Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 12th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I am privileged to thank the right reverend Prelate for a most excellent maiden speech which the House listened to with great interest. The right reverend Prelate was translated from Birkenhead to Birmingham in 2006, so he has had some experience, as we have learnt from his speech, of the organisations and activities there. I was particularly pleased to note his comments about the hospital at Selly Oak. The right reverend Prelate was also a representative in China of the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, and went there with the most reverend Primate in 2006. It is clear that he will bring to your Lordships' House much wisdom and experience. We look forward to hearing more from him and thank him for today's speech.

I regret that the incoming Administration have spent too much time and effort castigating the Opposition over their handling of defence issues when in government. The Armed Forces serve the Government of the day on behalf of the nation. They would benefit from a non-party-political approach to their activities and requirements. We have this on the need for the nuclear deterrent. Could not the Government and Opposition try to reach greater agreement on other parts of the defence programme and requirements? The previous Administration began a review along these lines. Their Green Paper was drawn up with cross-party involvement and published in February, but clearly this has not survived the change of Government. If the present Administration had been prepared to find around 3 per cent of GDP, there would not be so deep a black hole in the defence budget. Their indignation is overdone: are not both sides at fault?

Regrettably, yet again, defence is viewed by a Chancellor as a soft option for belt tightening. That was understandable in the years of the Cold War, but unforgivable when we have had forces fighting hard in Afghanistan for eight years, with the prospect of being heavily committed there for a further four years. The Prime Minister and other senior Ministers say that they wish Britain to continue punching above its weight in the world and that they have no less ambition for this country in the decades to come. I do not cavil at this aspiration, but is it not totally wrong not to fund the forces that may be necessary to fulfil that ambition?

The withdrawal of HMS “Ark Royal” and the remaining Harriers squanders the Fleet Air Arm's future in the fixed-wing carrier role. Scrapping the Nimrods even before they had entered service and reducing frigates and destroyers to a mere 19 vessels, collectively blows an enormous hole in national maritime capability which we shall be living with, on present plans, for the next decade and beyond. This gap in capability could endanger national security more than any reduced commitment to land operations.

The chiefs of staff, I am told, accepted these savage savings and those in the Army, but have forcefully pointed out that the force structures for the 2020s will be achievable only if there is real-terms growth in the defence budget over the second half of the decade. In other words, the defence budget has to grow from the reputed 2 per cent of GDP to, say, 3 per cent or more. In his Statement in another place on the SDSR on 9 October, all the Prime Minister was prepared to say on this vital point was that in his personal view,

“this structure will require year-on-year real-terms growth in the defence budget in the years beyond 2015”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/10/10; col. 799.]

But we shall have lost capabilities and momentum.

Indeed, I foresee a hard pressed Chancellor once again pointing out that, as we have survived thus far—if we have—with these reduced capabilities, would it not be reasonable, as we free ourselves from Afghanistan, to extend the period into a rolling year-by-year programme of just 2 per cent expenditure on defence? We are close to aping the position adopted in the 1930s: that the country will not be facing a serious threat for a decade and that defence provision should be scaled back accordingly.

Finally, I give my take on the regrettable but financially driven decision to withdraw from service the remaining Harriers. All the air defence Sea Harriers were scrapped in 2006, a decision taken when the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, was the First Sea Lord, leaving a fleet of combat offensive aircraft with no radar, no long-range air defence weapon and of no significant use in an air defence role. In 2008, a cost-cutting decision halved the remaining number of offensive support Harriers. For five years, from 2004 to 2009, this small jointly manned Royal Air Force/Royal Navy force maintained a detachment of eight aircraft in Afghanistan, a remarkable achievement for such a small force, bearing in mind the distance from home-base support, the very hot climate and high terrain and serious undermanning of the Royal Navy element. This tremendous effort became unsustainable. The Harrier force had to be relieved and was replaced in mid-2009 by Tornados.

This year's greater operational tempo in Helmand required additional offensive air capability and the Tornado's contribution has been increased temporarily from eight to 10 aircraft deployed. Compared to the Harrier, the Tornado provides a greater variety of missile systems, an exceptionally accurate gun and advanced intelligence gathering capabilities, as well as better range, endurance and payload. It also provides our ground forces with real-time tactical intelligence of enemy movements, live direction of the battle, and critical support to troops in contact. The Tornado force has the capacity to sustain this operational commitment and an element, if needed, for other air operations with unique capabilities such as Storm Shadow.

In the round, the decision made back in 2008 to replace the overstretched Harriers in theatre with Tornados by mid-2009 was soundly based, if we were to maintain our combat air contribution in Afghanistan. It would also have allowed the joint Harrier force to re-train in its neglected role of delivering airpower from a carrier. But the remaining Harriers could provide no task force protection from enemy air attack. It would be foolhardy—maybe I should say bonkers—to send a carrier to Falklands waters without the air defence coverage of the Typhoons at Mount Pleasant.

Support savings are also significant when an aircraft type is withdrawn from service. The search for economies in 2008 and again this year have forced a premature end to the Harrier force. I should like to pay tribute to the iconic Harrier, to the brilliance of its concept; to the airframe and engine designers and manufacturers who brought it and its jump jet engine into service; and to all those who flew and maintained it. It is a unique and internationally renowned aircraft, very much a Cold War requirement, conceived, developed and operational for that commitment. But no one could now argue that that made it unusable or unsuitable for the non-Cold War operations in which it took part.

From the recovery of the Falklands nearly 30 years ago in the freezing weather of the distant South Atlantic, along with its maritime derivative, the Sea Harrier, to the conflict over Kosovo; and to the five hard, pounding years in the heat and dust of Afghanistan, it has demonstrated operational longevity, great global reach and role flexibility. But for the financial cuts, it had many more years of service to offer, not least embarked on the first of the new carriers.

Eurofighter Typhoon, now in service with the RAF, is too often criticised as a legacy of the Cold War and so too expensive and useless for today's or future conflicts. But Typhoon is another fine example of a multi-role operational design. It will follow the real life example of the Harrier's 40 years in the front line. It will prove to be every bit as flexible, long-lived and valuable. Criticising Typhoon as a useless Cold War relic is mischievously misinformed and monumentally mistaken. It is a very fine aircraft prized and praised by its operators, as I learnt when I had a flight in one from RAF Coningsby. We should be praising Typhoon, now deployed 8,000 miles away in the Falklands, not denigrating it.

Armed Forces: Refusal of Goods and Services

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 28th October 2010 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Craig of Radley]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure that members of the Armed Forces are not discriminated against in the provision of goods and services in the United Kingdom, particularly while wearing their uniform.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, our Armed Forces are currently deployed to the most demanding areas of conflict to maintain our national security. I am sure the whole House will agree that there is no place for those who, without good reason, refuse to provide goods and services to service personnel wearing uniform. Where incidences do occur, it is mostly a local issue. Commanding officers have been given guidance on suitable action to resolve matters, based on engagement with the local community.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

I thank the Minister for that reply. He will have seen examples in news reports of servicemen in uniform being refused service, either in a hotel or when buying something in a supermarket. Is it not the case that the MoD now encourages servicemen to wear uniform? Are there any other such cases of unsuitable behaviour and discrimination being reported up the command chain? In opposition the Conservative Party talked about increasing the strength of the military covenant. Would this be a suitable vehicle for dealing with such discrimination?

Armed Forces: Harrier Fleet

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 27th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord to the Dispatch Box as his party’s spokesman on defence. I very much look forward to working constructively with him.

We will add cats and traps to the carriers, and although that will delay the entry of carrier-strike capability by three years, it will allow us to use a carrier variant of Joint Strike Fighter which has a heavier payload and a longer range than the STOVL variant. Overall, the carrier variant of JSF will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25 per cent over the STOVL variant.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very fine comments about the Harrier force. No one would wish to see them go. Under the circumstances, where the choice has to be between Tornado and Harrier or more Tornados, surely the Tornado produces a better result, bearing in mind how many aircraft need to be supported in Afghanistan. Does the Minister recall that the Sea Harrier force was withdrawn some four years ago?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

Yes, my Lords, I recall that. The military advice is that the Tornado has a greater capability. The primary capability advantages of the Tornado GR4 over the Harrier GR9 include greater payload and range and integration of capabilities, such as Storm Shadow, fully integrated dual-mode Brimstone, the Raptor reconnaissance pod and a cannon.

Afghanistan

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, on the latter issue, of course I agree with my noble friend. It is important that Members of this House, as well as of the other place, are properly briefed on difficult issues in Afghanistan, especially when our strategic defence and security review is taking place. I mentioned that, after the Statement, I will have a series of briefings in the Ministry of Defence. I have asked the Chief of the Defence Staff and the three other chiefs to come to give noble Lords the benefit of their wisdom. We will do that on a rolling basis. My door is always open to any noble Lord who wants to talk to me about Afghanistan or any other issue.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement, and particularly the implication that there will be an increased counterinsurgency effort. The redeployments make sense in achieving that. I am, however, concerned about the additional redeployment from Cyprus. The Minister mentioned that that would be temporary. Bearing in mind the extreme stresses that there have been on the Armed Forces, can he indicate what “temporary” means and whether those ground forces are being supported by additional air and other assets, which will be essential to their role?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his question. I asked officials the same question, but I was told that I could not say more than “temporary”. I assure the noble and gallant Lord that it will be temporary. I add that there is still a company of our Armed Forces in Cyprus, so there will still be soldiers in reserve out there. They will be supported by a number of additional support troops, but I do not think they will be supported by aircraft.

Gulf War Illnesses

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 28th June 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Manchester, on securing this debate. It allows the new Administration the opportunity to indicate their approach to a problem which has been lying for far too long in the not-yet-settled tray. I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, to his new ministerial responsibility. I remind the House that I was Chief of Defence Staff at the time of the first Gulf War. We knew that Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons. He had used them against his own people in Halabja only two years before in 1988 when 5,000 people were killed in a most dreadful way. We thus had to take all reasonable care before we attacked the Iraqi forces to protect our own troops in the event of a toxic attack. This we did, and rightly so. The alternative of not taking steps and then suffering toxic attacks and multiple deaths or illnesses would have been unforgivable. Noble Lords will agree that it is the duty of government to do all that they can to assist and compensate any who were made ill or incapacitated in the conflict.

As is well known, many veterans have suffered a variety of illnesses and some have died early. Time does not allow me to catalogue the series of promises and steps taken by earlier Conservative and the previous Labour Governments, but at no time has there been confidence that government treatment, both practically and emotionally, has been worthy of the sacrifice and loyalty shown by the men and women afflicted. Those familiar with the story will be aware that the veterans concerned feel that they have had a raw deal and their plight has not been followed up as thoroughly and expeditiously as it should. The MoD in particular has been seen as the uncaring, obstructive face of officialdom, lacking in the fair treatment of veterans who were clearly ill but felt that their plight was met with no more than vapid promises and little proactive support. At various times in the past two decades, the MoD has moved somewhat due to strong lobbying and parliamentary pressure—for example, conceding that the label “Gulf War syndrome” might be used as an umbrella term. But the MoD made clear that the label itself did not attract any pension for compensation rights.

It is perhaps ironic that the claims that have been met are under the former rubric of the MoD having to prove that the illnesses were not caused as a result of involvement with Operation Granby and deployment to the theatre. Under the new compensation arrangements, this burden or proof has been shifted to the veterans’ shoulders. A few Gulf veteran appeals to the war pensions appeal tribunal have also been successful, though even then there was procrastination by the MoD over implementing the tribunal’s findings, and no willingness to treat any group as a class action that would allow other veterans to be fairly compensated.

Five or more years ago, there was a determination not to treat service men and women differently, when dealing with pensions and compensation arrangements, from others in government service such as the police or fire fighters. This attitude has changed, and rapidly, in the past two or three years. In 2008, we had the previous Government’s command paper, The Nation’s Commitment. The new Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have spoken of a statutory military covenant and that our Armed Forces deserve special treatment. So will this new approach carry us through to a final and reasonable settlement of a long, tragic episode?

As the noble Lord, Lord Morris, has explained, the latest United States Research Advisory Committee’s report and the intentions of the US Veterans Department to reassess and to compensate those who have what they now accept is the unique condition of Gulf War illness. These latest findings of the RAC and the earlier independent inquiry carried out so ably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, provide a real opportunity for the new Administration to take steps to bring this regrettable treatment of so many of our fine service personnel to a reasonable and responsible conclusion. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, made no specific recommendations about levels of compensation—that was not in his inquiry’s terms of reference—and clearly that is a matter for the pensions and compensation authorities.

To help the Minister, who has consistently expressed his party’s sympathy while in opposition to reach the right conclusions, perhaps I may remind him of just a couple of things that he said in the course of the many debates that have taken place in this House since this problem was first aired in Parliament almost 20 years ago. When the Lloyd report, to which I have referred, was first debated in December 2004, the Minister said:

“The report's recommendations now provide the Government with a unique opportunity to close this long-running chapter in the lives of many who have suffered after serving in the Gulf during the period 1990–91 … This group of people have been ignored by the MoD and this report is a considered and convincing case for recognition”. —[Official Report, 21/12/04; col. 1734.]

Speaking in a debate on the latest RAC’s work in February 2009, the Minister acknowledged that Gulf War illness,

“can no longer be marginalised or dismissed”.—[Official Report, 5/2/09; col. 854.]

Can the House now be assured that the new Government will act as the US Department of Veteran Affairs is now acting and ensure that all the British personnel afflicted by the symptoms of Gulf War illness are given comparable support and help? It is right to treat them fairly. That is what they ask and I ask the Minister on their behalf. All hope at last for a helpful and positive response to this long-running saga.