Victims and Prisoners Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group is actually more limited than the debate that we have had. It was very succinctly set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when he gave his three short points in introducing his amendments. Very amusingly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said that the shadow of Dominic Raab should not remain across this Bill. A good way of removing the shadow is with these three amendments here.

The debate has strayed into the next group, but I will not address any comments on that group. As far as the specific proposals in the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, of course we agree with them on this side of the Chamber. I noted the point that the noble and learned Lord made about the reason why the chair of the Parole Board would not have a judicial function. It would mean that he or she could be sacked.

I also noted the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and other noble Lords, that it is absolutely normal and to be expected that in any number of judicial and quasi-judicial roles, the heads of those particular functions also sit as judges. That is standard practice and it adds confidence to the various institutions that the people who head them are also practising and sitting tribunal chairs or judges.

I look forward to the Minister’s response, but there is a very strong array of speakers against the Government’s proposals, including the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, who is a former chair of the Parole Board. We have two former Lord Chief Justices, a former Solicitor-General and my noble friend, a former shadow Attorney-General. It sounds like a pretty convincing line-up against the Minister.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for speaking to his amendments with his customary clarity. I hope I can be helpful to him and the Committee in my response.

I have heard unmistakeably the reservations expressed across the Committee about these proposals. Before saying anything else, I undertake to represent to my noble and learned friend the Minister the strength of those reservations. I do so without commitment at this stage but in good faith. It may be helpful to the Committee if I explain where the Government are currently coming from in making these proposals so that noble Lords can understand the issues as we perceive them.

Amendment 169 seeks to remove lines 35 and 36 of Clause 53, which would have the same effect as removing the clause in its entirety. Clause 53 amends Section 239(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allows the Secretary of State to make rules with respect to the proceedings of the Parole Board. At the moment, the provision permits rules to be made about how many members deal with particular cases, or that specified cases be dealt with at specified times. This clause adds that the Secretary of State may also require cases to be dealt with by

“members of a prescribed description”.

Amendment 169 seeks to remove that addition.

I will explain briefly why we want to ensure that the Secretary of State can make rules about who sits on parole cases. In the Root and Branch Review of the Parole System, the Government committed to increasing

“the number of Parole Board members from a law enforcement background”

and ensuring that every parole panel considering a case involving the most serious offenders has a law enforcement member on it. We are talking here about murder, rape, terrorist offences and the like.

The Government of course recognise that each and every type of Parole Board member brings with them different experience and skills. That range and diversity contributes to generally effective risk assessments and sound decision-making. However, members with law enforcement experience, such as former police officers, have particular first-hand knowledge of the impact and seriousness of offending. Many will also have direct experience of the probation system, including, for example, licence conditions and the likelihood of an offender’s compliance with such conditions.

Clause 53 enables the Secretary of State to make the secondary legislation needed to prescribe that certain Parole Board panels include members with a law enforcement background. We will, naturally, continue to consider operational readiness before we lay any secondary legislation. I hope that explanation is of help.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Am I to draw the inference from what my noble friend has just said that, under the current arrangements, inappropriate members of the board have been inappropriately appointed to particular cases?

[Earl Howe (Con)]

No, not at all, but we think that certain Parole Boards can be strengthened usefully by having additional members with the experience that I have described. I have not implied or, I hope, made any criticisms of Parole Boards that have sat in the past or their decisions.

[Baroness Prashar (CB)]

My Lords, I think that the explanation means that there is no confidence in the judgment of the chairman of the Parole Board to constitute the panels that they think are needed. Why is there a need for direction from the Secretary of State? That is what I fail to understand.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I have heard the arguments. I hope that the noble Baroness will allow that I have already given an undertaking to take those arguments back with me, and I will do so.

Turning, if I may, to Amendments 170 and 171, the first of these seeks to remove the power currently in the Bill which would allow the Secretary of State to dismiss the Parole Board chair on public confidence grounds and would remove the prohibition on the chair’s involvement in individual parole cases. Amendment 171 seeks to ensure that the chair would continue to be permitted to attend and participate in individual parole cases alongside the more strategic role defined by other amendments to the chair’s functions.

Let me begin by confirming that Clause 54(10) means that any changes in respect of the chair of the Parole Board do not impact on the appointment or functions of the current chair, Caroline Corby. Caroline has led the board well since her initial appointment in 2018, and the Government are very grateful to her for her leadership. However, there might be an exceptional occasion in the future when requiring a change of chair before the end of their appointment period is the best or only option. For that reason, new sub-paragraph (2C) within Clause 54(5) gives the Secretary of State the power to remove a chair from office if it becomes necessary on the grounds of public confidence.

[Lord German (LD)]

What is the term of office? There is a difference between the impact assessment, which says three years, and the pack against which people have applied, which says five years. Which is true? I am happy if the Minister wants to reply in writing.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I will reply in writing, if the noble Lord will let me.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I am sorry that it is very late and I am being tiresome. My noble friend the Minister said that there may come a time or there may be circumstances in which it would be necessary to remove the chairman or chairwoman of the Parole Board. I wonder whether my noble friend could perhaps give me one or two examples of the sets of circumstances in which that might apply.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

A mechanism already exists for the Secretary of State to ask an independent panel to consider dismissing the chair if there are concerns about the postholder’s performance or ability to do the job effectively. That route remains our preferred approach in the unlikely event that a dismissal is required. However, as the board is a high-profile public body, making important decisions on public protection every day, it is right, in the Government’s submission, that the Justice Secretary should have the levers to change the leadership if a situation arose where it was necessary to do so in order to maintain public confidence in the work of the board. It is not a power that any Secretary of State would ever use lightly, and ideally there will never be a cause to use it at all. We are talking here about situations where, for example, there might be conflicts of interest, security issues or confidentiality issues. At the moment, my understanding is that there is no mechanism to dismiss a chair should any issue of that kind arise. The grounds at the moment are quite restrictive.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Just to be clear, the Government are proposing that they will need to sack somebody who could be responsible for a breach of confidence, a breach of security, or some other grievous breach; but they will already have appointed this person to that job. Surely the vetting procedure leading up to the appointment would weed out the sort of eccentric people who would leak, or breach confidence, or misconduct themselves.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

That is exactly why I said that it is not a power that it is likely any Secretary of State would use often, if at all.

[Lord German (LD)]

To add to that point, I read out the list of delegations to Ministers about the appointment of the Parole Board chair. I am sure that Members of the House will have realised that it is a pretty extensive power over who gets a job. I wonder whether those delegations have altered. Once again, if the Minister does not know, perhaps he could write to me before we get to Report.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I should be happy to do so.

Alongside this new power, we are setting out for the first time in statute the functions of the Parole Board’s chair. The intention is both to define the chair’s role as a strategic leadership role and to make it clear that the postholder does not play any part in the board’s decision-making when it comes to considering individual parole cases. The package of measures here, I am advised, ensures that the provisions that we are putting in place are consistent with the European convention.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked me why the Justice Secretary will send only some cases to the Upper Tribunal, and whether he will delegate the power to officials. In line with other significant powers that the Secretary of State operates, such as the power to detain under Section 244ZB of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allows the SSJ to override a prisoner’s automatic release date and refer the case to the board, the operation of the power will be restricted to cases where it is considered necessary to take the not insignificant step of referral of a case via an operational policy.

It will be up to the Secretary of State to decide which of those cases they would like to refer to an independent court for a second check. We will develop criteria to ensure that this power is used only in those few cases where it is in the interests of protecting the public and maintaining public confidence. It will also be up to the Secretary of State, if he or she wishes, to delegate the power to senior officials, but we will ensure that there is a robust process in place.

I am of the view that retaining this clause—having a safeguard in case removal is ever necessary and being clear about what the role of the chair is—is vital. However, as I said at the start, I have listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords have said. I understand the concerns expressed. Without commitment at this stage, I undertake to consider the issues very carefully, in conjunction with my noble and learned friend, between now and Report.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I thank the noble Earl for agreeing to take all these points to the Minister. There are two points I really want to make. First, it is suggested that these decisions are somehow quasi-judicial. I had assumed that two of our most basic rights are not to be locked up and not to have our freedoms curtailed by restrictions. Deciding on those points is judicial; there is nothing “quasi” about it. Therefore, how “quasi” has got into this is, to my mind, a complete misapprehension. I hope it can be corrected, because the protection of your liberty and your freedom to do what you do as an ordinary person is essentially something that a judge must decide and no one else.

Secondly, I hope the Minister—not the noble Earl—will think back to his own experience when he sat as chairman of various judicial bodies. I do not know who the Government have in mind, but it is utterly absurd to think that they could maybe appoint someone who has run a large department store—there may be one of those becoming vacant in a moment—someone who has been head of a particular branch of the Civil Service, a retired physician, or a person who has run a hospital trust. These are the kind of people who know absolutely nothing about the difficulties of making a decision. The chairman of the Parole Board has to do the business, and if that person does not do the business, no one—not the public and certainly not the members of the Parole Board—will have any confidence in them.

I have put the message quite strongly; I think it has been understood. I am sorry to have gone on a little bit longer on these points at this late hour. I must particularly thank the noble Earl for the very courteous and clear way that he dealt with this. I look forward to seeing him be a much better advocate than me in persuading the Minister to make a decision that removes all three of these clauses. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.