Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I should mention that I am a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and, in one way or another, have worked in the financial services industry throughout my professional career, albeit generally on behalf of consumers.

The Bill is in effect a Brexit Bill, as emphasised by the two previous speakers, but the Government are taking the opportunity to pursue wide-ranging changes in the way the industry is regulated. This has led to the concerns which have been expressed and will be expressed subsequently in the debate. For my part, my main concern is to ensure, given any changes, that the interests of consumers are fully protected. The industry owes a duty of care to consumers, and how this should be implemented needs to be set out clearly and directly in the Bill.

Against that background, I want to highlight one aspect of providing care for consumers where more needs to be done. Mental health and financial circumstances are clearly linked. Problems with your mental health can make it harder to earn money, to manage spending and, crucially in the context of financial services, to get a fair deal on products and services. Facing financial difficulties should not result in needing mental health treatment, but too often those things come hand in hand. Financial difficulty itself causes stress and anxiety, but this is often made worse by, for example, collections activity or having to go without essentials. It is important, therefore, to understand the scale of the problem. In any given year, one in four people will experience a mental health problem, and the pandemic and the cost of living crisis have made things worse.

Common symptoms of mental health problems, such as low motivation, unreliable memory, limited concentration and reduced planning and problem-solving abilities, can make managing money significantly harder. Those symptoms can also make it more difficult to interact with financial services. For example, four in 10 people say that they find it difficult or distressing to make phone calls. Experiencing a mental health problem can also make people more vulnerable to fraud and scams. People with mental health problems are three times more likely to report that they have been the victim of an online scam than other people.

The relevance of all this to the Bill is that the financial services industry needs to be placed under an explicit obligation to act responsibly towards its customers who have mental health problems. The industry needs to recognise and understand the nature and scale of these problems, it should be placed under a duty of care towards its customers, and it should be required to take active steps that will minimise the potential difficulties faced by those who have or are at risk of having mental health problems that are associated with their finances. Obviously, this will be of benefit to the individuals concerned, but it will also relieve much of the pressure on our mental health services, and, finally, it will be of benefit to the financial services industry itself in not accumulating bad business.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th January 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, for the purposes of Committee I declare my interests in the register, in particular as a non-executive director of the London Stock Exchange.

I will comment only briefly in this debate because, as others have said, it touches on some issues that run throughout the Bill. This is a matter of great importance: how we transpose the legislation and get the benefits of that transposition into UK law. If we have the flexibility, we ought to be able to use it, but financial services are our largest-earning industry, and I believe it is right that Parliament has to be able to keep track of what is going on and why when there are changes, and, as has already been pointed out, to have its attention drawn to significant changes.

If this amendment comes round again on Report, I would also like to see in it a report on the resulting change to the regulatory perimeter. Quite a lot of change is already going on and it is not necessarily something that we have had our eye on. Some of this change will be entirely at the behest of the regulators rather than in the hands of government. We will come across this later. It was always clear with EU legislation—maybe irritatingly so, in some instances—that the regulator “shall” do something, which did not give it any room for manoeuvre if it thought something did not need to be done. It looks like we will give our regulators the bits of wriggle room and the flexibility that we want, but it is wholly right that there should a report back to draw to the attention of our House and those who scrutinise this the intended difference in the regulatory perimeter, among other things, so that we can watch it and see how it goes.

I will return to the regulatory perimeter in many ways, because one of the problems is that once something is inside that perimeter, a whole truckload of things that were not really necessary might come along. AIFMD might be a good example of that. It is a whole load of extra reporting: where has it gone, what has happened to it, and has it done anything?

At the same time, if bad things are going on, you want there to be some kind of powers of intervention. It should not be a whole caboodle, with lots of rules and regulations and reporting on one hand but nothing on the other. We need to be able to do the things that are in the middle and bridge that gap. Given the way the edges of what is or is not a financial service are getting more and more blurred, what with the big tech industries and so on as well as the more nimble fintechs, we need that ability to ensure that where there is harm there is a route for action, without it having to mean that the whole kitchen sink of reporting is thrown at it across the board.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for pointing out that the process here differs from that in the retained EU law Bill. Could the Minister in her response set out more clearly the differences between the process here and the process in the other Bill, and the reasons for the differences?

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I have just one brief point. I agree with the comments so far made that this may not be the appropriate place to deal with the whole problem of delegation, because this deals with revocation, although the amendment sensibly deals with what is inevitable, which is the replacement. It seems to me that parliamentary scrutiny is essential. We need to come back to this time and time again.

It is essential because, unlike the position of a Minister or that of a Government, we have, first, the issue of the accountability of regulators and, secondly, we do not want to politicise regulators. That is Parliament’s job. Therefore, we have to scrutinise this whole area, where we are moving financial services to regulators and away from being dealt with largely through a political process in the European Union. We are hoping to make great improvements, but the one thing we are losing is the input of the political process. One cannot pretend that the direction of financial services policy is not a political question as well as a regulatory question. Politics should be for this House and, although I hate to use this word, we should not taint the regulators with politics.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th February 2023 Grand Committee

This seems to have a lot of support in this House. It is worth noting that the Conservative chair of the Treasury Select Committee in the other place supported it too, as have a large array of organisations—people who really know what is happening out there, including Macmillan Cancer Support, StepChange Debt Charity, Age UK and the Money Advice Trust. I urge the Government to follow the advice of the people working with some of the most vulnerable in our society and accept these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 55. I broadly support the other amendments on financial inclusion and will perhaps say a bit more about that aspect when discussing the amendments in later groups. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for explaining many of the points on which I had questions about his amendment, although I am still unclear what is covered by the term “regulated investments”. I do not think it is defined in the legislation, so perhaps it could be clarified.

I want to add a note of caution. I am not against the idea—obviously, it is motherhood and apple pie, and we are all in favour—but our old friend shareholder democracy is coming up again, and we should recognise that it has a political subtext. The truth is that, unfortunately, that ship has sailed, the bus has left the stop and it has gone the other way. Quite rightly, reference was made to our old friend Sid: the “Tell Sid” campaign was a masterpiece of promoting a policy that has had a lasting legacy, but that legacy has not been greater share ownership—greater ownership of regulated investments. In fact, we have seen the reverse, as the noble Lord mentioned in his introductory remarks. The whole thing has gone into reverse such that now, according to the ONS, only 12% by value of UK shares, for example, are owned by individuals, with the majority of shares owned by overseas entities. It is true that other shares are owned through other bodies, such as pension funds and unit trusts, but, in total, that is less than 10%, which I do not believe provides the individual holders with any sense of ownership.

There are many reasons for the shift away from individual ownership, and I think the attitude of the regulator is only a very minor part of it. In a sense, the objectives set out in the amendment have been overwhelmed by bigger forces. There are many reasons why people do not have individual ownership; many people are too poor and simply do not have the money. Even those who have some money in savings—this is a bit of a caricature—have it for rainy days. Regulated investments are not necessarily, depending on the definition, the best place to put your rainy day money.

My concern is the extent to which this amendment suggests it is advisable for people to use their money in this way. It would be very unfortunate and of great concern—perhaps the noble Lord can give me an assurance on this—if the regulatory bodies by implication were providing investment advice. I certainly do not think investment advice belongs in an Act of Parliament.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as London’s Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience, as risks associated with access to cash were noted as a risk to financial inclusion in the London City Resilience Strategy published in 2020.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for allowing me to add my name to their excellent Amendment 117 on financial inclusion. I will speak particularly on digital inclusion. The other signatories have already outlined in much better words than I could why this amendment is required. This amendment would ensure that the heart of this legislation takes account of the needs of the most vulnerable and that we have the opportunity to mitigate the risk that a significant minority of the population may be unwittingly left behind or excluded from crucial financial services. This amendment would be an important addition to the legislation. I agree with my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe that this is not party political. It is a really sensible and pragmatic measure which should afford significant protection.

On financial inclusion, I ask noble Lords to note specific issues of digital inclusion. This relates to financial inclusion as, without access to a smartphone or computer, it is almost impossible to carry out online banking or transfer money to a family member or a business.

I apologise for using a string of statistics, but beneath them there is a significant minority of the population whose stories and suffering because of financial exclusion often get missed. These people may be unable to access basic banking services online, relying heavily on cash or even cheques, and may struggle to pay for very basic things we all take for granted—for instance, automated parking.

Latest figures from the ONS estimated that, in January to February 2020, 96% of households in Great Britain had internet access. This increased from 93% the year before and 57% in 2006, when comparable records began. Although this number is increasing, and statistically it looks as if there is not a huge number of people without internet access, in the same period 76% of adults were using online banking. This leaves a significant minority who still do not. Estimates suggest that over 7 million adults in the UK—around 14%—could be classed as potentially financially excluded, with around 5.8 million having no record of an open or closed bank account. There are well over 600,000 people who could be classed as credit invisible, with the issues that causes for affordable credit.

Digital exclusion’s effects fall disproportionately, and research by the Centre for Social Justice has found that digital exclusion is significantly higher among those on the lowest incomes. It has a disproportionate impact on those who can least afford it. A fifth of adults with a household income below £15,000 are digitally excluded, compared to just 1% of those with an income of £50,000 or more. In turn, this adds to the poverty premium they already pay, as they cannot access the best prices or deals. This poverty premium, which has already been mentioned in this debate, includes borrowing and other financial services, so the proposed duty to be placed on the FCA would ensure that it, as well as the Government and the banking sector, can act to mitigate the risks posed by increasing digitalisation of the sector.

I note that technology often moves faster than we can imagine, Covid changed behaviours that now cannot be unchanged, and any duties imposed on the FCA in relation to financial exclusion will need to assume that the discussion about cash versus card that we are currently having will move to card versus phone, as well as include other technological approaches. Ensuring that the FCA has oversight over that would provide additional protection for the most vulnerable in our society, and I hope the Minister sees the merit of safeguarding which this amendment would provide and agree to include it in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Hunt, I make a point in my amendment about the link between financial fraud—in practice this now broadly means “online scams”—and mental health. I made this point last Wednesday, in dodging between the Committee and the House, when I raised this issue in the context of the Online Safety Bill. The same issue arises under this Bill and should be dealt with.

There is no doubt that people who have problems with their mental health are, for a variety of reasons, more vulnerable to fraud than people generally. According to a recent survey, people with mental health problems are three times more likely to say that they have been the victim of an online scam than people generally. In reverse, scams are a threat to people with normal health that risk their mental health.

I will talk about this in a bit more detail during debate on the next group of amendments, but we must understand that the result of fraud, however perpetrated, is much misery, destroying people’s finances, in many cases their families and, in some cases, tragically, their lives, so the Bill should address the issue and face up to the need to provide adequate protection. Anyone can fall victim to a scam, but people with mental health problems are at particular risk and can suffer more as a result. We must do what we can, therefore, to improve scam protection and ensure that, when people fall victim to scams, they receive adequate support.

I must pay tribute to the great work being done on this area by the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute. It has drawn attention to the fact that although harm can arise in diverse areas—gambling, retail and scams—across them all, including financial services, there are recurring themes. There is the lack of friction in transactions, advertising of investment opportunities, and high-pressure techniques applied which can put people under pressure, particularly in online spaces.

The institute concludes that these concerns have, up to now, gone relatively unchecked and underexamined, with current regulation either lacking or poorly matched to the real environments in which people find themselves. Although the Online Safety Bill has an important role in this area, it needs to work with the regulations in this Bill to address the problems that cause so much misery.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, might there be a case for the regulators to play a more active role in addressing fraud?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am speaking a little earlier than I usually do on my amendments in case others want to join in on the Equitable Life issue. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for signing my first amendment; it is hard to tell what happened with the second. I hope she signed both of them. Yes? Fantastic.

I want quickly to follow up on the comments from my noble friend Lord Sharkey. Perhaps the Minister can clarify this for me. She will remember that the PPI scandal was widely spread across the industry. It was not unique to one or two companies, therefore no company that invested in that mis-selling was behaving as an outlier. Again, when interest rate caps were inappropriately sold to small businesses, it was not the action of one or two particular banks. It was industry-wide, therefore nobody was the outlier. Can she explain to me what this new consumer duty will contribute to enabling the FCA to act on these kinds of abuses? She will note that the FCA did not act until there was a major scandal and a huge amount of public pressure and pressure in Parliament because, when it looked at it, it could see no basis for action. Perhaps she might tell us how the consumer duty would have worked in those two key cases. I am sure that the Government must have tested those cases in coming to their decision to support the consumer duty, so I think she will be able to give us clarification on that.

Both of the amendments in my name arise out of the Equitable Life policyholder cases. I thank the Equitable Members Action Group, which has been frankly magnificent in support of the victims of the collapse of Equitable Life. It has fought for them in the past and continues to fight for justice.

Amendment 225 is a direct plea for compensation. When Equitable Life collapsed, 1 million people lost a significant part of their retirement savings. In 2008, the Parliamentary Ombudsman concluded that the victims’ losses were directly attributable to a decade of serious, serial regulatory maladministration.

The ombudsman made 10 determinations of maladmin-istration: one against the DTI; four against the Government Actuary’s Department; and five against the FSA, which

“resulted in the true financial position of the Society being concealed and misrepresented”.

I cannot think it extraordinary that, in a situation such as that, one would have expected the loss to the victims to have been remedied in full. In recommending redress, the ombudsman said that she would

“normally expect that, where appropriate, such a loss should be remedied in full”

and she called for the Government to

“fund a compensation scheme to put those people who have suffered a relative loss back into the position that they would have been in had maladministration not occurred.”

The Government later accepted that the amount of compensation to achieve that would have amounted to £4.5 billion but only £1.5 billion in compensation was announced by George Osborne. Some 37,000 with-profits annuitants were fully compensated but a further 10,000 received only £5,000—or £10,000 if they were on pension credit—because they took their annuities before September 1992. The vast majority of the victims—895,000 people who were not with-profits annuitants—received only 22.4% of their acknowledged losses. My amendment would carry out the recommendation of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and put everyone back into the position that they would have been in had maladministration not occurred.

This leads to my second amendment, Amendment 226, which would establish in law a requirement that, when the ombudsman finds maladministration by the regulators or government departments, all consumers affected

“are put back into the position they would have been in had that maladministration not occurred.”

Just imagine how we would react if a bank decided that, instead of paying the full compensation it owed, it would pay just a portion of it. I cannot see why the Government should be treated differently from an entity such as a bank. We would expect compensation to be paid in full.

How can we ask people to turn with confidence to the Parliamentary Ombudsman when recommendations are watered down after the fact? How we ask people to save when a rogue society—I think that describes Equitable Life quite well—cheats them? The Government make appalling mistakes to the level of maladministration —that is a very high bar; it is not a low bar—and then will not make it right. Many of the victims are now in their eighties and nineties so time is running out for justice; indeed, many have died without justice. That is the reason behind my two amendments. I very much hope that there is support for that perspective; indeed, I hope that we will finally see support from government.

In making a brief comment on the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Sharkey, on a return to a proper duty of care—it is one of the most important amendments that we are considering today —I want to stress, in this context, the private right of action. It seems to me that, without a proper duty of care or private right of action, we can never make banking institutions or other regulated financial services sector institutions live up to their full responsibilities to consumers.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. I dipped down the order a little because I wanted to hear what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would say on Equitable Life. I have nothing to add. I was an Equitable Life policyholder twice over and no one came out of that whole sorry saga well. I do not think that all the necessary lessons have been learned, but that is perhaps for another debate.

I will address my Amendment 77. I am sure all noble Lords accept the principle that financial regulation should pay regard to the particular problems faced by people who have problems with their mental health. The issue is not about the principle but about whether it requires or deserves a place in Section 1C of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. I think it does, which is why I start by re-emphasising something. Many noble Lords might have heard this part of this speech before, because it has arisen in debates on the Online Safety Bill and on the last group—although the personnel attending this part of the Committee has changed somewhat, so I am not that embarrassed at repeating myself.

There are strong links between having a mental health problem and experiencing worse financial outcomes. Either a financial problem leads to poor mental health or pre-existing poor mental health leads to financial problems. Either way, mental health difficulties all too frequently make it harder to earn money, manage spending and get a fair deal on products and services. Life is likely to cost more precisely when we have less money available to spend.

Facing financial difficulties should not result in needing mental health treatment, but too often these things come hand in hand. Financial difficulties do not just cause stress and anxiety; this is often made worse by the follow-up actions—collections activity and having to go without essentials. It is not just an occasional problem. Here I must pay tribute again to the work of the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, which in a series of reports has amply illustrated the scale of the problem and the relationship between good mental health and well-regulated financial markets.

Common symptoms of mental health problems, such as low motivation, unreliable memory, limited concentration and reduced planning and problem-solving abilities, are just the things that make managing money significantly harder. These symptoms can also make it more difficult to interact with financial services firms. For example, people with mental health problems are three and a half times more likely to be in problem debt than those without. Just under half of adults in problem debt also have a mental health problem. In nationally representative polling from November last year, the institute found that around half of those who were behind on multiple bills have had suicidal thoughts as a result of the increasing cost of living. More than 100,000 people in England attempt suicide while in problem debt.

A problem we face is that communicating with financial services providers can be particularly challenging for people with mental health problems. Three-quarters of people with mental health problems found at least one communication channel difficult to navigate, with four in 10 saying they found it difficult or distressing to make phone calls, for example. This has to be taken into account in FCA guidance. Part of the problem is that providers simply do not have the information about their customers to enable them to make better decisions. That is a crucial issue that will have to be addressed.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 20th February 2023 Grand Committee

I thought a Brexit benefit was meant to be agility and speed, not atrophy, waiting even longer for even less democratic international solutions. If our regulators are not up to addressing systemic risk in UK-specific matters, find people who are and put the requirement in legislation, so it is something to point to. I am afraid that is the measure of the loss of confidence that I have, but the amendment is a perfectly rational addition to clarify that we do not have to wait for international action to solve homegrown problems. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I broadly support the proposals in these amendments, although I have doubts and I do not think this is the final answer—I suppose that is what I am struggling to say—in part because I have yet to be convinced that the Bank of England is the appropriate holder of the knowledge on these issues. It is a highly contested area; there are strong views and a range of views.

It is not clearly understood, except perhaps by the noble Baroness who moved this amendment, that there is total confusion between different standards involved in assessing a pension fund. There are the technical provisions under the solvency legislation; the accounting standards set by the accounting bodies so that the sponsor has some idea of the ongoing liabilities to the pension fund; and the standards set by the Pension Protection Fund. They are all important, but they are not the funding standards. The funding standard is the assessment of what money is required to be paid into the scheme to fund future benefits, and none of those other three funding standards is designed to produce that result.

The technical provisions are not a funding standard, just a way of assessing whether further contributions to the scheme are required; they do not tell you what those contributions should be. Similarly, the accounting standard does not tell you how to fund the scheme; it is purely for the purposes of the sponsor, so it has some idea of its financial standing. The standards set by the Pension Protection Fund, which are a specific insurance-type approach, are certainly not a funding standard.

The problem is that there is total confusion, and I am not sure that we can look to the Bank of England in its present state of knowledge, or the financial responsibility committee, to make that assessment. The issue is: who is going to promote this debate and arrive at a conclusion?

Another point that needs to be clearly understood is that pension funds are distinct from insurance offices. They are two financial institutions of a completely different nature. Over the last 20 years we have edged to a situation in which pension funds are expected to behave as though they are insurance companies.

I support the amendments, but I raise some doubts as to whether we can really look to the Bank of England and its committee to provide the clarity that is so sorely needed on these issues.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, because he knows rather a lot about this area—far more than I and perhaps many other members of this Committee.

I added my name to Amendment 149 in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and have little to add to what she said on it. It was genuinely shocking to find out about the risks to financial stability that existed through the use of LDI strategies last September. Even more shocking was the fact that the Financial Policy Committee knew about them but had done very little about it. These amendments would not solve the problem but at least remind the FPC what its job is supposed to be: to identify areas of risk to financial stability and do something about it.

I did not add my name to the noble Baroness’s Amendment 159 because giving wide-ranging responsibilities around financial stability and systemic risk to three separate bodies is just a recipe for confusion and inefficiency. It is perfectly true that none of the three covered itself in glory during the LDI episode, but I do not think the answer is in this amendment.

I am also deeply sceptical about giving the FPC any role in relation to accounting standards, as proposed in the noble Baroness’s Amendment 149A. While individual accounting standards are often flawed, the underlying concept behind accounting standards is sound, because it is trying to ensure that financial statements are prepared in accordance with a consistent and coherent set of principles, and not driven by non-relevant preferences or by events. In a sense, the amendment is trying to shoot the messenger of what accounting standards are bringing in terms of the message.

Accounting standards can have real-world consequences—for example, when what is now IAS 19, which has already been referred to, was introduced, it was almost certainly one of the factors that led to the demise of defined benefit schemes in private sector companies. But that is not a reason for not applying the accounting standard. So, too, if any accounting happens to amplify financial stability risks, the problem is with risk management, not with the accounting. That should be the focus of the FPC, risk management, not the formulation or approval of accounting standards. But as I said, I firmly support Amendment 149.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I add briefly to my noble friend’s comments on the need for a proper and joint assessment of systemic risk in pension funds and their management strategies. I think the need is urgent, as the LDI debacle has shown. Indeed, there is continued turmoil and unrest in the sector. I notice that Risk.net reported last Friday that UK pension funds are exploring legal claims against LDI managers, their fiduciaries who they tasked with running the LDI strategies. Five law firms have told Risk.net that they have been approached by pension schemes invested in both pooled and segregated funds to investigate whether legal action can be taken against the relevant managers.

There are apparently also questions being asked, not surprisingly, about whether fund managers had fully explained to trustees the risks associated with LDI, a point raised by the chair of our Industry and Regulators Committee in his brief letter of 7 February to Andrew Griffiths. It is a point that has a direct bearing on the generation of systemic risk.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I intended to make a second point about risk. Everyone tends to think about risk in terms of systemic risk—the finances of the country come under some pressure—but there is another risk that is not given sufficient attention, which is the risk that pension funds will fail to deliver the benefits that people expect to receive. That risk is given insufficient attention, but I hope it will be covered if there is a system where someone is given responsibility to look at risk. There is the risk of not getting out the benefits expected, as well as the risk to the financial system.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not particularly understand the technicalities that have been alluded to in this debate. I will just say a word or two about the bigger issue here, which is the problem that human beings as individuals and institutions have with handling low-probability, high-consequence risk. We know that younger human beings, particularly, gamble their lives on it in how they behave.

Of course, I was very close to this because, in 1988, I took over London Underground, which had just killed 31 people. In a sense, the syndrome that led to that was, “Well, it won’t happen”. The defence was that it was unforeseen—that is, the circumstances that led to that catastrophe were unforeseen. Yes, it was unforeseen because it was not looked for. It was not unforeseeable. That is the issue.

Anybody or any organisation—public bodies, in particular—that is responsible for big risks has a duty to pursue the low-probability, high-consequence risks. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who said that this is about risk management. It is much deeper than individual bits and bobs. We have had centuries of knowing just how high the consequences of systemic risk can be. If these amendments can address this problem in the financial world, I hope that the Government will give them a fair wind.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the objectives behind all these amendments. I was going to direct my remarks specifically to Amendment 237, but I want to make a narrow but important point of qualification. I support the principle, but I cannot stop myself responding to the discussion we had earlier, led by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, about fossil fuels. The important point about fossil fuels is that there are massive externalities—external costs—which are not caught in the market, and, unless we do something now, our children, and their children, will pay the price. It is not just a question of moving the market now; we need to stop using this stuff, which is poisoning the planet.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

I was not disputing that; I was saying that we accept that we have to find the route to net zero, but the question is: should we phase out demand for fossil fuels, as the noble Lord’s last sentence indicated, or should we phase out supply? Which does he prefer?

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Both. I am not really being given that choice but, as I said, it was just a narrow point.

My question on Amendment 237 is: would you take investment advice or guidance from the Secretary of State? Is the Secretary of State even authorised to provide investment guidance or advice? I am troubled by the involvement of the Secretary of State, and I hope that we could perhaps consider a different wording if we wish to raise this on Report. If the Government want something to happen—net zero—as a matter of public policy, they have to accept the risk themselves and not pass it on to private individuals. I am talking about pension schemes, and the underlying point is that the money in a person’s pension scheme is their money, provided to them to be used in accordance with their wishes to provide them with a retirement income. Part of that retirement income depends on solving climate change—that is clear. I do not doubt the importance of taking these issues into account; I simply question the relevance and role of the Secretary of State in that process.

Over many years’ involvement with pension funds, I have seen that, when people see the massive amount of money involved, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, they see that the economic power is there, but it is there on behalf of the members’ interests and not, in principle, as a means of implementing government policies—however worthy. They might be in alignment, but the leading factor should be the members’ interests.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. Since the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, appeared to be directing a question at me about whether I oppose fossil fuels, I will take a moment to answer that. Do I think that pulling up carbon which has been stored in the ground over hundreds of millions of years, which was a crucial part of delivering the Holocene that gave us 10,000 years of incredibly stable climate in historic terms, and then pumping it into the atmosphere needs to be stopped with great speed? Yes, I oppose pumping out that stored carbon.

More than that, the fact is that extracting, transporting, burning and getting rid of the waste products from that fossil fuel causes huge damage to the health of people on this planet. One in five premature deaths that occur on this planet is as a result of burning fossil fuels—that is based on a study in environmental health in 2021. So do I want to do something urgently to make this a healthier planet for people? Yes, I do. However, that is not what any of these amendments are about. These amendments are to the Financial Services and Markets Bill, and all of them are about trying to stop the crashing of the financial markets, which are also crucial to our security and health in different kinds of ways. That is what all these amendments address.

It is really interesting that we have here a set of amendments which we might, collectively, for the purposes of Committee look at how we can hone and shape—I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But what we have in Amendment 168 are directions to the PRA to review capital adequacy requirements. That is about the security of firms. In Amendment 201, we have directions to the FCA to direct personal pension providers. Picking up on that point, I note the figures from the Pensions Regulator’s most recent survey of defined contribution schemes, which found that more than 80% did not allocate any time or resources to managing climate risk.

Then in Amendment 233, we have sustainable disclosure requirements, so that companies would report to investors what risks they are taking with their money by not dealing with all the sustainability risks which relate to the fact that we are exceeding planetary boundaries—not just on climate but on biodiversity, the loss of ecosystems and novel entities, and on phosphate geochemical flows. All these things are taking risks with people’s money, which is what we are talking about. Amendment 233 might indeed guide us in the direction of each major company having to have a chief environmental officer, who should be of equal status and importance to a chief financial officer because it is about ensuring the sustainability of the company, as well as the sustainability of this earth. Going on to Amendment 235, we are directing the Treasury to provide government guidance on how we achieve all of this.

That is an overview but I want to pick up one specific point. I would have signed Amendment 119, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, and others in a full cross-party group, had there been space. When people think about forest risk commodities, they often start by thinking, naturally enough, about timber but, if we look at some statistics, palm, beef and soya production collectively amount to 36% of global deforestation. When Orbitas, an investment body, surveyed 24 capital providers in 2020, all of which had high levels of tropical commodity exposure, not one had screened their loan books and/or investments for agricultural transition risks. I want to major on that point while we debate this today, because if we look at Indonesia, 76% of unplanted forest concessions and 15% of existing palm oil assets could be at risk—that is, financial risk—should Indonesia adopt what is seen as its essential plans to meet its Paris climate commitments.

I said that we need to look at all aspects of planetary boundaries being exceeded. We also must include water risk. Fresh water supplies rely heavy on fossil water aquifers—in the American high plains, in Mexico, in eastern Europe, in Egypt, in Arabia, Iran and China. All agricultural production of food—the big sectors globally and financially—is utterly dependent on fresh water supplies, which are not being replenished. That is a huge financial risk as well as a risk to when any of us can eat in the future, at a basic level.

Finally, I focus on Amendment 168, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Worthington, Lady Drake and Lady Sheehan. I would like to work with them ahead of Report because, as others have highlighted, this focuses particularly, though not exclusively, as the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, said, on fossil fuel exploration, exploitation and production. We must broaden this out to look at the agricultural sector, because it is an area of enormous financial risk. I draw on the work of the investment group FAIRR, which looks at the extremely high financial risks. The majority of the largest protein producer companies are at high risk for greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, water and waste. Over 60% of them saw soya feed from areas at high risk of deforestation and have still not set deforestation targets. Fewer than one in five meat, egg and dairy firms is adequately managing the pollution of waterways from manure. Just ask the people of Herefordshire about that if you want to know more.

FAIRR finds that the volume of waste produced by the 70 billion animals processed each year is equivalent to the volume of waste produced by twice the entire human population on this planet. Only 18% of global meat and dairy producers track even partial methane emissions, even though annual methane emissions from global capital and livestock make up 44% of anthropogenic methane emissions.

We are talking about the future of our life on this planet. We are talking about a liveable planet. That is inescapable. However, today we are talking about ensuring that we do not see the next financial crash. Let us remember the last financial crash, when the cash machines were within hours of stopping working. We must do something to stop the next financial crash from being at the point where the size of the carbon bubble, the level of stranded assets across a range of sectors—fossil fuels, animal agriculture and other areas—is such that it suddenly hits the markets. The markets are not counting this now. They must count this in if we are to have a sustainable financial sector.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 93. It is always a pleasure to follow my noble friend Baroness Drake, who has said it all. I will join on the back of her comments to say that I strongly support the approach she has taken.

I also support Amendment 113 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. I respect the extent to which some concerns have been taken into account to make it clear that the interests of the members are paramount in the amendment—that is crucial. On the idea that pension funds should have a more active role in growing our economy, obviously its time has come. It is not new—people have been making suggestions about it; I have been involved in it in the past—but there now seems to be a confluence of views that something must be done. However, it has to be done in a way that respects the fiduciary duty to put the interests of members front and centre in the decisions that are taken. I take a fairly broad view of what constitutes members’ interests, but it is the members and their trustees acting on their behalf who have to take that decision, rather than bodies which do not have the direct results inflicted on them if they get it wrong.

It is important to stress that any ideas have to be practical and effective. I have some doubt as to whether the problem we face is about the supply of money; rather, it is about how the money will be used. Putting these proposals forward without having the other side of the bargain improved will be a problem. It is also important to stress that there are very different types of schemes, and they all have different investment needs. Again, whatever guidance is given has to respect the particular types of schemes.

I have one concern, which I would like the Minister to address, about the phrase “have regard to” in relation to guidance. It appears in the government amendment and in Amendment 113 put forward and supported by my noble colleagues. The problem with the “have regard to” is that it is a legal lottery. It is very difficult to know in advance what exactly it means, so it would be very helpful to me, and I hope the House, if the Minister could say something about that. Is it, as is sometimes suggested, like the accounting requirement—you comply or explain—or do you have to, in some way or another, follow the requirements as they are set out? What does “have regard to” mean in this legislation? It would be good to have clarification during the progress of the Bill, because the phrase appears several times.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on her Amendment 4. I am sure that it is very well-intentioned, and it meets some of the concerns that were clearly expressed in Committee. I welcome the update that will be coming from her on the green taxonomy; I believe that there will be a consultation on that. There is also the new green finance strategy, which has been published. They are all welcome.

Amendment 4 is welcome, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, explained, although it will ensure that the Treasury produces guidance or requirements for sustainable investing by pension schemes and others, it would appear that the FCA and the PRA may not have the powers to issue that guidance. So, once the Treasury has produced its recommendations, we will still need to legislate. Can my noble friend the Minister confirm that that is the case, and that we will need further legislation if we want to implement the impacts of Amendment 4 through to pension schemes?

I have added my name to Amendments 93 and 113 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. Amendment 93 deals with the investment duties of pension providers and investment managers, and Amendment 113 deals with the investment duties of occupational pension trustees and managers. Clearly, if we are to make progress in line with the Government’s laudable objectives—and I congratulate them on all the work they have been doing, including some of their world-leading work on trying to ensure that pension schemes invest more in line with green objectives and sustainable investments for the long term—the amendments will ensure that the FCA and the PRA can make those rules. The amendments are very reasonably drafted; the FCA and the PRA may make these rules, but they do not require them at this stage to do so. The trustees and investment managers must then have regard to the rules, but, as the noble Baroness explained, they can explain why they are not going to implement the rules. However, at least we can set up a system where the trillions of pounds of long-term investment money in pension schemes can assuredly do more to protect the planet and provide investment opportunities that will help with social objectives for this country.

I do not have a problem with the concept of government directing pension schemes to invest a certain proportion of their assets, if necessary, in green, sustainable and socially desirable projects, including infrastructure, forestation, nature preservation and so on. At least 25% of all pension schemes—we are talking about hundreds of billions of pounds—has come from the taxpayer in the first place in the form of tax relief. Given that 25% of everyone’s pension is tax free, that is money that was spent by taxpayers. Given the budget circumstances that the country faces, and as taxpayers would otherwise be funding these projects outside pension schemes, I do not think that it is impossible to justify the idea that, should the private sector not be forthcoming with its investments in these vital elements for future growth and for a sustainable future for us all, the Government might themselves decide to require it.

These amendments will at least pave the way to ensure that there is more chance of these huge amounts of money, which are put aside for millions of people’s retirement income later in life, being invested in a way that will benefit them and the economy, as well as ensuring that there is much more and better protection for the planet, which I know that the Government wish to achieve. So I support Amendments 93 and 113, and I have added my name to Amendment 114, so excellently explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, again facilitating rules that it will be necessary for schemes to follow, should the Government desire that—which is the indication that I have had from my noble friend the Minister and which is implied in the Government’s Amendment 4.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I suggest to the noble Viscount that, in fact, the whole corpus of international soft law on finance is generally known in the trade as the international standards, and those who work in the regulatory community would immediately relate to the proposals of those particular institutions. As the noble Lord pointed out, occasionally Basel standards have not been followed. This is true in the United States, where only international competitive banks follow Basel committee standards. The US has learned painful lessons over the last year or so with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and others that did not follow Basel standards. The relaxation of standards was one of the elements that led to that particular collapse. Alignment with international standards and the institutions which—I say again—Britain has done so much to help develop is an important part of the maintenance of financial stability in this country.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make an argument that the idea that greater competition is a public benefit is simply wrong, if you think it is inevitable. Now, I spoke about this at length in Grand Committee a couple of weeks ago, and the Minister had the benefit of my views on the matter at the time, so I am not going to repeat them at length; one or two other Members present did as well.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a director of two investment companies, as stated in the register. I agree to some extent with what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, but I am not sure I can agree that the United Kingdom’s financial markets are uniquely peculiar in any sense. It is true that we do not have such a large domestic hinterland as the United States, but compared with financial centres such as Switzerland and Singapore, we have a rather larger domestic hinterland. I do not think what he said is therefore so relevant as he perhaps believes.

Furthermore, I agree that our high standards and what used to be called “my word is my bond”, which was what I was taught on day one when I went to work for Kleinwort Benson in the City, are very relevant. We have always been proud, and rightly so, of the very high standards and honourable way, in the main, in which our financial institutions have conducted their business. Indeed, competitiveness of the market depends, to a degree, on maintaining those high standards. But competitiveness also depends on having clear, comprehensible and proportionate regulation, and in recent years our regulation has become too cumbersome, particularly after the FSA was split into two regulators. If you are a dual-regulated company, it is a nightmare to have to report much the same information but in different formats to the two regulators. This is why the time spent by executive committees of operating financial companies in the City is so greatly taken up by compliance, reporting and regulatory matters, rather than innovation and the development of new businesses to attract more international companies to do their business in London, thus providing more revenue for the Exchequer and more jobs for British people, and indeed for non-British people to come and work here.

I support the Government’s amendments to strengthen the reporting requirements of the regulators, and Amendments 40 and 41 tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. I agree with those noble Lords who have thanked the Minister most sincerely for her response to concerns expressed across the House about accountability and scrutiny. However, the British Insurance Brokers’ Association has expressed concern that the Bill, as drafted at present, largely allows the regulators to decide how to fulfil the reporting requirements for the competitiveness and growth objective.

Clause 37 acts as a backstop that allows the Treasury to compel additional reporting. What assurances can the Minister give that the Government’s response to the ongoing consultation on the appropriate metrics for the regulators to publish will lead to concrete changes to which metrics are published, given that the Bill will have been passed by the time the Government respond to the consultation? Given that it will not be possible to include any details of specific metrics or how the Treasury will exercise its powers in Clause 37 in primary legislation, how can the Government ensure that the consultation will lead to a sufficient challenge to the regulators, allaying concerns about them marking their own homework in their reporting? Will the Minister also give assurances that the Government’s response to the consultation will reflect the parliamentary debate in this area, where noble Lords have consistently stressed the need for extensive metrics to be published by the regulators with regard to the new objectives?

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to run the risk of repeating myself, but I have made plain in previous debates my concern about the inclusion of the competitiveness objective in this legislation. Just to be clear, I think it has no place, but I welcome these provisions that there should be a report on the competitiveness objective. My concern is that the wording does not get to the heart of the problem that I believe exists, which is the interaction between the competitiveness objective and the other objectives. My reading of the way this is worded is that the report just has to talk about the competitiveness objective and does not have to say how it affected the other objectives. Maybe the Minister in her reply could allay my concerns and make it clear that the regulatory bodies are required to look across the whole gamut of their obligations when reporting on the competitiveness objective.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the House of my interest as an employee of Marsh Ltd, the insurance broker. I offer my support to the amendments in this group, so thoughtfully proposed by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. My noble friend the Minister has indeed made improvements since Grand Committee, and for that I thank her, but I wonder whether the Government have gone quite far enough. I particularly thank the Minister for the generous amount of time she spent with me the other evening.

My noble friend the Minister’s amendment proposes two reports, 12 months apart, as has been mentioned, but I believe that it is important that reports from the regulators should become an annual occurrence concerning the competitiveness and growth objectives. The financial sector of the United Kingdom is a major driver of revenue for the country and we must ensure consistency over time, not just the immediate future. In turn, this suggests the need for consistent metrics on which to report, allowing for the proper comparisons.

Amendment 19 concerns the principle of proportionality, recognising that not all financial services are the same. Again, I will look at the insurance market in particular, but I suspect there are similarities in other financial lines. I am all for keeping individual retail and small business customers safe when working with insurance companies, but there are significant differences to be found between them, users of the London wholesale insurance market—which is used by knowledgeable buyers, using one of many potential advisers—and captive insurance entities. Smaller customers need a level of protection not required by either of these other two groups.

In the debate on this amendment, I wish to refer particularly to captive insurance companies. Captives are wholly owned subsidiaries set up to provide risk mitigation services—insurance—for their parent company and/or related entities. The parent is inevitably a sophisticated entity, almost certainly hiring advisers. They should require a very different approach from the retail customer.

There currently seems to be a one-size-fits-all approach by the regulators when reviewing insurance companies that does not take into account the nature of the purchaser. This is not only time consuming but costly in comparison with other overseas regimes. Captives provide low risk to the financial system and the buyer of their services requires a significantly different level of regulation from an insurance company trading with individuals. They are fundamentally different.

There is no captive company authorised in the UK and even those of our major companies, including UK public bodies, are located in overseas jurisdictions. The captive insurance business generates in excess of $50 billion annually, and here lies a significant opportunity for growth in the insurance sector which, should the regulator alter its stance and act with proportionality, could, as an example, add significant additional capital into the country.

Amendments 40 and 41 refer to the requirements to publish regulatory performance on authorised firms and new authorisations. The Government certainly recognise in Clause 37 the need to improve the regulatory culture, but we need more teeth in terms of reporting metrics so it becomes standard practice within the regulators. This culture needs to become ingrained.

The metrics being proposed in Amendment 40 are granular concerning timing and would bring some needed haste to the system. In business, time is often of the essence and being held up disproportionately by a UK regulator, as opposed those in other jurisdictions, acts as a deterrent to trade in this country. The metrics being proposed in Amendment 41 link together to give a consistent window into the activities of the regulators. With quarterly reporting it will be possible to gain some comparative statistics that will tell a story.

Lastly, Amendment 92 concerns determination of application. London remains one of the world centres of insurance and we must do all we can to preserve its status, but there are for sure a number of other locations that can attract capital more easily and so challenge it. Unfortunately, regulatory burden is regularly raised as an issue damaging London’s ability to attract additional capital and support the market.

Concerns have been raised about the overall performance of the regulators in terms of timing, with authorisations and approvals taking longer they should. It is recognised that they are falling behind their KPIs. Insurance companies here have experienced delays in case handler assignment, which is the beginning of a domino effect. In addition, concerns have been expressed over some of the questions asked and the appropriateness of the data being requested, leading to additional time and expense. The regulators need to streamline their activities by being relevant.

These amendments refer to a great extent to measures designed to bring some more accountability to the reporting by the regulators. I realise there is a consultation with the financial markets, but I believe that the measures being proposed are the bare minimum that should be required and included in the Bill. These sets of metrics will prevent the regulators deciding which of their own sets of data to publish. Certainly, from an insurance perspective, this will allow life to proceed way more freely. This will ensure transparency from the regulators, which is surely what is being strived for.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, there are currently quite a few difficulties with the UK economy, but one that seldom gets the focus, attention and commentary that it requires is the lack of financial inclusion for so many people right across the United Kingdom. At its extreme, it is best summed up as: those who have the least are often forced to pay the most for financial services and products. However, it is a question not just for individuals but for micro and small businesses, which can find themselves effectively financially excluded.

Amendment 13 simply seeks to introduce a secondary objective for the FCA on financial inclusion. It would not in any sense fetter any of the other objectives, not least the primary objectives. It could operate effectively and efficiently within that current stream of objectives for the regulator.

Without in any sense seeking to pre-empt my noble friend when she comes to wind up, I think that she may well say that it is not the right approach to introduce a new objective for the financial service regulators without first undertaking a significant and serious consultation. That is a fair point. If she is unable to accept my Amendment 13, would she agree to take away the opportunity and possibility to launch the consultation into a secondary objective for our financial service regulators on financial inclusion? I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 14 proposes a new clause to the objectives, adding the principle of protecting the mental health of consumers. I set this out at some length in Committee, and I think it is worth repeating the point. I should perhaps say at the beginning that I support the other two amendments, although I prefer the one from my Front Bench. I would like to see an explicit statement that the concept of financial inclusion extends to people who have problems dealing with financial services because of problems with their mental health.

Financial services have to understand and recognise the nature and scale of the mental health problems faced by some people. They need to be placed under an explicit duty of care to their customers who suffer from these problems, and they should be required to take explicit additional steps to minimise the potential difficulties faced by those who have or are at risk of having mental health problems associated with their finances.

I am sure that all noble Lords accept the principle that financial regulation should pay regard to the problems faced by people who have problems with mental health. It goes almost without saying. The issue is not about the principle but about whether it should be referred to explicitly in this bit of the legislation. I think that it should, but I am willing to take small mercies if the Minister can make clear the explicit and implicit responsibilities on the regulators to undertake to provide this sort of support and explanation for people who have mental health problems.

The experience works both ways: financial problems lead to mental health problems, and people with mental health problems have difficulty in handling their finances. That is an established fact. I ask for general support for the principle and an indication that, one way or another, the legislation will provide these people with the support they require.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I thought it might be useful to speak at this point to introduce Amendment 18, the amendment in my name in this group. I have taken part in many discussions in this House on financial inclusion. It is to this House’s credit that such a keen interest is taken by Members on all sides on this topic. Financial exclusion is a priority concern for the Labour Party. It is often caused by the way that financial products are designed and marketed. Of course, poverty and the cost of living crisis plays a huge part in this: they mean that the poorest often pay more in fees for products, but there are even things like mobile phones not being available on a contract unless you have a bank account. We know that all these issues can make life more expensive for people who can least afford it.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, I am concerned that, while seemingly innocuous, this amendment might turn out to be the thin end of the wedge of government intervention in pension investment. Clearly, the obligation on pension trustees should be to do their best to get the right returns for their investors. Once we start incentivising trustees to take decisions based on incentives offered to them, that raises the question of who then bears the consequences and the responsibility if those investments turn out in the long term not to be the right thing for their pensioners to be invested in.

I do not dispute the point that pension fund investments have not been optimal in the past, but to my mind that is to do with regulatory restrictions that have been placed on pension funds and the requirements to meet those restrictions. I think there is a case to look at the regulations around pension funds that restrict their investment choices and to enable them to invest in a wider set of assets, but I do not think the right way to do that is to start proposing incentives that would turn into the Government mandating the way that pension funds should be invested.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. I still think of myself as a relatively new Member of the House, so it is useful to remind the House of my lifetime spent working in the pensions industry, broadly in support of scheme members. I have been a scheme trustee, I have chaired the Greater London Council investment panel and I have advised trustees of pension schemes as the scheme actuary. I am just stating my expertise here.

I support the amendment because I think a review is required. I take on board the remarks about the thin end of the wedge, but unless we have the review those concerns cannot be addressed. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said, there is now a big conversation about using pension scheme money to promote the British economy. There is actually a long history of that sort of proposal going back over many years, but it seems to have reached a crescendo over the last year or so.

It is essential that we have a review. What is also essential, of course, is that the review is undertaken by those who know what they are talking about, but that has not necessarily been true about all the comments made so far. For example, I draw the attention of the House to the recent useful report produced by the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association—not a body that I consistently agree with—on supporting pension investment in UK growth and thinking up quicker and simpler ways to promote pension fund investment in our economy.

I was going to raise two issues. One has already been explained clearly by my noble friend Lord Eatwell: the funding standards that have been established work against the principles that I am sure we all support. Another problem that we have is the Conservative Government’s introduction of freedom and choice. It is difficult to oppose freedom and choice but, when you come to pensions, which are long-term arrangements depending on long-term investment, giving people freedom of choice weakens the very basis upon which they are being organised. It is all very well saying to pension funds, “You’ve got to invest in infrastructure”, but if the members of that scheme have the right to pull their money out at any time, it is very difficult to take the long-term view. That is a fundamental incoherence behind the so-called policy of freedom and choice. Those issues need to be addressed in the review.

I also hope that the list of consultees for the review is not a complete list; to the extent that it is possible to consult the scheme members, they should be consulted as well. I also hope that the issues can go somewhat broader than those listed in the amendment.

In general terms, a review is needed, and I hope it will lead to the objective being clearly set out of promoting the UK economy.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I fully support and have added my name to this amendment. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies. We both go back a long way in the pensions industry. My entire career has been in pensions—examining occupational pension schemes as an academic, then managing occupational pension investments in the City, then advising schemes and Governments. I have also been a trustee on investment committees for pension schemes.

I have to say that the current position that members of pension schemes find themselves in—both members of defined benefit schemes and members of too-often-forgotten defined contribution schemes—has not been positive in terms of the experience of the 2022 markets. As we have heard, trustees and managers of pension schemes have been encouraged to believe that the right way in which to invest a pension fund is in supposedly low-risk—which actually also means relatively low-return —investments, rather than in the traditional and older-fashioned way of managing schemes that persisted until the noughties, which was to try and maximise returns.

We have now moved to a position whereby we were supposed to be minimising risk, but I argue that that entire movement away from supporting the British economy and away from supporting UK equities and UK growth assets has been underpinned and misled somewhat by quantitative easing. The Bank of England’s policy, which effectively offered a natural large buyer that underwrote and underpinned the government bond market, perhaps led people to believe that that was the best or safest way in which to invest pension funds. That was partly because the long-term value of the liabilities, as well as their present value, is discounted and measured as of today by using the gilt yield or bond yield measure. In corporate reporting it is double-A corporates; in actuarial valuations it is typically gilt yields.

In 2022, conventional gilts lost 20% and index-linked gilts 30% of their value. The FTSE 100 rose a little. Yes, smaller companies did not do so well, but the idea that pension schemes were investing in a low-risk manner was actually confounded last year, and I would argue that, as we move into a post-QE world and as we have recognised and I have been warning since 2011, or even earlier than that, the policy of quantitative easing is a significant danger for pension scheme investments and members.

We must recognise that we do not fully understand what investment risk means any more. The capital asset pricing model is based fundamentally on the idea that gilt yields are the lowest-risk assets and all assets are more risky—even if they offer more returns, potentially they are more risky—and may need to be considered with a little more circumspection.

That leads on to the idea that, if we do not quite know whether gilts and fixed income are indeed low risk in the way that we thought they were and they have been in the past—because central banks are going to need to offload at some point and are certainly no longer underpinning the markets—diversifying investments and supporting the domestic economy in the way that this review would be investigating must come into the public debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

I will speak very briefly to offer Green support for the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the most reverend Primate. The amendment, in a way, is a smaller and lighter version of my attempt to strike out the competition clause, on setting a competitiveness objective, which has sadly remained in the Bill.

In November last year, City Minister Andrew Griffith told the Financial Times:

“The overall thrust of things is to allow more risk … you shouldn’t be risk”


averse;

“we just need to manage that in an appropriate way”.

He went on to say that the aim of reducing ring-fencing was

“to release some of that trapped capital over time”.

I acknowledge that the Minister said that before the collapse of SVB and Credit Suisse, and the other crunches in the American banking system.

In an April piece in the Financial Times, Martin Wolf said:

“A shock like this should make mindless deregulation less appealing to politicians”.


As has been clearly outlined already, the amendment does not actually make anything happen; it just ensures parliamentary oversight. When we get to the dinner break business, my noble friend will seek to ensure that parliamentary oversight is included there. Surely, this is what democracy is supposed to be about.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. We will return to these issues on Thursday, when we discuss the regulations in Grand Committee. However, it is worth mentioning to the House the clash today between this Bill and a meeting of the Economic Affairs Committee, of which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and I are members. By chance, the committee was interviewing the Governor of the Bank of England. The issue of this arrangement arose, and the governor was quizzed on these very issues. It will be useful on Thursday to explore further why and how this action was taken. The governor provided a justification, but, in the light of his remarks, it will be worth while exploring these issues in more detail when we get the regulations.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the most reverend Primate have retabled as a single amendment—Amendment 106 —the two amendments that were debated in Grand Committee: Amendment 241C on ring-fencing, and Amendment 241D on the senior managers and certification regime.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes said during that debate, these amendments are trying to set in stone for all time the conclusions of the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Times change, and I cannot support this amendment because it introduces an inappropriate degree of rigidity.

As my noble friend also pointed out, the lesson of the HSBC and Silicon Valley Bank episode was that the ring-fencing rules were not, after all, considered inviolable. It was necessary to provide HSBC with special statutory exemptions from the ring-fencing rules to enable it to acquire Silicon Valley Bank. That exemption has brought permanent changes to the ring-fencing regime for HSBC which affect it alone. Can my noble friend say whether that means it has a permanent competitive advantage over rival ring-fenced banks in the UK?

In any case, I rather doubt whether the introduction of ring-fencing has reduced the risks to which bank customers’ deposits are exposed. I disagree that it is therefore important to make it very difficult to weaken the ring-fencing regulations in any way. As I said in Committee, I worked for Kleinwort Benson for 23 years, for a further 12 years for Robert Fleming and then for Mizuho. All three banks operated both commercial and investment banking businesses. Internal Chinese walls between departments made it quite impossible for customers’ commercial banking deposits to be diverted to risky investment banking activities. As I said in Grand Committee, there is no positive correlation between the two cash flows of retail and investment banking. It follows that universal banks are in fact gaining diversification benefits. There is little global evidence that splitting up the banks has made them less likely to get into trouble.

Following the Lehman shock, is it not interesting that the US Government did not go for the reintroduction of a kind of Glass-Steagall Act? I am not convinced that ring-fencing is a good thing, and in general I am opposed to market distortions of this kind, which actually make the consumer less safe rather than safer. Ring-fencing also makes it harder for smaller banks to grow, because they must compete for a small pool of permitted assets against the capital of the larger banks. Will the Government conduct a review of the effectiveness of ring-fencing?

As for the senior managers and certification regime, I am sceptical as to whether it has been effective, because there is no hard evidence that it has been used as the stick that was originally intended. Most well-run banks operate in a collegiate manner, and I think it rather odd to attempt to attribute personal responsibility to managers and directors of banks for the decisions and actions of those banks, beyond the responsibilities that the directors carry in any event.

The SMCR has especially inconvenienced foreign banks operating in London. As an example, I refer to the Japanese megabanks. It used to be their practice to assign a very senior executive to London to take responsibility for all the bank’s activities in the UK and in most cases the whole EMIR region. Often, this might be the executive’s last major management position before retirement, and would typically be for two to three years leading up to his retirement date. Such executives have typically worked for 40 years or more for that bank and have managed regulated financial businesses in Japan for many years. However, the FCA has consistently been extraordinarily slow in approving those executives under the SMCR.

Therefore, the Japanese banks have given up on this strategy and feel compelled to appoint as head of their UK and EMIR operations not the person most appropriate for the job, but the most senior person who has already been working in London for three years or so, merely in order to meet the criteria of the SMCR regime. This has caused considerable inconvenience, because it is unreasonable to send a trusted senior executive overseas for five or six years in the last years of his active career, rather than a more reasonable stretch of two to three years. I know that the SMCR is much resented by Japanese and other foreign banks and I ask my noble friend if she will agree to conduct a review of how it is being implemented by the FCA.