Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2015 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

22A: Clause 13, page 17, line 38, at end insert—
“292D Marketing of social investments
(1) Any financial promotion which is communicated by a charity shall not be subject to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005.
(2) The Treasury may by regulations set out rules for the communication of financial promotions by charities.
(3) In making any such regulations, the Treasury shall have regard to—
(a) the desirability of creating rules which are proportionate to the nature, scale and capacity of different charities and which are easy to understand and follow;(b) the desirability of creating rules which support the growth, development and financing of charities and which are enabling and facilitative;(c) the desirability of facilitating, where appropriate, direct investment on the part of consumers into charities, including charities which operate locally to the consumer;(d) the desirability of consistency of approach in the regulatory treatment of communications made by different forms of charities;(e) the differing expectations that consumers may have in relation to different kinds of investment or other transaction and, in particular, the fact that many when investing in charities do so for a variety of non-financial reasons; and(f) the desirability, where appropriate, of the Financial Conduct Authority exercising its functions in a way that recognises differences in the nature of, and objectives of, charities as compared to other organisations which are subject to the requirements of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.”

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, in our meeting last week, following on from the group headed by Amendment 16, which was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, we discussed the challenges of facilitating social investment by charities and the implications for trustees; indeed, that issue came up in the debate that we have just had. We went through the intricacies of programme-related investment and mixed-motive or, in my words, mixed-purpose investment. As I said then, I felt that my noble friend did not give us an entirely satisfactory answer. However, I am grateful for his agreement to have a meeting, if necessary. I also know that he has managed to fix up a meeting to let the lawyers argue it out—a mere mortal probably cannot contribute much to that debate.

This amendment is designed to move the discussion forward to a parallel, but important, development of a social investment market involving new people from among the public. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, is not here, as I am sure that he would be horrified by this. So far, we have been dealing only with committees, trustees or people who are well caught up in the charity world. What we must try to do is to find people who are interested in supporting charities but are not yet committed to doing so. As I said last week, and say again now, it must be counterintuitive to enable people only to give money but not invest it. However small the chances may be of getting your money back, no matter how meagre the rewards may be, it must be better, and people must be more likely to give money, if they have a chance of seeing a return on it.

After we finished our debate last Tuesday, by a happy coincidence I received a 61-page booklet, Developing A Global Financial Centre for Social Impact Investment, which contained some interesting research carried out by the City of London. I will not read out the 61 pages, but the booklet’s conclusion states:

“A number of major financial centres, largely national capitals, have been at the forefront of driving change so far, with London pre-eminent among them. Our research suggests that London has certain features that it must address—not least in relation to ensuring a supportive regulatory environment, accreditation, enabling greater retail investment, developing its skills base and technical assistance models—if it is to be a global financial centre for social impact investment”.

I wish to focus on enabling retail investment—one of the proposals that the City of London document suggests is important and which Amendment 22A addresses. What stands in the way of developing a wider retail base? It is essentially the financial promotion regime. The document further states:

“The Financial Promotion Regime is particularly relevant to the UK social investment market. Though 90% of lending to this market was in the form of secured loans in 2011/12, social enterprises are increasingly in need of unsecured debt capital. Projections by Boston Consulting Group suggest that by 2015, demand for investment into the market will reach £750m, 58% of which will be in the form of unsecured debt and 15% in equity-like capital. The role of the retail investor in helping to provide this capital is as yet untapped, although there is survey evidence of an appetite among retail investors to make social investments. The creation of a Social Investment Tax Relief (‘SITR’), as announced in the 2014 Budget, is also designed to encourage a wider individual social investor base in the UK”.

So all appears set fair, but what then are the problems? One of them is, of course, that the total amount being invested by investors is small. The document continues:

“The Financial Promotion Regime does not distinguish between large investments and small investments. Where small investments are being made”—

individually—

“the risk of loss will be less but this is not acknowledged. In the social investment market, most investments are likely to be relatively small in size. The total amount being raised as part of the offer is small: social enterprises typically seek to raise”,

sums,

“of less than £100k. Ordinary retail investors therefore provide a good ‘match’ for social investments in terms of the size of the investment opportunities available. However, the Financial Promotion Regime treats all investment raises beneath €5m in the same way and does not make it any easier for social enterprises to raise small amounts of money”.

Another issue is that the investor is investing with certain significant non-financial goals. Social investment may often be considered by investors as an alternative to philanthropic donations, as I have just explained. Although the Financial Services Act recognises that investors may invest with non-financial goals, the financial promotion regime does not yet expressly recognise this possibility. There are no exemptions or any lighter-touch regulatory requirements where investors are investing primarily with non-financial goals or with significant non-financial goals in mind, such as the desire to support the cause being furthered by a social enterprise. Finally, does the investor live locally in the community of the investee seeking the investment?

Those are some of the difficulties that are currently being faced. So what is the answer? We have gone a certain distance of the way, because the Financial Conduct Authority recognises an experienced investor. That is to say that, if someone has a certain knowledge and a certain amount of wealth, they do not have to go through all the hoops that one does if one wishes to offer it to the man on the street. That is quite right. We should be trying to promote a social investor—a social investor who has a different approach. That is what my amendment seeks to do.

This is a permissive amendment. The Treasury may, by regulations, set out rules. They must be proportionate and easy to understand and follow and they must be enabling and facilitative. They must also take particular regard of charities that operate locally to the consumer, the desirability of consistency of approach, the difference of expectation and, last but not least, the desirability where appropriate of the Financial Conduct Authority exercising its functions in a way that recognises differences in the nature and objectives of charities as compared to other organisations that are subject to the requirements of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Regulators are always risk-averse; they are always terrified that they are going to end up with egg on their face. Therefore, if we do not find a way to make them understand that this is different, we will have a very long, difficult uphill road. I say to my noble friend—and, in his absence, to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, given what he has said before—that this is not a better or worse investor regulatory regime; it is a different one. It is trying to deal with different sorts of situations.

There is a final anomaly, which the Committee should be aware of. There is a loophole in the financial promotion regulations for industrial and provident societies such as co-ops and community benefit societies. Provided that they are offering non-transferable debt instruments or non-transferable shares, the financial promotions regime does not apply, only the general law—that is the point made by my noble friend Lord Borwick at Second Reading. Non-transferrable means illiquid; it means that, once bought, the purchaser is stuck with it for ever. Both the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, expressed concerns in our earlier debate about general social investment for charities having unquantifiable risks and the need for diversification and liquidity. This is a real challenge. If we do not rebalance the regulatory regime to put social investment generally on the same footing, the investment market will gradually tilt itself towards IPSs, co-ops and community benefit societies. I have nothing against that form of organisation—I am sure that they do a very worthy job—but this does restrict the growth of a wider social investment market.

To conclude, I am sure that my noble friend will say—my X-ray eyes can see what is on his notes—that this is one for the Treasury. That is fair enough, but in 2012 a number of us in Committee bashed away at the passing of the Financial Services Act. His colleague on the Front Bench, the then Treasury Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, said that this was very interesting but one for the Charity Commission. We are never quite in the right place at the right time. To be fair, I recognise the increased specialist attention being given by the FCA, but we need another incremental step forward to help the growth of retail investment and this amendment will provide it. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie]

My Lords, this amendment would enable charities to market social investments to individual investors but exempt charities from the restrictions of the financial promotions regime. It would provide rules for the development of a regulatory regime for marketing by charities and allow the Treasury to set out rules for the communication of financial promotions by charities through regulations, if it chose to do so.

From our point of view, three of those sound quite reasonable, but I have to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, whether an exemption from the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the 2005 order means less protection for consumers—by which of course I mean investors. Would the new rules specifically for social investments come into force at the same time as social investments were no longer required to meet the demands of the 2000 Act? In my view, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, did not spell out in sufficient detail why exemption from the Act is necessary. We believe there are potential difficulties in freeing up charities from those laws.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

It is perfectly possible, although it is exceptionally expensive, to have a financial promotion involving an authorised offer of shares because it goes to everybody. Such an offer has to deal with people who are quite unsophisticated and therefore it must be done carefully: the process is lengthy and expensive, and hundreds of thousands of pounds have to be spent in preparing a prospectus that is fit for the general public. That is quite right and entirely appropriate—I am not complaining about that.

What we have here is people who might be interested in making a social investment and who would understand—I am sure the Treasury rules and regulations would make this clear—that the primary purpose was not to have a financial return and that they should act accordingly. This is designed to enable social companies such as charities to raise relatively small sums of money without the commensurately high costs that would be required if you were offering the promotion to the general public. This would be a new category of investor, and if the noble Lord were to ask whether that was better or worse, I would answer that it is different—not better or worse. This would be designed, or purpose made, for this particular area.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie]

I thank the noble Lord for that clarification. However, again, are we to constrain the development of social investments on the grounds of cost? Obviously there is no maximum or upper limit as to what a charity will or will not be able to afford when trying to pursue the provisions of the Bill in relation to social investment, and that is part of the problem. I certainly do not want to see that restrained at all; I would like to see all charities, even smaller ones, feel that they can enter this field with confidence. I think that is what all noble Lords present in this debate would want to see.

However, we have some fears. It would not require too great a leap of the imagination to arrive at a situation where, for example, a charity working for older people might devise a product that offered attractive-sounding investment opportunities to the elderly, showing how they would do great good for the cause even if the return was not quite what other products might have produced. That could be fraught with potential pitfalls that could make telephone cold calling, which noble Lords will recall we discussed in Committee last week, seem quite innocuous, and I would want to make sure that such difficulties did not arise. It might also be possible for cold calling to be used to market those bonds or whatever the products on sale were to be termed. I do not want to overdramatise such possible scenarios, but we have to be aware that they could arise. Certainly in the early days of social investment for charities, it will not all be plain sailing.

I want to ask the noble Lord why the amendment states that the Treasury “may” set out rules for the communication of financial promotions by charities. Again, that seems a little loose. If it is thought that such rules are necessary, I would have thought that “may” should have been replaced by “must”. It might be thought that the need for such rules would be paramount at the start, when the whole area of social investment is introduced, with many charities being less than absolutely clear about what is required of them.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

By some alchemy of draftsmanship, “may” equals “shall” in drafting legislation. Do not ask me how it comes about, but they mean the same. We have had this discussion many times in these Committees. “May” and “shall” are the same word for a parliamentary draftsman.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie]

Alchemy, the noble Lord says. I am not a chemist, but that still seems rather opaque to me.

To return to the rules, it may not be necessary for them to be compulsory further down the line, but if there are to be such rules, they should apply right from the start and to everybody if we want to ensure that social investment takes off smoothly. Further, how might any rules proposed by the Treasury be consulted on? It is an important aspect whether the sector would have an opportunity to feed in and have its views given appropriate weight.

We are largely in agreement with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord. Some of the clarification that he has provided is helpful. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his determination, if not doggedness, on this issue and in seeing it being addressed. I should pay tribute also to his excellent eyesight for being able to read my brief and especially my handwriting, which is a first.

Before I go into the detail, let me take a step back and put this debate in a little context. We recognise that, increasingly, the public are looking to invest their money socially in a range of social investment sector organisations, including charities. This is a growing area of activity alongside areas that we are already familiar with, such as donations to charities, which of course remain significant.

In particular, we know that there is an increase in the number of members of the public making small, direct investments in charities and social enterprises. Specifically, we know that there has been an increase both in the value of investment offers—the market was worth £249 million in 2014, up 78% from 2013—and in the number of participants. More than 15,000 individuals invested in co-operatives, to which my noble friend referred, and community benefit societies in 2014—up 33% from 2013—so this is a growing market.

Such investments might take the form of shares in community enterprises, such as the more than 3,000 people who recently bought shares in Hastings Pier Charity, or they may take the form of bonds in charities. As my noble friend alludes to in his amendment, we know that for such investors the decision to make an investment in the charity or the social enterprise is often motivated by factors other than, or in addition to, the prospect of financial returns.

A recent study found that doing social or environmental good was an important factor in deciding to invest for 90% of investors in community shares, such as those in the Hastings pier project. I understand, however, that the effect of the financial promotion regime is an increasingly important issue for charities and social enterprises looking to raise funds from the public in this particular way. These financial promotion rules, which are designed to protect consumers, apply to many of these deals. Where they do not apply there are emerging voluntary regimes, such as the community shares mark, which was launched last week.

I understand that the aim of today’s amendment is prompted by concerns around the appropriateness of these rules for charities which want to raise investment funds from members of the public, just as they might ask for donations. These concerns indeed reflect reports from the social investment sector that issues around inconsistent treatment for the different types of social enterprises under these rules lead to disproportionate costs and unnecessary complexity. I also understand, as my noble friend said, that this is not the first time that these issues have been raised.

I want to assure noble Lords that the Government are indeed aware of these issues and, in response to interventions from your Lordships during the passage of the Financial Services Bill, the Government made very valuable changes to ensure that the FCA had the proper incentives to take into account the differing needs of different types of organisations that it regulates, including those of charities and social enterprises. Since then, the Government and the FCA have been working with the sector to consider evidence about the effectiveness of the regime, particularly in light of the report Marketing Social Investments—An Outline of the UK Financial Promotion Regime, which was published by the Social Investment Research Council last year. These discussions between the sector and the Treasury are live and ongoing, but I believe—indeed I am told—that real progress is being made in understanding the challenges faced by charities and social enterprises.

I also think that it is important that the issue of changes to the scope and substance of regulation raised today should be considered as part of those discussions between industry representatives, the FCA and the Treasury. I have, therefore, written to the Treasury to make it aware of the issues that have been raised to ensure that they are given full consideration. I will be meeting my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to discuss them.

I am sorry to say that this is one of those issues that is a large hot potato—as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said—that sits both in the lap of the Cabinet Office and in the Treasury, but I am grasping my end of it with both hands and trying to ensure that action is taken. It is, of course, in all our interests that any regulation is proportionate, consistent and clear. Protection of consumers must be paramount, as the noble Lord, Lord Watson, said—a point with which I entirely agree. We also need to be careful that investors understand what they are investing in, as the noble Lord said, and that the reputation of the growing social investment market is protected. That is why the Treasury is engaging with key stakeholders and interested parties on these issues.

In addition to looking at suggestions, including in this amendment and what has been said in the debate, the Treasury will explore whether there are other non-legislative ways of mitigating burdens or costs to social investment offerings. Obviously there will need to be consultation on this point if further action needs to be taken. I warmly welcome my noble friend’s input to the Treasury on these points and, as I said, I am meeting my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to discuss them. I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Of course, I recognise that there has been progress. As I said earlier, the FCA has begun to move—the tectonic plates have begun to shift. I absolutely accept the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Watson, about the need to protect consumers. I am sorry that I got so excited that I jumped up to interrupt him twice, for which I apologise. He is right that what we do not want to happen is too much weight being put on this new idea too early, where there is a scandal and it is all set back because obviously things that go wrong get more publicity than things that go right. I accept that.

I am grateful to my noble friend. I am happy to withdraw the amendment for the time being. I hope that we can perhaps have some further news from the Treasury side of the hot potato—do hot potatoes have sides?—or the other end of the hot potato before Report. This is an interesting issue and, to be honest and being candid with the Committee, it is only at times like this that we are able to push matters over the line. This is the moment. Once the Bill is gone the next opportunity to do this will be some way away. It would be a pity not to find something that we can coalesce around to make sure that the joint objectives that we have of a new social investment regime, proper consumer protection and a different type of regulation can be achieved. In the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 22A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

22B: After Clause 13, insert the following new Clause—
“Appeals and applications to Charity Appeal Tribunal
(1) The Charities Act 2011 is amended as follows.
(2) For section 319 (appeals: general) substitute—
“319 Appeals: general
(1) Except in the case of a reviewable matter (see section 322) an appeal may be brought to the Tribunal against any decision, order or direction made by the Commission or any decision on the part of the Commission not to make any decision, order or direction.
(2) Such an appeal may be brought by the following—
(a) the Attorney General;(b) the charity trustees of the charity subject to the relevant decision, order or direction;(c) (if a body corporate) the charity subject to the relevant decision, order or direction;(d) any other person who is the subject of the relevant decision, order or direction or who is significantly interested in and affected by the relevant decision, order or direction.(3) The Commission is to be the respondent to such an appeal.
(4) In determining such an appeal the Tribunal—
(a) must consider afresh the legal decision, order, direction or decision not to act (as the case may be), and(b) may take into account evidence which is not available to the Commission.(5) The Tribunal may—
(a) dismiss the appeal; or(b) if it allows the appeal, exercise any of the following powers—(i) to quash (in whole or in part) the decision, order or direction and (if appropriate) remit the matter to the Commission;(ii) to substitute for the decision, order or direction any other decision, order or direction which could have been made or given by the Commission;(iii) to add to the decision, order or direction anything which could have been contained in a decision, order or direction of the Commission;(iv) to give such direction to the Commission as it considers appropriate; and(v) where appropriate, to make any decision, order or direction which the Commission could have made.”(3) For section 321(2) substitute—
“(2) Such an application may be brought by—
(a) the Attorney General;(b) the charity trustees of the charity subject to the relevant reviewable matter;(c) (if a body corporate) the charity subject to the relevant reviewable matter; or(d) any other person who is the subject of the relevant reviewable matter or who is significantly interested in and affected by the relevant reviewable matter.”(4) For section 323 (remission of matters to Commission) substitute—
“323 Remission of matters to Commission
The reference in section 319(5)(b)(i) to “remit the matter to the Commission” means the power to remit the matter—(a) generally, or(b) for determination in accordance with a finding made or direction given by the Tribunal.”(5) Omit section 324 (power to amend provisions relating to appeals and applications to Tribunal).
(6) Omit Schedule 6 (appeals and applications to Tribunal).”

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am afraid that this is another of my long-standing quarrels. It is about the Charity Tribunal. Before the 2006 Act, the only appeal against the Charity Commission was to the High Court. That was expensive, slow and difficult to achieve. The then Labour Government, to their credit, introduced the Charity Tribunal in the 2006 Act. The plan was that it would improve access to justice: it would be quick, low-cost, user-friendly and non-adversarial. There was a subsidiary aspect to that, which I am not sure that the designers of the 2006 Act quite recognised, which was about helping more charity law precedents to emerge. Much of what charities are guided by now is quite old and backward-looking—we have discussed the tin-rattling regulations covering cash collections, which date from 1916. Re Resch, the big case about public benefit—an issue that we shall come to later this afternoon—concerning a private Australian hospital in the grounds of a state one dates from the 1920s. We were hoping that the Charity Tribunal would act to help bring charity law forward into the 20th and 21st centuries but the early experiences were a bit disappointing. As is too often the case, everybody reached for their lawyers—as they are entitled to do. I was not present at the end of the independent schools case that came before the tribunal, but I am told that nine QCs were present, which must have cost a bit of money.

However, although it has been slow, there has been progress. There has been more determination on the papers, which means that the tribunal does not require people to attend. More litigants have been appearing in person, which I think is also a good thing. During my review, a lot of evidence was received about the operations of the tribunal and ways they could be improved.

Some of these issues are being addressed by the Law Commission in its current consultation—which I think will be the escape hatch that my noble friend uses in a minute or two—but the Committee might like to be aware of a couple of extraordinary features. In order to appeal against the Charity Commission, a charity has to go to the commission to ask its permission as to whether the use of its funds to make the application is charitable. That seems to be entirely perverse. There is an inherent conflict of interest if the Charity Commission is on one side, the charity is on the other and the charity has to ask, “Is it fair to use this to attack you?”. That does not lead me to believe that there will be an even-handed decision. I hope that the Law Commission will move responsibility for this to the Charity Tribunal.

The second issue worth drawing to the Committee’s attention is that the Charity Commission cannot apply to the tribunal without the permission of the Attorney-General. It seems to me extraordinary that the top regulator in this sector does not have that freedom of action. It must be a threat to its independence if it has to go to a law officer of the Crown in order to be able to get determination of a case. I hope very much that the Law Commission will decide that the Charity Commission is free to act, even if it must of course still inform the Attorney-General. That would be a good way of bringing the law up to date.

There remains a major impediment to the effective working of the tribunal which the Law Commission has decided it cannot address, and that is the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which appears in Schedule 6 to the 2011 Act. There are 10 pages of it, with a series of headings about what the decision, direction or order is, who the applicants can be and what the tribunal’s powers are in response to a decision. That table was seen by the vast majority of contributors to my review as overly complicated and narrowly drawn. Even specialist charity lawyers complained of difficulty in understanding it. The list of cases brought before the tribunal also shows a large number being struck out for being outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. That raises the question of whether its jurisdiction is sufficiently well defined to address the concerns people have about the commission’s work. Of course, with any forum there will always be cases that fall outside its jurisdiction, but in combination with the wider concerns about Schedule 6, the number of rejected cases raises questions.

The Schedule 6 table is focused on a specific range of formal legal decisions made by the commission. In some cases, but crucially not all of them, this includes the decision not to exercise a power, and the decision not to open a statutory inquiry into a charity is a frequently cited omission. Many of the decisions referred to in the schedule relate to the exercise of legal powers that the commission, as part of its more refined and focused approach to regulation, is choosing to make less frequent use of. Concern has therefore also been expressed that as the commission moves towards this lighter-touch regulatory regime, even more of its work will fall outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Amendment 22B is designed to clarify the situation by providing a right of appeal against any legal decision of the Charity Commission and a right of review of any other decision by the commission. The new clause proposed in the amendment has two elements. The proposed changes to Section 319 of the 2011 Act deal with appeals and set out, very simply, who would be able to make the appeal: it can be any trustee or director of a charity or charitable company or,

“any other person who is the subject of the relevant decision”,

or is “significantly interested in” or “affected by” it. It lays out the powers the tribunal would have in responding to these appeals. The proposed changes to Section 321 deal with reviews. Finally, subsection (6) of the proposed new clause would delete the dreaded Schedule 6, which I hope will foreshorten and cut out the regulatory regime. This is not a complex issue. Access to the Charity Tribunal is unnecessarily complicated, particularly for smaller charities, and the charity world will appreciate and benefit from simplification. I beg to move.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, it is excellent to address another of my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s issues—I will not call it a bugbear. Obviously I am sympathetic to the aim of wanting to simplify the legislation because in many senses less is more. My noble friend advocated the approach taken in his amendment in his statutory report on the Charities Act 2006. I hope I will be forgiven for reminding noble Lords of the Government’s response:

“In principle the Government supports the rationalisation of the appeal rights in Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011, provided it can be done in a way that does not … expose the Charity Commission to challenges where it decides not to intervene in a charity in keeping with its risk and proportionality framework (this is already capable of Judicial Review); or … create any significant new appeal rights that would add to the jurisdiction’s case-load”.

I believe that this was a sensible position to take. We must remember that the Charity Commission has limited resources. We would not want to expose the commission to challenges where it decides not to intervene in a charity in keeping with its risk and proportionality framework. As I have said, this is already capable of judicial review. Providing a right of appeal to the tribunal could result in an unmanageable workload of cases for the Charity Commission, diverting its resources to defending proceedings in the tribunal, many of which may be spurious or vexatious. Appeal rights in the event of the commission not making a particular decision would in effect enable others to direct the use of commission powers and resources, rather than it being left to the good sense of the commission to decide such matters for itself within the scope of its objectives, functions, processes and duties.

We consider that the balance is about right under Schedule 6 as it currently stands. There is a right of appeal against the opening of a statutory inquiry but no right of appeal if the commission decides, for whatever reason, not to open one. We do not want to overburden the tribunal with significant new rights of appeal that are likely to generate a large number of cases where none had previously existed.

I am not sure that everyone shares my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s viewpoint on the difficulty of interpreting Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011. There are some who are attracted to the structure of Schedule 6 and find it easy to navigate. It allows one to look up a particular provision and quickly see who can appeal and what decisions are available to the tribunal. It is not something that has been raised with the Government as causing particular difficulty, other than by my noble friend.

Most of the Bill is about giving the Charity Commission the tools it needs to do its job, so I hope my noble friend will understand that, although I approve of his eye for simplification, I am very reluctant to consider anything that could divert its resources from its core functions. I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment on that basis.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I have not found many people who have said that Schedule 6 is easy to navigate. I did not get into too much of the detail but there is also the question of the timescales for making appeals. However, I can see that I am not going to make any progress with this.

I am disappointed that the Minister has fallen back on the issue of vexatious litigation. That suggests that the tribunal does not have the sense to strike out vexatious litigants by saying, “This isn’t a case”, and I do not find that that argument really holds water. What I think has happened is that small charities in particular are finding their legal position not as strong as it should be. I am sure that this will lead to additional casework for the Charity Commission but I do not mind about that: if the commission needs to be challenged, it needs to be challenged. If that happens unfairly then the Charity Tribunal will step in and say, “This is not a worthwhile case”, and strike it out. I understand that it has done so with other cases in the past. Still, that is as far as we are going to get today, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 22B withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Bridgeman (Con)]

My Lords, while supporting the sentiments behind these two amendments, I have a small difficulty with the drafting. Surely in proposed new subsection (5) of both amendments, engaging fully implies aspirations towards an ideal. I feel that this does not lie easily with the word “minimum” in proposed subsection (6) of the two amendments. For example, a school that very reluctantly complies with the minimum requirements may be well aware that it is not engaging fully. The local community and, indeed, the Charity Commission, may feel the same way. Therefore, if these two amendments find favour with the Government, I suggest that they should be redrafted so that the two proposed subsections are absolutely compatible.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, these are well-meaning amendments. Who cannot be swayed by the brilliant call from my noble friend Lord Moynihan for consistency and for building on the memories of 2012, and, indeed, by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, talking about the importance of music and the arts? However, my noble friend Lord Lexden has sounded a cautionary note. I fear that putting all this into statute may open a Pandora’s box. I am not against opening a Pandora’s box but, before doing so, let us be clear that that is what we are going to do and what may follow as a result.

Just to give some brief background, the Committee is aware that the roots of charity came from the dissolution of the monasteries. Before that, the church educated people, promoted religion and acted as, in modern terms, a social services department by looking after the sick, the destitute and the disabled. When that ceased to be done by the church, it was done by the private sector, if I may call it that. Those three purposes were presumed automatically to be charitable. There was a fourth category—such other activities as may be presumed to have a public benefit. That meant that for the vast majority of charities up to 2006 there was a presumption of public benefit. If one struck out every charity that had anything to do with education, religion and social services, a whole heap of charities would be removed and we would be left with a small number that depended on the definition of “public benefit”.

The public benefit test was introduced in 2006, when the Labour Government’s Bill removed presumption and made every charity show that it was providing a public benefit. I am not saying whether that was a good or a bad thing; it is just what happened. It meant that the public benefit test went from being concerned with a very small number of charities to being the keystone of the arch. Every single charity now had to live with that. That was a very big change and the question of how that public benefit test should be set and enforced occupied many hours of the debates on the Charities Bill, as it was in 2004 to 2005. I was a newcomer in the House at that time and I listened to lengthy speeches. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, from the Labour Benches made a 45-minute speech on what is a religion, to the increasing worry of his Whip and his Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who rightly thought that we were never going to leave that group of amendments. I promise that I shall not speak for 45 minutes this afternoon.

The conclusion reached was that there was no ideal solution and that the least worst option was to give responsibility to the Charity Commission and to keep charities as far as possible away from the political fray. Lord Phillips of Sudbury, who is no longer with us but who then led the charge on these things, was the Peer who introduced the amendment that now forms Section 13(4) of the 2011 Act, which reads:

“In the exercise of its functions the Commission is not subject to the direction or control of any Minister of the Crown or of another government department”.

The conclusion of that long debate was that the public benefit test should be put to the Charity Commission and that the commission should be given a wraparound of avoiding political interference.

I accept the point made by my noble friend Lord Moynihan that the initial public benefit guidance from the Charity Commission after the 2006 Act was unduly financially oriented. I think that everyone now recognises that there was too much emphasis on scholarships and bursaries and not enough on the hearts and minds that both these amendments are driving at—namely, the provision of sporting facilities, arts and music. Of course, following the independent schools tribunal, the guidance has now been revised and things are not quite as they were.

The Pandora’s box that could be opened is that if my noble friend were inclined to accept these amendments the Charity Commission would no longer be truly independent. You cannot be a little independent—you are either independent or you are not. Others might have their own ideas of what could be added to the list of things that the Charity Commission should consider and would have to take into account in considering the public benefit test. I need not remind the Committee that the OSCR—the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator—has a different public benefit test. It requires that when the public benefit test is set, it should have particular regard to institutions that charge fees. That might be something to consider in this country in order to match the public benefit test in England with that in Scotland. I am concerned about how this might develop and, once the stitch is removed, how this theme might run through the charity sector. Slowly and inexorably, charities might find themselves moving towards the political stage, with all that that entails.

My noble friend made an important point about the uneven application of consistency. We have come across private schools that have been not unwilling but unable to provide the sorts of issues that my noble friend Lord Moynihan mentioned—a point also made by my noble friend Lord Lexden. A rural prep school that is badly endowed and has no local community is going to find it very hard to deal with the sorts of provisions that appear in these two amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I must remind the noble Lord that on the previous day that this Committee sat he made a very powerful speech about the need to define rather more clearly some of the elements in the Bill. He now seems to be arguing in entirely the opposite direction.

I recognise that the public benefit test has to be left relatively broad, and indeed both these amendments say so. I also recognise, with regard to the use of the word “fully”, that there are ways in which this amendment might need to be reconsidered.

All that we are attempting to do here is to make it clear that there is an expectation of public benefit, as we have both said. Different schools demonstrate that in different ways, and we all expect them to do so. I have to say that many of us are a little worried about a small minority of schools that now seem to have a large proportion of overseas students, for example, and have raised their fees to such an extent that they are a very long way from the original charitable purposes for which they were founded. If we are nudging them—nudging is, after all, one of the things that this Government are extremely keen on—in the right direction, it is this sort of wording that seems to be pushing them in that direction, and that is what we wish to do. I do not think that we are going down the route of politicisation; we are, however, reminding them—and providing them with some examples—that charitable status is a privilege and public benefit is an expectation.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I entirely agree that charitable status is a privilege. The question is whether that status is better enhanced by statute or by guidance. I am saying that the test should be made clear but it should be a Charity Commission guidance test rather than be put in statute, with all the inflexibilities and ancillary problems that may flow from that.