Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill [Lords]

Lord Garnier Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Monday 31st October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Whittingdale]

That point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) earlier. The fact that there have been no convictions does not necessarily imply that the Act is not working—it is important to have it on the statute book. I do not believe that this country is full of dodgy art dealers who wilfully ignore the law and deal in plainly illegally exported objects.

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

Nor should we go around lowering the threshold in order to scoop up innocent people.

[Mr Whittingdale]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a perfectly valid point and I agree with him. The art market is determined and supports the Bill. The last thing it wants is for this country to become a place where people can deal in unlawfully exported objects. It is worth bearing in mind that the market is hugely competitive and the third biggest in the world—it was worth something like £9 billion in sales in 2014. I would not like to see it inadvertently put at a disadvantage compared with other markets around the globe. I hope the Government bear that in mind. As I have said, I very much welcome their commitment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con)]

I am delighted to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (David Warburton) but, with all due respect, if there are two speeches to which the Government should pay particular attention, they are those of my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) and my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). Despite the excellence of the other speeches from both sides of the House, they are the two that really hit the problems on the head.

The Bill is welcome and I wholeheartedly support it, subject to one or two concerns that I shall touch on briefly. The first relates to the definition of cultural property, as mentioned by several hon. and right hon. Members. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport also touched on the topic in her opening remarks. The definition in the Bill lacks sufficient clarity. I accept that the Bill refers us to article 1 of The Hague convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict but, taking the example of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan), film and so on were I suspect not considered when the convention was drawn up in the early 1950s. New forms of heritage—if that is not a contradiction in terms—have emerged since then, and the Government need to give the definition of cultural property a little more thought. That is not an aggressive point; I simply want to point out something that it would be sensible for the Government to look into.

The other area that also needs more thought is the absence of any definition of an occupied territory. My right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon mentioned that when he was Chairman of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, the west bank, the Golan heights and perhaps another place—

[Mr Whittingdale]

East Jerusalem.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

East Jerusalem—they were designated as occupied territories. However, the world has moved on and, as my right hon. Friend correctly pointed out, there are now other parts of the world that could, either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, be considered occupied territories. The Government must be more open, or at least clearer, about the definition of an occupied territory.

There is, however, perhaps an even more important matter that needs resolving, which involves the level of criminal intent for the offences described in clause 17. In framing my remarks, I am grateful for the help I have had from the British Art Market Federation, the British Antique Dealers’ Association, Mr Hugo Keith QC, and Professor Janet Ulph of the University of Leicester school of law. I stress, however, that what I shall say is my interpretation. If I have got things wrong, that is my fault and not the fault of those who valiantly tried to explain the matter to me. You will be glad to hear, Mr Speaker, that I cannot for reasons of time go into the detailed legal analysis undertaken by them, but I sent the Secretary of State a copy of Mr Keith’s opinion, which carefully explains why the use of “reason to suspect” in the context of this Bill is unwise and unfair.

Clause 17(1) makes it an offence to

“deal in unlawfully exported cultural property”

that the dealer knows or has

“reason to suspect… has been unlawfully exported.”

So far, so good. No one can support the dealing in unlawfully exported cultural property when they know it has been unlawfully exported, but the mens rea—criminal intent—required under the provision has caused concern in the London art market. The worry is that “reason to suspect” will place an unacceptable and stifling burden on the market. That aspect of the Bill was touched on only briefly in the other place but was not taken up by the Government.

Clause 17 creates an offence of dishonesty, carrying with it a sentence of imprisonment of up to seven years, as well as the destruction of reputation. The problem that worries me arises from the provision that relates to the state of mind, which must be proved before the defendant can be convicted. Dealing in prohibited property knowing that it has been unlawfully exported, the first offence created by clause 17, is simple, easily described, uncontroversial and comes within well-established and clearly understood principles of criminal law. Dealing in such prohibited property believing that it has been unlawfully exported would also be an equally straightforward offence. “Knowledge” or “belief” identify the mens rea, or criminal state of mind, accompanying the prohibited activity. To establish guilt, the prosecution would have to prove that at the time when the prohibited activity took place the defendant knew or believed that he was dealing in prohibited property.

That, however, is not what the second offence created by clause 17 provides. Rather, it defines the criminal activity—dealing in prohibited property—but by relating the criminal state of mind required for the offence to “suspicion” it introduces an unusual concept into the ordinary law that applies to offences of dishonesty. Indeed, it does not even provide that the offence is proved if the defendant personally suspected that he was dealing in prohibited property.

[Victoria Prentis (Banbury) (Con)]

Can my right hon. and learned Friend think of any other examples of mens rea of this type that are in use?

[Sir Edward Garnier]

One often sees the type currently drafted into clause 17 when a defendant has to rebut a presumption—the possession of certain items in sexual offences or drugs offences. It is also to be found under certain rarely used disclosure offences, such as under section 119 of the Companies Act 2006—something that we speak about so frequently in the clubs and bars of Market Harborough. As regards the substantive criminal law and the making of a substantive criminal offence, my hon. Friend is right to say that this is a rare and wholly unusual distinction, and I quietly urge the Government to think again.

As drafted, this provision abandons the principle that it is the defendant’s state of mind that must be “criminal”, whether defined in terms of belief or even suspicion, for an objective test: whether he had reason to suspect. What may arise from an offence defined in that way can be quickly described. The defendant may be offered property which, because of the circumstances, he may have reason to suspect may be prohibited. Just because he wishes to proceed with caution, and to avoid committing a criminal offence, after sensible inquiry and investigation he may in good faith decide that his suspicions have been allayed and proceed to deal in the property. For a defendant acting in good faith to be convicted of an offence of dishonesty is a novel proposition. It may be suggested that the offence is not intending to apply to such an individual, but only to the individual who, notwithstanding any investigations he may make, turns a blind eye to reasonable grounds for suspicion, but that is not what the clause says. The offence can and should be defined in terms of the defendant’s belief or suspicion, and currently it is not.

Surely the question to ask is whether the defendant did or did not believe, or did or did not suspect. The more powerful the evidence that he had reason to suspect, the more likely it is that the jury would conclude that he did indeed believe or suspect, and that the offence is proved. In short, where the defendant did indeed have “reason to suspect”, that would provide the evidence to establish that he did indeed believe or suspect that he was dealing in prohibited property. That however goes to the evidence available to prove guilt; it should not define the offence.

It would be unusual for an offence of dishonesty to be created that did not focus on the defendant’s personal state of mind. It would also be unusual to create two offences in a single provision which make provision for separate and distinctive forms of criminal intent: knowledge, which is entirely subjective; and reason to suspect, which is not. Any summing up in an indictment which alleges the two offences as alternatives would not be straightforward. Worse still, it would be unwise, and it would make for significant complexity in any trial for two statutes with the same objective—the protection of the cultural heritage of every nation—not to define criminal intent in exactly the same way.

Section 1 of the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 states—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I do apologise to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but when he leant down like that, I thought it was because he was approaching his peroration. That may have been a triumph of optimism over experience.

[Tim Loughton]

Ungallant.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

Ms Bell, I think, has spoken on my behalf. I was just advising you, Mr Speaker, about section 1 of the 2003 Act, which I know you want to hear about.

[Mr Speaker]

Indeed.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

At least I am right about that. [Laughter.] It states:

“A person is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly deals in a cultural object that is tainted, knowing or believing that the object is tainted.”

This Bill says that it is

“an offence for a person to deal in unlawfully exported cultural property, knowing or having reason to suspect that it has been unlawfully exported.”

For the reasons that I have been briefly explaining, I suspect that the 2003 Act provides the better wording. The provision in this Bill is not following well-established principles relating to the prosecution of offences of dishonesty. I am concerned that the Bill, which is concerned with the same issues, fails properly to take into account that set of principles. As drafted, it may result in the prosecution and conviction for an offence of dishonesty of a defendant who has, or may have, acted in good faith.

It is one thing for a defendant to be convicted of handling stolen goods where they have been shown to have known or believed the goods were stolen—the law is clear and the defendant knows when he is convicted that the jury was sure he knew or believed the goods were stolen—but under this Bill, as currently framed, a convicted defendant cannot be sure that his conviction reflects his actual state of knowledge or belief and that he was not convicted simply for lacking curiosity. Absence of curiosity may be regrettable and sometimes stupid or negligent, but it should not lead to a conviction, with all the reputational damage that flows from it.

Beyond that, I urge the Government to consider what effect this provision will have on the art market here in London. As was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark, who speaks with the advantage of being not only a lawyer, but a former director of Christie’s, this will have a stifling effect. It may be that there will not be many convictions or many arrests, but the mere threat of the reputational damage caused by this possibility is enough to put the mockers on this valuable and entirely legitimate aspect of the London art market. The art market will go elsewhere and the crooks will get away with it. If we want to catch the bad boys, and if we want to inhibit this wrong and immoral market, why not stick to the 2003 wording or something similar to it, rather than allowing this Bill to contain an error of principle which could confound the interests of all of us who wish to see the destruction and the dealing in cultural objects that have been stolen brought to an end?

[Tim Loughton (East Worthing and Shoreham) (Con)]

I am delighted to follow my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), peroration and all. I declare an interest, as the chairman of the all-party groups on archaeology and on the British Museum, and as a fellow of the Society of Antiquaries.

As we have all agreed, the Bill has been a long time coming—it is 62 years old. As I glance around the room, I hazard a guess that that makes it older than anybody in the Chamber, now that my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames) has left.

[Sir Edward Garnier]

rose—

[Tim Loughton]

I am delighted to be put right by my right hon. and learned Friend, although we would never know it, Mr Speaker.

I also pay tribute to what is left of the Labour Opposition and the remarkable dexterity of the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) who, in a debate on cultural artefacts, managed to mention Keats, Uber taxi drivers, the temple of Bel and an attack on private education. He certainly gave us his money’s worth, even if he does not have many mates with him to support this excellent Bill.

I very much welcome the Bill. We know that the original protocol and convention were passed in 1954, largely as a reaction to the destruction of cultural artefacts of the second world war. We know that the second protocol, which came about in 1999, mostly followed in the wake of great destruction in the former republic of Yugoslavia. We recall the familiar scenes at the UNESCO world heritage sites such as the Mostar bridge, which really brought home the futility of war and the destruction of our culture, which we just do not get back. That protocol recognised that the desecration of cultural property could become a war crime and identified the blue shield scheme, which many Members have referred to. It also set up an international non-governmental organisation advisory body to the intergovernmental committee for the convention. There were therefore great hopes in 1999 that we might follow suit. We have made reference to the heritage Minister Andrew McIntosh, who brought forward in 2004 a commitment to ratify the convention. That led to a Bill in 2008, which was scrutinised by the Select Committee, led by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale). The Bill was supported by the Ministry of Defence and the whole heritage sector, but the excuse given for what happened was that it became overshadowed by the financial crisis and ran out of parliamentary time. Then in 2011, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey), as a Minister, reconfirmed the Government’s commitment to ratification at the “earliest possible opportunity”.

In 2014, there was another great body blow when the Cabinet Committee said that it had not been able to grant drafting authority for a Bill—not even a handout Bill. The commitment of successive Governments was in question when their warm words were not followed up by definitive action. At long last, that earliest possible opportunity has arrived. I particularly pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon—he is not in his place at the moment—whose personal commitment to this matter and lobbying of the powers that be at No. 10 has made this Bill a reality.

The announcement in last year’s autumn statement of the £30 million cultural protection fund together with a summit of heritage experts really gave flesh to that commitment. The legislative wheels grind frustratingly slowly, and, as with the second protocol, it has taken the cultural cleansing atrocities in Syria and Iraq to concentrate the minds of those in a position to bring forward this ratification today.

I do not want to be churlish, because I really welcome the Bill and the commitment behind it. I absolutely praise all those who have played an integral part in this. Many of them have been mentioned today. I am talking about Sir Neil MacGregor, the former outstanding director of the British Museum, and my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) who, in his relatively short time in this House, has made a big impact in this area. It is really important now that we get on with it. We need to gain the moral high ground and become the only one of the five permanent UN Security Council member countries to ratify both the protocols and the convention.

Why is this important? At a time when we are seeing horrific scenes of women, children and men being bombed, murdered and executed in the most grotesque fashion by Daesh in the tragic conflicts in both Syria and Yemen, why should we be concerned about a bunch of old rocks and relics? My hon. Friend the Member for Newark described just a couple of examples. Let me mention Professor Assad, the director of antiquities at Palmyra, which I was privileged enough to visit just before the civil war in Syria—it is the most magical archaeological site imaginable, and I speak as someone who studied Mesopotamian archaeology and who has visited many sites—and the guards at Nineveh. These people gave their lives because they appreciated and understood the importance of protecting culture as the spirit of a nation, and that it makes mankind what it is and is what separates mankind from savages. As the Heritage Alliance put it:

“The destruction of cultural capital is a powerful propaganda tool and is part of a long history of demoralising communities by destroying the symbols of their nationhood.”

As Irina Bokova, the director general of UNESCO, said, this is “cultural cleansing”, and we must view it as such and in the same terms as trafficking.