical situations.

The other point to which I want to draw attention is the difference between Amendments 22 and 48. On the one hand, Amendment 22 states simply that

“no information may be shared … which breaches”

the duty set out in the General Medical Council ethical guidance on confidentiality. That is a simple formula that merely requires looking at the way the guidance is expressed; no doubt, with the balances that are built into the guidance. On the other hand, Amendment 48 says that regulations

“must not require the release of personal health information if a doctor regards that release as a breach”

of the duty of confidentiality.

I rather wonder whether that would be the right way to go: to leave it up to the decision of a doctor without further consideration. With great respect to the medical profession, that may be taking a little bit of a risk, because there are situations where a doctor may feel under pressure and that would not be the right thing to do. I think the amendment would be strengthened by taking out the reference to the doctor and just laying it down as a matter of proper structure that the regulations should not require the duty of confidentiality, as set out in the guidance, to be breached, leaving individual doctors’ decisions out of it.

[Lord Kakkar (CB)]

My Lords, I support the principles of the amendments and declare my interest as a registered medical practitioner.

The debate in Committee has been most interesting in this regard, because it raises a delicate and deeply sensitive issue for any practising clinician—any practising healthcare professional—with the suggestion that something that is considered absolutely sacrosanct, the duty of confidentiality, may be in some way undermined.

That is, of course, not to neglect or fail to understand the fact that there are clear circumstances provided in the context of well-recognised and frequently applied professional guidance in which confidentiality may indeed be breached. But there is a suggestion that the way the Bill is drafted, there may be a deeply undermining impact on a very important principle, one that is so well recognised that it is protected in both data protection legislation and, as we have heard, common law. I wonder whether the Minister can explain why it is so important to achieve what are important objectives in the Bill that we need to undermine the common-law effect of such an important principle—confidentiality of medical information—and why they need to be promoted in the way proposed in the Bill. Have Her Majesty’s Government considered other ways to achieve their important objectives without creating this deep anxiety and uncertainty, because the full implications are clearly not well understood by the regulator or by professionals more generally, and which, we must therefore all feel, has the potential to be attended by consequences that could be deeply unhelpful to the nature and solidity of the doctor-patient relationship?

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is so much in this Bill that causes concern, whatever else in it we can agree with, so I will focus on only three points. It is a bit difficult for me, as the 45th speaker in this debate, to find something new to say, but I think my first point is new; the second point, not so new; and the third point has been dealt with by several others.

My first point relates to new offence in Clause 66 of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, which will attract a prison sentence. My second point relates to the provision in Clause 106 to increase the minimum term for discretionary life sentences from one-half to two-thirds. My third point relates to the powers given to the Secretary of State to make provision, by regulation, about the meaning of key phrases in Part 3 of the Bill relating to public order—a matter referred to in powerful speeches by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

Of all the driving offences, careless or inconsiderate driving is at the bottom of the scale. It has never been thought until now that it should attract a prison sentence. A moment’s inattention is all it takes, and that may happen even in the case of the most careful and responsible driver. There is no criminal intent whatever. Where criminal intent exists, it is possible that the prospect of a prison sentence may act as a deterrent, but that is not so where intention of that kind is not part of the offence at all. As for serious injury, a broken arm or broken leg will do, and that can happen to someone who, by a moment’s inattention, is knocked off a bicycle. The injury is of course to be regretted, but it seems to me that the imposition of a prison sentence for an offence of this kind is disproportionate. Do we really need to do this? Has any assessment been made of the consequences of this seemingly well-meaning measure?

At the other end of the scale is the discretionary life sentence. Not so long ago, the minimum term was reduced from two-thirds to one-half. I think that was to help to reduce prison numbers, and because it was after all only a minimum term. Given the fact that our prison population is still rising, why revert to two-thirds? Has any assessment been made of the consequences for our prisons and of the pattern of release dates since the minimum term was reduced?

I turn to a matter that has been discussed by many other speakers, on Part 3 of the Bill. The right to peaceful protest, whatever the issue and whether or not we agree with it, is an essential part of our democracy. There is no doubt that our laws are being challenged by the way in which that right is currently being exercised but any attempt by the Government to curtail that right, such as we find in Part 3, must be scrutinised with great care. I focus on the changes as to the powers of the police to give directions under Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act, a breach of which amounts to a criminal offence. That is the context for the measure that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, emphasised in his speech not long ago. If the police reasonably believe that a procession or an assembly may result in public disorder or disruption to the life of the community, they may give such a direction. Now we find that the Secretary of State is to be given power to make provision by regulation as to what is or is not to be treated as falling within these expressions. That excludes not only a power to define these expressions but also to give examples of cases that are to be treated as falling within them. In effect, as there are no limits, she and her successors are being given the power to declare the kind of protests, the reasons for them and their effect that the Government simply find inconvenient or unacceptable. That declaration will then be used for the giving of directions by the police, with its criminal consequences. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, the use of delegated powers in this way is unacceptable.

The guiding principle must surely be that it is for Parliament, not the Executive, to decide what powers to give to the police. The words in the Public Order Act speak for themselves; as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, might say, we know what they mean. Because they are broadly expressed, they can be adapted to the needs of each case. However, if amendments are needed, they should be put in the Bill—so why are the changes, which are already in draft in respect of one of these phrases, not here in the Bill so that we can subject them to scrutiny in the usual way? Can the Minister say why that should not be done?

Non-Domestic Rating (Public Lavatories) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con) [V]]

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

Therefore, where one finds a stand-alone public lavatory—which is what the Government are providing for in the Bill—one would expect it to be entered in the roll with its own entry and its own value. The reform which the Bill introduces is that the value of these subjects is to be taken to be nil. As the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, made very clear, the problem is that there are not enough of them. That is what the amendments in this group seek to address.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

[Lord Lucas (Con) [V]]

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 25 because it seems essential for us to have safeguards in place if we go down this road at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke very convincingly on this matter. I am glad to support her on this and I do not suppose it will be the last time in my parliamentary career that I support her in her initiatives. While we are debating this group, I want to say how much I applaud Amendment 12 by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, and Amendment 19 by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. In the operation of our society and our legal systems, we need some clear-cut cornerstones about what is permissible and what is not. I like the forthright language that they use in their amendments because it cuts out all the grounds for rationalising and talking ourselves into situations where we should not be at all. The point is that vulnerable people of the kind described in the amendments, and children, should not be involved in this kind of activity.

We are signatories to the conventions on the rights of children, and we have reaffirmed on many occasions our commitment to them. Are we just sentimentalists or are we real? If we are real, and if we want to give muscle to our expressed sentiments in those directions, that becomes very applicable in this kind of activity. We are also signatories to, and have frequently expressed our adherence to, the European Convention on Human Rights. I would always go further in this context and say that what matters even more is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the reasons why it was put in place. Again, if we are serious and not just sentimentalists, it is in matters of this kind that adhering firmly to the principles set out in those conventions becomes so important.

All these matters become particularly poignant—it is interesting that we have not dwelt much on this—given what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic. All of us, particularly perhaps in this Chamber, operate in the context of a political family in which it is expected and assumed that certain rules of decency, honesty and integrity will apply. We cannot be certain that will always be the case. I have always felt this about legislation: what matters is not just the people who are in place at the time of the legislation is passed, but how firmly that legislation establishes principles that it would be difficult for anyone who comes afterwards to vary. For that reason, it is significant to look at events in the States and wonder, when we talk about the kind of society that we want to be, whether we are really taking seriously our obligations, duties and concern for children and young people who have perhaps been asked to undertake activity that is very much against so much that is established as the norm for behaviour that is required in our society, for all the reasons that we have discussed on many previous occasions on this legislation. If we take those responsibilities seriously, we need the firmness of Amendments 25 and 19.

I am sure that I must be among many Members on all sides of the House who are deeply fearful about the implications of what is happening on the other side of the Atlantic. At moments such as this, where we still have the context of our own society—thank God—we need to be explicitly clear about what is acceptable and what is not. I cannot say more strongly that it is not acceptable for children to be involved in activity of this kind. That is the point: it is not acceptable; it is not something we can rationalise our way out of by saying that there are exceptions in this particular case. There are not; it is a principle that children should not be involved in such activity. Similarly, when we think of what vulnerable people have been through mentally and physically and all the traumas of their life, it is not acceptable to involve them in any way in activities which may have serious implications for their stability and well-being and for their safety.

From these standpoints, I am very glad that we have this group of amendments before us. I again say that the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Cormack, have been exemplary in stating a principle on which the rest of our activity should be founded.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, as the speeches that we have been listening to in this debate have made so very clear, this surely is the most difficult part of the Bill and, as we search for a solution, for each of us making up our own minds this group presents a real challenge. The solutions range from an absolute bar—the “clear-cut cornerstones”, as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, has just described it—on granting authorisations to anyone under 18, in Amendment 12, and anyone under 16, in Amendment 19, to which the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Cormack, spoke so movingly, to the more nuanced and carefully worded procedures proposed in Amendments 23, which would require the prior approval by a judicial commissioner, and Amendments 24 and 26, which have no such requirement.

I entirely recognise the force of the principle that the child’s best interests are paramount, and I appreciate the attraction of a clear and simple absolute bar—a red line—by reference only to a person’s age. That is right when dealing with, for example, the age of criminal responsibility, but I am not so sure that it is right here, where we are being asked to balance the protection of the best interests of the child against the need to protect the public against serious crime, such as that perpetrated by county lines where children are, sadly, so much involved. Recognising that a child’s best interests are paramount does not entirely exclude the possibility of looking at all the circumstances and balancing the interests of the child against other interests, as judges have to do from time to time, but of course it has a crucial bearing on how that exercise is carried out.

Looked at from that point of view, I suggest that one can take account of the fact that children do not all have the same circumstances, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has said. Also, the facts and circumstances may differ widely as to nature of the case and the extent of any risk of physical and psychological harm to the particular child who may be involved—I was interested in the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, based on her own experience of the Scottish Bar. The fact is that we are not in possession of all the information that would guide those taking such decisions. I would therefore prefer to leave the door open for the use of children in strictly and most carefully limited circumstances, taking every possible care in full recognition of all the risks, rather than closing it firmly against their use in any case whatever. Had Amendment 12 been qualified in some way, by reference, for example, to “exceptional circumstances”, I would have found it easier to accept, but, of course, as soon as one adds such words, one has to explain what they mean. That is why I am drawn to Amendment 24, to which the noble Lord, Lord Young, has also put his name. It contains that qualification and then defines what such circumstances are. I pay tribute to the clarity with which it is expressed.

Then there is government Amendment 26. It seems to fall short of what is needed, not only because it lacks that qualification about exceptional circumstances but because it lacks the protection which Amendment 24 would give to vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery, whom we must also consider. I look forward to listening carefully to what the Minister has to say in support of her amendment, but, for the moment, my preference is for Amendment 24 and for supporting it if the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, presses it to a vote.

Lastly, I am grateful to the Minister for her letter of today’s date about territorial extent. As she may tell us later on, she informs us in it that the Scottish Government have confirmed that they will recommend to the Scottish Parliament that it should withhold its consent to the Bill. It was for the Scottish Government to take that decision and we must respect it. I am sure that the Minister is right, respecting the Sewel convention, to remove from the Bill the ability to authorise participation in criminal activity for devolved purposes in Scotland. It is not for us to question the decision of the Scottish Parliament and she is right to proceed in that way.

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I want to speak briefly to Amendments 12, 13 and 14. In relation to the first, I have recently done some research on military national service, introduced by a Labour Government with the support of a Conservative and Liberal Opposition in 1947 and lasting for just over 10 years. This recruited at age 18 young men to serve in the forces and possibly to face death. There was an element in that Act which allowed 17 and a half year-olds to be recruited, so it was not a carte blanche cut-off at 18; it actually started at 17 and a half.

Against that background, it seems to me—it is quite a long time ago now, but I was one of those who did my national service—today’s young people are certainly more experienced than we were at that age. Also, there is this great move afoot to give 16 year-olds the vote. That is a conundrum, is it not? If that were to happen—Scotland is in the lead on that—are those who get the vote at 16 still children or are they adults? For my money, on Amendment 13, there should be a cut-off age of 18, but subject to particular exceptions.

--- Later in debate ---

I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and to express my support for the amendment she has just moved.

I have to say that I am wholly unconvinced by the argument that adherence to the Human Rights Act is all that is needed. The fact is that the convention rights set out in the schedule to that Act were not designed for this situation at all. Their purpose is to define the rights of individuals against the state, as represented by public bodies. It is not a catalogue of what individuals may or may not do to each other. Of course, the sources that the police may use must have these protections against those who use them. But to use the convention rights in the Human Rights Act to define what the sources may do to other people or may be encouraged to do to other people is to take those rights completely out of context.

Furthermore, reference to these rights lacks the precision and clarity that is needed to deal with what a source may or may not be authorised to do. If you look at Article 2 of the list of convention rights—the right to life—what is really dealt with there is the right to life as against the things that a state may do: depriving the individual of his life except in circumstances where that may be absolutely necessary; and the circumstances are set out there. Article 3 deals with the prohibition of torture, although I notice that it omits the word “cruel” before “inhuman”, which is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the UN convention against torture. Therefore, if one was trying to define the prohibition or the control against the misuse of sources, one would want to put in the word “cruel”, which is more easily understood than the word “inhuman”. Article 4 deals with the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, which is drifting far away from what we need to have as reassurance in the matter we are dealing with here. So it is with Article 5, which is the right to liberty and security, and which really deals with the circumstances in which an individual may be arrested or detained by the police. Furthermore, there is no mention in the convention rights of rape or other sexual offences, no doubt because that is what people do to each other, not what public authorities do to their citizens.

That said, I have to confess, if the noble Baroness will forgive me, that some of the wording of amendment 15 troubles me. The criterion we must apply is that what we have asked to be set out in the statute should be clear and easily understood. Proposed new subsection (8A)(b), which is given in Amendment 15, refers to

“an attempt in any manner to obstruct or pervert the course of justice.”

That is a very wide-ranging crime, and I am not sure that it would be sensible to include it in this list because very often it may be a relatively minor thing to do, with no psychological or physical consequences to anybody; it is just obstructing the interests of justice. Paragraphs (d) and (e) refer to the Human Rights Act, but for the reasons I have given, I would prefer that that reference was omitted. The Canadian example to which the noble Baroness referred is clearer in its wording. For example, when dealing with obstructing or perverting the course of justice, it includes the word “wilfully”, which would be wise if one is trying to strike the right level of balance in dealing with these matters. It refers to the torture convention when defining what is meant by torture, which I would support, particularly because it includes the word “cruel”. As for paragraph (e), when the amendment refers to depriving a person of their liberty, it really means detaining an individual, which is what the Canadian example gives. The Canadian example adds another point: damaging property. It might be wise to think of including something along those lines too. To take the example of committing or participating in arson, that would give rise to a serious risk to individuals who are in the building and it would be as well to include that along the same lines and for the same reasons as the others in the list. I suggest that some matters might have to be looked at again if the amendment is to be taken further.

I wish to emphasise one thing, as I did at Second Reading, which is that great weight must be given to the obligation in the torture convention. That convention does not merely require states to abstain from torturing people. It requires them to do more than that; it requires them to do everything in their power to avoid torture in any circumstances. I would therefore support an amendment which particularly includes the reference to torture as something that would never be authorised in any circumstances whatever.

Despite these misgivings, and extending again my apology to the noble Baroness for criticising her carefully drafted amendment, and because I believe the Government must think again, I support Amendment 15.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Speaking for the Opposition, I reiterate our appreciation of the work that our police and security services do on our behalf to keep us safe and our country secure. We know only too well that what they do makes a real difference.

Amendment 15, so ably moved by my noble friend Lady Massey of Darwen and to which my name is also attached, would put limits in the Bill on the crimes that could be authorised under a criminal conduct authorisation. The serious crimes that could not be authorised would cover murder, grievous bodily harm, torture and degrading treatment, serious sexual offences, depriving someone of their liberty and perverting the course of justice.

The Government have given an assurance that the Bill

“would not allow the public authorities named in the Bill to grant CHIS unlimited authority to commit any and all crimes. To allow this would breach the Human Rights Act 1998”.

In that context, I note the comments that were just made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, about the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the Bill itself contains no explicit limit on the types of criminal conduct that can be authorised. The Government say that to have a list of offences excluded from being given a criminal conduct authorisation would lead to covert human intelligence sources being tested against that list. But placing no explicit limit on the types of crimes that can be authorised is not the approach that has been taken in other jurisdictions, where the same risks of CHIS being tested would apply. As my noble friend Lady Massey has said, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act contains a power to authorise criminal conduct similar to that proposed in the Bill, but the legislation provides that nothing in that Act justifies many of the serious crimes also excluded under this amendment.

The FBI in the USA operates under guidelines that do not permit an informant to participate in any act of violence, except in self-defence. In Australia, the legislation provides protection from criminal responsibility and indemnification for civil liability only where the conduct does not involve the participant engaging in anything likely to cause death or serious injury to, or involve the commission of a sexual offence against, any person. The Government maintain that countries which have lists of such offences do not have similar criminality to us, but it is not clear what the established basis is for that assertion.

The Government then say that such a list of serious offences is not necessary, because the Human Rights Act provides all the protection needed against such serious crimes being given a criminal conduct authorisation. But if a criminal or terrorist group was sufficiently conversant with the terms of legislation excluding specific offences from being authorised to be able to test a CHIS, it would almost certainly also be sufficiently conversant with the protections against serious crimes being authorised in the Human Rights Act to test a CHIS if, as the Government presumably believe, those protections are clear-cut.

However, the Bill does not preclude specific criminal conduct being prohibited through a list, since it gives the Secretary of State the power, through secondary legislation, to prohibit the authorisation of any specified criminal conduct. Since it would be secondary legislation, Parliament would not get the right to amend what was put forward by the Secretary of State, as it would with primary legislation. Since the Government, presumably, do not believe that whatever criminal conduct might be prohibited from being authorised through such publicly available secondary legislation could be used by criminals as a checklist against which to test a covert human intelligence source, and put such sources at risk, it is not clear why explicit limits cannot also be set out in primary legislation.

Extradition Arrangements: European Union Member States

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can certainly assure my noble friend that the principle of proportionality is implemented in UK law through Sections 2, 12A and 21A of the Extradition Act 2003. It enshrines the principle of proportionality, which allows the UK to reject warrants where extradition would not be proportionate to the alleged conduct or where other, less intrusive measures could be used to progress an investigation. This is a much-needed improvement on the previous arrangements.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, what steps have been taken to identify and appoint those persons who are to serve as our representatives on the very important specialised committee to which Article 83 of the “Surrender” part of the trade and co-operation agreement refers?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I will have to get back to the noble and learned Lord because I do not know where that is up to.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and the noble Lords, Lord McLoughlin and Lord Walney, on their excellent maiden speeches. I had the pleasure of welcoming the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, in my capacity as lord president on the very threshold of his career at the Scottish Bar when he was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1993. He has come a long way since then, further than we would have dared to contemplate on that day. It is a real pleasure for me to welcome him once again and to wish him well now that he takes on his new responsibilities as Advocate-General for Scotland.

It has occurred to me, as I have been reading and thinking about the Bill and the dangerous nature of the activities that it refers to, that I have led a very sheltered life. I have not been involved in any way with supervision of the work of the intelligence services, but I have had something to do with torture. When I was working here as a Law Lord, I was a member of the Appellate Committee in two cases that raised issues about it. One was the Pinochet case, in which we had to consider the reach of the UN Convention against Torture. The other was under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The question was whether our courts could rely in terrorism cases on information provided to us by agents from overseas that might have been obtained by torture.

As Lord Bingham said in the latter case, the fundamental nature of the prohibition against torture requires member states to do more than avoid the practice. It is not enough to say that I did not do it, I was not there, I did not see it happening or even that for some very good reason resort to it was necessary. It requires member states to do everything in their power to prevent and avoid it. The torture convention, we must remember, is breached by any act by which severe pain or suffering is inflicted to obtain information or as punishment by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a person acting in an official capacity. Article 3 of the ECHR is at least as wide as that.

The reference in new Section 29B to the authorisation of criminal conduct by persons designated for the purposes of that section, and thus acting in an official capacity, seems to fall within the ambit of these provisions. The conditions mentioned in Section 29B(4) and the obligation merely to take account of the Human Rights Act in Section 29B(7) do not go nearly far enough with regard to this particular crime. We need to be very careful—ought it not to be made clear somewhere and somehow that participation in any way whatever in acts of torture will never be authorised? I am not suggesting this should expressly be mentioned as an exception in the statute but somehow, somewhere, a solution to this problem needs to be found.

Of course, to raise that question begs the question of whether we should go further. The right to life in Article 2 of the ECHR is also unqualified. At the very least, clear guidance needs to be read into the code as to when, if ever and for what purposes, participation in murder could be authorised. I also find the idea that children might be authorised to participate in torture or crimes of such gravity—by no means unimaginable given the way county lines operate—deeply disturbing for all the reasons mentioned a moment ago by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I am sure the Minister will take his comments and his suggestions very seriously.

Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill [HL]

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 5th March 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I support Amendment 9. As I indicated at Second Reading, I support the Bill. There is a great deal to be said for the proposition that there should be reciprocity between countries that respect the rule of law on the administration of criminal justice. However, I strongly support this amendment; I see absolutely no inconsistency between the two propositions.

The reasons why are very simple. We all know that there are countries in the world that do not respect the rule of law. I will not set about trying to give your Lordships a list because the list itself changes. Countries that respected the rule of law no longer do. Weimar Germany did; Hitler’s Germany did not. This is a moveable feast.

My concern is that we are giving the Secretary of State wide powers to add different nations to the list by regulations. At Second Reading I went through the possible reasons, and they are still there: political motivation, getting a good deal on a treaty, the fact that we need a bit of support on this or that, so we put a country on the list. There is a whole series of reasons why, in years to come, since this Act will be in force for many years, Ministers—not, I hasten to assert, either of these Ministers—will think it appropriate to add to the list countries that this House and the other place together think are inappropriate to be added.

We are doing this by way of regulation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out. The consequence is that the Prime Minister of the day or his acolyte—and we are talking about a Prime Minister who would not perhaps respect the rule of law himself, but who knows what could happen—would insist on having a country that we in both Houses would regard as totally inappropriate to be a brother or sister nation on such a list and with whom we would think it quite inappropriate to have any sort of arrangement of this kind simply because it does not respect the rule of law. I have been through that.

What are our processes? They are that such a country could be included in a list of perfectly acceptable countries—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said the Netherlands and Turkey—but can we just cut down a little further into that? It means that when the House considers the regulation, it will have to decide whether to exclude Turkey—to use the country that the noble Baroness used—because it is really rather important and because we greatly respect the Netherlands, or whether to reject Turkey and the Netherlands. Or, to go the other way, we must have the Netherlands, so we must therefore have Turkey. If one or other of these courses is taken—whichever way round it is—if there is any amendment, the whole thing falls to the ground. We will not want the Netherlands to fall to the ground, nor Denmark, France or Germany. There are many countries that we would want to espouse as colleagues in respect for the rule of law.

What is proposed in this amendment is utterly simple. What is the difficulty in doing it one country by another? It might take a little longer; there might a little more typing, a little more printing—we could even have all the countries, except the ones objected to, come through as a job lot. I gave a little cricketing analogy earlier and I am sorry that I bowled bouncers not googlies at the Minister. One of the most famous things ever said at a cricket match was when, in 1902, Hirst came out to bat against the Australians with 15 runs to get on a difficult wicket in the dark; the story goes that Rhodes met Hirst and exchanged the words, “We’ll get them in singles”. Let us get this done in singles.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I cannot match the noble and learned Lord’s eloquence, except I remember that Lord Bingham used to use that phrase to describe how judges should nudge the law forward gently, step by step, rather than sit hitting sixes and fours.

I support this amendment for the reasons that have been explained. There are two features of the issue that are worth bearing in mind. First, the standard that the Government have set, which was described by the Minister, is a relatively high standard and, therefore, we are not talking about large numbers. Indeed, the Schedule itself demonstrates that we are not expected to have a great list, they will come in twos or threes at the worst, preferably ones, as the amendment seeks. Secondly, the issue of a standard is something that we would wish to debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, demonstrated in his contribution. It is a great shame if we are masked, as it were, by having one good country on the list that we would not object to but which is in the kind of pairing that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, so that we cannot really grapple with the one to which we are objecting because the instrument is not amendable.

With great respect, this seems a very sensible amendment that meets the problem of the non-amendable instrument without at the same time creating an insuperable difficulty for the Government. It enables a debate to take place that would have a real point to it instead of one that really does not have a point because one part of the list—if it is a list—is unobjectionable. I very much support the amendment.

[Lord Inglewood]

My Lords, I add my general support to the proposition and arguments that have been made. When I had the good fortune to chair the ad hoc committee looking at the workings of this legislation three or four years ago, this was one issue that the committee spent a long time discussing. Our concern throughout was essentially—and, I believe, entirely properly—about injustice. We must have an extradition system that is just at its heart. If there is any risk or probability of people being extradited into circumstances in which their human rights will be abused or ignored, or in which injustice will be meted out to them, we should not be party to it.

I was particularly grateful for the remarks by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. He has touched on a point that I will come to when I move my amendment later on in the proceedings. I will not say that he has stolen my thunder—he has made the point a lot better than I might have.