(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I should like for a moment to narrow the wide focus of this very welcome debate and turn to an issue that I have repeatedly raised in debates in your Lordships’ House: combat immunity and the legislative fog that surrounds it. I have long argued that it is essential to tackle incompatibilities between the Armed Forces, human rights and international humanitarian legislation—that is, incompatibilities between international humanitarian law and the European Convention on Human Rights as interpreted by the European court in Strasbourg, and incompatibilities between the current Armed Forces Act and the Human Rights Act. I first raised this matter in 1998 when the House was considering the Human Rights Act. Since then, and particularly in the past decade, I have pressed and encouraged the Government of the day to come forward with new proposals, particularly to provide a clearer definition, understanding and reach of combat immunity.
A series of judgments handed down by the Strasbourg court about the geographic areas and the exercise, even for a limited time, of effective mandate of the European Convention on Human Rights, have overridden some of the judgments of our national courts and blurred the primacy that is due to the lex specialis of international humanitarian law in combat situations. The Supreme Court judgment in Smith and others in 2013 upheld the defence of combat immunity, narrowly defined, but invented an area of middle ground edging the land of combat immunity, where the writ of Article 2 and other articles of the European convention were deemed not automatically excluded. The judgment was not unanimous; three of the seven judges did not support the finding. They were concerned that the courts would be drawn into the judicialisation of combat and potentially inhibit the actions of commanders and others in operations.
However, the majority finding of the Supreme Court, in the absence of any clear guidance from Strasbourg, was that the boundary between combat immunity, narrowly defined, and that putative middle ground had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. For the service man or woman, however, that is not a clearly described or marked boundary. To them, the meaning of the phrases “narrowly defined” and “the middle ground” are unclear. It does not help them to appreciate in advance, or at the time, whether their operational activity in the course of hostilities or a threat of hostilities is or is not combat-immune. The services operate to, and respond to, executive direction. They need to be clear what their mission is, what the constraints on the exercise of force are and whether their actions can be deemed combat-immune. Faced with conflicting interpretations of legislation, and the practical experience in the past decade or so of the complexities and protracted nature of claims and counterclaims arising out of injury or death to their fellow service men and women, this situation cries out to be clarified.
Indeed, as far back as October 2013, I asked,
“will Her Majesty’s Government consider new legislation to define combat immunity, in order to clarify the current position”?—[Official Report, 23/10/13; col. 1003.]
Happily, after a number of false starts and some indecision, the Government have set about doing just that. The MoD’s consultation paper, circulated earlier this year, briefly set out their case and sought views on a variety of issues relating to the scope and definition of combat immunity. The nub of their proposals is that the Government will legislate to enshrine the position that combat immunity should apply to deaths or injuries that occur in the course of combat. This will be combined with awards of compensation for the death or injury of entitled individuals equal to that which a court would have awarded as if the Government and their servants had been negligent, even when no negligence arises. This will remove a requirement to take legal action against the Government to gain the fullest compensation for a death or injury in combat.
I do not underrate the challenge of a statutory description and definition of combat immunity. The Government have put their mind to it and I welcome that. This time they must see it through—no ifs, no buts. Clearly, new legislation will be required. In so far as the enlarged compensation package is concerned, this can be achieved by secondary legislation to the Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Act 2004. This Act allows for the Secretary of State to make orders about pensions and compensation schemes. With an affirmative order, it would seem straightforward.
Combat immunity, however, will call for primary legislation, presumably led by the MoD, rather than by the Ministry of Justice, which had been involved previously in the legislative considerations. The Bill of Rights—of forgotten memory—was trailed for some considerable time as a possible statutory vehicle for combat immunity. Now that the MoD has the lead, it should consider whether new legislation should be by amendment to the Armed Forces Act, rather than by a new, free-standing Bill.
The Armed Forces have been disadvantaged in the past by serious incompatibilities in primary legislation to which I have already referred. The existence of combat immunity, as defined by statute, would directly relate to many of the disciplinary provisions in the Armed Forces Act. It would be helpful if those who have responsibility for and oversight of service behaviour —when deployed on operations—had all the statutory provisions, including for combat immunity, within one service statute. I urge the Government to give this suggestion serious consideration.
A further suggestion for legislation is to enact a time limit to forestall historic investigations and the charging of individual service personnel many years after they have been actively involved in a combat scenario. Recent experience of historical allegations relating to Iraq—and their inept handling—shows the obvious problem of finding witnesses and reliable evidence 10 years after the event being examined, let alone 20 or even 40. This points to having some time limit, as the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, suggested a few moments ago. Combat immunity compensation claims will surely have to be time-limited. Why not also have a similar time limit for allegations made about behaviour when combat immunity obtains? These two proposals clearly do not refer directly to the continuation order that is the subject of this debate and to which I give my full support.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my amendment, with government support, to the Armed Forces Bill in 2011, inserted the section in the 2006 Act which requires the annual covenant report. This section refers to removing,
“disadvantages arising for service people”,
and,
“the principle that special provision … may be justified by the effects on such people”,
of their service. The Act requires the Secretary of State to have regard to those principles.
Earlier annual covenant reports made numerous references to disadvantages, but the recent report lays stress on treating people fairly. Fairness is a subjective and immeasurable concept, which bears too little relationship to dealing with or correcting a disadvantage; a disadvantage is more measurable. Morphing from disadvantage to fairness in the work of the covenant is confusing; it is agin the statute.
COBSEO and others in the recent report questioned a proposal to remove the service and medical members from the panel of the War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation Tribunal. In 2008, I tabled an annulment Motion to an affirmative SI because it threatened to disband the then War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation Tribunal and transfer its work to a social entitlement chamber—a totally inappropriate chamber. Before the debate on the SI, a Written Ministerial Statement said:
“The Senior President of Tribunals … requires the continued use of service members on hearing panels within the war pensions and armed forces compensation chamber and maintains their present role without diminution or alteration. … A decision made at a hearing of an appeal in this chamber will normally be dealt with by a three member panel of one judge, one service member and one medical member”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/08; col. 51WS.]
The Government changed their mind and retained a separate chamber. I moved my annulment Motion but did not divide on it.
Similar tribunals in Scotland and Northern Ireland remain tripartite. It would be an immeasurable disadvantage to have dissimilar tribunals to judge claims. Will the Minister assure the House that the 2008 tripartite tribunal arrangement for England and Wales is to be continued by this Government without variation or diminution?
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too commend the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, for instigating this debate and for the way in which he introduced it. There are two impacts, as he has termed them, to consider. First, how should the UK’s Armed Forces relate to their opposite numbers in the European nations? Secondly, what needs to be done to further our military-to-military relations in the wider world?
Thanks to the many years that we have trained and worked together, both through NATO and the large variety of bilateral contacts with European forces, there is a solid professional foundation to the relationship to sustain and build on. Brexit is largely a political, economic and diplomatic animal. On the last of these, there are many highly experienced individuals in your Lordships’ House speaking today, so I shall not go there. Following our withdrawal from the EU, every effort should be made to continue our multilateral and bilateral military relations with our European neighbours. This can be an ongoing process, with exchange visits and exercises at all levels co-operatively sustaining those contacts. Combative occasions may arise, but I think they may be largely confined to the golf course.
Turning to the future beyond Brexit, there is a need to continue and strengthen our wider global contacts, particularly with Commonwealth and other political friends and trading partners. These activities might include more involvement in the five-power defence arrangement, which would be well received, particularly in Australia and New Zealand. The recent highly commendable and successful deployment of RAF Typhoons to the Far East and the first ever engagement in air exercises with the Japanese are indicative of what can be done already. When the carrier “Queen Elizabeth” is operational, the opportunity for the Royal Navy to deploy a task force, maybe with the RAF embarked, for training and exercise in the Far East should again be seized. The soft power contribution of the Red Arrows, who have just returned from displays in China and the Gulf, is a further demonstration of highly flexible and positive military contributions in the global arena. Such gestures and engagements will be helpful to building and sustaining new political and trading agreements.
Before getting carried away by such thoughts and plans, however, there is a serious problem: the deficit in the numbers of ships, aircraft and personnel in all three services to sustain such global presence over a continuous period, even in the small-scale numbers that have been used in recent months. The ongoing operational commitments for the RAF’s half dozen or so front-line fighter squadrons are highly demanding, not just on airframes but on the air crews and ground crews who fly and service them. The 24/7 immediate air defence in the UK, the Falklands and Cyprus, offensive operations in Iraq and deployments for NATO in the Baltic and, soon, Romania all require combat-ready aircrew and ground personnel.
Inevitably, thought is being given to how to speed training and shorten the time taken for combat preparation of new air crew, which is essential to help ease the pressures on those who have already been in operational mode for months and years. Fortunately, these missions have enjoyed almost complete air superiority, with little risk of combat loss, but any unfortunate accident, a loss of air crew due to a terror attack on a mess or even a serious hangar fire could cause a significant percentage loss in airframes and/or crew availability to undertake the variety and current tempo of activities. The forces are stretched, with the attendant risk of a sudden serious loss in the Armed Forces’ operational capability.
Further expansion in front-line numbers—and, as has already been said, such arguments apply to fighting ships as well as aircraft—is becoming more rather than less necessary as we move to the post-Brexit scenario. I also remain concerned about other areas of overstretch and overcommitment being faced by the Armed Forces. In the time available, let me highlight just one of a number: Reaper crews operating remotely piloted aircraft systems have the task of being legalised assassins operating far from the scene and commute from home daily to undertake their work. Little experience is yet available of how this type of commitment over an extended period will affect those involved, but they are so few in number that replacements to allow stand-down and recuperation periods are virtually non-existent. I hope the Minister can reassure the House that these individuals have combat or legal immunity in their work.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am delighted to be able to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and commend his absolutely brilliant analysis. The Minister stated only last month, on 19 October, that there are no current plans to amend the Human Rights Act; that the Government might derogate from the ECHR in some undefined circumstances; that they do not rule out legislating about combat immunity but there are no plans in train for any major change; and that they will “announce further measures shortly”. It is a quiver full of the vaguest of promises but no action. Lack of action has been going on for far, far too long.
More than three years ago, I pointed out that this year’s Armed Forces Bill would be a very appropriate and timely vehicle for introducing in statute combat immunity and other legal protection for the Armed Forces on operations. The Government resisted. Every service man and woman of whatever rank should not be exposed in operations to fear of, let alone belated mental trauma from, contemporary legislation, even that which has brought strength and validity to human rights protections. In a non-violent, peacetime scenario, there must be few who do not accept and support these rights, but they were surely cast and designed for use in non-operational settings. Some may still have a place whatever the scenario, but others, such as the right to life, or to family life, are so clearly at odds with the stark realities of conflict.
Nearly 20 years ago, when the Human Rights Bill was being debated, I pointed out the incompatibilities between the Armed Forces Acts—in those days each service had its own Act—covering the behaviour and discipline of the Armed Forces, and the human rights legislation. While the Armed Forces were obviously a public body, the requirements of discipline underwritten in the forces’ Acts could not be dovetailed into the intentions of the human rights legislation. My pleas and those of others were not accepted. The services have therefore had to live with the incompatibilities between these Acts—incompatibilities that have now morphed into the many cases of alleged criminal behaviour being followed up by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, or IHAT.
IHAT’s existence and behaviour is, in part, also due to other legislation—the International Criminal Court Act 2001—which was much trumpeted and most earnestly endorsed by the then Government. I can remember well the concerns expressed not only by the then Chiefs of Staff and other serving officers but by many of us in your Lordships’ House. The then Government’s stance was to insist that arraignment before the International Criminal Court could never happen. Our courts and the International Criminal Court would abide by complementarity; that is, that the International Criminal Court could only be brought in if the national court and authorities were unwilling to deal with a case or negligent in doing so. No British justice would fall foul of such a charge, it was asserted. So the services had nothing to fear. But the obverse is now the case. Serious criticism and faults have been found by the UK courts in IHAT methods. Indeed, the Government seem to fear that one or more IHAT cases might be at risk of being brought before the International Criminal Court. The Minister admitted as much when responding to a Question on 19 October. If this is true, what should the Government now do about their involvement in and commitment to the ICC?
The USA and the French have not ratified, and there is a fine legalistic distinction between declarations and statements in any ratification. But, given the difficulties—the unintended consequences, if you will—surely thought and action must be given to adjusting the UK position with the ICC. Media comment recently suggested that other countries are indeed withdrawing from it. The Government are to pull away from the European Court of Human Rights and repatriate all aspects of legal procedures into our own sovereign authority. Should they not also apply the same philosophy to our relationship with the ICC? The USA is said to be helpful and supportive of the ICC without ever having ratified the treaty. Why cannot we have a similar approach and understanding?
Some will no doubt argue that any derogation or change would be quite impossible, or at least that the services’ concerns are not reason enough to be seen to be trying to push a few tender fruit off the ICC apple cart. But we are not talking about just anyone—service men and women and veterans have surely earned special consideration, as the Armed Forces covenant’s statutory approval indicates. We have had words of determination from government sources at the highest levels, we have had manifesto commitments, and we have had a quiver full of promises, but we seem to be no nearer to resolution. Service men and women are in conflict situations today. They have no immunity. Action, not fine words, is needed, and needed now.
I am grateful. However, to clarify this point, the Challenger case mentioned by the noble Lord turns on training rather than procurement, but the important point here is that no one now knows the extent to which military decisions may be questioned in court. That is the problem the Government must, and will, address. I also suggest that combat immunity is a real problem. We have three major cases progressing through the courts at the moment, and many others are stayed behind them. Therefore, to suggest that this is only a minor issue involving one or two people is incorrect.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, suggested that the Armed Forces compensation scheme should be made subject to statute. In fact, the scheme covers any claims made since 6 April 2005. It was made part of the Armed Forces Act of that year.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, suggested that one solution would be to reinstate Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act. I am hesitant about that solution. It is one of the options we have been looking at but it would be possible only under certain specific circumstances, and careful consideration would need to be given to the impact on service personnel. Certainly, I agree with the noble and learned Lord that such a step would not be sufficient on its own.
I also want to make it clear that we remain unequivocal in our commitment and duty to look after our Armed Forces and veterans, particularly those who are subject to investigation. What is more, we remain steadfast in our commitment to support those who face legal proceedings. In respect of the Iraq conflict, the IHAT is now making rapid progress towards its expected completion by the end of 2019—a point which Sir David Calvert-Smith affirmed in his recent review of the IHAT. Some 70% of the more than 3,000 allegations received have already been disposed of, the vast majority without the need to interview service personnel or veterans. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, that we are confident, based in part on Sir David Calvert-Smith’s report, that the IHAT will be able to meet the progress targets it has set. The IHAT’s workforce is comprised of Royal Navy Police and experienced former civilian police officers who are dedicated to conducting their investigations as sensitively and effectively as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, questioned whether three days was enough training on the conditions in Iraq, and said that perhaps Ministers were not briefed about the proceedings often enough. There is a balance to be struck here. Ministers absolutely respect the IHAT’s independence, but I am sure they will take full account of any recommendations the Commons Defence Committee makes on this matter.
I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, suggested that we are actively paying Iraqi witnesses to travel to interviews. I make it clear that the IHAT pays only travel and subsistence expenses and loss of earnings. That is essential if the necessary investigations are to proceed.
My noble friend Lord Robathan turned our attention to issues in Northern Ireland, and said very powerfully that something has to be done about prosecutions of veterans in Northern Ireland 30 or 40 years after the event. I very much share my noble friend’s concern that these legacy investigations must recognise that the vast majority of deaths in the Troubles were the direct responsibility of the terrorists. Northern Ireland would not be the peaceful place it is today without the tireless work and many sacrifices made by the Armed Forces.
The noble Lord, Lord Bew, also referred to issues in Northern Ireland, and in particular the soldiers from Bloody Sunday who face prosecutions, whereas the terrorists do not. The noble Lord will recognise that, as a Ministry of Defence Minister, I cannot comment on or influence possible prosecution decisions. I am sure that those who make such decisions will take due note of his words.
I shall of course write to noble Lords whose questions I have not had time to answer today. At the end of a debate of this kind it is right for me to conclude by reiterating my unwavering admiration for our Armed Forces. The job they do, protecting and defending our freedom, security and prosperity in often difficult and challenging circumstances, is second to none. In this spirit the Government are seeking to move forward and deliver their manifesto commitment to ensure that our Armed Forces are able to do their job effectively, safe in the knowledge that they have our full and unstinting support, and confident in our ability and intent to protect their freedoms when they return home.
My Lords, the Minister mentioned bringing forward some further information about combat immunity shortly. Can he define “shortly”?
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord makes a very good point, and I agree. It enables us as a department to commit to an enduring defence presence in Scotland through a number of programmes. As he is aware, we have now committed to building eight type-26 global combat ships on the Clyde. We are investing more than £500 million in the infrastructure and capability of the naval base at Clyde as it becomes the home of all Royal Navy submarines by 2020. We are investing in the expansion of RAF Lossiemouth, so that it will be home to at least one additional Typhoon squadron, as well as the maritime patrol aircraft. We are investing in concentrating some Army capabilities in Leuchars Station. That will improve access to suitable training areas. Across a whole range of projects, Scotland will benefit.
My Lords, I have a couple of questions for the noble Earl. Generally, I welcome the Statement, but in repositioning units and so on considerable capital expenditure is incurred. Is it reasonable to expect that the amount of money from sales will be adequate to meet that expenditure as it occurs, and not fall to the Ministry of Defence to find additional funds early on in the hope of jam tomorrow? Secondly, runways are of course vital to the Royal Air Force and to any flying unit. With the reduction in the number of airfields, will there be sufficient runway availability when some runways have to be repaired and flying from that unit will have to stop? Finally, this presumably refers only to MoD holdings in this country, and not to holdings overseas.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in that case, would the Government be interested in manning the royal yacht and what objections would there be to not having the Royal Navy do it?
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is no contradiction. As the noble Lord rightly said, the vast majority of service personnel deployed on operations overseas have acted in accordance with the law and their training. However, where credible criminal allegations are made, we must investigate in accordance with our legal obligations. What we need to do is strip out the vexatious claims. That is why we are taking a range of measures, as I am sure the noble Lord is aware.
My Lords, what combat immunity or other legal protection have the Government arranged for Armed Forces personnel currently engaged in armed conflict in the air or on the ground, in the light of the views expressed by the Prime Minister?
As regards combat immunity, the Government have previously made it clear that we will not rule out legislating, which is being considered among a range of options. It has been suggested that we should simply reinstate Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act; that is one of the options we are looking at, but it would be possible only under certain specific circumstances. No plans are in train for any immediate change on that front.
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord. If one looks at the map of Farnborough and the surrounding area, it is easy to see how densely populated it now is. It simply is not possible to conduct a Red Arrows display without significant overflight of Farnborough, Camberley and Fleet. As I have explained, the decision has been taken by the Chief of the Air Staff that the potential risk to life from display flying over those areas, which I am afraid is inevitable given the extreme air manoeuvres that the Red Arrows undertake, could not be tolerated.
My Lords, the decision about Farnborough whereby it is allowed to show formation flypasts but not formation aerobatics, would indicate that perhaps formation aerobatics carry some measure of risk. Can the noble Earl confirm that in making any decision about flights by the Red Arrows, there is never any question that there is a risk in their performance? If it is necessary to make a decision not to participate, would it not be better if the Red Arrows did not appear? It seems to me that an aerobatic team which does not perform aerobatics is of little use to the RAF or to the country.
My Lords, I would not wish to give the House the impression that the decision taken in relation to Farnborough will apply to every other air show because each event is assessed on a case-by-case basis. There will be many shows and other events where the Red Arrows will continue to perform with an acceptable degree of risk, but that risk always exists and safety must remain the paramount consideration at all times. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the noble and gallant Lord about the Red Arrows remaining at Farnborough and performing a flypast. I think that the flypast was appreciated, as was the static display on the ground.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this long-awaited report has done a thorough and commendable job. I wish to comment on two particular issues: the way the inquiry has sought to apportion responsibility for things that did not go right in the period from 2002 to 2009, and some of the lessons that should be drawn from what happened.
By and large, the report’s criticisms are directed at either Ministers or senior service personnel. I do not intend to attempt to second-guess any of those criticisms, other than to make the perhaps obvious point that what is clear with the benefits of mature reflection and 20/20 hindsight may not have been known to, or so apparent to, those concerned at the time. It is certainly my recollection that the prevailing view at the time, post-conflict, was very much optimistic. One enduring issue—not, it appears, so explicitly dealt with in the inquiry—which I am aware of from my own experience with the first Gulf War in 1991, is how to apportion the responsibility shared between Ministers and the military for shortfalls. For example, there were shortfalls in preparations for operations and their subsequent periods, or in the conduct of operations.
If, for instance, Ministers wish to commit forces to an operation, how far should they or their predecessors in office be held blameworthy because of gaps or shortages in capability recommended by the operational requirement process but judged to be less important or unaffordable at the time? With the timescales for major equipment programmes, it is indeed unlikely that the Ministers involved in procurement decisions will still be in office.
The military can-do reaction to ministerial demands—as commended by Chilcot—is of course laudable, and with £35 billion or so of annual budgets, blunt refusals are unrealistic. But pressures to delay or shorten preparation for deployment times lie uneasily with the reasonable Chilcot view that military timetables should not dictate diplomatic ones. At heart are matters of risk, not just the major risk of a failure of a mission, but also the risk of casualties, and that is never easy to predict in a fight. Another risk, as highlighted in the inquiry, was that the UK feared being excluded from US plans unless they were offering ground forces. Taking such risks, while important to consider, cannot realistically be blamed individually, if they occur. A decision to commit forces beyond planning assumptions sounds unwise, unless national interests are under serious attack, when the decision to fight has to be with what you have, or to surrender. The commitment of forces to an expeditionary operation would seem to lend itself to a judgment about how far, and at what risk, to go. But as in so much else to do with such operations, the unfolding of events and the macrostrategic issues are most likely the dominant drivers, rather than putative risks, in reaching decisions.
The separation of responsibility between Ministers and senior commanders in operations is now also very different in the days of instant communication. I am reminded of an apocryphal story. An admiral at sea in the days of sail, seeking ministerial direction, would hand his quill-written request to the captain of his fastest frigate. Sails set, he would make all speed to bear the message to their Lordships in London, catching a tide up the Thames some three weeks later. Immediately —and to catch the falling tide—he would have their Lordships’ response. This would be with the admiral some six weeks after he had sent it. Today, the commander at sea, or in the field, can of course instantaneously signal the Ministry of Defence. The response will also reach him instantaneously, maybe some six weeks later.
Modern communications though, have also led to the explicit involvement of Ministers in live operations; for instance, giving approval to aerial attacks on a target. The scale and pace of recent operations make such involvement practical, and politically it may be essential for Ministers, who have the responsibility to describe and defend operations in public. Faced with a more aggressive foe, however, leading to the loss of ships or aircraft, such minute-to-minute involvement could become unmanageable. If things do not go as planned, who then is to blame?
Finally, I endorse strongly Chilcot’s views on the importance of news management. In the first Gulf War, when dealing, for example, with the loss of aircraft, comment would be sought almost simultaneously in the 24-hour news cycle from spokesmen in Riyadh, London and maybe Washington. Getting consistency in responses—when the veracity of the original claim had perhaps not been fully established—called for constant interaction and preparation against possible events or calamities. News management—I do not mean that in a pejorative sense—was difficult then. Social media have compounded the difficulties, but the success or failure of public support for an operation may depend on how the facts are reported and commented on. Chilcot is right to give this vital lesson renewed prominence.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, from these Benches I also want to pay tribute to our Armed Forces. It has been a small and not quite perfectly formed Bill, but a very interesting Bill on which to work and I thank the Minister and his team for being ready to talk to us and to listen to our proposals and our views. I also thank the Opposition for a certain amount of joint working and collaboration on some issues. Indeed, it has been a very good-spirited and incredibly well-informed Bill. There will be another Armed Forces Bill in five years, but in this one we looked at the usual government tidying-up, the issue of child soldiers, the issues of courts martial and justice, mental health and sexual offences. The Government resisted the amendments very effectively, but I rather feel that they will be revisited in five years’ time and I look forward to discussing them in future with the noble Earl. In the mean time, we on these Benches are more than happy to support the Bill.
My Lords, I join in commending the noble Earl the Minister for the way he has handled the Bill, and the Bill team for supporting him. I have one regret, as I am sure he understands, in that there has been no dealing yet with the problem of the impact of the Human Rights Act on operations. We have had assurances from the noble Earl and from other members of the Government that this is being actively pursued. I hope that it continues to be pursued and that we do not have to wait for the next Armed Forces Bill in five years’ time. I hope that whatever is introduced, by a Bill of Rights or in another way, will be as an amendment to the Armed Forces Act and not standing within its own Act, because the problem we have faced is that the Armed Forces Acts and the Human Rights Act are incompatible. This would have been avoided if we had not treated the problems of the Armed Forces and human rights in the way they have been treated in the past.
My Lords, this Bill is on a much smaller scale than the one introduced five years ago, which dealt with the whole concept of the covenant and included very complicated and very necessary commitments. I am very pleased that even this week the Minister has pursued those issues by engaging with the House and making us aware of developments in that area. Frequently, pieces of legislation are rushed through and their implementation sometimes leaves much to be desired. So while the provisions in this Bill are not on the same scale as those of the previous Act, nevertheless they are significant.
As I understand it—perhaps the Minister can clarify this—as well as provision every five years in an Act of Parliament, the actual Armed Forces also need to be renewed on a regular basis. That seems rather a peculiarity because it is very difficult to envisage circumstances where we would not need them. I do not know whether a more permanent mechanism is required in a future Bill so that that provision does not have to be renewed.
I place on record my thanks to the Minister for the manner in which he engaged with noble Lords, dealt with our concerns and gave us an opportunity to participate fully and follow up our queries, some of which may have been better informed than others. Nevertheless, I am happy to see the Bill pass.