Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

The Bill introduces secondary objectives unrelated to the core objectives. Should that unlimited liability also be extended to these? Will the regulator be determining acceptable travel policies for business? Which financial markets are priorities for growth and competitiveness? What will be the enforcement process if individuals or companies disregard these? How can the regulated have confidence in the application of these objectives without some kind of body of precedent and rapid appeals process? The regulators themselves will benefit from a clear body of case precedents when making decisions. I urge the Minister to give serious consideration to the importance of rapid and practical accountability of the regulator for its actions to those it regulates, if London is to remain a financial hub where the global community wants to base its investments, businesses and careers.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I regret that I was not able to take part at Second Reading as I was working in the United States. I hope I have the indulgence of the Committee to make some comments on this set of amendments. As someone who has chaired a major regulator, I found the representation of the principles and approach to regulation as “vague” a rather chilling remark.

What we have seen with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lilley, and those who have supported them, is an attempt significantly to change the entire philosophy on which the regulatory system has so successfully developed in this country. That philosophy has been based on principles-based regulations. Those principles are not vague, as has been asserted; they are determined by Parliament. The rules have then been developed on the basis of serving an industry which is dynamic and continuously changing, unlike the building industry, many of whose practices have not changed since Tudor England.

The fact that the regulatory system can adapt to a rapidly changing industry has been a source of considerable strength within our regulatory system. If we are to introduce an entirely different legal approach, that has to be argued out. There should be a Green Paper, a White Paper and a proper Bill saying that the regulatory approach in this country is going to be fundamentally changed. That is what I fear: the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, would effectively introduce a wedge of change that would fit very uncomfortably with the current structure.

On the other hand, I support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and particularly commend the remarks of the noble Lords, Lord Hill and Lord Forsyth. They argued that although this new accountability device—this new entity—would deal with, let us say, the technical side of regulatory issues, we still need a parliamentary committee to deal with the political side because regulation is both highly technical and has an essential political core. That is why we need both components. Therefore, I strongly support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and the views put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Hill and Lord Forsyth, on the need for the dual structure to ensure a proper level of both technical and political accountability.

[Lord Tyrie (Non-Afl)]

First, I declare my interest as in the register. I am deeply concerned about this second set of amendments; they could have a profound impact on and consequences for the SMR, the ombudsman’s service and the RDC in particular, and I shall go through each in turn. I strongly agree with what has just been said about the nature of regulation and the risks of moving at such pace to a wholly different approach, bearing in mind for how many decades this system has been in place and has become understood and accepted—at some cost, by the way, and, therefore, changing it is itself something whose costs we need to bear in mind.

On the question of predictability, consistency and unintended consequences, in response to an earlier amendment I cited abuse of cryptocurrency technology, which might be made more difficult for the regulator to adapt to if it has to show that what it has done was predictable on the basis of existing law. That could be spread betting or, to take a topical example of 15 years ago, asset-backed securities. I am extremely nervous about including this without substantial consultation, which should be preceded by a detailed explanation of what is intended. We have not had any of that, and it is certainly not suitable to be put in this Bill.

Although I have not said very much so far on the Bill, I fear I will speak at some length on these three areas, which in my view are crucial to providing fairness and making sure that we are better prepared for the next financial crash that will inevitably come.

As I read Amendment 169, it would create a defence before the Upper Tribunal, and possibly a complete defence if a person could show that they had acted reasonably and in good faith. That might sound quite reasonable in itself—more apple pie—but a defence of reasonableness and good faith would mean that if an individual did not know about a problem, he could not be held responsible for it. That would be goodbye to the SMR, at least, as an effective regulatory tool. It strikes me as likely to reintroduce all the gateways to unacceptable risk and risk taking that the SMR was designed to expunge.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, we were addressing the question of when alternative service provision is put in place and the accessibility of that service provision.

I have addressed the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans about connectivity. He also made a point about customers needing, for example, a smartphone to make payments or access online banking. The FCA has stated that it expects payment service providers to offer solutions that work for all groups of people. It encourages all firms to consider the impact of their solutions for customers. The regulators’ guidance recognises that not all customers will have mobile phones or a reliable signal and that viable alternatives should be provided in these situations.

All service providers, including banks and building societies, are bound under the Equality Act to make reasonable adjustments where necessary. Many of them support access to digital services through initiatives to distribute devices, teach skills, or facilitate support networks.

As my noble friend Lord Holmes highlighted, moving towards digital can create opportunities for accessibility but it can also create barriers. It is important that we embrace these technological changes in ways that reduce those barriers, so his point about ensuring that interfaces, including ATMs and point-of-sale terminals, are accessible is really important.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

Would the Minister indulge me for a moment? I have been intrigued by her discussion of the role of digitisation. I refer to Amendment 184, tabled by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, on the duty to collect data on cash acceptance.

When teaching monetary economics, the first thing that you ask students to understand is, “What is money?” Money is something that is generally accepted in discharge of a debt. That is the definition of money. The issue of cash acceptance is therefore vital as society develops in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, outlined so clearly. What will happen is that, for the section of society who rely on cash—several million people—their cash will no longer be money. It will no longer be generally acceptable in payment of a debt. In those circumstances, the digital instrument will be crucial. However, if the digital instrument is issued only by companies, namely banks, to those who are customers of the banks, who have some basic criterion, it is surely the responsibility of the state to issue a digital instrument that is available to all citizens.

That being the case, to get to that stage, we need to know how cash is generally accepted. Therefore, the amendment, which contains a duty to collect data on cash acceptance, is vital for the development of future policy with respect to cash and digital instruments. The Minister rejected the amendment by saying that it is not the FCA’s responsibility. Can she tell me which department of government has this responsibility to collect data on cash acceptance?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, there are a number of ways to tackle the issues that the noble Lord referred to. There are various statistics around payment methods used by consumers in the UK; I quoted some at the start of my speech. The Government have not mandated service providers to accept certain forms of payment; that is not the approach we intend to take to ensure that people continue to have access to cash or money. I have said that, in supporting businesses’ access to deposit services, that will support people’s ability to use their cash as a form of payment.

The noble Lord also raised the question of a digital form of money. That is a question that the Government have looked at very carefully. We launched what I think was a joint consultation between the Government and the regulators, looking in more detail at the question of a central government digital currency and how to take forward that work, as well as considering questions such as those from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about privacy issues in a world of having a digital form of money versus having cash as a form of money.

I understand the importance of having a picture and the data that allows us to understand what is going on. I do not think that the data is necessarily the gap here; it is about how you provide for the ongoing use of cash in a society where rapid changes are being made. Our approach to that has been through legislating in this Bill on access to cash withdrawal and deposit facilities.

I was just talking about the importance of the accessibility of payment interfaces, including ATMs and point-of-sale terminals. I am pleased that UK Finance and the RNIB have developed accessibility guidelines for touch screen chip and PIN devices, as well as an approved list of accessible card terminals. The Government’s disability and access ambassador for banking, Kathryn Townsend, also encourages a consistent consumer experience and engagement with deaf advocacy groups.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st March 2023 Grand Committee

[The Archbishop of Canterbury]

Going back to the fiscal event, a lot of the pension funds almost went bust. We learned a lesson from that, quite rightly, and I think it is a lesson that will be kept.

The ring-fence and the SMCR have been important for encouraging—not solving—improved standards and culture in the banking sector and for protecting the public from bearing the brunt of future banking failures. We cannot forget the lessons learned with such pain for so many outside the banking sector, who had no idea what goes on in banking but found that life suddenly just did not work any more.

I hope that the Government take a further look, certainly through the consultation, at the lessons of the last few weeks, and that the ring-fence is strengthened, not weakened, and improved. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about both the ring-fence and the SMCR. Both are cumbersome and need rethinking, but not abolishing.

When asked why he had changed his mind, John Maynard Keynes—apocryphally, I think—replied:

“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”


Given that the facts have changed over the last few weeks, the Government need to ask themselves whether they are going to change their minds and think harder about adequate protection for the basic financial structures that protect the weakest in our society.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, these three amendments project a peculiar background, which is an issue that this Committee debated in an earlier session—that of accountability. The first amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, Amendment 216, is too detailed for primary legislation. On the other hand, I sympathise entirely with the noble Baroness’s goals. In a principles-based system, I would have expected these goals to be expressed in the principles and achieved by the rule-making regulator but, given the lack of accountability with which the Government seem so comfortable—I was impressed by the noble Baroness’s argument on Amendment 216—we cannot be confident that changes will be made at the necessary points. There is no vehicle for Parliament to ensure or inspect the rule-making of the regulators.

I think Amendment 216 is necessary because the Government are so weak on accountability. If we had strong accountability, whereby we could hold the rule-makers to account—both positively, in the sense that you are doing something that you should not be, and negatively, in the sense that you are not doing something that you should be—amendments such as this would not be necessary. Amendment 216 is necessary in the way so carefully described by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, simply because of the lack of accountability in the system.

This also applies to the other two amendments in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, powerfully pointed out that, because of the peculiar circumstances in which it took place, the resolution of SVB UK required a relaxation of the ring-fence. I am entirely sympathetic with the goals of these amendments, which address the overall structure of the industry and therefore the overall risk appetite of this country for banking and financial services. That is what the ring-fence and the senior managers and certification regime are about.

The “but” is the important case highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, where some modification was necessary. If we had proper accountability, this could come to Parliament, which could then examine this example of relaxation to discuss whether it is appropriate to extend it to other banks, so that there is this mythical level playing field in the competitive relationships between them.

I am enormously sympathetic to the goals of these amendments: to the first because it is a practical issue of excessive risk-taking by insurance companies and, as we have seen, pension funds; and to the other two because they refer to the structure of risk which Parliament has decided is appropriate in this country’s financial services industry. It should not be modified wilfully—I am thinking of the marriage ceremony—and without due consideration of the consequences. Therefore, the Government would once again be well advised to reconsider the issue of accountability, which they have brushed away so casually, because it would provide the flexibility for Parliament to be involved in changing the risk appetite of the country as a whole.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I again declare my interest as a director of two investment companies, as stated in the register. I will speak about all three amendments.

In Amendment 216 the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, seeks to prevent a matching adjustment being applied to a portfolio of assets with a Standard & Poor’s rating of BBB or less. Does this mean a portfolio of assets comprising at least one holding of BBB paper, or a portfolio consisting exclusively of holdings rated BBB or worse? Either way, I welcome the Government’s proposal to remove the disproportionately severe treatment of assets with a credit rating of BBB or below, which will reduce the incentives for insurers to sell BBB assets in a market downturn. These reforms would encourage insurers to revise their investment strategies and risk appetites for investing in sub-investment grade assets, increasing funds available for investment in beneficial infrastructure projects, for example.

In any case—here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell—is this attempt to constrain the powers of the PRA not too specific, and the kind of very precise regulation that we want to get out of primary legislation so that we can give discretion on this kind of thing to the regulators? I therefore cannot support this amendment.

I tremble in my shoes to disagree with the good intentions expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury in seeking, in their Amendments 241C and 241D, to make it very difficult to weaken the ring-fencing provisions or change the senior managers and certification regime. It is clear that she and her co-signatories are among those who believe that the introduction of ring-fencing has reduced the risks to which bank customers’ deposits are exposed and that it is therefore important to make it very difficult to weaken the ring-fencing regulations in any way.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Penn) (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak first to Amendment 216, which pertains to the Government’s announced reforms to Solvency II, made possible through the Bill’s revocation of retained EU law.

The Government are reforming Solvency II, the rules for prudential regulation of the insurance industry currently set by the EU, to reflect the UK insurance market’s unique features. These reforms will provide incentives for insurers to increase investment in long-term productive assets by more than £100 billion. They will also benefit consumers by increasing insurers’ ability to provide a broader range of more affordable products.

The Government have committed to make changes to the matching adjustment, an accounting mechanism whereby insurers can match their long-term liabilities with long-term assets and hold less money to pay out claims. These reforms will incentivise firms to invest significantly more in long-term productive assets such as infrastructure. This investment will support growth across the UK and the Government’s climate change objectives.

The noble Baroness’s amendment would instead result in a stricter treatment for some assets than under current rules. I reassure noble Lords that the Government’s reforms to Solvency II strike a careful balance between boosting growth across the economy and maintaining high standards of policyholder protection. Insurers will still be required to hold extra capital to safeguard against unexpected shocks, they will still have to adhere to high standards of risk management, and they will still be subject to comprehensive supervision from the PRA, our world-class independent regulator.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked whether we would replicate the Canadian Government’s position with regard to pensions and insurance firms in this context. She referred to statements in the Budget about pension funds—although I think they were focused more on defined contribution pension funds than defined benefit pension funds. I do not know the detail of the specific Canadian regime, but the reforms proposed here do not pose risks to financial stability. As I said, each insurer must still hold enough capital to survive a 1-in-200-year shock over one year. Insurers will still have to adhere to the high standards of risk management. The Government and the PRA have announced a series of additional supervisory measures that the PRA will take forward to ensure that policyholders remain protected. For example, the PRA will now require insurers to take part in regular stress-testing exercises.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

May I comment on the issue of stress tests, which the Minister also raised during Questions this afternoon? You can stress test only risks that you know are there. It depends on the underlying model that you create to examine in your stress tests. Thus stress tests did not pick up the LDI problem at all because it was not there in the models that were used. In financial services, risks appear in entirely unexpected places, and relying on stress tests is, and has been demonstrated to be, a very weak answer. She should reconsider her reliance on this argument.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

Since it is related, I also question the readiness for a 1-in-200-year shock. We have seen very similar kinds of mathematical approaches, if you like, taken to issues such as flood risk and other climate risks, and they have been found to be very ineffective in dealing with problems. They only increase the failure to understand risks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Bridges and Lord Forsyth. I agree with the analysis by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, of the dangers of having Parliament bypassed in the creation of a CBDC, but I will mention two things to which he may not have given enough weight.

The danger crystallises in the possibility of the disintermediation of the retail banking system, which would have incalculable consequences. Given the difficulties people have in dealing with their own banks at the moment, imagine the difficulty of trying to deal with the Bank of England about your personal account when things go wrong or you do not understand what things are doing. Given banks’ habit nowadays of closing people’s accounts without notice or reason, I wonder whether the Bank of England would take the same view if it had that power.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, I would prefer any such creation—although I am not sure that I want one—to be via an Act of Parliament rather than regulation. However, regulation is tempting because I notice that proposed new subsection (3) of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, finds a way of amending secondary legislation. With a bit of luck, we will deal with my amendment tomorrow, which does exactly the same thing in exactly the same kind of words but with broader application.

It is dangerous in the extreme to have Parliament excluded on the central bank digital currency, as the Government clearly intend at the moment. We ought to be very careful about that. When it comes to Report, where we need to think about what amendments we press, I would be very tempted to suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that he presses his amendment.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make two general comments about these amendments—first, on Amendment 218 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes.

When I was chairman of the Jersey Financial Services Commission and therefore the regulator in Jersey, I was continually lobbied about the issue of digital identification simply because of the high cost of repetitive KYC investigations that institutions had to go through. It seems that the possibility of having a system of digital identification which would be generally acceptable and generally accepted within financial services would significantly reduce the costs of KYC and would provide a much sounder foundation for the credibility and respectability of the individuals attempting to transact within financial services. So this is broadly a good idea. It is very complicated, as I discovered when I tried to introduce it in Jersey, and it raises very important privacy issues, but, none the less, this is the way that the world is going and we need to think this through extremely carefully. It could be of great benefit to the whole KYC problem.

With respect to digital currencies, the one comment I will make is to remind the Committee of the debate that we had about the decline in the acceptance of cash and the fact that a significant number of people in our country are being deprived of money, since cash no longer works as money—it is no longer generally acceptable in discharge of a debt, which is the definition of money. Therefore, there will be a responsibility for the state to provide a digital form of money, because digital payment, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, argued strongly at the time, will become the standard form of payment and cash is basically going to disappear —apart, perhaps, from the Tooth Fairy.

The issues of digital currency and digital identification are both hugely important for our future and, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, argued—I agree with him most strongly—they require very careful parliamentary consideration.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, on the digital pound, we support the Bank of England’s work exploring the potential benefits of a safe and stable central bank digital currency, but the Government’s overall approach to crypto remains unclear.

With the collapse of FTX, it is clear that crypto can pose a real threat to normal people in the real economy and therefore may pose a systemic risk in future. The approach HMT has taken to the digital pound is a welcome contrast to this Administration’s eagerness to lean into a crypto Wild West in the recent past. We need to get serious about attracting innovative fintech companies to the UK by safely harnessing the potential of new technologies. How will the Government do this?

On the amendments in general, the issue of accountability has come up once again. The concept of using primary legislation to have a check on these ideas is clearly practical and therefore very attractive, but it will have problems. If the Government would only embrace our concerns about accountability and come forward with a proper and comprehensive accountability structure, perhaps we would be able to develop a more sophisticated approach than the rather raw power of primary legislation. However, as a fallback it is very attractive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 238 in my name. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that “know your customer” and anti-money laundering—KYC and AML—are not working optimally? There is a plethora of examples that we could look at; I will not do so. The simple truth is that they are not fit for purpose and are not achieving their aims. They are not providing the environment that we would want to conduct our financial services in. Does my noble friend the Minister not agree, therefore, that it is high time we had a thorough review of the regulations to put in place a system that works and is inclusive, efficient and effective?

If we look at some of the practical elements, to put it in terms, is it not time that we stopped messing about with gas bills? That takes us to an amendment in a previous group on digital ID, which would go far in resolving many of the issues around KYC and AML. Does my noble friend the Minister not agree? The difficulties that we have heard about and which many members of the Committee may have experienced in all areas of the financial services landscape could be effectively resolved if we resolved the current situation with KYC and AML. It is resolvable; when she comes to respond, my noble friend the Minister could simply say, “I will resolve it”.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, surely these regulations are derived from the Financial Action Task Force. We would usurp international agreements if we modified our regulations in a way that was outwith the positions established by the FATF.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I completely accept that we need to comply with the Financial Action Task Force regulations but, as we discovered the other day when we were discussing PEPs, the regulations we have in the UK have in some instances gone beyond what is actually required by the Financial Action Task Force. The issue with the KYC regulations is one of immense bureaucracy and great irritation for people to no particular end. It is worth looking again at whether the way we have drafted our regulations, to the extent they go beyond what we are required to do, has in turn led to more problems for individuals.

I am sure we have all had problems but I will share one with the Committee. My husband had a very small investment—way below the level at which it would have to be declared as one of my interests in your Lordships’ House—and there was periodic updating of the know your client regulations. Because of the way that firm’s forms were comprised, it refused to accept my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s signature attesting that the document was a fair copy, because she could not tick a particular box on the form. It was completely ludicrous.

That permeates the way many financial service institutions have come to apply these rules in practice. They have become highly bureaucratic, operated by people who probably have no common sense and possibly not even a brain. To go back to the regulations and see what is absolutely required and then follow it on through the FCA seems a really important thing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from my noble friend Lord Leong. I was a bit shocked to discover that factoring companies are not regulated through the FCA. My discovery of this through my noble friend’s initiative reinforces my view, which he very clearly expressed, that this is the business equivalent for SMEs of payday loans in the consumer retail sector. Given the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises to the growth of the UK economy, which he quite rightly pointed out, one of the most important elements of public policy is to ensure that they receive the best, most appropriate and well-regulated financial services, which provide them with a firm financial platform on which to grow. I hope that the Minister takes this amendment away and has a serious think about it, because this is a serious gap in the regulatory framework.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

I rise briefly to support this amendment. It was with some surprise that we also discovered that this sector is unregulated, but we entirely understand how important it is to the small business community. In that respect, it is hard to see why it is not regulated and why it should not be regulated. It is hard to see how any Government could resist the force of the noble Lord’s amendment—but we may see a demonstration of that in a moment or two.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for introducing this amendment. I have chosen to address simply the green infrastructure parts, and at this time of the evening I shall park the high-growth debate in the interests of not sidelining the main issue.

The idea of a review is useful here, because the evidence we have of other measures the Government have tried to take to encourage green investment is perhaps mixed—that is the charitable description. I refer to a survey published this month by Pensions for Purpose, which looked at the first wave of obligatory reporting of the scheme introduced in October 2021 based on the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures being done by the larger occupational pension schemes and authorised master trusts. That study found that this introduction by the Government was having very limited effects and that it was, to a large degree, being treated as a tick-box exercise. Where it was having an impact on investments, it was not driving towards green investment but rather to a portfolio decarbonisation—a stepping away from things rather than into the kinds of investments we need. This is something we are also seeing implicitly, in that the pension regulator is about to launch a publicity campaign for pension trustees, stressing the need to look at ESG responsibilities, particularly around climate issues—that has been its responsibility since 2019. It is clearly thought necessary to have a publicity campaign about this.

We really need to see steps forward and to see things joined up here. I am reminded of a debate last week with the same Minister, when we finally finalised the UK Infrastructure Bank Bill, which, of course, is looking at another source of investment going into green. I am very encouraged by the Government’s decision to include nature-based solutions there, which is obviously a cross-reference to our need to see much more private investment in nature-based solutions as well. Dare I say it, it would be nice to see some circular economy as well—if I can just put that in there.

On the idea of a review, we desperately need to see money going into green infrastructure. All the evidence we have says that is simply not happening. I also note that the Government need to create the frameworks in other areas of policy to make this happen. I was sitting here, thinking of when I was in this very same Room a few weeks ago with the Energy Bill. One of the things that could be a very good target for investment would be that if we are to get community energy schemes up and down the land—if we get delivery of the widely-backed Local Electricity Bill, as it is in the other place—that would be a great area to see pension funds investing in and supporting. I was at an event this morning debating social value and the importance of that in procurement.

We need to tie all these things together. All these things are running off at different angles, but we are still not creating an environment where people who are putting money into their pensions, seeking to invest in their own future, will have a liveable future for that pension to pay out in.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, it is obvious that the issue of pension funds investing in equities and longer-term growth prospects was highlighted by the LDI crisis in the autumn. I hope that, when the Government come to consider the consequences of that crisis, they will look at the letter that your Lordships’ Industry and Regulators Committee sent to Andrew Griffith MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, setting out the reasons it saw for the peculiar financial structures that led to the LDI crisis and the lack of long-term investment in equities and growth stocks by British pension funds. They traced this to the accounting regulations that are imposed on British pension funds—particularly the way in which liabilities are assessed—and noted that, since those regulations were introduced maybe 15 years ago, there has been a dramatic reduction in the investment by British pension funds in long-term equity assets and a focus mostly on rather low-yielding government securities instead.

The LDI scandal was produced by the development of a peculiar financial device using repos, which were then used to make some investment in equities. There is clearly a fundamental problem in the regulation of British pension funds, which has both reduced the returns on their investment and limited the sort of investments they might be able to make in growth assets to their benefit and that of the economy as a whole. There needs to be a major review on the regulation of pension funds, both to make them more secure—to avoid them resorting to very unstable financial constructions to try to increase their returns—and for the overall benefit of the economy.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has said. We are happy to support this amendment. I simply have two questions and one observation about it.

The amendment says that we must include “green infrastructure”. Is there a practical, generally agreed working definition of what that actually means? I also notice that, in carrying out the review, the Treasury must consult a list of organisations. The final group of organisations is “relevant financial services stakeholders”. Is the intention also to include professional advisers? They would be a vital addition; perhaps that should be made explicit as we go forward.

My observation is that proposed new subsection (3)(c), which talks about

“establishing frameworks to enable DB pension funds to invest in firms and infrastructure alongside the British Business Bank”,

is an extremely good idea. We should make sure that this happens as soon as we can.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will make very few comments on this group of amendments. I accept that they are technical. I find some of them distasteful, particularly those that enhance the scope of the competitiveness and economic growth agendas. I fear very much that the underlying concept and construct will lead us back in the direction of the kind of risk taking that created the crisis that we went through so badly in 2008 and 2009. However, given that our attempts to turn around those objectives have not won support from other parts of the House, there is no sensible reason for me to object to these more technical amendments, other than to say that it is a sad day and that many of us will be revisiting this, if we live long enough, when we hit the next financial crisis.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make two points on these technical amendments. As the Minister said, central counterparties are fundamental institutions in maintaining the stability of financial markets. This measure, to continue the role of overseas-based central counterparties, is enormously sensible. But there is an issue that has not been addressed. What if the overseas central counterparties decide not to provide services to UK firms—if they decide, following the UK exit from the European Union, that they will withdraw from providing such a service? What provision has His Majesty’s Government made for providing those services in those circumstances?

Secondly, I echo the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, made about the competitiveness and economic growth objective that is being incorporated as a subsidiary objective. As a subsidiary objective, it is unobjectionable. What is striking in the government amendments that we will debate is the way in which it is continuously privileged, such that it no longer remains subsidiary; extra reports and consideration will now be required, all focused on one objective. This is a serious mistake, because the statutory objectives of the regulatory authorities will change with circumstance over time. Writing into law that one objective should be privileged is a significant error. The primary and secondary objectives make sense, but overegging the position of a subsidiary objective is a mistake.

My main point at this time is to ask the Minister what measures provide central counterparty provision in those areas where overseas central counterparties decide not to act for UK firms.

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for both contributions to this short debate. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, brought up the competitiveness issue, which is something we will come on to at a later stage in the proceedings on the Bill. In answer to his point about overseas CCPs, that would be a commercial decision for that institution to make. However, the idea of the run-off regime is to provide time for UK firms to wind down their operations and make alternative arrangements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, it is late, so I will not repeat the arguments which have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. The amendment seems to be a very sensible measure, and if my noble friend cannot accept it, the noble Lord suggested a compromise of at least consulting on this. However, I am not sure that many people would say that this was not a sensible proposal. The amendment has certainly been very carefully drafted. We are on Report, and I have some sympathy with my noble friend on the Front Bench being faced with this, but it merits very serious consideration and would be very much welcomed in the City.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise for missing the introduction from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie; I was caught out by the Whips’ rearrangement of business. Fortunately, I read his pamphlet on this matter, so I have a good idea what he said.

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was not here for the opening comments from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I am probably the only Member of this House who has been a member of the Regulatory Decisions Committee and I might have some observations to make.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

Clearly, the House wants to hear the noble Lord’s remarks, so please continue.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

If the Whips had not rearranged the business so peremptorily, one would not have been caught out.

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

The business has not been rearranged; the Order Paper says,

“at a convenient time after 7.30pm”.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, as a founding member of the Regulatory Decisions Committee of the Financial Services Authority who served from 2001 to 2006, I reflect on the fact that at that time the FSA took extraordinary care in preparing the documentation that was submitted to the RDC. This clearly had an effect on the way in which the RDC prepared itself. This is an important element in ensuring that our regulatory system is not only fair but seen to be fair. Having read with care the pamphlet from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, I support the arguments that he made there, which I am sure he recently repeated in the House.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the work that the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, has put into this amendment. He has worked for so many years and has so much knowledge on this subject. If my noble friend cannot accept the amendment today, I urge her to come back at Third Reading if possible, perhaps with the Government’s own proposals for at least a consultation, which would be a reasonable compromise. There is a strength of feeling on this issue.

As the noble Lord said, the FCA has already been clipping the RDC’s wings. We can see dangers and that there is huge support for proper independence on a statutory basis. We do not want the City to become an oligopoly; we need to protect some of these smaller firms for healthy competition. What is the Government’s objection to this proposal?

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 10 and 112 in my name; I gratefully acknowledge the support of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. This is a bit of a diverse group, but Amendment 10 in particular heads in a similar direction to Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted—a direction that seeks to lead towards a financial sector that meets the needs of the real economy rather than swallowing up the scarce human and capital resources that could be used to far better effect than creating complex financial instruments that, when they go down, threaten to take the rest of us with them.

Had it not been for events between Committee and Report, I might have chosen to sign the noble Baroness’s amendment instead of tabling my Amendment 10, which states that Clause 24—the growth and competitiveness clause to which the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred—should not be deleted from the Bill. It mirrors exactly the amendment tabled in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, signed then by myself. However, in the light of events, I thought it really important that we tackle the “growth at any cost” foundation that underlies Clause 24: “Growth is infinite; let’s chase as much growth as we can”—which is, of course, the ideology of the cancer cell.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said:

“The secondary objectives of growth and competitiveness cannot be reconciled with the main role of ensuring financial stability and consumer protection”.—[Official Report, 1/2/23; col. GC 242.]


This is a position that we both hold. However, it was clear in Committee that there was no support from the Front Benches, and the issue might have been allowed to lapse. But then there were events that highlighted the many dangers of chasing growth in the financial sector. After several weekends of financial panic, emergency meetings and sudden bank rescues, parts of the real economy—in particular, the digital sector—were left highly uncertain of their financing. I am referring, of course, to the collapse and rescue of Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse and Signature Bank, the first and last of those being mid-sized US banks and the middle one being a former European banking colossus.

These US events came after President Trump watered down the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, better known as the Dodd-Frank Act, in 2018, reducing the supervisory oversight of banks with assets between $50 billion and $250 billion; the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to this watering down in his introduction to this group. However, just because someone else is doing the wrong thing and reducing controls and protections, it does not mean that we should chase after and try to compete with them. As David Enrich from the New York Times put it, this was a

“crisis that has revealed the extent to which the banking industry and other opponents of government oversight have chipped away at the robust regulatory protections that were erected after the 2008 financial meltdown”.

What happened is that competitiveness had been advanced while security was lost and risk increased. A great many people had sleepless weekends as a result of that.

What has also become clear since Committee is how Credit Suisse clients withdrew nearly $69 billion from the bank in the first quarter of this year before its fire sale rescue by UBS in March. Of course, Credit Suisse had been hit by the insolvency of Greensill Capital—something that is rather close to home in your Lordships’ House—and the collapse of family office of Archegos Capital Management, which caused huge trading losses. However, the end came very quickly.

Clearly, in the digital age which SVB helped to fund, financial events can occur at a speed that was unimaginable even in 2007-08. I wonder whether, when wrapping up, any of the Front Benches are prepared to say that they believe that regulators today are truly prepared for the world in which they operate, a world that also faces the risks of other substantial shocks, as we have seen highlighted today with the Russian attack on the Kakhovka dam, geopolitical risks and, of course, environmental risks, since as we speak, Canada is essentially ablaze. That will undoubtably have enormous impacts on the insurance sector.

The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report from April reflects on the challenges posed by the interaction between tighter monetary and financial conditions, and the build-up of vulnerabilities since the global financial crash. It says that:

“The emergence of stress in financial markets complicates the task of central banks at a time when inflationary pressures are proving to be more persistent than anticipated”—


a statement which is particularly true within the UK. There are stresses from the shadow banking sector, the effect of geopolitical tensions on financial fragmentation, the risk of potential capital flow reversals, disruption of cross-border payments, impacts on bank funding costs, profitability and credit provision, and more limited opportunities for international risk diversification. The IMF concludes that there is a need to “Strengthen financial oversight”. This is all referring to events since we were in Committee. That is my case for Amendment 10.

My Amendment 112 is much more modest and addresses in a different way a point that I raised in Committee. I discussed the growing body of literature around too much finance, but in this amendment I am not asking the Government to agree with me on that; I am asking for them to prepare a report to consider the ideal size of the financial sector. What is the Goldilocks range for a financial sector, where we can afford the risks and supply the human resources and it serves the needs of the real economy?

As the House has heard before, I approach this question in the light of the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute’s study from 2018, which found that the UK had lost £4.5 trillion over two decades because of its oversized financial sector—£67,500 per person. To bring this right up to the present day, in a study published last week, the global hiring website Climatebase has posted more than 46,000 jobs from over 1,500 organisations in the past two years. Of these, data science and analytics were the hardest to fill, taking an average of nearly four months to fill posts compared with three months for engineering roles.

This brings me back to Amendment 10, which would delete Clause 24. I did not have a chance to speak in Committee, but I suggest that Clause 24 as it stands is internally contradictory. It gives the FCA the duty of facilitating the international competitiveness and medium to long-term growth of the economy of the UK,

“including in particular the financial services sector”.

This clause talks of growing the economy of the UK and growing the financial sector. I posit that those two objectives are mutually contradictory. I refer to a Bank for International Settlements working paper from 2018, Why Does Financial Sector Growth Crowd Out Real Economic Growth? It is actually impossible to promote growth both in the real economy and in the financial sector. It comes back to—probably the easiest part of this to understand—the need to think about human resources. We all know the labour shortages and skills shortages that so many sectors of the UK economy are suffering, and we know that many skills are going into the financial sector when they could be going into other areas.

Tomorrow, your Lordships’ House will debate the report of our Science and Technology Committee titled “Science and Technology Superpower”: More Than a Slogan? I am not asking any Front-Benchers or the Government to agree with the claims that I am making here; what Amendment 112 asks for is a report to look at the evidence, so that the Government and the country can make considered judgments about what size financial sector we both need and can afford.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I will address the amendments proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. In some way, they are part of the whole privileging of the competitiveness objective, but I do not want to talk about that. I will talk specifically about his concern about aligning with international standards.

I suggest that the success of the development of international financial markets since the 1970s has been predicated entirely on the development of an international regulatory system. It was first stimulated by the Herstatt Bank crisis in the summer of 1974, which led to the establishment of the Basel committee on settlement risk. Since then, we have developed a whole international financial infrastructure of regulation—the Basel committees, IOSCO and, most importantly today, the Financial Stability Board. That, by the way, was a British idea that has greatly aided the stabilising of international financial markets.

These committees, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, pointed out, are not part of any form of international law or treaty. They are what is known in the trade as “soft law”. They are laws that countries agree it is in their mutual benefit to align with, and failing to align is against the benefit of individual countries as well as of the system as a whole. It has been the judgment of His Majesty’s Government that it is in the best interests of the United Kingdom to align with international standards.

But there are other international standards with which we align. Take the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force. Would the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, suggest that we do not align with the international anti-money laundering police? It is essential that we agree to align with this framework of international financial regulation, which we have been such an important element in creating.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I want to correct him for criticising me for opposing all international standards. The ones he has chosen to mention are not ones that I objected to specifically. I was just saying that in general international standards are not defined.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I suggest to the noble Viscount that, in fact, the whole corpus of international soft law on finance is generally known in the trade as the international standards, and those who work in the regulatory community would immediately relate to the proposals of those particular institutions. As the noble Lord pointed out, occasionally Basel standards have not been followed. This is true in the United States, where only international competitive banks follow Basel committee standards. The US has learned painful lessons over the last year or so with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and others that did not follow Basel standards. The relaxation of standards was one of the elements that led to that particular collapse. Alignment with international standards and the institutions which—I say again—Britain has done so much to help develop is an important part of the maintenance of financial stability in this country.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make an argument that the idea that greater competition is a public benefit is simply wrong, if you think it is inevitable. Now, I spoke about this at length in Grand Committee a couple of weeks ago, and the Minister had the benefit of my views on the matter at the time, so I am not going to repeat them at length; one or two other Members present did as well.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, I find myself in the very odd position of having to say that the Government have handled Committee stage consideration of the Bill brilliantly. The Minister listened to a lot of quite robust criticism of the Bill, some of it from me, on the issue of accountability. It is fair to say that, across all sides of the Committee, there was a feeling that it was essential that there be proper accountability and scrutiny, given that we are, in effect, giving the regulators all our financial services legislation. She spent a great deal of time talking to all noble Lords in Committee and listening to those concerns. I therefore support the government amendments and thank her and her colleagues for the brilliant way in which they responded to what was a very robust Committee.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, there is a certain amount of confusion about the competitiveness objective and it is important to clarify it in discussion on Report. To illustrate this point, we have to understand that London is a rather peculiar financial centre, because it has a very limited hinterland of domestic savings. It is unlike the United States, where New York has a huge hinterland of domestic savings. It is therefore necessary for London to attract savings and funding from around the world, and it does that brilliantly well.

An important component of that is that London is seen as a well-regulated and efficiently regulated centre. The primary objectives set out in FSMA of maintaining market confidence, financial stability, public awareness, protection of consumers and the reduction of financial crimes are competitiveness goals in and of themselves. They make London more competitive and are a crucial component of the success of London at attracting funds from around the world.

The competitiveness objective that was introduced as a subsidiary objective is rather different, because there competitiveness means being allowed to take more risk. As everyone knows, in financial affairs the balance of risk and return is one of the key elements in making sensible decisions. This is true as much in regulation as it is in the operation of financial services business. It is particularly true in regulation when it applies to systemic risks, which only the regulator can understand and deal with.

It is therefore important that we do not overegg the competitiveness objective. It is important—it has introduced an important element in discussing the relationship between risk and return—but we should recognise that the primary objectives are the key to London’s competitiveness as a financial centre.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on government Amendment 11. The competitiveness and growth objective is a long-term, ongoing objective and, with the best will in the world, it is highly unlikely that we will see any discernible change in measurable competitiveness or growth in just two years. The objective does not end in two years and yet the amendment put forward by the Government has only two years’ worth of reporting.

As usual, the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has put together an elegant solution in Amendment 12, which would create an ongoing annual reporting requirement, as well as being a bit more specific about what should be included within the reports. I understand from the Minister’s earlier speech that she expects this to be covered off in the normal annual reporting thereafter, and I think we can probably live with that.

I will add to the comments made by noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, with this caveat: I support the competitiveness and growth objective, but only as a secondary objective. The primary objective of stability must remain paramount. Can the Minister confirm that, as part of the reporting on the competitiveness and growth objective that is expected, the regulators will consider and report on the impact it is having on the primary stability objective? The two are not unconnected, as we have just heard, and it is really important that when we report on one, we also report on its impact on the other.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I have attached my name to Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, who very powerfully introduced it. I associate myself with all his comments. Essentially, he was talking about reasonable adjustments for people with mental health conditions in dealing with the financial sector.

I will briefly address this consumer protection objective from the other side, which is that the financial sector should not make people ill. I am sure the Minister will recall the meeting we had a couple of months ago with mortgage prisoners. At that meeting, we heard some testimony about the impacts of how people had been trapped in the system and suffered enormously as a result.

I want to reflect on two things. The first is the figures that have come out since Committee and the fact that the head of UK Finance has labelled the UK the fraud capital of the world, with fraud last year estimated at £1.2 billion. That reflects the fact that very many people now approach any interaction with the financial sector with a sense of fear, asking, “Is this true?”, “Is this right?”, “Is this a proper email?” This is something that the financial sector needs to do more to address so that people are not suffering that stress and pressure.

The second thing is that I know some individuals who are somewhat older than me who find that there is an inability to walk into a branch and deal with an issue by having a person solving your problems face to face. People spend weeks and weeks trapped in cycles of emails and phone calls. No one can ever solve your problem and you never speak to the same person twice. That has serious impacts on people’s lives and well-being. We need to acknowledge that and say to the banks that this is not acceptable and not good enough.

On the financial inclusion amendments, I have spoken about this at some length so I will not go over the same ground. However, it is clear, in all the amendments in this group, that the financial sector is not meeting the needs of our society. As a Parliament, we need to ensure we do more to make sure that it does.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 18 in the name of my noble friend Lady Chapman, while also recognising the contribution made in the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and my noble friend Lord Davies.

This is an extremely urgent matter because between 6 million and 7 million of our fellow citizens conduct all their financial affairs in cash. Cash is becoming increasingly unacceptable in a whole series of financial transactions that are conducted by electronic means. This means that cash is ceasing to be money, because money is something which is generally accepted in payment of a debt. If you cannot use cash to buy things, it is no longer money.

It is therefore necessary for both the Bank of England and the Treasury to consider making available to all citizens in this country a means of electronic payment. That is a big challenge, but it is urgent because we are all aware that, over the next decade, virtually everything will be entirely electronic and cash will be unacceptable in most transactions. My noble friend Lady Chapman has hit the nail right on the head by saying that this is a consumer protection objective. That 10% of our fellow citizens needs to be protected by financial inclusion in this way. This is an urgent matter which should not be postponed.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, in speaking to this group I am channelling my colleague, my noble friend Lady Tyler of Enfield, who is unwell and, to her distress, cannot be here. I will focus on Amendment 18, which she has signed, which would require the FCA to have regard to financial inclusion within the consumer protection objective. My noble friend Lady Tyler chaired the Select Committee on Financial Exclusion in 2017 and this was a cornerstone recommendation. A further Lords review in 2020 came to the same conclusion, as did the Treasury Select Committee in 2022.

My noble friend Lady Tyler made a powerful speech in Committee so I will not repeat the detail, but I will cite the briefing I have received from Fair4All Finance, which finds that more than 17 million people—I previously used the number the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, used of between 6 million and 7 million people who are under stress for this—in the UK are in financially vulnerable circumstances, with access to credit being increasingly difficult. We will discuss access to cash later.

Endless years of discussion on this topic have failed to significantly move the dial. Basic bank accounts are a little improved but still limited. The hopes for credit unions or fintech solutions have faded. Frankly, nothing will change unless the FCA puts its shoulder to the wheel. Amendment 18, if noble Lords look at it in detail, is not the introduction of a new objective; it is a clarification of the consumer objective through a “have regard” duty. In that way, it is different from the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes—which I do not object to, but the Government have frequently said that we cannot have additional objectives. This is not an additional objective; it is clarification and emphasis of a key aspect of an objective.

Amendment 18 does not ask the FCA to step into territory which the Government have said is theirs—to close the gap on financial inclusion—but to use powers within its existing scope, which it has shown us it will not do without this emphasis from Parliament. I very much support Amendment 18 and consequently hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, will ensure that it is tested in the House if the Government do not accept it—although government acceptance is of course the preferred route for us all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I actually said the opposite; access to cash will not be useful if the cash cannot be used to make a transaction. Increasingly, transactions cannot be made with cash but only electronically.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

Some of the implications of the noble Lord’s contribution on potentially obliging people to use certain payment systems show that including financial inclusion under the consumer protection objective could have quite far-reaching consequences that we would want fully to think through and consult on before changing the objectives. That lies behind the Government’s concern about this approach.

As I was saying, this does not mean that there is no action to promote financial inclusion by the Government and the regulators. Major banks are required to provide basic bank accounts for those who would otherwise be unbanked. As of June last year, there were 7.4 million basic bank accounts open and during 2020-21 around 70,000 basic bank account customers were upgraded to standard personal current accounts, graduating to more mainstream financial services products. The FCA’s financial lives survey has shown that those aged over 75 are becoming more digitally included, with 64% digitally active in 2020 compared to 41% in 2017. However, we absolutely recognise that there is more work to be done in this area. The Government have allocated £100 million of dormant asset funding to Fair4All Finance, which is being used to improve access to affordable credit, with a further £45 million allocated recently to deliver initiatives to support those struggling with the increased cost of living.

While the FCA has an important role to play in supporting financial inclusion, it is already able to act where appropriate. For example, it has previously intervened in the travel insurance market to help consumers with pre-existing medical conditions access affordable credit. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, recognised, the new consumer duty developed by the FCA is yet to come into force and we are yet to feel the full benefits of that. However, importantly, these issues cannot be solved through regulation alone. Where there are gaps in the provision of products to consumers, the Government will continue to work closely with the FCA and other key players across industry and the third sector to address them.

I turn to Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. I reassure him that the FCA is already well placed to take into account the protection of consumers’ mental health within its existing objectives. The regulator’s vulnerability guidance sets out a number of best practices for firms, from upskilling staff to product service and design, and specifically recognises poor mental health as a driver of consumer vulnerability. Where FCA-authorised firms fail to meet their obligations to treat customers fairly, including those in vulnerable circumstances, the FCA is already empowered to take further action. Since the publication of the vulnerability guidance, the FCA has engaged with firms that are not meeting their obligations and agreed remedial steps.

In summary, the Government believe that this is an incredibly important issue but consider that it is for the Government to lead on the broader issues of financial inclusion. Where necessary, in the existing framework the FCA is able to have the appropriate powers to support work on this important issue. While the Government do not support these amendments, I hope that I have set out how they are committed to making further progress in this area. I therefore hope that my noble friend Lord Holmes will withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, will not press theirs when they are reached.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this is the first of two groups that seek to improve the level of parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Arguably, I think the groups are the wrong way around from a logical point of view, but we are where we are. We had long debates on this in Committee, and it was clear that accountability and parliamentary scrutiny was probably the single biggest issue on which Members from across the House felt that the Bill fell woefully short, particularly given the huge amount that is being transferred to the responsibility of the regulators by the Bill.

We heard in Committee of the need for three legs to the whole process of scrutiny and accountability: reporting, independent analysis and the parliamentary accountability elements. This group is about the second leg—the independent analysis that will support the parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. The Government have listened, and that is welcome, but I am sure I am not alone in finding what they have proposed to be rather thin gruel.

The Government have introduced a number of amendments which enhance the role of the various policy panels, in particular the cost-benefit analysis panel. These are welcome, but I am afraid they really do not go far enough. Other noble Lords, especially the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, have tabled further amendments to enhance and support the role of the panels. Again, that is very welcome but not, I think, sufficient. Despite these improvements, the panels remain appointed by the regulators and are not genuinely independent.

I remain strongly drawn to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges of Headley, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name, to create a genuinely independent office for financial regulatory accountability. As I said, so much responsibility is being handed to the regulators that it must make sense to have a genuinely robust system of oversight over the regulators, not just responding to consultations about proposed changes to regulations that the Government have put into the Bill but a much more holistic oversight of the whole regulatory direction—something that deals with what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to as the multiplicity of panels. We need to draw this all together, and we need to be much more forward-looking about the direction of regulation, rather than backward-looking as to what is proposed.

This is such an important matter and such a huge volume of work that, if we are to scrutinise it effectively, we need to have something such as the proposed office for financial accountability to enable parliamentary committees and others to carry out the meaningful scrutiny. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, talked about the need for resources; we will come on to that in the next group, but she is quite right. This would really help because, if the independent information were available to the committees, it would save them the job of doing all the sifting and all the rest of it, and they would be able to concentrate on the bits that really matter.

Even with the amendments proposed by the Government, I do not think that we get anywhere near that real scrutiny. I am sorry to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, does not intend to push these amendments; I would have liked him to do so and would have supported him if he had. I hope that he will continue to use his influence as the chair of the Economic Affairs Committee to push for a similar approach.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I totally agree with what the noble Lord has just said and therefore I will not repeat his words. The office for financial regulatory accountability proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, would become an important part of the whole regulatory architecture in this country. The reason why I have proposed a couple of amendments—I am delighted to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, actually likes my amendments to his amendments—is to enhance the position of the office within that architecture.

We have to recognise that there will be virulent opposition to this in the Treasury. The Treasury’s darkest day in recent years was the day that the Office for Budget Responsibility was established as an independent entity evaluating the performance of the economy. In the same way, having gone through that dark day, I can imagine the horror with which the Treasury observes the possibility of an independent entity evaluating the performance of regulators and the performance of the Treasury in its activity in guiding regulation. It is no surprise at all that we have what the noble Lord has quite appropriately called “thin gruel”, instead of something that would be truly effective and would create both an independent assessor and a sounding board for the industry, consumers and others who have an interest to express in regulation to get their views on to the front line.

With my Amendments 67 and 72 I am again in slight opposition to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, in the sense that I want to remove the lines in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, that specifically focus on the competition objective, because I do not want to second-guess what the office might do. The office could choose to travel over any part of the regulatory countryside. I regard my Amendment 72 as much more important because, as part of the architecture, the office should be funded through the levy in the same way as other parts of the regulatory system; the FCA, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and so on are all financed via the standard levy on the industry. After all, this would be a trivial amount of money because—as has been pointed out—it would be only a relatively small entity. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, liked my amendment to his amendment. I hope that he will be able to carry forward these proposals in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested.

I will comment on Amendments 44 and 47 from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, on the membership of panels at the FCA and the PRA. I support his view that placing practitioners on panels can have a very positive effect. I say this because I was an independent member of the board of the old Securities and Futures Authority, which was a practitioner-run regulatory authority with independent members, of which I was one. I was very impressed by the way that practitioners, when required to be regulators and placed in a regulatory role, assumed the role of regulators—they were not just representatives of their special interests. In fact, their special interests were left at the door; what came in with them was their specialist knowledge. I was sceptical when I first joined the board of the SFA but was won over by the performance of practitioners there. The proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, for practitioners will add to the regulatory effectiveness and knowledge of these panels.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I must advise the House—this will not surprise the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth—that, if this amendment is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendment 26.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I will comment briefly on the proposal which has emerged and is contained in Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Penn. It refers to the possibility of parliamentary committees being

“the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons … the Committee of the House of Lords”

or a Joint Committee. It says “and” but I presume that they would be mutually exclusive.

What is extraordinary about this amendment is that it contains a seriously bad idea which might lead to an extremely good outcome. The seriously bad idea is that the two committees, one in the other place and one here in the Lords, would be sitting at the same time and looking at the same material, requiring the same levels of expertise to advise them and the same commitment of time by the regulators—and, perhaps, producing divergent opinions which would lead to regulatory uncertainty. That is a very bad outcome. Why I fully support these amendments, however, is that the seriously bad idea will lead to an extremely good outcome, because people will see that the possibility of having a committee in the other place and a committee here doing the same thing, with all the negative connotations that I have just discussed, will lead to the rational outcome of a Joint Committee of both Houses.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, so I thought I would stand and associate myself completely with his comments. I am delighted that the noble Baroness has effectively accepted the proposal. I will add my voice to say this: the subject of financial services is so huge, complex and important that it really requires a dedicated committee, whether a Joint Committee or committee of this House, not just to be part of, say, the Industry and Regulators Committee or the Economic Affairs Committee. It is much too big a subject to be covered by a committee that is not dedicated to the subject—and, if you have a dedicated committee, it must be properly resourced.

The Government rightly say that this is a matter for Parliament, but let us be realistic: they have huge influence on what happens there. I really hope that the Government and whoever the powers-that-be in this House who make these decisions are—even as the chair of the Finance Committee, this is still slightly opaque to me—are listening. This is so important. We must go ahead and must resource it properly.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Eatwell Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

Both my noble friends have a much more sensible approach to this matter.

I echo the other remarks of my noble friend Lord Forsyth, whose Amendment 101 I was minded to support. I too am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for listening to the opinions of your Lordships expressed in Grand Committee. I added my name to Amendment 227 in Grand Committee, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes. Her amendment was debated on 13 March alongside Amendment 215, tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan and other noble Lords. I would have added my support to my noble friend Lord Moylan’s Amendment 105, but it was too popular and there was no room.

My noble friend the Minister will recognise the disproportionate difficulties which UK PEPs must endure as a result of the money laundering regulations 2017. On balance, I would have preferred to be excluded by virtue of being a UK citizen, but my noble friend has decided that exclusions will apply to domestic PEPs, which does not sound so nice, but will achieve the same outcome.

Unfortunately, it will take years for British citizens resident abroad who are connected to UK PEPs to be released from similar regulations in many different jurisdictions. For example, my son has found it impossible to be appointed as a bank account signatory in Taiwan and South Korea. However, my noble friend the Minister’s amendment should make the life of UK PEPs easier. I am interested to see whether, in a year’s time, the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Moylan will be the triumphant, most successful and best one of these. In any event, I am most grateful to her for taking up this point, as she said she would.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, we seem to be predominantly discussing personal experiences at the moment, so I declare an interest as the former chairman of the Jersey Financial Services Commission.

The definition of a politically exposed person in Amendment 96 refers to persons

“entrusted with prominent public functions by the United Kingdom”.

Presumably, that would not apply to the Crown dependencies, since they are not part of the United Kingdom. I think that this is a mistake; it should be corrected by the Government, given the important role many UK citizens play in the Crown dependencies and in the financial services industry in the Crown dependencies. Would the Minister agree to take this away and see whether the omission of the Crown dependencies is just an error that has been made in drafting this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Overall, you could put many more things into this and it will not be the end of the story, but I think it is important to put this into the Bill so that work starts on it quickly, because we are almost in an emergency with the state of investment in this country and, therefore, the sooner we begin to address to address it and to make our money work for the things that are better for the economy, the sooner we will get results.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, this is not just a good amendment, it is a very important and timely one. Noble Lords will recall that after the death of Robert Maxwell and the exposure of the way in which he had looted the Mirror Group pension funds, the Government introduced a new pensions structure to protect defined benefits pensions, as well as new accounting standards which needed to be obeyed by pension funds. The effect of this protective barrier placed around defined benefits funds has been that they have adopted extremely conservative investment strategies and the return on investments has correspondingly been extremely low compared with what could be achieved by quite modest amendments of investment strategy.

These issues are now a matter of widespread discussion where the unfortunate unintended consequences of the post-Maxwell legislation have been revealed. It is necessary quite rapidly to take account of the discussions, to assess the performance of pension funds since the last significant pensions legislation, and to come up with sensible proposals for reform. That is why this amendment is crucial, for both the pensions funds industry and the wider economy. I encourage the Minister to support this amendment because by doing so the Government would make a major contribution to the future prosperity of a whole raft of pensioners in this country and to the success of pension funds as investment vehicles within the UK economy.

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, I am concerned that, while seemingly innocuous, this amendment might turn out to be the thin end of the wedge of government intervention in pension investment. Clearly, the obligation on pension trustees should be to do their best to get the right returns for their investors. Once we start incentivising trustees to take decisions based on incentives offered to them, that raises the question of who then bears the consequences and the responsibility if those investments turn out in the long term not to be the right thing for their pensioners to be invested in.

I do not dispute the point that pension fund investments have not been optimal in the past, but to my mind that is to do with regulatory restrictions that have been placed on pension funds and the requirements to meet those restrictions. I think there is a case to look at the regulations around pension funds that restrict their investment choices and to enable them to invest in a wider set of assets, but I do not think the right way to do that is to start proposing incentives that would turn into the Government mandating the way that pension funds should be invested.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the most reverend Primate have retabled as a single amendment—Amendment 106 —the two amendments that were debated in Grand Committee: Amendment 241C on ring-fencing, and Amendment 241D on the senior managers and certification regime.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes said during that debate, these amendments are trying to set in stone for all time the conclusions of the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Times change, and I cannot support this amendment because it introduces an inappropriate degree of rigidity.

As my noble friend also pointed out, the lesson of the HSBC and Silicon Valley Bank episode was that the ring-fencing rules were not, after all, considered inviolable. It was necessary to provide HSBC with special statutory exemptions from the ring-fencing rules to enable it to acquire Silicon Valley Bank. That exemption has brought permanent changes to the ring-fencing regime for HSBC which affect it alone. Can my noble friend say whether that means it has a permanent competitive advantage over rival ring-fenced banks in the UK?

In any case, I rather doubt whether the introduction of ring-fencing has reduced the risks to which bank customers’ deposits are exposed. I disagree that it is therefore important to make it very difficult to weaken the ring-fencing regulations in any way. As I said in Committee, I worked for Kleinwort Benson for 23 years, for a further 12 years for Robert Fleming and then for Mizuho. All three banks operated both commercial and investment banking businesses. Internal Chinese walls between departments made it quite impossible for customers’ commercial banking deposits to be diverted to risky investment banking activities. As I said in Grand Committee, there is no positive correlation between the two cash flows of retail and investment banking. It follows that universal banks are in fact gaining diversification benefits. There is little global evidence that splitting up the banks has made them less likely to get into trouble.

Following the Lehman shock, is it not interesting that the US Government did not go for the reintroduction of a kind of Glass-Steagall Act? I am not convinced that ring-fencing is a good thing, and in general I am opposed to market distortions of this kind, which actually make the consumer less safe rather than safer. Ring-fencing also makes it harder for smaller banks to grow, because they must compete for a small pool of permitted assets against the capital of the larger banks. Will the Government conduct a review of the effectiveness of ring-fencing?

As for the senior managers and certification regime, I am sceptical as to whether it has been effective, because there is no hard evidence that it has been used as the stick that was originally intended. Most well-run banks operate in a collegiate manner, and I think it rather odd to attempt to attribute personal responsibility to managers and directors of banks for the decisions and actions of those banks, beyond the responsibilities that the directors carry in any event.

The SMCR has especially inconvenienced foreign banks operating in London. As an example, I refer to the Japanese megabanks. It used to be their practice to assign a very senior executive to London to take responsibility for all the bank’s activities in the UK and in most cases the whole EMIR region. Often, this might be the executive’s last major management position before retirement, and would typically be for two to three years leading up to his retirement date. Such executives have typically worked for 40 years or more for that bank and have managed regulated financial businesses in Japan for many years. However, the FCA has consistently been extraordinarily slow in approving those executives under the SMCR.

Therefore, the Japanese banks have given up on this strategy and feel compelled to appoint as head of their UK and EMIR operations not the person most appropriate for the job, but the most senior person who has already been working in London for three years or so, merely in order to meet the criteria of the SMCR regime. This has caused considerable inconvenience, because it is unreasonable to send a trusted senior executive overseas for five or six years in the last years of his active career, rather than a more reasonable stretch of two to three years. I know that the SMCR is much resented by Japanese and other foreign banks and I ask my noble friend if she will agree to conduct a review of how it is being implemented by the FCA.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I must say that, listening to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, just now, I think he has given strong arguments in favour of this amendment—strong because what the amendment asks for is accountability to Parliament on the performance of the ring-fence and the SMCR. If that accountability existed, the noble Viscount would have the opportunity to present his views in a framework, which might then have greater effect than, I am afraid, his speech had without such a mechanism.