Victims and Prisoners Bill

Lord German Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 49 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I rise with the leave of the House and at the request of my noble friend Lord Marks to oppose the Question that Clause 49 stand part and speak to the stand part notices for Clauses 50, 51 and 52.

Clause 49 would disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act in respect of any decision made under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. That chapter of the 1997 Act sets out a range of provisions concerning life sentences and sentences of detention during His Majesty’s pleasure, including minimum-term review for under-18s. For life prisoners, the provisions concern release on licence, termination of licences for public protection, recall for breach of licence conditions, the duration of licences, release at the direction of the Parole Board and removal of life prisoners from the United Kingdom.

The chapter is specifically extended by this Bill, in particular by Clause 41, to provide, in respect of public protection decisions, those considerations that the decision-maker is to be bound to take into account relating to such things as the risk of reoffending and the risk of breach of licence conditions. The clause includes, ominously, the provision under Clause 41(9):

“This section does not limit the matters which the decision-maker must or may take into account when making a public protection decision”.


Clause 44 provides for the Secretary of State to have the power to direct the referral of a prisoner’s case to a court—currently the High Court or the Upper Tribunal —as discussed on 26 February. Clause 48 makes further provision about the termination of the licences for life prisoners for public protection. For all these provisions, Clause 49 would disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Section 3 lies at the heart of the human rights protection afforded by the Human Rights Act. It governs the interpretation of legislation by courts and also, importantly, by public authorities, and so effectively by all relevant public decision-makers. It provides:

“So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.


Section 3 gives legislative teeth to the convention, requiring legislation to be compatible where possible. Clause 49 would disapply that crucial protection in relation to this chapter of the 1997 Act and any subordinate legislation made under it.

The Explanatory Notes, in paragraph 353, claim that this disapplication

“will apply the section as it is intended to be applied, and not use section 3 to alter the interpretation”.

In other words, the clause is intended to operate in a way that enables convention rights to be ignored or overridden; otherwise there would be no point in the disapplication. This represents a real and important threat to human rights and should be removed from the Bill.

Clause 50 would operate in exactly the same way in respect of the provisions of Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to the licences, release, supervision and recall of fixed-term prisoners. These provisions are to be amended by Clauses 42, 45 and 47 of the Bill. At present, this chapter of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is subject to the protection of the interpretive requirement of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. Clause 50 would remove that provision, and not just in relation to the new provisions in the chapter introduced in this Bill. As with the 1997 Act dealt with in Clause 49, it would remove it in respect of the whole chapter of the 2003 Act dealing with fixed-term prisoners.

Similarly, Clause 51 would disapply Section 3 in respect of the amended Section 128 of the LASPO Act. This amends the power to change the release test for release on licence in cases involving public protection.

Clause 52 deals with a similar issue. It is not approaching the interpretation of legislation in the light of the convention, but the different question of whether a person’s convention rights have been breached in connection with a prisoner release decision under the two chapters I have previously mentioned in the 1997 and 2003 Acts.

Paragraph 354 of the Explanatory Notes sets out how to govern any challenge on human rights challenge under the convention to a prisoner release decision. Where Clause 52 is offensive is in subsection (3), which requires:

“The court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing the risk to the public from persons who have committed offences in respect of which custodial sentences have been imposed”.


That provision would apply regardless of the length of the custodial sentence imposed, regardless of what harm was being risked to the public and regardless of the injustice to the offender or the offender’s circumstances or the risk to the offender’s health, family or prospects of rehabilitation. What is the “greatest possible weight”? That, effectively, means exclusive weight—the only factor the judge is to consider.

When the Explanatory Notes say:

“Requiring the courts to give the greatest possible weight to this factor reinforces the precautionary approach and means that public protection will be given appropriate consideration in any balancing exercise”,


they are disingenuous. The provision does not call for a balancing exercise. It requires courts not to consider questions of balance or appropriate considerations, but instead to prefer one factor over all others. That is pernicious and ought to go. Judges are perfectly capable of performing balancing exercises. They can and do give appropriate weight to public protection when they do so. They should not have their judicial function curtailed in this way. The clause should go.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, here we go again. First, they came for the asylum seekers and then for the prisoners. Which unpopular and demonised group—to quote my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—will be next to be deprived of some of the rights contained in the Human Rights Act?

As some of us have been arguing during the passage of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill, to deprive marginalised groups of their human rights in this way undermines the principle of universality at the heart of human rights. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, quoted back at us that it is

“a fundamental tenet of modern human rights that they are universal and indivisible”.—[Official Report, 14/2/24; col. 342.]

He then went on to try to justify the very opposite.

In answer to some general Oral Questions on our human rights legislation in June, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice emphasised the Government’s commitment to

“a human rights framework that … works for the British people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/23; col. 145.]

He later talked about our legislation delivering on the interests of the British people. Leaving aside whether universal human rights can be confined to the British people, it raises the question of whether prisoners no longer count as British people.

As it is, some of the briefings we have received, including from the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Prison Reform Trust, make the point that in the words of the latter,

“it is precisely in custodial institutions like prison … that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state”.

The NAYJ, a member organisation which campaigns for the rights of and justice for children in trouble with the law, is particularly anxious about the implications for children in prison. The Law Society, the EHRC and the then chair of the JCHR have all expressed their deep concern about the diminution of human rights protection represented by these clauses. The EHRC, in particular, warns that there may be an impact on the UK’s international legal obligations.

The Constitution Committee sets out the government justification for these clauses in the human rights memorandum on the Bill, but invites us to seek further explanation from the Government as to what effect they intend to achieve with the disapplication of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. According to the memorandum, the intention is to ensure that the HRA does not get in the way of the policy intentions of the release regime. In other words, it seems to be saying that human rights should not trump government policy. No evidence is provided to justify the need for this diminution of human rights, and of course the clauses were not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.

In his response to the Second Reading debate, the Minister seemed to say that all the organisations expressing concern are making a mountain out of a molehill because Section 3 of the HRA is “a procedural provision only”. He argued that it gives the courts an

“unusual power to reinterpret what Parliament has said in a manner that may not have been and probably was not Parliament’s original intention so as to render a particular provision compatible with the convention”.—[Official Report, 23/12/23; col. 2135.]

This, he suggested, was a “neutral” description of the function of Section 3.

I am grateful to Amnesty for its help in making sense of what the Minister said, although it would be the first to emphasise that its analysis is in line with that of the independent Human Rights Act review, established by the Government. It questioned whether this was a “neutral” interpretation of the role of Section 3. The reference to reinterpreting legislation seemed to suggest that there is one legitimate act of interpretation, which is then challenged by a second questionable one under Section 3. But this interpretation is itself highly questionable. I am advised that Parliament intended for Section 3 to be used in the way that it is. There is no reason to think that Section 3 interpretations lead to interpretations that are “probably not” in line with Parliament’s original intention, as confirmed by the Human Rights Act review, even if that was not the view of one member of the commission cited by the Minister.

More practically, and I think for the first time in this context, the Minister suggested that it has been a difficult section to apply, with the case law having “gone all over the place” and the introduction of uncertainty where the Government want certainty. I am advised that while this may have been true of when Section 3 was first brought into force—although “all over the place” is a misleading description—that period has long passed and the legal issues around it have not substantively changed for the past decade or so. As the Minister acknowledged, it has “settled down more recently”. So having been in effect for 20 years, it is not at all clear why its continued function would create the kind of complexity and uncertainty the Minister fears.

If the Minister cannot come up with a more convincing case for the disapplication of Section 3 from a group of citizens for whom the protection of the Human Rights Act is especially important, given their relationship to the state, I certainly think that these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I have yet to hear any argument that justifies this further breach of the principle of the universality of human rights.

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[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, as your Lordships know, this group is a stand part challenge to Clauses 49 to 52 of the Bill, which, in essence, disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act to prisoner release legislation. The issue before us is, as much as anything, to do with the constitutional balance between Parliament and the courts. It is not about disapplying the Human Rights Act; it is about who does what. What do the courts do and what does Parliament do? That is the issue.

The provisions with which we are concerned include the new release test for releasing prisoners on licence—namely, the public protection test set out in Clauses 41 and 42, which make it abundantly clear that the protection of the public is the overriding factor. The Human Rights Act is also disapplied in relation to the referral mechanism, referring the most serious release decisions by the Parole Board to a court—currently the Upper Tribunal—and to other prison release decisions. As far as I am aware, no amendment has been tabled in this House objecting to the principle of the new public protection test, nor to the proposed referral mechanism—though there is an argument about which court it should go to—nor to the principle of our IPP reforms, except that it is argued that we should go further. Parliament has plainly indicated what it is trying to achieve.

Against this background, where exactly does Section 3 of the Human Rights Act fit in? Lest any misunderstanding persist—which it seems to do—my first point is that nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by any prisoners, or anyone else for that matter, by virtue of Section 1 of the Human Rights Act or under the convention. A breach of human rights may still be pleaded before any domestic court or in Strasbourg in the usual way, whether it be the right to liberty, family life or any other right protected by the convention. Clauses 49 to 51 do not alter or detract from those rights in any way.

Even if—which I do not for one moment believe—anything in the legislation from which Section 3 has been disapplied were held by a higher court to be incompatible with the convention rights, in such a hypothetical case it would be for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility. Then, in accordance with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, it would be for Parliament to decide what to do—whether to amend the legislation and, if so, in what way. In other words, it is the job of Parliament to make challenged legislation compatible with the convention. It is Parliament’s legislation; it is for Parliament to fix it, and it is the constitutional responsibility of everyone in either House to find a legislative solution.

The problem with Section 3 is that it gives finding the legislative solution to somebody else altogether—namely the court. This is Parliament’s legislation and not the courts’. That was why I said at Second Reading that Section 3 of the HRA is, in essence, a procedural and interpretive provision that requires legislation to be given effect to in a way which is compatible with convention rights. Those words “given effect” have led, in certain circumstances, to the court reading in or reading down words into the legislation that Parliament has passed. In other words, the court is empowered under Section 3 to add to or subtract from what Parliament originally intended. This has been a difficult section to apply. It has required courts to depart from Parliament’s intention and, if I may say so, to stray into the legislative realm.

These amendments directly raise the proper balance between the courts and Parliament when it comes to legislative matters. That issue was highlighted in the 2021 Independent Human Rights Act Review. It was discussed over 80 pages, toing and froing on all sorts of points and suggesting numerous recommendations and amendments, with the majority of the panel finally recommending a series of reforms to Sections 2 and 3.

On the Government’s position that Section 3 is a most unusual power in this respect, I can do no better than refer your Lordships to the trenchant criticism of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act on constitutional grounds by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, King’s Counsel, present in this Chamber, in his evidence to that 2021 review. His basic point was that it is not the function of the courts to legislate; it is the function of Parliament. Against that background, in the present context, the Government’s position is that, on an issue of importance, such as public protection and prisoner release, it is for Parliament to determine what the test should be.

In the unlikely event of any of those provisions being disapplied, and a declaration being made under Section 4, again, it is for this House and the other place to put it right and not to delegate, abdicate or push away that responsibility on to the courts. That is the Government’s position and it is essentially a question of the constitutional balance between what we do and what somebody else does—in other words, the courts. That is essentially the background to these amendments.

Clause 52 sets out the approach a court should take if there is a challenge on human rights grounds regarding the release of a prisoner. I do not accept the characterisation by the noble Lord, Lord German, that the wording of Clause 52 is effectively saying that public protection is an exclusive requirement; it simply says that that is a requirement to which weight should be given. No doubt, the courts are perfectly capable of arriving at a sensible interpretation of the provision, but the Government’s view is that the importance of public protection is a matter that Parliament can rightly draw to the court’s attention as something to which weight should be given. I will just add that that requirement does not apply to the so-called non-derogable rights under the convention, which are: Article 2, the right to life; Article 3, the prohibition of torture; Article 4, the prohibition of slavery, and Article 7, no punishment without law.

The courts already consider risk to the public. The Bill simply ensures that weight is properly given to that consideration. The essential point is that on these matters, in this context, it is not for someone else to be reading in or reading down what your Lordships decide; it is for your Lordships and for Members of the other House to put matters right.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, having heard that explanation, on the first part I suspect that this will have to come back when we have an array of former judges of all sorts in this House to test the position the Government have placed on this matter. To a lay person, it seems to be on a trail of chipping away Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, in particular. Therefore, I think this can wait for another day to have that legal learning that I think we will all need to take it on board.

In respect of the Minister’s second point, about weight, it would not be so bad if it were simply “weight”; it would not be quite so bad if it were “great weight”; but it is “the greatest possible weight” and the greatest possible weight to me means virtually everything you can possibly put into it. I will take a simple Welsh analogy. You have a scrum. You put the weight of everybody into it with the objective of pushing the other side off the ball so that you can take it yourselves. That is where you would apply “the greatest possible weight”. There might be a bit of pulling of hair and ears, and whatever else goes on inside a scrum—but I am not going to talk about that any more.

If you think about it, though, the words “the greatest possible weight” are pretty conclusive that what you must do is virtually everything that is in sight. So, I take on board the Minister’s view that the word “weight” is important, but I do not take on board the words “the greatest possible weight”. However, on the basis of the future legal discussion we are likely to have in this House, I beg leave to withdraw my objection to Clause 49 standing part.

Clause 49 agreed.

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[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I too echo the words that have been spoken. Rather than repeating all this or speaking to this in the next group, I will talk about those issues in this group because they are very relevant to these amendments.

I have a series of practical questions. For example, stating which Parole Board members should be involved in a particular case is definitely an interference in the independence of the board. If the reply to that is, “Well we need to make sure that the right people are hearing the right cases”, surely all you have to do is to make sure you appoint to the panels more people who have those experiences available to them. The Government, of course, have gone on the issue of those with enforcement experience. You simply recruit more enforcement-experienced people to the panels.

I agree with what has just been said. These parts of the clauses are analogous to the Government deciding who will be the judge in a particular case. Whether the chair should be involved in individual cases is a matter for the board; it should not be the subject of statutory prescription, as is before us now.

There is concern about the broad powers given to the Secretary of State to remove the chair on the grounds of public confidence. The outgoing chair of the Parole Board, Caroline Corby, said in her evidence to the Justice Committee that the power to remove the chair could see them dismissed if the board made an “unpopular decision”. Unpopular with whom? With the Secretary of State, perhaps. As the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, just said, she argued that

“the chair of the Parole Board needs more protection than pretty much any other chair of any arm’s length body”.

There is already a termination clause which means that the chair of the Parole Board, or any other member, can be removed. It is therefore not clear why a statutory power is needed. Perhaps the Minister can explain to us why he needs a statutory power rather than relying on the contractual power he already has.

Who is going to judge that public confidence has been breached and when? What is the need for this confidence test? Does the existing contract not provide for appropriate removal? What is going to be the threshold for the new test of breached public confidence? Will it be an opinion poll? Will it be an assessment of the latest newspaper cuttings? What will be the criteria? How will that threshold be applied? As many of us suspect, will it rest merely with the subjective view of the Secretary of State, which is the reason why it appears in the Bill at this point?

Public opinion should not form the basis for ministerial interference in an independent body making quasi-judicial decisions. I say “quasi-judicial” because that is what the Government say they are called. Most people would just call them “judicial”. Last year the High Court noted that:

“It is … well established that, when exercising powers in relation to the Board, the Secretary of State must not to do anything that undermines or would be perceived as undermining the independence of the Board or that encroaches upon or interferes with the exercise by the Board of its judicial responsibilities”.


There is no explanation anywhere why engagement in individual applications is needed. Currently, the chair holds these quasi-judicial judgments in his or her hands. Paragraph 14B of the board’s current rules, which were put before this House in 2022, states that:

“The Board chair may determine an appeal by—(a) upholding the decision made by the panel chair or duty member … or (b) substituting their own decision, which may contain any direction that the panel chair or duty member could have made under paragraph (5)”


of the rules.

Pages 67 and 68 of the root and branch review made no such recommendation to neuter the chair. Instead, the review supported a strategic oversight group and a rules committee to recommend procedural changes to the Secretary of State. The impact assessment for this Bill states that the chair will be appointed for a three-year term, renewable. However, the job pack, a copy of which I have with me, issued by the Ministry of Justice with a closure date of just last month, states that the appointment is to be made for five years. So applications closed in February and people have applied for a job where the tenure of the job—whether it is three or five years—is not known. I hope that the Minister can tell us how that circle is to be squared.

Can the Minister confirm the delegated authority that the Secretary of State has given to Ministers for appointment of the role of board chair? Does it remain as it was when Liz Truss was the Secretary of State, because, on delegation to Ministers, the review said that Ministers

“should be involved at every stage of a competition, including: agreeing the advertising and the advisory assessment panel membership; suggesting potential candidates; being consulted on closing a competition; being invited to give views on candidates; being provided with a choice of appointable … candidates; and having the opportunity to meet candidates”.

If that is still the case, Ministers have an incredible influence over the person to be appointed, and one might reasonably wonder why they might want to sack them.

So those are a lot of practical questions, some of which are contained within the Bill and within the job pack for the new person taking over the role, which need to be clarified. I hope that the Minister in replying will be able to answer them.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for missing the opening part of this debate. I was with representatives of the Bar Council discussing these very issues.

Having chaired a committee that questioned Dominic Raab about his ambitions for the Executive to take over functions which I do not think that any of us regarded as appropriate for takeover, this seems to me to be Members of the House of Lords doing what we do so well. We are trying to help find a way through and answer the questions. We should just be rubbing the whole thing out because of that Executive takeover, which is anathema to probably everybody who is sitting in the Chamber at the moment.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I have heard the arguments. I hope that the noble Baroness will allow that I have already given an undertaking to take those arguments back with me, and I will do so.

Turning, if I may, to Amendments 170 and 171, the first of these seeks to remove the power currently in the Bill which would allow the Secretary of State to dismiss the Parole Board chair on public confidence grounds and would remove the prohibition on the chair’s involvement in individual parole cases. Amendment 171 seeks to ensure that the chair would continue to be permitted to attend and participate in individual parole cases alongside the more strategic role defined by other amendments to the chair’s functions.

Let me begin by confirming that Clause 54(10) means that any changes in respect of the chair of the Parole Board do not impact on the appointment or functions of the current chair, Caroline Corby. Caroline has led the board well since her initial appointment in 2018, and the Government are very grateful to her for her leadership. However, there might be an exceptional occasion in the future when requiring a change of chair before the end of their appointment period is the best or only option. For that reason, new sub-paragraph (2C) within Clause 54(5) gives the Secretary of State the power to remove a chair from office if it becomes necessary on the grounds of public confidence.

[Lord German (LD)]

What is the term of office? There is a difference between the impact assessment, which says three years, and the pack against which people have applied, which says five years. Which is true? I am happy if the Minister wants to reply in writing.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I will reply in writing, if the noble Lord will let me.

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[Earl Howe (Con)]

That is exactly why I said that it is not a power that it is likely any Secretary of State would use often, if at all.

[Lord German (LD)]

To add to that point, I read out the list of delegations to Ministers about the appointment of the Parole Board chair. I am sure that Members of the House will have realised that it is a pretty extensive power over who gets a job. I wonder whether those delegations have altered. Once again, if the Minister does not know, perhaps he could write to me before we get to Report.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I should be happy to do so.

Alongside this new power, we are setting out for the first time in statute the functions of the Parole Board’s chair. The intention is both to define the chair’s role as a strategic leadership role and to make it clear that the postholder does not play any part in the board’s decision-making when it comes to considering individual parole cases. The package of measures here, I am advised, ensures that the provisions that we are putting in place are consistent with the European convention.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked me why the Justice Secretary will send only some cases to the Upper Tribunal, and whether he will delegate the power to officials. In line with other significant powers that the Secretary of State operates, such as the power to detain under Section 244ZB of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allows the SSJ to override a prisoner’s automatic release date and refer the case to the board, the operation of the power will be restricted to cases where it is considered necessary to take the not insignificant step of referral of a case via an operational policy.

It will be up to the Secretary of State to decide which of those cases they would like to refer to an independent court for a second check. We will develop criteria to ensure that this power is used only in those few cases where it is in the interests of protecting the public and maintaining public confidence. It will also be up to the Secretary of State, if he or she wishes, to delegate the power to senior officials, but we will ensure that there is a robust process in place.

I am of the view that retaining this clause—having a safeguard in case removal is ever necessary and being clear about what the role of the chair is—is vital. However, as I said at the start, I have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords have said. I understand the concerns expressed. Without commitment at this stage, I undertake to consider the issues very carefully, in conjunction with my noble and learned friend, between now and Report.