Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Lord Bridges of Headley Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2015 Grand Committee

[Baroness Pitkeathley (Lab)]

My Lords, I support all these amendments because they encourage trustees to focus more attention on the progress of social investments and to review them regularly. I, too, think that “from time to time” is a bit vague, although I understand that it has a legal meaning.

There are two reasons why I support the amendments. The first is that I think they will make the position of trustees and their responsibilities clearer. Social investment is a fairly new concept and trustees on the whole are not very familiar with it. We are trying to encourage them to be more so, and I believe that these amendments would help in that. The second reason—and here I declare an interest as chair of the Big Society Trust—is that I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that the financial return on these social investments is often not realised for some time, although the social return may be obvious at an earlier stage. To some extent, charities and trustees are learning as they go in this area, so any further guidance or direction we can give them would be of benefit.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Lord Bridges of Headley) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for tabling these amendments, which raise interesting points, and I hope that I will be forgiven for going into a little detail on our thinking around them.

Once again, I think we agree on the need for transparency and accountability. It is important to ensure that charities take the opportunity to review all their actions from time to time with the intention of ascertaining how effective those actions have been. This should apply to their grant-making activities no less than their financial investments. It is also desirable for charities to be suitably transparent in reporting. Public-facing organisations should aim to explain how they operate, and I share your Lordships’ wish to encourage as much openness and information sharing as is practicable.

However, while I support these intentions, we must be careful not to overburden charities by mandating the collection and publication of information to an extent that could distract from their core activities. This must be the case in particular for the large number of charities that are small and may not have the requisite capacity or capability—the “little platoons” I referred to on Second Reading. Charity trustees have overall responsibility for the investment of their charity’s funds. They must make the strategic decisions about how to use a charity’s assets to achieve its aims.

In relation to financial investments, charity trustees are already under a legal duty to keep their investment portfolio under regular review. Those reviews must cover how their investments are performing, and if an investment manager is used, the service provided by that investment manager. Trustees should also monitor and review their internal arrangements for managing the charity’s investments. In terms of the regularity of the review, the trustees may decide to hold reviews at specific intervals or they may decide to hold a review in response to a specific event, for example if there was evidence of inadequate performance of an investment or if there was a sudden change in the economic outlook. This seems appropriate and allows charities to respond flexibly to circumstances rather than impose a rigid timetable.

The phrase “from time to time” is indeed understood among the legal profession and is explained in case law. The commission’s guidance on investments covers what it means. Given the existing requirements to review financial investments regularly, it would be beyond the scope of this Bill to impose duties to review social investments on the far wider range and greater number of investments in the general sense. Furthermore, in addition to requirements to review investments, there are also a number of disclosure requirements in relation to financial reporting by charities. Any charity with a gross income greater than £25,000 must submit its audited or independently examined accounts to the Charity Commission on an annual basis.

In addition, there is the charities SORP—a nice word—contained in Accounting and Reporting by Charities: Statement of Recommended Practice, which, as I am sure noble Lords know well, sets out the recommended practice for the purpose of preparing the trustees’ annual report and for preparing the accounts. The recommendations of SORP supplement accounting standards, thereby providing an even stronger basis for reporting. The statement of recommended practice deals expressly with the reporting of social investments. As social investments are different from financial investments, the reporting criteria should not and cannot be equated; they should instead be tailored.

While I am extremely keen to see charities taking greater steps towards impact assessment, thereby enabling them to think about their total impact in the round, imposing specific new rules via statute would seem too blunt an approach and potentially a highly burdensome one. It would seem to place a greater requirement for assessing the impact of social investments than currently exists for grants, spending or financial investments. This might have the unintended consequence of making charities less likely to make use of social investment—the opposite of what we are trying to achieve, particularly at this early stage of market development.

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[Lord Watson of Invergowrie]

Alchemy, the noble Lord says. I am not a chemist, but that still seems rather opaque to me.

To return to the rules, it may not be necessary for them to be compulsory further down the line, but if there are to be such rules, they should apply right from the start and to everybody if we want to ensure that social investment takes off smoothly. Further, how might any rules proposed by the Treasury be consulted on? It is an important aspect whether the sector would have an opportunity to feed in and have its views given appropriate weight.

We are largely in agreement with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord. Some of the clarification that he has provided is helpful. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for his determination, if not doggedness, on this issue and in seeing it being addressed. I should pay tribute also to his excellent eyesight for being able to read my brief and especially my handwriting, which is a first.

Before I go into the detail, let me take a step back and put this debate in a little context. We recognise that, increasingly, the public are looking to invest their money socially in a range of social investment sector organisations, including charities. This is a growing area of activity alongside areas that we are already familiar with, such as donations to charities, which of course remain significant.

In particular, we know that there is an increase in the number of members of the public making small, direct investments in charities and social enterprises. Specifically, we know that there has been an increase both in the value of investment offers—the market was worth £249 million in 2014, up 78% from 2013—and in the number of participants. More than 15,000 individuals invested in co-operatives, to which my noble friend referred, and community benefit societies in 2014—up 33% from 2013—so this is a growing market.

Such investments might take the form of shares in community enterprises, such as the more than 3,000 people who recently bought shares in Hastings Pier Charity, or they may take the form of bonds in charities. As my noble friend alludes to in his amendment, we know that for such investors the decision to make an investment in the charity or the social enterprise is often motivated by factors other than, or in addition to, the prospect of financial returns.

A recent study found that doing social or environmental good was an important factor in deciding to invest for 90% of investors in community shares, such as those in the Hastings pier project. I understand, however, that the effect of the financial promotion regime is an increasingly important issue for charities and social enterprises looking to raise funds from the public in this particular way. These financial promotion rules, which are designed to protect consumers, apply to many of these deals. Where they do not apply there are emerging voluntary regimes, such as the community shares mark, which was launched last week.

I understand that the aim of today’s amendment is prompted by concerns around the appropriateness of these rules for charities which want to raise investment funds from members of the public, just as they might ask for donations. These concerns indeed reflect reports from the social investment sector that issues around inconsistent treatment for the different types of social enterprises under these rules lead to disproportionate costs and unnecessary complexity. I also understand, as my noble friend said, that this is not the first time that these issues have been raised.

I want to assure noble Lords that the Government are indeed aware of these issues and, in response to interventions from your Lordships during the passage of the Financial Services Bill, the Government made very valuable changes to ensure that the FCA had the proper incentives to take into account the differing needs of different types of organisations that it regulates, including those of charities and social enterprises. Since then, the Government and the FCA have been working with the sector to consider evidence about the effectiveness of the regime, particularly in light of the report Marketing Social Investments—An Outline of the UK Financial Promotion Regime, which was published by the Social Investment Research Council last year. These discussions between the sector and the Treasury are live and ongoing, but I believe—indeed I am told—that real progress is being made in understanding the challenges faced by charities and social enterprises.

I also think that it is important that the issue of changes to the scope and substance of regulation raised today should be considered as part of those discussions between industry representatives, the FCA and the Treasury. I have, therefore, written to the Treasury to make it aware of the issues that have been raised to ensure that they are given full consideration. I will be meeting my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to discuss them.

I am sorry to say that this is one of those issues that is a large hot potato—as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said—that sits both in the lap of the Cabinet Office and in the Treasury, but I am grasping my end of it with both hands and trying to ensure that action is taken. It is, of course, in all our interests that any regulation is proportionate, consistent and clear. Protection of consumers must be paramount, as the noble Lord, Lord Watson, said—a point with which I entirely agree. We also need to be careful that investors understand what they are investing in, as the noble Lord said, and that the reputation of the growing social investment market is protected. That is why the Treasury is engaging with key stakeholders and interested parties on these issues.

In addition to looking at suggestions, including in this amendment and what has been said in the debate, the Treasury will explore whether there are other non-legislative ways of mitigating burdens or costs to social investment offerings. Obviously there will need to be consultation on this point if further action needs to be taken. I warmly welcome my noble friend’s input to the Treasury on these points and, as I said, I am meeting my right honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury to discuss them. I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Of course, I recognise that there has been progress. As I said earlier, the FCA has begun to move—the tectonic plates have begun to shift. I absolutely accept the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Watson, about the need to protect consumers. I am sorry that I got so excited that I jumped up to interrupt him twice, for which I apologise. He is right that what we do not want to happen is too much weight being put on this new idea too early, where there is a scandal and it is all set back because obviously things that go wrong get more publicity than things that go right. I accept that.

I am grateful to my noble friend. I am happy to withdraw the amendment for the time being. I hope that we can perhaps have some further news from the Treasury side of the hot potato—do hot potatoes have sides?—or the other end of the hot potato before Report. This is an interesting issue and, to be honest and being candid with the Committee, it is only at times like this that we are able to push matters over the line. This is the moment. Once the Bill is gone the next opportunity to do this will be some way away. It would be a pity not to find something that we can coalesce around to make sure that the joint objectives that we have of a new social investment regime, proper consumer protection and a different type of regulation can be achieved. In the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am afraid that this is another of my long-standing quarrels. It is about the Charity Tribunal. Before the 2006 Act, the only appeal against the Charity Commission was to the High Court. That was expensive, slow and difficult to achieve. The then Labour Government, to their credit, introduced the Charity Tribunal in the 2006 Act. The plan was that it would improve access to justice: it would be quick, low-cost, user-friendly and non-adversarial. There was a subsidiary aspect to that, which I am not sure that the designers of the 2006 Act quite recognised, which was about helping more charity law precedents to emerge. Much of what charities are guided by now is quite old and backward-looking—we have discussed the tin-rattling regulations covering cash collections, which date from 1916. Re Resch, the big case about public benefit—an issue that we shall come to later this afternoon—concerning a private Australian hospital in the grounds of a state one dates from the 1920s. We were hoping that the Charity Tribunal would act to help bring charity law forward into the 20th and 21st centuries but the early experiences were a bit disappointing. As is too often the case, everybody reached for their lawyers—as they are entitled to do. I was not present at the end of the independent schools case that came before the tribunal, but I am told that nine QCs were present, which must have cost a bit of money.

However, although it has been slow, there has been progress. There has been more determination on the papers, which means that the tribunal does not require people to attend. More litigants have been appearing in person, which I think is also a good thing. During my review, a lot of evidence was received about the operations of the tribunal and ways they could be improved.

Some of these issues are being addressed by the Law Commission in its current consultation—which I think will be the escape hatch that my noble friend uses in a minute or two—but the Committee might like to be aware of a couple of extraordinary features. In order to appeal against the Charity Commission, a charity has to go to the commission to ask its permission as to whether the use of its funds to make the application is charitable. That seems to be entirely perverse. There is an inherent conflict of interest if the Charity Commission is on one side, the charity is on the other and the charity has to ask, “Is it fair to use this to attack you?”. That does not lead me to believe that there will be an even-handed decision. I hope that the Law Commission will move responsibility for this to the Charity Tribunal.

The second issue worth drawing to the Committee’s attention is that the Charity Commission cannot apply to the tribunal without the permission of the Attorney-General. It seems to me extraordinary that the top regulator in this sector does not have that freedom of action. It must be a threat to its independence if it has to go to a law officer of the Crown in order to be able to get determination of a case. I hope very much that the Law Commission will decide that the Charity Commission is free to act, even if it must of course still inform the Attorney-General. That would be a good way of bringing the law up to date.

There remains a major impediment to the effective working of the tribunal which the Law Commission has decided it cannot address, and that is the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which appears in Schedule 6 to the 2011 Act. There are 10 pages of it, with a series of headings about what the decision, direction or order is, who the applicants can be and what the tribunal’s powers are in response to a decision. That table was seen by the vast majority of contributors to my review as overly complicated and narrowly drawn. Even specialist charity lawyers complained of difficulty in understanding it. The list of cases brought before the tribunal also shows a large number being struck out for being outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. That raises the question of whether its jurisdiction is sufficiently well defined to address the concerns people have about the commission’s work. Of course, with any forum there will always be cases that fall outside its jurisdiction, but in combination with the wider concerns about Schedule 6, the number of rejected cases raises questions.

The Schedule 6 table is focused on a specific range of formal legal decisions made by the commission. In some cases, but crucially not all of them, this includes the decision not to exercise a power, and the decision not to open a statutory inquiry into a charity is a frequently cited omission. Many of the decisions referred to in the schedule relate to the exercise of legal powers that the commission, as part of its more refined and focused approach to regulation, is choosing to make less frequent use of. Concern has therefore also been expressed that as the commission moves towards this lighter-touch regulatory regime, even more of its work will fall outside the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Amendment 22B is designed to clarify the situation by providing a right of appeal against any legal decision of the Charity Commission and a right of review of any other decision by the commission. The new clause proposed in the amendment has two elements. The proposed changes to Section 319 of the 2011 Act deal with appeals and set out, very simply, who would be able to make the appeal: it can be any trustee or director of a charity or charitable company or,

“any other person who is the subject of the relevant decision”,

or is “significantly interested in” or “affected by” it. It lays out the powers the tribunal would have in responding to these appeals. The proposed changes to Section 321 deal with reviews. Finally, subsection (6) of the proposed new clause would delete the dreaded Schedule 6, which I hope will foreshorten and cut out the regulatory regime. This is not a complex issue. Access to the Charity Tribunal is unnecessarily complicated, particularly for smaller charities, and the charity world will appreciate and benefit from simplification. I beg to move.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, it is excellent to address another of my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s issues—I will not call it a bugbear. Obviously I am sympathetic to the aim of wanting to simplify the legislation because in many senses less is more. My noble friend advocated the approach taken in his amendment in his statutory report on the Charities Act 2006. I hope I will be forgiven for reminding noble Lords of the Government’s response:

“In principle the Government supports the rationalisation of the appeal rights in Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011, provided it can be done in a way that does not … expose the Charity Commission to challenges where it decides not to intervene in a charity in keeping with its risk and proportionality framework (this is already capable of Judicial Review); or … create any significant new appeal rights that would add to the jurisdiction’s case-load”.

I believe that this was a sensible position to take. We must remember that the Charity Commission has limited resources. We would not want to expose the commission to challenges where it decides not to intervene in a charity in keeping with its risk and proportionality framework. As I have said, this is already capable of judicial review. Providing a right of appeal to the tribunal could result in an unmanageable workload of cases for the Charity Commission, diverting its resources to defending proceedings in the tribunal, many of which may be spurious or vexatious. Appeal rights in the event of the commission not making a particular decision would in effect enable others to direct the use of commission powers and resources, rather than it being left to the good sense of the commission to decide such matters for itself within the scope of its objectives, functions, processes and duties.

We consider that the balance is about right under Schedule 6 as it currently stands. There is a right of appeal against the opening of a statutory inquiry but no right of appeal if the commission decides, for whatever reason, not to open one. We do not want to overburden the tribunal with significant new rights of appeal that are likely to generate a large number of cases where none had previously existed.

I am not sure that everyone shares my noble friend Lord Hodgson’s viewpoint on the difficulty of interpreting Schedule 6 to the Charities Act 2011. There are some who are attracted to the structure of Schedule 6 and find it easy to navigate. It allows one to look up a particular provision and quickly see who can appeal and what decisions are available to the tribunal. It is not something that has been raised with the Government as causing particular difficulty, other than by my noble friend.

Most of the Bill is about giving the Charity Commission the tools it needs to do its job, so I hope my noble friend will understand that, although I approve of his eye for simplification, I am very reluctant to consider anything that could divert its resources from its core functions. I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment on that basis.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I have not found many people who have said that Schedule 6 is easy to navigate. I did not get into too much of the detail but there is also the question of the timescales for making appeals. However, I can see that I am not going to make any progress with this.

I am disappointed that the Minister has fallen back on the issue of vexatious litigation. That suggests that the tribunal does not have the sense to strike out vexatious litigants by saying, “This isn’t a case”, and I do not find that that argument really holds water. What I think has happened is that small charities in particular are finding their legal position not as strong as it should be. I am sure that this will lead to additional casework for the Charity Commission but I do not mind about that: if the commission needs to be challenged, it needs to be challenged. If that happens unfairly then the Charity Tribunal will step in and say, “This is not a worthwhile case”, and strike it out. I understand that it has done so with other cases in the past. Still, that is as far as we are going to get today, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I feel that I could not have put the case for these two amendments better than the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan and Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I also echo the comments of my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley. Like them, we very much hope that the arguments will not fall on stony ground. Indeed, in a previous debate in this Room, the noble Lord, Lord Nash, agreed with our direction of travel, saying:

“It would be nice to see the independent and state sectors collaborating more”.—[Official Report, 27/11/14; col. 991.]

As we know, though, encouraging words are simply not enough in themselves. Despite being subsidised by the taxpayer to the tune of some £700 million over the course of a Parliament, only 3% of independent schools sponsor an academy, only 5% loan teaching staff to state schools and only one-third allow pupils to attend lessons on their premises. That is not sufficient to show that they are providing “public benefit”.

I agree with noble Lords that there are pockets of good practice but I also very much echo their view that it is not consistent. As Sir Michael Wilshaw, the head of Ofsted, has described it, it feels like public schools are offering the state sector only the “crumbs off your tables”. So independent schools with charitable status must do more to develop partnerships with state schools by sharing their resources and skills.

It is in all our interests, public and private, that every child has access to a first-class education with the skills to succeed in the global marketplace, and this is certainly one way of delivering that. We would envisage much deeper partnerships than has been the case in the past, not just by the sharing of sports, art and music facilities—important though they are, and an important case for that has been made in the debate—but also by the running of summer schools, mentoring schemes and giving access to networks for careers advice, work experience and internships. All these issues are equally important in a future partnership scheme.

It is important for independent schools to engage in these activities with the state sector as an equal partner rather than as a tokenistic gesture. I will give an example of this. I visited a school recently which on its website talked proudly of the relationship it had with the local public school. When I went to speak to the sixth form, I commented that the students must feel proud to have access to all the facilities in the school down the road, but I have to say that those students looked at me with completely blank faces. They did not know what I was talking about. An awful lot is said about this without it being acted upon on the ground in a way that young people feel is delivering for them. This is why we have called for a new schools partnership standard against which independent schools will be measured. Furthermore, we believe that the Local Government Act 1988 should be amended so that private schools’ business rate relief becomes conditional on passing that new standard.

Amendments 23A and 23B provide a start by identifying at least three areas, sports, drama and music, where facilities and expertise can be shared to the benefit of pupils from both sectors. I would say to the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Hodgson, that independent schools which are already involved in such initiatives have nothing to fear from these changes, while, quite frankly, those which have not kept up with the times will find it difficult to justify why they should continue to be subsidised on the pretence that they are providing a public benefit rather than a private benefit for just the few.

That brings me to the second part of the two amendments, where we totally concur with the view that the Charity Commission should be required to set out the minimum necessary for the public benefit test to be met. No other agency or individual is allowed to mark their own homework and decide for themselves what their standard is and whether they have met it. Without some kind of independent and transparent guidance, it is impossible for taxpayers or their representatives to review and test the standard, or to check that it has been met in each case. Even auditors cannot justify themselves that the requirement has been met since there is no standard against which they can benchmark any particular charity.

We have tolerated the corrosive effect of the divided school system for far too long. It cannot be right that public schools account for only 7% of all pupils in England yet provide more than 50% of our CEOs, Lords, barristers, judges, QCs, doctors and even journalists. We very much welcome the amendments and the analysis behind them as a first step towards a new model of accountability and partnership in education. It may well be that the wording does need to be finessed before Report, but I am sure that the proposers of the amendments will welcome any constructive suggestions in that regard. While I am sure that the Minister agrees with these sentiments, I hope he will also agree with our practical proposals, and I look forward to hearing his response.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, I should start by saying that I am very much on side with my noble friend Lord Moynihan and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, in their intention to encourage more sharing of facilities and expertise between charitable independent schools and local communities, including state schools. Indeed, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Moynihan on all the excellent work that he has done on this, including during the Olympics. I have to say that I am not an accomplished sportsman myself—indeed, the words “accomplished sportsman” and “Bridges” do not go together. I try to pull myself around Battersea Park once a week, but that is as far as it goes, so I look with awe at what my noble friend has achieved in terms of encouraging more people to take part in sport.

As I said, I sympathise with the noble aim of these amendments. However, although we may agree on the aim, where I differ is on the way in which we achieve it. In direct response to what my noble friend has said, I would argue that the Charity Commission already has the tools to do this job and to do it consistently. Public benefit has long been a concept at the heart of the definition of charity, as all noble Lords know. It is not enough that charities have a charitable purpose; they must further their charitable purpose for the public benefit. However, how they do so is rightly a matter for a charity’s trustees—a point made eloquently and forcefully by my noble friend Lord Lexden?

The Charities Act 2006, now consolidated into the Charities Act 2011, gave the Charity Commission a statutory objective of promoting awareness and understanding of the operation of the public benefit requirement. It also required the commission to publish statutory guidance on the public benefit requirement, as noble Lords will know. The published guidance as it applied to charitable fee-charging independent schools was challenged in the Upper Tribunal and was found to be overprescriptive. I just want to remind your Lordships what the tribunal found.

The tribunal summarised the two strands to the public benefit test as follows: first, what is provided must be of benefit to the community; and, secondly, those who benefit must be sufficiently numerous and identified in such a manner as to constitute a “section of the public”. On the first point, the test was satisfied, in that the delivery of a standard curriculum to school-age children was for the benefit of the community. On the second point, providing that more than de minimis or token provision is made for the poor, there is a range of direct, indirect and identifiable wider benefits that schools provide to the community that can be taken into account. The test is to look at what a trustee, acting in the interests of the community as a whole, would do in all the circumstances of the particular school, and to ask what provision should be made, other than the provision of education to fee-paying students, over and beyond the de minimis or token threshold.

As with all charities, the trustees of charitable independent schools are required to report on their public benefit activities in their trustees’ annual report. It is worth pointing out that the Charity Commission provides guidance on how the public benefit requirement can be met by charities, including schools. As I am sure your Lordships know, this is set out in Public Benefit: The Public Benefit Requirement. I repeat that this matter should be left to the discretion of the charity’s trustees operating within the Charity Commission’s published guidance. In practice, charitable independent schools are likely to use a combination of ways of providing opportunities to benefit people who cannot afford the fees. Such schools have widely varying circumstances and assets which can affect what benefits, other than an education for pupils at the school, they choose to give.

As my noble friend Lord Moynihan alluded to, much is being done in terms of partnership. According to the Independent Schools Council, 93% of ISC schools are in mutually beneficial partnerships with state schools and local communities, sharing expertise, best practice and facilities to the benefit of children in all the schools involved. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said, we need to encourage them to do more. The ISC states:

“The best partnerships develop between Heads or teachers really wanting to work together, out of genuine local relationships and enthusiasms, not dictated from the top”.

In addition to sharing expertise or facilities as set out in the noble Lord’s amendment, other examples might include allowing pupils from local state schools to attend certain lessons or other educational events; collaboration between independent schools and state schools, including academies—a point that has been referred to—an independent school working in partnership with a non-fee-charging school overseas to share knowledge; the formal secondment of teaching staff to other state schools or colleges—for example, in specialist subjects such as individual sciences or modern languages—and supporting state schools to help them prepare A-level students for entry to universities. Those are just a flavour of the different ways in which a charitable independent school can work with the wider community and the state education sector to further its charitable purposes for the public benefit.

However, I wish to return to my main point, which has been made before, which is that charities are independent and their trustees must be able to make decisions in the best interests of the charity, taking into account the needs of their beneficiaries and individual circumstances of their charity. We must be careful not to fetter their discretion with prescriptive requirements that will not be appropriate in all circumstances.

As my noble friend Lord Lexden eloquently argued, we need to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach. Therefore, I entirely share the sentiment behind this amendment and the view of my noble friend Lord Moynihan that we need to do more to raise standards in the teaching of sport and music in state schools while encouraging independent schools to do their bit.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, referred to Ofsted. Indeed, Ofsted has looked into this matter, as I am sure she knows. I remind your Lordships what was said in its report Going the Extra Mile, which was published in June last year. It states:

“Of course, many independent schools enjoy financial advantages not available to their state-funded cousins. As this report makes clear, it is not resource that is the key to independent school success but attitude. Children are expected to compete, train and practise secure in the knowledge that teachers will go the extra mile to help them. … As things stand, many state schools treat competitive sport as an optional extra or fail to offer it any meaningful way. They get on the bus but fail to turn up on the pitch”.

The report goes on to say:

“The time that PE staff, other teachers and coaches dedicate to organising sport before, during and after school and at weekends is one of”,

the “fundamental reasons” why some maintained schools and academies match what independent schools do.

An Ofsted music report said that, as regards the provision of music:

“The root of the problem lay in a lack of understanding, and low expectations in music, among the schools’ senior leaders and their consequent inability to challenge their own staff, and visiting teachers, to bring about improvement. More often than not, they evaluated the quality of music in their schools too optimistically”.

I am not for one instant saying that we should not encourage independent schools to do their bit and to do more. Clearly, we need to do that and clearly there is work to be done. I know that my noble friend Lord Moynihan is encouraging us to do a lot of work in the state sector, but there is a lot of work to be done on both fronts. However, while the activities covered in these amendments are worthy, there may be many others which have equal value or may be more appropriate in the particular circumstances of the school. Trustees will want to take into account the needs of their beneficiaries and be able to develop innovative responses to such needs. It would be wrong to restrict their discretion in the way proposed by the amendments. I look forward to meeting my noble friend Lord Moynihan before Report to discuss his proposals in more detail. However, on the basis of what I have said, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Watson of Invergowrie]

My Lords, the Labour Party has no objection to Amendment 26, with the exception of the first six words. It does not seem appropriate to ask that the Chancellor become involved in a review such as this because it would seem unnecessarily to broaden the aegis of this part of the Bill relating to social investment, and we do not believe that it would be welcomed by charities.

I am aware that this amendment is supported by Social Enterprise UK and the Charity Finance Group, and I understand the rationale behind it, which is that the Treasury controls fiscal and regulatory levers with regard to investment and therefore should have a say in this area as well. However, at a stage in the process when some charities will remain sceptical of entering the field of social investment, the shadow of HM Treasury lurking in the background does not seem to us to create the kind of setting designed to assuage such concerns.

I wrote in my note of this speech that Amendment 27 is uncontentious, but I have just heard the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, outline why she has included it. She basically said that the amendment has been included to allow for the review of the activities of the Charity Commission. I do not think we necessarily disagree that that might be appropriate in some circumstances. I assume that behind the scenes it goes on anyway, but the amendment says,

“any other areas deemed relevant by the Minister”,

which leaves the door open for the Minister to say, as I imagine he might well do, “Well, I don’t deem it relevant for us to carry out a review of the Charity Commission—certainly not in this context”. By and large, we would not be unhappy with an open door in this situation. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, it is in many pieces of legislation that come before us.

That leaves only Amendment 29, which stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. This is similar to Amendment 22ZA, in which we argued for the inclusion of an initial review of charities’ social investments after three years, with subsequent reviews at five-yearly intervals. The arguments in favour in Amendment 29 are similar too, mainly to the effect that, with a number of significant changes being introduced in this Bill, it will be important to review their effectiveness at an earlier stage to enable progress to be assessed and any difficulties encountered to be highlighted. Doing so will enable all charities to benefit from the experience of others, while the Cabinet Office might wish to seek to amend the Act in the light of experience. Each of the factors listed in paragraphs (1)(a) to (c) are easily measurable and will inform the reviews with the most up-to-date information available.

Publication of the reports of the reviews will also provide Parliament with an important opportunity to examine the impact of the Act at that point. A period of five years seems to us to be too long to await that kind of appraisal initially and for it to be laid before Parliament, and we believe that it would be in charities’ best interests to initiate the review after three years, with further reviews every five years.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, this has been an interesting contribution to the debate. Let me start by setting out the aim of the review provision in the Bill before commenting in detail on the amendments.

Clause 14 makes provision for the operation of the Act to be reviewed by the Minister at least every five years, in line with government policy on reviewing legislation that imposes a regulatory burden. I should add, on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about the Charity Commission per se, to which the noble Lord, Lord Watson, referred, that I am reminded that the Public Accounts Select Committee reviews the Charity Commission every year and the NAO will undertake a follow-up review of the Charity Commission’s progress. The review of this legislation will, by considering the operation of the Act, consider the Charity Commission’s use of powers, guidance, and so on.

The purpose of such a statutory review is to establish whether, and to what extent, the provisions in the Bill have achieved their original objectives. The review must also consider whether the objectives are still valid, whether the measures are still required and the best option for achieving those objectives—and if so, whether the provisions can be improved to reduce burdens on businesses, including charities. The review must address three related questions. First, are the policy objectives that led to the introduction of the measures still valid and relevant? Secondly, if the objectives are still valid and relevant, is regulation still the best way of achieving those objectives compared with the possible alternatives?

Thirdly, if regulation is still justified, can the existing measures be improved? Additionally in this Bill, the review must include consideration of how the Act affects public confidence in charities, the level of charitable donations and people’s willingness to volunteer. As I am sure noble Lords know, this follows on from similar requirements in the Charities Act 2006 but should not be considered limiting on the scope of any review. The standard period for such a review to take place is within five years of the legislation being enacted, a point I shall return to.

I turn to Amendments 26 and 27 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. As the noble Baroness said, social investment is a relatively new field but it is growing very fast, and the UK is already a world leader in many respects. I do not believe that the review clause of the Bill is the right place to propose a wide-ranging review of the social investment market, public perceptions of social investment and any impact on grant-making. In relation to social investment, the Bill makes a modest contribution by clarifying the existing law for charities in a way that we hope will encourage more charities to consider whether making social investments is right for them. For many, as I have said, it will not be.

The Cabinet Office and the Treasury have worked closely together for several years on growing the social investment market, a point I made earlier—for example, on the social investment tax relief that was launched in April 2014, the first of its kind in the world, or on the establishment in 2012 of Big Society Capital, the Investment and Contract Readiness Fund and the Social Outcomes Fund. The then Government also published annual progress updates on growing the social investment market. These covered a broad range of policies, including those owned by the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, so a lot is being done here already. All this was done without a statutory requirement for a review. I do not believe that a statutory review requirement would achieve much that is not already being done more frequently and with much broader scope.

There is nothing in the review clause that would prevent the Minister from specifying other matters to be considered in or alongside those required in the statutory review, so I do not think that Amendment 27 is really needed. I would strongly argue that the scope of the review clause is right as it is, and that it would be wrong to start focusing it on matters beyond the direct scope of the Bill when these are already being considered and reported on regularly by the Government. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

On Amendment 29, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Watson, I have some sympathy with his arguments about bringing forward the first review but should also point out some of the downsides to holding the review within three years rather than five. Once the Bill becomes law, the clock begins to count down towards the review, but the Commission will need to develop and consult on guidance in relation to its new powers as well as putting in place systems and processes, training and internal guidance for its staff. It is not unrealistic to expect this process to take at least six months. The review clause requires the review to be published within so many years of enactment, which means that the review itself will have to begin earlier—say, six months. So it is easy to see how in practical terms a “three-year” review would actually be a two-year review, losing six months to preparation and guidance at the beginning and six months to the review itself at the end.

Then there is the important point that the commission itself has said that it would expect to exercise some of the powers on only a very few occasions each year—for example, the power to direct the winding up of a charity, which the commission expects to use on only two occasions each year. Factor in the time that it takes for an appeal to be determined, and one can see that there would be a real risk that some of the powers in the Bill may have been exercised only a couple of times by the time of a three-year review. That is unlikely to provide a sufficiently useful sample on which to base an assessment of the powers’ efficacy.

The standard period for reviewing legislation is within five years. The provision in the Bill as it stands does not prevent the review from taking place earlier than five years after enactment. It is also worth pointing out that the Charity Commission publishes an annual report on its compliance work called Tackling Abuse and Mismanagement, which I referred to last week, to help explain its case work and to help trustees learn any important lessons. This annual report would represent a good opportunity for the commission to report on the use of its new powers as and when they are used.

Having said all that, the noble Lord, Lord Watson, has made some helpful points about the timing of a review and I would like to consider them in more detail. For now, however, I hope that he will feel able not to press his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

30: Clause 15, page 18, line 20, leave out “This Act comes” and insert—
“( ) This section and section 14 come into force on the day on which this Act is passed.
( ) The other provisions of this Act come”

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

My Lords, this is a minor and technical amendment to the commencement provision in Clause 15. At present, subsection (3) of the clause provides for the Bill to come into force on whatever day is specified in regulations made by the Minister. Subsection (4)(a) states that the regulations may specify,

“different days for different purposes”.

The amendment would amend subsection (3) so that Clauses 14 and 15 come into force on the day the Act is passed; that is, on Royal Assent. Clause 14 imposes a duty on the Minister to review the operation of the Act. This should apply to the Act regardless of when other provisions are brought into force, so there is no need to delay commencement following Royal Assent. Clause 15, “Short title, extent and commencement”, contains general provisions, and it is good practice for Acts to make it clear that such general provisions come into force on Royal Assent. The remainder of the Bill would, as now, come into force on the day specified in regulations made by the Minister. This allows for commencement of the substantive provisions of the Act at an appropriate time which, in accordance with the convention, will be at least two months after Royal Assent. I commend the amendment to the Committee and I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister may say that it is a minor amendment but I happen to have a very long speech here. However, he will be pleased to know that I rise only to thank him for introducing the amendment. When we started on day one, my noble friend Lord Watson wished him well in the Committee stage and promised that we would deal with him gently. I hope he agrees that we have done just that.

This is an opportunity for me to thank the Minister for his patience and thoughtfulness, although maybe not his flexibility, in responding to our amendments. Of course, that has enabled us to hear all the Government’s arguments against our changes, which I hope will fortify and sharpen our case as we bring some of them forward on Report on 20 July.

I also take advantage of this moment to thank, in particular, my noble friends Lady Jones and Lady Pitkeathley for their contributions at this stage. I also give particular thanks to my noble friend Lord Watson for the heavy lifting on many of the amendments. It is the first time that we have worked together in this capacity, but I hope it is not the last. For the moment, we are happy to support this very minor amendment.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

I am very grateful that that was not the speech that the noble Baroness was about to give. For one moment my heart sank and I wondered what I might have missed at this late stage. She has been very kind and has indeed dealt with me very gently, as has the noble Lord, Lord Watson, for which I am very grateful. I also extend my thanks to everyone—the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, my noble friend Lord Hodgson and the many others who have made this debate extremely fruitful. I said at Second Reading that this would be a very good opportunity to kick the tyres of this policy—although I know that it has been kicked for quite a long time—and we have certainly done that. We have had some good debates on a range of topics, some in the Bill and some not, and those debates have been incredibly well informed.

I put on record that I have agreed to meet a number of noble Lords between now and Report in two weeks’ time. I look forward to meeting, for example, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, to discuss her proposal to extend automatic disqualification to sex offenders, something on which I am very sympathetic. I look forward to dancing on the head of a pin with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and my noble friend Lord Hodgson as we define social investment still further. A number of other points on the Bill were raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which I will look forward to discussing, as I will the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on unincorporated charities. As I said, I also intend to meet my noble friend Lord Moynihan to discuss his proposals on sport. So all in all it looks as though I have a very busy couple of weeks ahead of me.

Amendment 30 agreed.