Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

391: After Clause 167, insert the following new Clause—
“Misconduct investigations where officer acquitted(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.(2) In section 13B –(a) in subsection (1), at end insert “but this is subject to the exception in section 13BA.”, and(b) in subsection (2), at the beginning, leave out “The” and insert “Unless the exception in section 13BA applies, the”.(3) After section 13B, insert—“13BA No re-investigation on acquittal for the same conduct(1) Where this section applies, the Director-General may not make a determination under section 13B(2) to re-investigate the complaint, recordable conduct matter or DSI matter.(2) This section applies where—(a) the Director-General, appropriate authority or relevant review body (as the case may be) has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4G) of Schedule 3,(b) as a result of the determination mentioned in paragraph (a), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and(c) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.(3) The exception in subsection (1) does not apply only if—(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of substantial new evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the investigation, and(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be significantly likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.(4) In this section—(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the investigation related; (b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority, local policing body or relevant review body (as the case may be).”(4) After paragraph 24C of Schedule 3, insert—“Investigation where person acquitted in criminal proceedings
24D (1) This paragraph applies where—(a) an investigation of a complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter (“the index investigation”) has concluded and the final report has been submitted to the relevant authority,(b) the relevant authority has made a determination under paragraphs 23(2)(c), 24(2)(b) or 25(4F),(c) as a result of the determination mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Director of Public Prosecutions has brought criminal proceedings against the relevant person, and(d) the relevant person has been acquitted in those criminal proceedings.(2) In this paragraph—(a) “relevant person” means the person to whose conduct the index investigation related;(b) “relevant authority” means the Director-General, appropriate authority, local policing body or relevant review body (as the case may be).(3) Where this paragraph applies, the relevant authority may not initiate a new investigation, re-open an investigation or order a re-investigation against the relevant person in relation to the same complaint, conduct matter or DSI matter that was the subject of the index investigation.(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not apply only if—(a) the relevant authority has come into possession of substantial new evidence relating to the conduct that was the subject of the index investigation, and(b) the relevant authority is of the reasonable opinion that the new evidence would, if considered, be significantly likely to lead to a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.”(6) In paragraph 25 of that Schedule—(a) after sub-paragraph (4D) insert—“(4DA) The Director-General may not direct that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4C)(b) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to that investigation.”, and(b) after sub-paragraph (4E) insert—“(4EA) The local policing body may not make a recommendation to the appropriate authority that the complaint be re-investigated under sub-paragraph (4E)(a) if paragraph 24D applies in relation to the conduct to which the investigation related.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent the Independent Office for Police Conduct from investigating an officer where that officer has already been investigated and acquitted in court for the same conduct matter.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 391 stands in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. In Committee, speaking to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, I raised the case of the police officer, Martyn Blake, whose case served as the perfect example of the difficulties of serving as a police firearms officer.

The Independent Office for Police Conduct, as is the norm, investigated Martyn Blake following a police firearms operation in London that resulted in the fatal shooting of Chris Kaba, and he was subsequently charged with murder. The case proceeded through the full criminal justice process and the evidence was examined in open court before jury under the rigorous standards of criminal law. After hearing the evidence, the jury acquitted him.

For most people, an acquittal, after an initial investigation and then a full criminal trial, would represent the end of the matter, but in this case, despite the acquittal, the IOPC indicated that the circumstances of the case would still be examined further in the context of police misconduct proceedings. The IOPC then reopened those proceedings, constituting its second investigation and the third investigation overall.

Whatever one’s view of the original incident, the situation raises the question of how many times an officer should be required to defend themselves for the same conduct. We have had restrictions and double jeopardy since the 12th century, but this appears to be triple jeopardy. Police officers can be investigated by the IOPC, referred to the CPS, dragged through the courts, acquitted and then reinvestigated. My amendment would amend the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that where a police officer has been investigated for a complaint or a conduct or DSI matter, prosecuted in a criminal court and acquitted, the same conduct cannot simply be reinvestigated by the Independent Office for Police Conduct unless there is substantial new evidence. That last point is important.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reformed the law of double jeopardy by permitting retrial where there was new and compelling evidence. I completely understand that if new evidence comes to light, the IOPC may need to reopen an investigation. There is a safeguard in the amendment to ensure the fairness of the police complaints system. I do not dispute the importance of police accountability; public confidence in policing depends on robust oversight, and the Independent Office for Police Conduct plays a vital role in that framework, but accountability must also be balanced with basic principles of justice. When the criminal courts have examined a case and reached a verdict, there must be a strong presumption that the matter is settled.

I know only too well that police officers make difficult and sometimes life and death decisions in circumstances that are fast-moving, dangerous and highly uncertain. They do so in order to protect the public. When something goes wrong, it is entirely right that their actions are scrutinised carefully and independently, but it is equally important that the process is fair, proportionate and finite.

I hope that the Minister will realise the harrowing mental burdens placed on the police and accept the amendment. All I am asking is for him to meet me half way and bring something at Third Reading or perhaps commit to bringing forward a proposal along these lines in the upcoming Bill on police reform. If he does not accept my amendment today and cannot give me an assurance about police reform, I will seek to divide the House.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

In family cases of sexual or physical abuse, someone can be tried and acquitted but then dealt with in the family court on very much the same evidence. That is partly because there is a difference in the standard of proof, which, in a criminal case, is much greater than in civil and family proceedings. Having said that, I am entirely sympathetic to this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for initiating his Amendment 391. I know that it is motivated by the desire to support police officers in the difficult role they perform. He and I share that motivation. I say to him, however, that the amendment as drafted would have the effect of curtailing existing powers that the Independent Office for Police Conduct can use to reinvestigate or reopen a case that it has previously closed. The amendment also seeks, more generally, to prevent the reopening of investigations into complaints against the police from the public, again if such complaints have resulted in criminal proceedings which have not resulted in a conviction.

I take very straightforwardly the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who made the point that I was going to make: we know of no recent cases where the Independent Office for Police Conduct has reopened a closed case. However, it is in the public interest that cases of alleged police misconduct can, if need be, be reopened in the light of substantive new evidence or evidence that the original investigation was flawed. As has been said by the three noble Members who have spoken, not all criminal proceedings against serving police officers involve line-of-duty incidents. Some may involve serious corruption or sexual violence by police perpetrators, and there may be compelling public interest arguments for reopening such cases.

The powers of the Independent Office for Police Conduct to reinvestigate a case are already limited by existing law, which requires the IOPC to have compelling reasons to reopen a case. This is a legal threshold and is already a high bar. Disciplinary proceedings involve different evidential tests, as was mentioned by those who contributed, and the lower threshold for finding misconduct or gross misconduct is the balance of probabilities. They also serve a different purpose from a criminal trial. We rightly expect the highest standards from our police officers, so a blanket presumption that no police officer who has been acquitted in the criminal courts should face disciplinary proceedings would, in the Government’s view, be quite wrong—I think that reflects the points of view put by the noble Viscount, the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness. That is a compelling argument which I hope the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, will reflect on if he seeks to push the amendment, which I hope, in due course, he will not.

Amendment 392, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to improve the timeliness of police complaints and misconduct investigations by creating a new system of legal adjudicators with the power to overrule both chief constables and the Independent Office for Police Conduct by closing down investigations where they determine that there is no good or sufficient reason for any delay. As we have previously debated, unnecessary delays in these investigations are not in anyone’s best interests. I know the impact they will have on public confidence and on the welfare of the police officers involved. However, while it is right to strive for improvements in timeliness, this amendment risks adding another layer of bureaucracy, thereby adding cost and delay and not removing it.

The Government are committed to supporting chief constables to remove those who are not fit for purpose, but the amendment has the potential not only to overrule the responsibilities of chief constables and the Independent Office for Police Conduct, but to create some perverse outcomes. The Government’s recent police reform White Paper already confirms our commitment to an independent, end-to-end review of the police conduct system, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would support. It will include looking at timeliness and how this can be improved. Again, further process will be brought back following the police White Paper proposals.

Amendment 393A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, would require that, where a police officer uses force based on an honestly held but mistaken belief, that belief can justify the use of force only if the mistake was objectively reasonable. In effect, as she knows, it seeks to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of police officer W80, which found that the civil standard applied to this test. As the House will know, police officers carry out important and demanding roles. The Government are determined to ensure that both the public and the police are able to feel confident in the police accountability system. That is why we commissioned a review—again, the noble Baroness referred to this—from Timothy Godwin, a former senior police officer, and Sir Adrian Fulford. They carried out a rapid, independent review into police accountability.

The findings of that review were published in October 2025—again, the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, referred to this—and it recommended that the Government change the legal test for the use of force in police misconduct cases from the civil to the criminal law test. The Government, again, have accepted this recommendation and we are in the process of making the necessary changes via secondary legislation. Our intention is that these changes will come into force later this year, in the spring of 2026.

While I understand the noble Baroness’s concept, I cannot support it, because we have put in place the independent commissioners to examine the matter thoroughly and they heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Their recommendation was clear: the current approach has created confusion, inconsistency and, I accept, a very bad effect on police morale, particularly among firearms officers. I hope the changes we are making will bring clarity to the system. I reassure the House that it will still be the case that any force used must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary. I hope that satisfies the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, after her comments—it may not—and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

Finally in this group, I will speak briefly to government Amendments 395 and 397. These are technical amendments to ensure that specialist police force barred and advisory lists are consistently applied across police forces. The provisions in Clauses 173 to 181 and Schedule 21 are part of a broader effort to raise standards and conduct within law enforcement. They also include the closure of a legislative loophole. These technical amendments have been tabled to ensure that we have alignment in the treatment of civilian employees within the police service.

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I hope I have satisfied the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. I hope not just that I have satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, but that on reflection he is able to listen to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and therefore not push his amendment to a vote. But, as ever, that is entirely a matter for him.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his valid points and for injecting his valuable experience into this debate. I say to my noble friend Lord Hailsham that it is wrong to draw a comparison between policing and the medical profession. Policing is uniquely different.

This has been a thoughtful discussion about how we maintain robust police accountability while ensuring fairness to the officers who serve the public. The case of Martyn Blake has brought this issue into the public consciousness. Whatever view one takes of the circumstances of that tragic incident, the fact remains that the case was heard in open court before a jury and the officer was acquitted, yet the prospect of further investigation has remained. For many officers watching that case unfold, the concern is not about accountability; it is about whether there is ever a point at which a matter can truly be regarded as concluded.

As my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington pointed out, there is much current discussion about police morale and those young-in-service officers leaving the police service. The proposal in my amendment is fair to officers. It is clear for the system and maintains the integrity of the oversight framework. It is highly unfortunate and extremely disappointing that the Minister has not been able to at least meet me half way and make the commitment that I sought. On that basis, I beg to test the opinion of the House.