Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hague of Richmond
Main Page: Lord Hague of Richmond (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hague of Richmond's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Our security and prosperity in Britain are indivisible from those of other countries. We cannot seal ourselves off from dangers in other countries or prosper fully alone, and it is against our values—as, indeed, it is against our interests—to stand by while conflict and instability develop. That has been shown to be true time and again in the regions that we are debating today.
Britain could not turn a blind eye when Colonel Gaddafi turned his forces against innocent civilians in Libya, shelling crowds of peaceful protesters and even hospitals crammed with victims, and launching a ferocious campaign of arbitrary detentions, torture and summary executions. This is a country on Europe’s southern edge, and a regime that threatened to “exterminate like rats” the people who had risen against it. The Arab League clearly called for help and intervention, which is one of the reasons why we have taken a strong lead in calling for, securing and implementing UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973. Other reasons include the effect on Libya’s neighbours and the consequences for migration, terrorism and our own national interest if a pariah state had emerged in north Africa. Our action in Libya has a compelling legal and moral basis, strong regional and international support and a clear objective, and it continues to make progress.
The Secretary of State is aware that a great many people view it as very important that this has been a UN-mandated mission from the start. Will he update us on developments within the United Nations to ensure the maximum protection for civilians in Libya and to bring hostilities to the earliest possible end?
Yes, the hon. Gentleman is quite right. The fact that we are acting on a United Nations resolution made an enormous difference to the scale of the vote in this House in favour of the action we have taken and, of course, to the maintenance of international support. The UN Secretary-General attended the London conference that I hosted at the end of March and a meeting of the contact group. The UN continues to be represented at those contract groups. The UN special envoy, Mr al-Khatib, visited Tripoli yesterday, and we are waiting to hear what he found on that visit. The UN remains fully engaged and has offered to lead the stabilisation effort that will follow the conflict in Libya; support across the UN for the implementation of the resolutions remains very strong.
There is evidence that NATO’s insistence that Gaddafi be removed is prolonging the civil war, and that civilian casualties are mounting as a result. Would the Foreign Secretary consider asking a third party—someone independent, such as Kofi Annan—to mediate, without preconditions, for the purpose of a desperately needed ceasefire, if this is after all an intervention based on humanitarian need?
The United Nations envoy to whom I referred is such a third party, and he has just been to Tripoli. Other third parties have made efforts as well, some of them on the basis suggested by my hon. Friend. A high-level African Union delegation visited Tripoli, without the insistence that the Libyan opposition and we have on the departure of Gaddafi, but that did not lead to a successful mediation. Indeed, however one looks at it, it is impossible to see a peaceful or viable future for Libya without the departure of Gaddafi.
Does the Secretary of State agree with the comments made at the weekend by the Chief of the Defence Staff about increasing the number of targets that we can hit, with specific reference to infrastructure? What discussions has he had with NATO colleagues about the apparent change of focus to regime change rather than the protection of civilians?
I do agree with the comments of the Chief of the Defence Staff, but they did not relate to regime change; they related to implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. It will be evident to the House that over the last few weeks the regime forces have tried to adapt to what we have done to implement the resolutions. They have made themselves look like the forces of the other side, and have fought in a more asymmetric way. In such circumstances it is legitimate for NATO to increase the proportion of targets that are the command and control systems of the regime forces who are harassing and threatening the civilian population. That is what the Chief of the Defence Staff was referring to.
The Foreign Secretary will, of course, appreciate that there is a desire for conflict resolution that will lead to a democratic opportunity for Libya. Will he accept from one who represents many people from north Africa, and many from the Arab and Muslim world, that the intervention that we made is extremely respected and appreciated by those communities here? They want us to continue to uphold the transformation in the Arab world to more democratic countries, because one of their reasons for being here is their inability to exercise their freedoms fully in the countries from which they have come.
That is absolutely true. We responded to the call from the Arab League, and I discussed the situation in Cairo two weeks ago with its secretary-general, who remains supportive of what we are doing. As my right hon. Friend rightly says, that is representative of opinion not just across the region but among many people in this country.
On previous occasions the Foreign Secretary has told us that the Attorney-General is giving advice to the Cabinet. Can he assure us that if there is an increase in the scope and range of the targets that we will hit, that advice will be made available to the House?
I cannot give an assurance that we will provide a running commentary on legal advice, but I can give the assurance that the Attorney-General is always included in such discussions. He is always included in the decisions about targeting, and indeed in our general discussions about policies. The National Security Council on Libya met earlier today to discuss the increased tempo of the military campaign, and the Attorney-General took part in that discussion. Retaining what we have had from the beginning—a clear legal authority to do what we are doing—is very important. However, although the Government can give it consideration, I cannot undertake to give a running commentary on legal advice.
The Foreign Secretary said that General Richards had been referring to the command and control structure, not the infrastructure. It seems to be agreed that command and control is an acceptable target. However, General Richards said in The Sunday Telegraph that he
“wanted the rules of engagement changed so that direct attacks can be launched against the infrastructure propping up Gaddafi's regime.”
That suggests that he was calling for a change of policy, and I should be grateful if the Foreign Secretary could say whether he has a legal opinion that would support that change of policy.
That would, of course, have to be discussed with our colleagues, partners and other members of NATO, as all targeting is discussed in NATO. But certainly it is our opinion that it comes within the scope of United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 that if particular items of infrastructure are particularly supporting the military effort and the regime’s effort to make war against civilians, those would also be legitimate targets.
The Gaddafi regime is now isolated and on the defensive. It has lost control of large swathes of Libya already. The regime’s military capability has been significantly degraded and £12 billion of its assets have been frozen in this country alone. NATO has conducted more than 6,600 sorties and more than 2,600 strike sorties since 31 March, destroying ammunition stores, armoured and other vehicles and surface-to-air missile launchers, while at sea 20 ships are now patrolling the central Mediterranean under NATO command to enforce the arms embargo.
Scores of senior figures have abandoned their positions in the regime, including Ministers, generals, ambassadors, bankers and senior officials. Many of these defectors are actively supporting the opposition national transitional council. We welcome the announcement today by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court that he has requested judges to issue arrest warrants for Colonel Gaddafi and two other members of the regime wanted for the deliberate killing of unarmed civilians. This should leave the regime in no doubt that crimes will not go unpunished and that the reach of international justice will be long.
May I say that in recent weeks the Foreign Secretary has conducted his part of the campaign with exemplary skill and force? As the International Criminal Court seeks the arraignment of Colonel Gaddafi for all the things he has done, what difference is there between those and the terrible cruelty, killings and torture by President Bashar al-Assad in Syria? Does the Foreign Secretary agree with the Minister for the Armed Forces, who said in Defence questions an hour ago that he believed that Syria’s President should also be put before the International Criminal Court?
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for, unusually, paying me a compliment. There are important differences, of course, in the level of international support and concern about Syria. I spoke a moment ago about the importance of our legal and international authority. So far, the Arab League position on Libya has been different from its position on Syria. Our ability to pass a resolution at the United Nations Security Council is very different on Syria from what it is on Libya, so if we believe that it is important to operate with legal and international authority, we must recognise that we are in a different situation in respect of Syria than we are in respect of Libya. I will return to Syria in the course of my remarks.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of us are worried about what the Chief of the Defence Staff said at the weekend, because he seemed to be implying that in order to resolve a stalemate that we ourselves have created, we should constantly widen the envelope of what we attack? We want a firm assurance that we will attack only military targets that directly target civilians, and that our mission is humanitarian and designed to achieve a ceasefire and peace.
My hon. Friend can certainly be assured that we will stay within the scope of the UN resolution, with legal advice, but he must bear it in mind that as the situation changes, what is targeted and the methods necessary to achieve our objectives will sometimes have to change. It would not be effective to say that we are only ever going to target the same things. Many different parts of the apparatus of the regime in Libya that are engaged in prosecuting a war against its own civilians have not actually been targeted yet.
Will my right hon. Friend reassure us that there will be no change in the mission—no mission creep? A no-fly zone can be successful in preventing civilians from being massacred—that is why I voted for it—but what would the Government do if it became clear that the air raids have succeeded in preventing that and that Gaddafi is desisting from threatening to massacre whole swathes of his own people, but that he is staying in place? Would we then call off the campaign because the threat of massacre had been reduced to the point that it did not need to concern us any more, or would we say, “As long as Gaddafi is in place, the campaign goes on”? That is where we might find ourselves in legal difficulties?
Of course it is open to Colonel Gaddafi to comply with resolution 1973, to end violence against civilians and to have a genuine ceasefire. President Obama and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made it clear at the beginning what he would need to do in order to do that; he would need to disengage from battles in places such as Misrata, to cease using his forces against civilians who try to protest in Tripoli, and so on. So it is open to him to do this. It would certainly not bring to an end the enforcement of a no-fly zone, the arms embargo and so many parts of the UN resolution, but in that situation the position—the need to protect civilians from attack—would be different. However, Colonel Gaddafi does not do this, presumably because if he did he would no longer be able to maintain himself in power, as he relies entirely on force to keep himself in power. That is why the question of his being there and remaining in power is, in practical terms, intimately bound up with resolving the conflict.
Any innocent person listening to the Foreign Secretary’s speech would assume that the whole policy that has been conducted by NATO, with the support of the UK, is one of regime change, and that they are just hiding under this fig leaf of its not being regime change. When does this become regime change in fact? Would he do the same in Bahrain, Syria or any other country? Clearly, that is the direction of travel at the moment.
Those countries are all in different situations. I wish to discuss those different countries later, but Libya’s is the one case where we are dealing with a clear call from the Arab League and a United Nations Security Council resolution, and that makes it very different from all the other situations that we are dealing with. The hon. Gentleman should support the fact that Britain is acting on that basis, with that international authority. The purposes of our military action are exactly as set out in the resolution but, for the reasons that I have just been explaining, it is hard to see us achieving those objectives, or any peaceful solution being arrived at among the people of Libya, while Colonel Gaddafi remains in power. We have to recognise that, and it is why most of the world, including people across north Africa and in the Arab world, want him to go.
This House and our country should be confident that time is not on the side of Gaddafi; it is on our side, provided that we continue to intensify the diplomatic, economic and military pressure on his regime. The tempo of military operations, which some of my hon. Friends have been asking about, has increased significantly in recent weeks, and we are now targeting not just deployed military assets, but the fixed military command and control facilities which the regime uses to threaten the civilian population. That action is within the constraints of the Security Council resolutions, and we are increasing the regime’s diplomatic and economic isolation at the same time.
At the contact group meeting in Rome on 5 May, which I attended, all members agreed to reject diplomatic emissaries from Tripoli unless the regime shows serious willingness to implement a real ceasefire. We also agreed to explore action to prevent the regime from exporting crude oil and importing refined products for non-humanitarian use, and to clamp down on states and entities supplying arms and mercenaries to the regime. We are also working with our partners to stop satellite or state support for the broadcasting of Libyan state television, and the whole House will welcome the Arab League’s decision yesterday to request a ban on Libyan state-owned TV from broadcasting on the Arabsat satellites. We also welcome the mediation role of the UN special envoy, as I have said.
In parallel with that pressure, we are increasing our support for the Libyan national transitional council, which we regard at this moment as the legitimate representative of the people of Libya. In Rome, the contact group agreed terms of reference for a temporary financial mechanism that will aid the provision of basic services in eastern Libya, as well as efforts to stabilise its economy. The first meeting of the steering board for the mechanism is due to take place today in Doha, and up to $180 million has already been pledged by the Gulf states.
The British Government were also one of the first to provide humanitarian support to Libya, including medical supplies for 30,000 people and basic necessities for more than 100,000. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development will want to expand on this subject when he winds up the debate.
On the subject of the national transitional council, on a recent visit to the US the Select Committee on Defence was told at a high level that we do not know who the rebels are. Is the Secretary of State confident that it is appropriate to give them official recognition when we do not really know the details of where they are coming from?
We have not given them official recognition; we recognise states, not Governments. We recognise the state of Libya. We say for now—at this moment—that they are the legitimate representatives, as Gaddafi has lost legitimacy, and we have invited them to open an office but not an embassy here in London. We know a lot about who they are—after all, we have met a lot them. I have met their principal leaders and we have a diplomatic mission in Benghazi that is working with them daily. They have published their vision of a democratic Libya and, as I shall explain, have gone on to set out their own transition plan for Libya, which tells us quite a lot about what they intend.
The hon. Lady brings me naturally to what I was going to say next. Last Thursday, during a visit to London by its chairman Abdul-Jalil, the Prime Minister invited the council to open a mission in London. That will enable closer consultation. We welcome the road map for a democratic transition published by the council. It pledges the establishment of an interim Government after the departure of Gaddafi and a ceasefire—an interim Government including council figures as well as technocratic figures from the regime—the convening of a national congress with balanced representation from across the country, the drafting of a new constitution and internationally supervised parliamentary and presidential elections within six months. Those are laudable objectives that show the right way forward, as proposed by the national council.
The Prime Minister also announced new support for the protection of Libyan civilians, including communications equipment, bullet proof vests and uniforms for the civilian police authorities of the NTC as well as support to improve the public broadcasting capacity. That assistance is designed to help ensure that the NTC administers territory under its control to international standards. In the coming weeks we will also increase our diplomatic presence in Benghazi. We have appointed a permanent special representative to the national transitional council based there, and we are sending development specialists who will form the core of an international team to advise the council on longer-term planning.
Is the Foreign Secretary not glossing over the significance of what the Chief of the Defence Staff said? I think that the Chief of Defence Staff is worried about stalemate. We are doing enough to keep the operation going but not enough to finish it off, and we are turning our backs on the opportunities for negotiation, to the extent that they exist, yet we are not going far enough to finish this. He is worried about war and misery without end as well as ongoing cost and stretch. He is saying something different from the Government, is he not?
No. I have called at successive meetings of the contact group and in this House for a steady intensification of the military, diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime. We have always been clear that it would require intensification and the Chief of the Defence Staff is certainly talking about the next stage of that intensification. That is not at variance with what the Government have said. It might contain more detail than what we have said before, but it does not vary from the approach the Government have taken. We have always been clear that such intensification is necessary to avoid a stalemate, but we need diplomatic and economic, as well as military, intensification.
We are doing all we can to implement the UN Security Council resolutions on Libya. We should be fortified by the knowledge that our action has already saved countless people from the risk of death, injury or certain repression. I hope the House will join me in paying tribute to the brave men and women of the armed forces and to British diplomats and aid workers on the ground in Libya. The contact group will meet again in Abu Dhabi in early June, a meeting that I will attend, and I will keep the House closely informed of developments. The Gaddafi regime’s efforts to cling to power are in stark contrast with the largely peaceful transition that has taken place in Libya’s neighbours, Egypt and Tunisia. Tunisia continues to lead the way in the transition to Arab democracy. Despite many complex challenges, a great deal of progress has been made since the revolution in January. A new broad-based interim Government including independent figures and opposition parties has been formed, media censorship has been removed, formerly banned parties have been legalised and an election date has been set. The challenge now is to ensure that reforms are fully implemented and that all arrangements are in place for free and fair elections. I spoke to Tunisia’s Foreign Minister last week to discuss those things. Through our Arab partnership initiative, we are helping to produce the first media code of conduct for Tunisia’s elections, to build domestic observation capacity for Assembly elections in July and to strengthen legislation protecting freedom of expression. Further British support for political and economic reform is being agreed and we are also working at the EU and with other international bodies to look at assistance for Tunisia as part of a broader approach to democratic reform in north Africa.
I visited Cairo at the beginning of the month. Egypt has many challenges to overcome before democratic reform is assured, including the need to stabilise the economy and create confidence for investors. I met senior members of the transitional authorities and representatives from across the spectrum of groups of Egyptian activists who participated in the revolution. Such engagement is vital if we are to understand and influence decisions by such groups in the future. In my meetings with Field Marshal Tantawi and Prime Minister Sharaf, as well as welcoming the progress that has been made so far, I raised Britain’s concerns about the Egyptian authorities’ current use of military courts, rather than civil legal mechanisms, and about the rise of sectarian tensions in Egypt, which is gravely concerning.
Violent clashes between Salafi Muslims and Coptic Christians left up to 15 dead and more than 250 injured in Cairo earlier this month. Peaceful demonstrations about those events were attacked by gunmen on Sunday and 78 people were injured. We condemn that violence and call on both sides to find a peaceful resolution to their differences in the spirit of the unity shown in Tahrir square. The rights of Christian minorities in Egypt and across the middle east must be protected and we welcome the fact that many in Egypt are clearly appalled by those actions. Many in the House will be deeply concerned if we begin to see in Egypt signs of the dreadful attacks against Christians or any other minorities that have taken place in Iraq and elsewhere in the region.
None of us should be under any illusion about the scale of the transition still required in Egypt. The success of the Arab spring will largely be judged on what happens in the Arab world’s largest nation. The UK is offering technical assistance ahead of crucial elections in September. Last week, we hosted the Egyptian team who are responsible for the elections and gave them an overview of the electoral process in Britain. We are also discussing what assistance Britain can offer through our Arab partnership initiative to strengthen political participation and the rule of law, including anti-corruption efforts, but the international community must rapidly accelerate its assistance to Egypt.
We are arguing in the European Union, the United Nations, the G8 and international financial institutions for a transformative new relationship with the countries of the middle east and north Africa. We have put forward our proposals in Europe for a reformed neighbourhood policy that offers market access and trade in return for reform, leading eventually to a customs union and free trade area. We hope that the G8 summit in Deauville next week will mark the start of a new approach to the region and to co-ordinated and expanded financial assistance. Offering a new hand of friendship and a new partnership is the right response to the aspirations of the people in the region, but it is also manifestly in our own long-term interests. The response of Europe in particular must be as bold, ambitious and historic in its scale and nature as these events themselves.
I hope that the situation in Yemen will also be raised during those discussions because, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, a mass demonstration is planned for tomorrow at which thousands and thousands of people will be marching on the presidential palace. Ways in which we can help are through mediation, by trying to persuade the sides to come together, and by giving the financial assistance that is absolutely vital because Yemen is facing a humanitarian problem.
I shall come to Yemen in a moment, if the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to keep a semblance of order to my remarks, but he is quite right to raise that important issue.
The experiences of Egypt and Tunisia reveal an important lesson from the Arab spring—that an immense economic challenge goes hand in hand with the political opening up of those societies. Two other lessons should act as a warning in the region to those who might be tempted to think that legitimate aspirations can be ignored.
The first is that demands for political and economic freedom will spread more widely and by themselves, not because western nations advocate these things, but because they are the natural aspirations of all people everywhere. The second is that Governments who set their face against reform altogether are doomed to failure. Simply refusing to address legitimate grievances or attempting to stamp them out will fail. Reform is not a threat to stability; it is the guarantor of it over the long term. It is not credible or acceptable for any country in the region to repress now and suggest that reform will only follow later, nor is it sustainable to promise economic reform without steady political development.
This is our message to Syria, alongside our utter condemnation of the violence. Only meaningful reform that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people can provide peace and stability for Syria in the long term. The alternative—ever more violent repression—simply stokes up anger and frustration that will spill over in the future. On the point raised by the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), the European Union has already imposed a travel ban and assets freeze on 13 individuals in the Syrian regime, and on Friday we informed the Syrian ambassador to London that if the violence does not stop immediately, the EU will take further measures, including sanctions targeted at the highest levels of the Syrian Government.
Alongside this action in the EU we are seeking a response from the UN Security Council in New York, where we are working to convince others that the Security Council must send an unequivocal message of condemnation of the situation and call for urgent political reform.
The Foreign Secretary is making a perfectly correct and robust case, but does he agree that the emergence of protest right across the middle east changes the dynamics of the middle east peace process and the mood of the Palestinians, and that we need to ensure that the international community secures a response and that they do not feel that they are stuck in a time warp when things are changing all around them?
My right hon. Friend is right. That is changing the dynamics and it is important for all to understand that this increases the urgency of the middle east peace process, rather than meaning that it can be put off. The remaining opportunity to breathe new life into it must now be taken. I shall say more about that in a moment.
What steps is the Foreign Secretary taking to encourage Turkey to take a democratic lead in the region, which would also include ending the persecution of legitimately and democratically elected Kurdish politicians? That would give great succour to Kurdish people in Syria, who are the subject of murderous repression by their own Government.
Turkey is taking a lead in the region, in particular in trying to persuade the Syrian authorities to go down the route of reform, rather than the route of repression. We very much welcome the highly active role—not yet a successful role, but a highly active role —played by the Turkish Government in that regard. Of course, we look to Turkey, particularly as an aspirant nation for membership of the European Union, always to set a strong example itself.
While condemning so many things that have happened in some countries, we should welcome the fact that in some other countries of the Arab world Governments are setting out plans for reform. In March, the King of Morocco announced a package of reforms, including putting the national human rights body on an independent footing and constitutional changes that will be put to a referendum. Jordan has announced committees on national dialogue and constitutional and economic reform, and we look forward to those reforms being agreed and implemented.
In Yemen, the economic, security and humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. More protesters were killed only last week by Government forces, in violence that the whole House will deplore. The United Kingdom supports the Gulf Co-operation Council’s initiative to resolve the deadlock, which requires the President to step aside and a new Government to be formed who include members of the Opposition. We are in close contact with the GCC about the progress of negotiations, we have supported those negotiations, and we are in close contact with the United States and our partners in Europe about our wider approach to the country.
Instability in Yemen has serious implications for the terrorist threat from that country, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has demonstrated the intent and capability to attack western targets inside and outside Yemen. Britain and our allies are working around the clock to counter this threat and we will continue to do so. The arguments about the need for reform and dialogue apply to all countries in the region. Although each country is different, we will make the case to all that steps to reverse freedoms and curtail human rights are wrong and counter-productive.
We welcome the announcement in Bahrain that the state of national emergency will be lifted on 1 June and look forward to this commitment being met. We remain very concerned by the restrictions on freedom of speech and the reports of human rights abuses, including the widespread arrest of political activists and the severe charges brought against a number of doctors and nurses by a Bahraini tribunal. The Government of Bahrain must meet their human rights obligations and uphold political freedom, dialogue, equal access to justice and the rule of law. We also call on opposition groups in Bahrain to be prepared to enter into genuine dialogue.
That is very kind; I look forward to making many more interventions on that basis. Does the Secretary of State share the concern that Bahraini opposition activists will not receive fair trials and, if he does, does he think there is a role for the UK mission to send observers to witness those trials?
We certainly expect and will demand fair trials, and I have discussed that situation with Bahrain’s Foreign Minister in recent weeks, so it is very clear where the UK stands. We will send observers as necessary. Our embassy in Bahrain has been highly active for years in raising human rights concerns there, before the recent trouble, and in maintaining contact with opposition groups and good relations with the Government. We will keep that going.
Serious challenges also remain in Iraq. The formation of a national unity Government between Iraq’s major political blocs remains incomplete, the security situation is fragile and political tensions have risen. In recent months there have been a number of high-profile attacks and targeted assassinations by al-Qaeda and insurgent groups, but we judge the Iraqi security forces to have the necessary capabilities to prevent a wholesale return to violence. With its young democracy, oil reserves and economic potential, Iraq can become an important stabilising influence in the region and a key contributor to global energy security. Compromises must be made to end the stalemate and tackle the many grave problems the country faces.
The Arab spring remains in its early stages, in my view, and has caused uncertainty as well as optimism, but the middle east peace process must not be allowed to become a victim of that uncertainty. Delay leaves a vacuum of leadership which can be exploited by extremists or lead to increased violence. We are deeply concerned by emerging reports that up to 17 people were killed and many more injured over the weekend in violence in Israel and the occupied territories. We call on all parties to exercise restraint and protect civilian life.
The House will join me in paying tribute to the efforts of the UN special envoy, Senator Mitchell, who will step down from that position this week after two years of tireless efforts to restart talks. We believe that the parties must return to direct negotiations as soon as possible, on the basis of clear parameters for a two-state solution. We hope that the announcement of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas will lead to a Government who reject violence and pursue a negotiated peace. President Abbas has reaffirmed his commitment to a negotiated two-state solution based on 1967 borders. A new Government have yet to be formed, but when that happens we will judge them by their actions and their readiness to work for peace.
Today, when hon. Members from both sides of the House have joined in celebrating the 63rd anniversary of the independence of Israel, will the Foreign Secretary offer an assurance that the Government will not provide any support for organisations such as Hamas, which threatens not only Israel’s independence, but its very existence?
Further to that point, will the Foreign Secretary make clear the central importance that the Government place on the Quartet principles and state that no organisation, particularly Hamas in this instance, may genuinely be part of the peace process while it remains committed to Israel’s destruction?
Securing peace in the middle east must of course be done on the basis of the Quartet principles, which is why we will judge any Palestinian Administration by the conditions I have set out. As I have often said, we look to Hamas to make concrete movement towards the Quartet principles, which remain of central importance.
I have lost count of the number of Foreign Secretaries who have told us that every effort would be made to bring about a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Time and again that promise has been made, and I am sure with every genuine wish that it should be brought about, but it has not been. The situation of the Palestinians remains precisely what it has been since the occupied territories were taken in 1967. Is there any possibility that the United States—to a large extent it is the United States alone that will decide this—will move more than it has done so far, which in fact has not been much?
It is no discredit to my predecessors that they have worked hard on this, and it would be wrong to desist from doing so just because we have not been successful so far. I believe that President Obama will make a major speech this week on these matters, including the middle east peace process. The United States of course plays a central role in pushing this forward.
Could the Foreign Secretary explain how negotiations can take place and be successful in the new situation of a reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, which is exceptionally important, if Hamas is to be excluded in some way from peace making? Does he not remember Abba Eban, the former Israeli Foreign Minister, saying that one makes peace by talking to one’s enemies?
In this situation the interlocutor for Israel remains President Abbas. He insists, I understand, that he is available to negotiate with Israel on the same basis as before, that the Government he has formed will be ready to do that and that Hamas will not have changed the Government’s policy. I hope that a return to negotiations will be possible, notwithstanding all the difficulties the House can see.
I thank my right hon. Friend for being generous in giving way. On the point made by the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), does my right hon. Friend recognise the concern shared by many Members that until Hamas repudiates its stated position, which is that the state of Israel should not exist, it cannot come to the table? Furthermore, does he agree that unilateral declarations of statehood, rather than round-table discussions without conditions, are not the best way forward and that the latter are?
Negotiations on statehood are certainly the best way forward, but it is when those negotiations get nowhere that discussions about unilateral recognition get going in the world. That has to be recognised by all concerned. Yes, it is of course important for any peace in the future that all concerned recognise Israel’s right to exist, forswear violence and recognise previous agreements.
I am conscious that at this rate of progress mine might be the only speech in this debate and that I am yet to touch on Pakistan and Afghanistan, so I am going to be a little less generous in giving way and I will shorten what I was going to say about Iran.
The same urgency must apply to our efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme, which remains a vital international issue. Tackling Iranian nuclear proliferation will remain at the centre of our approach to the region. We are seeking to intensify, including through the EU, the impact of existing sanctions in order to slow down Iran’s acquisition of material and finance for its nuclear programme and press the Iranian Government to reconsider their position. The people of the middle east aspire to a better future. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a threat to that future, as are the continued efforts of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
No country has suffered more from the scourge of terrorism than Pakistan. In the 10 years since 9/11, more than 30,000 of its civilians have been killed and many more maimed or injured, including the 80 people killed in a suicide attack last week. Osama bin Laden’s death is therefore a blow against the forces undermining the Pakistani state and an opportunity for Pakistan, working with Britain and its allies, to redouble the fight against violent extremism. Pakistan should certainly address the many serious questions surrounding bin Laden’s likely support network in Pakistan. We welcome Prime Minister Gilani’s announcement of an investigation, which must be credible and thorough, but it is right that we support the Government of Pakistan in their efforts to defeat terrorism. More than 1 million people of Pakistani origin live in the UK and what happens in Pakistan directly affects us. As we help Pakistan today, we are also investing in our future security. The enhanced strategic dialogue that our Prime Minister launched with Pakistan last month strengthens our co-operation on many shared interests and supports that long-term goal.
We want the people of Pakistan to know that the UK seeks a long-term partnership with Pakistan for generations ahead. British development support is helping to tackle inequalities in Pakistani society, to get more children into school and to build communities that are more resistant to radicalisation. Whatever its concerns about sovereignty, Pakistan should use the opportunity of bin Laden’s death to side unconditionally with all those aiming to defeat al-Qaeda, including Muslim countries. We hope that Pakistan will decide not to turn its back in any way on the west, but to take up the offer of partnership from us and the Americans and to use this moment in order to build long-term strategic partnerships.
Neighbouring Afghanistan remains at the top of the Government’s priorities in foreign affairs.
Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm the very welcome report last week that the Prime Minister intends to make an announcement this month on the repatriation of 450 British troops—a report that gave great hope to the loved ones of those soldiers?
I am coming on to Afghanistan, and I will talk briefly about troop levels, but I will leave any such announcement for my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
We have received news in the past 24 hours—the hon. Gentleman’s remarks relate to this topic—of the death of a Royal Marine from 42 Commando Royal Marines, and the whole House will join me in paying tribute to that officer and in expressing our sincere condolences to his family.
Osama bin Laden’s death will not mean the end of the security threat posed by the insurgency, or of the need to build up the capacity of Afghans to take charge of their own affairs. We remain committed to building a stable and secure Afghanistan that is able to prevent international terrorist groups from operating from its territory. Bin Laden’s death presents a clear opportunity for the Taliban to break decisively from al-Qaeda and to participate in a peaceful political process.
I wish to spend the remaining few minutes of my speech—so that others can speak—updating the House on recent developments and on the Government’s overall strategy, treating these remarks as our quarterly report to Parliament on progress in Afghanistan. At the close of this debate, the Secretary of State for International Development will inform the House of development progress.
The next four years in Afghanistan will be decisive. The Prime Minister has made it clear that by 2015 our troops will no longer have a combat role or be there in the numbers they are in now. President Karzai and the international security assistance force coalition have confirmed that, by then, Afghanistan will be in charge of its own security. That process of security transfer is already under way, and President Karzai announced in March the first group of provinces and districts where the transition will begin. Lashkar Gah district in Helmand is in that first group, confirming the progress that we have made in improving security in central Helmand. The National Security Council has approved our strategy that will support this transition over the next four years.
The momentum of the insurgency has been halted and, in many areas, reversed. Afghan and ISAF forces are now working to consolidate gains, which are not yet irreversible, and levels of violence have been relatively low in recent months, although a little higher than in the same period last year. In April there were a number of insurgent attacks, including the barbaric assault on a UN compound in Mazar-e-Sharif and an attack on the Defence Ministry in Kabul, and there was the escape of a large number of insurgent detainees from prison in Kandahar. Those incidents underline the need to continue pursuing our counter-insurgency strategy and our efforts to build Afghan security capacity, but they should also be seen as of limited wider impact when placed in the context of the campaign. In early May, Taliban leaders announced the start of their spring offensive, and we must therefore be prepared for such attacks to continue.
The UK’s overall military contribution is well over 10,000 troops. In task force Helmand’s area of operation, our focus is on maintaining momentum and retaining the tactical initiative in preparation for the end of the poppy harvest, when Helmand’s fighting-age males, many of whom have in previous years turned to the insurgency for employment, must be encouraged not to do so again. We keep our force levels under constant review, and some reductions this year may be possible, to answer the question from the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), dependent upon conditions on the ground and the implementation of the security transition.
If the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghans is to succeed and endure, we have to build up Afghan capacity, and we are making progress on that. Afghan security forces responded capably to the Taliban’s co-ordinated assault on Kandahar city on 7 May. The numbers in the Afghan security forces continue to grow ahead of schedule, but just as important are the improvements being made in their capability and professionalism.
Some 95% of ISAF operations are conducted side by side with Afghan forces, and about 74% of Afghan national army kandaks and 75% of Afghan national police are now rated as effective with advisers or effective with assistance. Eleven out of 12 planned ANA branch schools are now open, teaching the soldiers the skills they will need to move from an infantry-centric force to a more self-supporting organisation.
Literacy rates in the army continue to improve, with 80,000 members of the security forces having now completed a period of literacy training and a further 60,000 in training at any one time. The NATO training mission estimates that in nine months more than half the Afghan security force will have completed basic literacy training, compared with just 15% today.
We continue to work with the Afghan Government and our international partners to support reconciliation in Afghanistan and to make progress towards a political settlement. We want a durable and inclusive settlement that respects the interests and rights of all Afghans. I agree with Secretary Clinton, who said on 18 February that we must intensify our efforts on a political process. We need to take advantage of military and civilian gains to make 2011 a year of reconciliation and transformation in Afghanistan. We will work with anyone who genuinely shares the goal of a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan that is not threatening to its neighbours and who are not threatened by it, and we look to the Bonn conference later this year as an important opportunity for progress.
In all the countries and regions that I have discussed today, we have a strong national interest in both democracy and stability, and our country is playing a major role bilaterally through the European Union, the United Nations and NATO, including in Afghanistan, where we are the second largest contributor of international forces.
This year already stands out as a momentous year in foreign affairs—one that not only gives rise to great optimism about the potential for greater economic and political freedom in a part of the world that has known little of either, but that generates risks to the United Kingdom which we will work to anticipate and address, working with our allies to protect our nation’s interests while standing up for the highest values of our society.