Moved by
11: Clause 5, page 6, line 15, at end insert—
“(za) After point (a) insert—“(aa) the data subject has given consent for his or her personal data to enter the public domain via a public body;(ab) processing is carried out by a public body pursuant to a legal or statutory obligation or right, and the public body is entitled to make such data available to the public;””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would add to the list of GDPR Article 6(1) on the lawfulness of processing.
Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 11 and to Amendments 14, 16, 17, 18, Clause 5 stand part and Clause 7 stand part. I will attempt to be as brief as I can, but Clause 5 involves rather a large number of issues.

Processing personal data is currently lawful only if it is performed for at least one lawful purpose, one of which is that the processing is for legitimate interests pursued by the controller or a third party, except where those interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights of the data subject. As such, if a data controller relies on their legitimate interest as a legal basis for processing data, they must conduct a balancing test of their interest and those of the data subject.

Clause 5 amends the UK GDPR’s legitimate interest provisions by introducing the concept of recognised legitimate interest, which allows data to be processed without a legitimate interest balancing test. This provides businesses and other organisations with a broader scope of justification for data processing. Clause 5 would amend Article 6 of the UK GDPR to equip the Secretary of State with a power to determine these new recognised legitimate interests. Under the proposed amendment, the Secretary of State must have regard to,

“among other things … the interests and fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects”.

The usual legitimate interest test is much stronger: rather than merely a topic to have regard to, a legitimate interest basis cannot lawfully apply if the data subject’s interests override those of the data controller.

Annexe 1, as inserted by the Bill, now provides a list of exemptions but is overly broad and vague. It includes national security, public security and defence, and emergencies and crime as legitimate interests for data processing without an assessment. Conservative MP, Marcus Fysh, said on Third Reading:

“Before companies share data or use data, they should have to think about what the balance is between a legitimate interest and the data rights, privacy rights and all the other rights that people may have in relation to their data. We do not want to give them a loophole or a way out of having to think about that.” —[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/23; col. 896.]


I entirely agree with that.

The amendment in Clause 5 also provides examples of processing that may be considered legitimate interests under the existing legitimate interest purpose, under Article 6(1)(f), rather than under the new recognised legitimate interest purpose. These include direct marketing, intra-group transmission of personal data for internal administrative purposes, and processing necessary to ensure the security of a network.

The Bill also provides a much more litigious data environment. Currently, an organisation’s assessment of its lawful purposes for processing data can be challenged through correspondence or an ICO complaint, whereas, under the proposed system, an individual may be forced to legally challenge a statutory instrument in order to contest the basis on which their data is processed.

As I will explain later, our preference is that the clause not stand part, but I accept that there are some areas that need clarification and Amendment 11 is designed to do this. The UK GDPR sets out conditions in which processing of data is lawful. The Bill inserts in Article 6(1) a provision specifying that processing shall be lawful for the purposes of a recognised legitimate interest, as I referred to earlier, an example of which may be for the purposes of direct marketing.

Many companies obtain data from the open electoral register. The register is maintained by local authorities, which have the right to sell this data to businesses. Amendment 11 would insert new Article (6)(1)(aa) and (ab), which provide that data processing shall be lawful where individuals have consented for their data

“to enter the public domain via a public body”,

or where processing is carried out by public bodies pursuant to their duties and rights, which may include making such data available to the public. Individuals are free to opt out of the open electoral register if they so wish and it would be disproportionate—in fact, irritating—to consumers to notify those who have consented to their data being processed that their data is being processed.

On Amendment 14, as mentioned, the Bill would give the Secretary of State the power to determine recognised legitimate interests through secondary legislation, which is subject to minimal levels of parliamentary scrutiny. Although the affirmative procedure is required, this does not entail much scrutiny or much of a debate. The last time MPs did not approve a statutory instrument under the affirmative procedure was in 1978. In practice, interests could be added to this list at any time and for any reason, facilitating the flow and use of personal data for limitless potential purposes. Businesses could be obligated to share the public’s personal data with government or law enforcement agencies beyond what they are currently required to do, all based on the Secretary of State’s inclination at the time.

We are concerned that this Henry VIII power is unjustified and undermines the very purpose of data protection legislation, which is to protect the privacy of individuals in a democratic data environment, as it vests undue power over personal data rights in the Executive. This amendment is designed to prevent the Secretary of State from having the ability to pre-authorise data processing outside the usual legally defined route. It is important to avoid a two-tier data protection framework in which the Secretary of State can decide that certain processing is effectively above the law.

On Amendment 17, some of the most common settings where data protection law is broken relate to the sharing of HIV status of an individual living with HIV in their personal life in relation to employment, healthcare services and the police. The sharing of an individual’s HIV status can lead to further discrimination being experienced by people living with HIV and can increase their risk of harassment or even violence. The National AIDS Trust is concerned that the Bill as drafted does not go far enough to prevent individuals’ HIV status from being shared with others without their consent. They and we believe that the Bill must clarify what an “administrative purpose” is for organisations processing employees’ personal data. Amendment 17 would add wording to clarify that, in paragraph 9(b) of Article 6,

“intra-group transmission of personal data”

in the workplace, within an organisation or in a group of organisations should be permitted only for individuals who need to access an employee’s personal data as part of their work.

As far as Amendment 18 is concerned, as it stands Clause 5 gives an advantage to large undertakings with numerous companies that can transmit data intra-group purely because they are affiliated to one central body. However, this contradicts both the ICO’s and the CMA’s repeated position that first party versus third party is not a meaningful distinction to cover privacy risk. Instead, it is the distinction of what data is processed, rather than the corporate ownership of the systems doing the processing. The amendment reflects the organisational measures that undertakings should have as safeguards. The groups of undertakings transmitting data should have organisational measures via contract to be able to take advantage of this transmission of data.

Then we come to the question of Clause 5 standing part of the Bill. This clause is unnecessary and creates risks. It is unnecessary because the legitimate interest balancing test is, in fact, flexible and practical; it already allows processing for emergencies, safeguarding and so on. It is risky because creating lists of specified legitimate interests inevitably narrows this concept and may make controllers less certain about whether a legitimate interest that is not a recognised legitimate interest can be characterised as such. In the age of AI, where change is exponential, we need principles and outcome-based legislation that are flexible and can be supplemented with guidance from an independent regulator, rather than setting up a system that requires the Government to legislate more and faster in order to catch up.

There is also a risk that the drafting of this provision does not dispense with the need to conduct a legitimate interest balancing test because all the recognised legitimate interests contain a test, of necessity. Established case law interprets the concept of necessity under data protection law as requiring a human rights balancing test to be carried out. This rather points to the smoke-and-mirrors effect of this drafting, which does nothing to improve legal certainty for organisations or protections for individuals.

I now come to Clause 7 standing part. This clause creates a presumption that processing will always be in the public interest or substantial public interest if done in reliance on a condition listed in proposed new Schedule A1 to the Data Protection Act 2018. The schedule will list international treaties that have been ratified by the UK. At present, the Bill lists only the UK-US data-sharing agreement as constituting relevant international law. Clause 7 seeks to remove the requirement for a controller to consider whether the legal basis on which they rely is in the public interest or substantial public interest, has appropriate safeguards and respects data subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms. But the conditions in proposed new Schedule A1 in respect of the UK-US agreement also state that the processing must be necessary, as assessed by the controller, to respond to a request made under the agreement.

It is likely that a court would interpret “necessity” in the light of the ECHR. The court may therefore consider that the inclusion of a necessity test means that a controller would have to consider whether the UK-US agreement, or any other treaty added to the schedule, is proportionate to a legitimate aim pursued. Not only is it unreasonable to expect a controller to do such an assessment; it is also highly unusual. International treaties are drafted on a state-to-state basis and not in a way that necessarily corresponds clearly with domestic law. Further, domestic courts would normally consider the rights under the domestic law implementing a treaty, rather than having to interpret an international instrument without reference to a domestic implementing scheme. Being required to do so may make it more difficult for courts to enforce data subjects’ rights.

The Government have not really explained why it is necessary to amend the law in this way rather than simply implementing the UK-US agreement domestically. That would be the normal approach; it would remove the need to add this new legal basis and enable controllers to use the existing framework to identify a legal basis to process data in domestic law. Instead, this amendment makes it more difficult to understand how the law operates, which could in turn deter data sharing in important situations. Perhaps the Minister could explain why Clause 7 is there.

I beg to move.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 13 and 15. Before I do, let me say that I strongly support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about HIV and the related vulnerability, and his assertion—almost—that Clause 5 is a solution in search of a problem. “Legitimate interest” is a flexible concept and I am somewhat bewildered as to why the Government are seeking to create change where none is needed. In this context, it follows that, were the noble Lord successful in his argument that Clause 5 should not stand part, Amendments 13 and 15 would be unnecessary.

On the first day in Committee, we debated a smaller group of amendments that sought to establish the principle that nothing in the Bill should lessen the privacy protections of children. In his response, the Minister said:

“if over the course of our deliberations the Committee identifies areas of the Bill where that is not the case, we will absolutely be open to listening on that, but let me state this clearly: the intent is to at least maintain, if not enhance, the safety and privacy of children and their data”.—[Official Report, 20/3/24; col. GC 75.]

I am glad the Minister is open to listening and that the Government’s intention is to protect children, but, as discussed previously, widening the definition of “research” in Clause 3 and watering down purpose limitation protections in Clause 6 negatively impacts children’s data rights. Again, in Clause 5, lowering the protections for all data subjects has consequences for children.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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The balancing test remains there for legitimate interests, under Article 6(1)(f).

Amendment 16 seeks to prevent organisations that undertake third-party marketing relying on the legitimate interest lawful ground under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR. As I have set out, organisations can rely on that ground for processing personal data without consent when they are satisfied that they have a legitimate interest to do so and that their commercial interests are not outweighed by the rights and interests of data subjects.

Clause 5(4) inserts in Article 6 new paragraph (9), which provides some illustrative examples of activities that may constitute legitimate interests, including direct marketing activities, but it does not mean that they will necessarily be able to process personal data for that purpose. Organisations will need to assess on a case-by-case basis where the balance of interest lies. If the impact on the individual’s privacy is too great, they will not be able to rely on the legitimate interest lawful ground. I should emphasise that this is not a new concept created by this Bill. Indeed, the provisions inserted by Clause 5(4) are drawn directly from the recitals to the UK GDPR, as incorporated from the EU GDPR.

I recognise that direct marketing can be a sensitive—indeed, disagreeable—issue for some, but direct marketing information can be very important for businesses as well as individuals and can be dealt with in a way that respects people’s privacy. The provisions in this Bill do not change the fact that direct marketing activities must be compliant with the data protection and privacy legislation and continue to respect the data subject’s absolute right to opt out of receiving direct marketing communications.

Amendment 17 would make sure that the processing of employee data for “internal administrative purposes” is subject to heightened safeguards, particularly when it relates to health. I understand that this amendment relates to representations made by the National AIDS Trust concerning the level of protection afforded to employees’ health data. We agree that the protection of people’s HIV status is vital and that it is right that it is subject to extra protection, as is the case for all health data and special category data. We have committed to further engagement and to working with the National AIDS Trust to explore solutions in order to prevent data breaches of people’s HIV status, which we feel is best achieved through non-legislative means given the continued high data protection standards afforded by our existing legislation. As such, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree not to press this amendment.

Amendment 18 seeks to allow businesses more confidently to rely on the existing legitimate interest lawful ground for the transmission of personal data within a group of businesses affiliated by contract for internal administrative purposes. In Clause 5, the list of activities in proposed new paragraphs (9) and (10) are intended to be illustrative of the types of activities that may be legitimate interests for the purposes of Article 6(1)(f). They are focused on processing activities that are currently listed in the recitals to the EU GDPR but are simply examples. Many other processing activities may be legitimate interests for the purposes of Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR. It is possible that the transmission of personal data for internal administrative purposes within a group affiliated by contract may constitute a legitimate interest, as may many other commercial activities. It would be for the controller to determine this on a case-by-case basis after carrying out a balancing test to assess the impact on the individual.

Finally, I turn to the clause stand part debate that seeks to remove Clause 7 from the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for this amendment because it allows me to explain why this clause is important to the success of the UK-US data access agreement. As noble Lords will know, that agreement helps the law enforcement agencies in both countries tackle crime. Under the UK GDPR, data controllers can process personal data without consent on public interest grounds if the basis for the processing is set out in domestic law. Clause 7 makes it clear that the processing of personal data can also be carried out on public interest grounds if the basis for the processing is set out in a relevant international treaty such as the UK-US data access agreement.

The agreement permits telecommunications operators in the UK to disclose data about serious crimes with law enforcement agencies in the US, and vice versa. The DAA has been operational since October 2022 and disclosures made by UK organisations under it are already lawful under the UK GDPR. Recent ICO guidance confirms this, but the Government want to remove any doubt in the minds of UK data controllers that disclosures under the DAA are permitted by the UK GDPR. Clause 7 makes it absolutely clear to telecoms operators in the UK that disclosures under the DAA can be made in reliance on the UK GDPR’s public tasks processing grounds; the clause therefore contributes to the continued, effective functioning of the agreement and to keeping the public in both the UK and the US safe.

For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My first reaction is “Phew”, my Lords. We are all having to keep to time limits now. The Minister did an admirable job within his limit.

I wholeheartedly support what the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, said about Amendments 13 and 15 and what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said about her Amendment 12. I do not believe that we have yet got to the bottom of children’s data protection; there is still quite some way to go. It would be really helpful if the Minister could bring together the elements of children’s data about which he is trying to reassure us and write to us saying exactly what needs to be done, particularly in terms of direct marketing directed towards children. That is a real concern.

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This is a fundamental group of amendments. It takes quite a lot for me to stand up on something so party political—I think my husband will be completely horrified that I did this homework over the weekend—but I ask the Minister to reconsider and to listen hard to the considered views, probably more considered than mine, on the Opposition Benches calling for more consultation before something such as this is introduced.
Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Harding and Lady Bennett, after the excellent introduction to the amendments in this group by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, used the word “trust”, and this is another example of a potential hidden agenda in the Bill. Again, it is destructive of any public trust in the way their data is curated. This is a particularly egregious example, without, fundamentally, any explanation. Sir John Whittingdale said that a future Government

“may want to encourage democratic engagement in the run up to an election by temporarily ‘switching off’ some of the direct marketing rules”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/2023; col. 885.]

Nothing to see here—all very innocuous; but, as we know, in the past the ICO has been concerned about even the current rules on the use of data by political parties. It seems to me that, without being too Pollyannaish about this, we should be setting an example in the way we use the public’s data for campaigning. The ICO, understandably, is quoted as saying during the public consultation on the Bill that this is

“an area in which there are significant potential risks to people if any future policy is not implemented very carefully”.

That seems an understatement, but that is how regulators talk. It is entirely right to be concerned about these provisions.

Of course, they are hugely problematic, but they are particularly problematic given that it is envisaged that young people aged 14 and older should be able to be targeted by political parties when they cannot even vote, as we have heard. This would appear to contravene one of the basic principles of data protection law: that you should not process more personal data than you need for your purposes. If an individual cannot vote, it is hard to see how targeting them with material relating to an election is a proportionate interference with their privacy rights, particularly when they are a child. The question is, should we be soliciting support from 14 to 17 year-olds during elections when they do not have votes? Why do the rules need changing so that people can be targeted online without having consented? One of the consequences of these changes would be to allow a Government to switch off—the words used by Sir John Whittingdale—direct marketing rules in the run-up to an election, allowing candidates and parties to rely on “soft” opt-in to process data and make other changes without scrutiny.

Exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said, respondents to the original consultation on the Bill wanted political communications to be covered by existing rules on direct marketing. Responses were very mixed on the soft opt-in, and there were worries that people might be encouraged to part with more of their personal data. More broadly, why are the Government changing the rules on democratic engagement if they say they will not use these powers? What assessment have they made of the impact of the use of the powers? Why are the powers not being overseen by the Electoral Commission? If anybody is going to have the power to introduce the ability to market directly to voters, it should be the Electoral Commission.

All this smacks of taking advantage of financial asymmetry. We talked about competition asymmetry with big tech when we debated the digital markets Bill; similarly, this seems a rather sneaky way of taking advantage of the financial resources one party might have versus others. It would allow it to do things other parties cannot, because it has granted itself permission to do that. The provisions should not be in the hands of any Secretary of State or governing party; if anything, they should be in entirely independent hands; but, even then, they are undesirable.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling her amendments. Amendment 19 would remove processing which is necessary for the purposes of democratic engagement from the list of recognised legitimate interests. It is essential in a healthy democracy that registered political parties, elected representatives and permitted participants in referendums can engage freely with the electorate without being impeded unnecessarily by data protection legislation.

The provisions in the Bill will mean that these individuals and organisations do not have to carry out legitimate interest assessments or look for a separate legal basis. They will, however, still need to comply with other requirements of data protection legislation, such as the data protection principles and the requirement for processing to be necessary.

On the question posed by the noble Baroness about the term “democratic engagement”, it is intended to cover a wide range of political activities inside and outside election periods. These include but are not limited to democratic representation; communicating with electors and interested parties; surveying and opinion gathering; campaigning activities; activities to increase voter turnout; supporting the work of elected representatives, prospective candidates and official candidates; and fundraising to support any of these activities. This is reflected in the drafting, which incorporates these concepts in the definition of democratic engagement and democratic engagement activities.

The ICO already has guidance on the use of personal data by political parties for campaigning purposes, which the Government anticipate it will update to reflect the changes in the Bill. We will of course work with the ICO to make sure it is familiar with our plans for commencement and that it does not benefit any party over another.

On the point made about the appropriate age for the provisions, in some parts of the UK the voting age is 16 for some elections, and children can join the electoral register as attainers at 14. The age of 14 reflects the variations in voting age across the nation; in some parts of the UK, such as Scotland, a person can register to vote at 14 as an attainer. An attainer is someone who is registered to vote in advance of their being able to do so, to allow them to be on the electoral roll as soon as they turn the required age. Children aged 14 and over are often politically engaged and are approaching voting age. The Government consider it important that political parties and elected representatives can engage freely with this age group—

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Lord Kamall Portrait Lord Kamall (Con)
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May I make a suggestion to my noble friend the Minister? It might be worth asking the legal people to get the right wording, but if there are different ages at which people can vote in different parts of the United Kingdom, surely it would be easier just to relate it to the age at which they are able to vote in those elections. That would address a lot of the concerns that many noble Lords are expressing here today.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, this whole area of democratic engagement is one that the Minister will need to explain in some detail. This is an Alice in Wonderland schedule: “These words mean what I want them to mean”. If, for instance, you are engaging with the children of a voter—at 14, they are children—is that democratic engagement? You could drive a coach and horses through Schedule 1. The Minister used the word “necessary”, but he must give us rather more than that. It was not very reassuring.

Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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The Minister mentioned a presumption that the ICO will update its guidance. Is there a timeframe for that? Will the guidance be updated before this comes into effect? How does the age of 14 relate to the AADC, which sets the age of adulthood at 18?

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Lord Kamall Portrait Lord Kamall (Con)
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My Lords, I know that these amendments were said to be technical amendments, so I thought I would just accept them, but when I saw the wording of Amendment 283 some alarm bells started ringing. It says:

“The Commission may do anything it thinks appropriate for the purposes of, or in connection with, its functions”.


I know that the Minister said that this is stating what the commission is already able to do, but I am concerned whenever I see those words anywhere. They give a blank cheque to any authority or organisation.

Many noble Lords will know that I have previously spoken about the principal-agent theory in politics, in which certain powers are delegated to an agency or regulator, but what accountability does it have? I worry when I see that it “may do anything … appropriate” to fulfil its tasks. I would like some assurance from the Minister that there is a limit to what the information commission can do and some accountability. At a time when many of us are asking who regulates the regulators and when we are looking at some of the arm’s-length bodies—need I mention the Post Office?—there is some real concern about accountability.

I understand the reason for wanting to clarify or formalise what the Minister believes the information commission is doing already, but I worry about this form of words. I would like some reassurance that it is not wide-ranging and that there is some limit and accountability to future Governments. I have seen this sentiment across the House; people are asking who regulates the regulators and to whom are they accountable.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I must congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. Amid a blizzard of technical and minor amendments from the Minister, he forensically spotted one to raise in that way. He is absolutely right. The Industry and Regulators Committee has certainly been examining the accountability and scrutiny devoted to regulators, so we need to be careful in the language that we use. I think we have to take a lot on trust from the Minister, particularly in Grand Committee.

I apparently failed to declare an interest at Second Reading. I forgot to state that I am a consultant to DLA Piper and the Whips have reminded me today that I failed to do so on the first day in Committee, so I apologise to the Committee for that. I am not quite sure why my consultancy with DLA Piper is relevant to the data protection Bill, but there it is. I declare it.

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Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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In which case, you are warned.

Amendment 20 agreed.
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As a result, I have no idea what information the Government now hold about me. Under this clause, it would be so easy for someone to deny that information to me if I requested it. If people such as me cannot access personal data, it will be almost impossible for us to exercise our right to call for the erasure of that data. I cannot ask anyone to delete that data if someone refuses to give it to me. I urge the Minister to withdraw this clause, as it is an affront to human rights and public accountability.
Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. He raised even more questions about Clause 9 than I ever dreamed of. He has illustrated the real issues behind the clause and why it is so important to debate its standing part, because, in our view, it should certainly be removed from the Bill. It would seriously limit people’s ability to access information about how their personal data is collected and used. We are back to the dilution of data subject rights, within which the rights of data subject access are, of course, vital. This includes limiting access to information about automated decision-making processes to which people are subject.

A data subject is someone who can be identified directly or indirectly by personal data, such as a name, an ID number, location data, or information relating to their physical, economic, cultural or social identity. Under existing law, data subjects have a right to request confirmation of whether their personal data is being processed by a controller, to access that personal data and to obtain information about how it is being processed. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out that there is ample precedent for how the controller can refuse a request from a data subject only if it is manifestly unfounded or excessive. The meaning of that phrase is well established.

There are three main ways in which Clause 9 limits people’s ability to access information about how their personal data is being collected and used. First, it would lower the threshold for refusing a request from “manifestly unfounded or excessive” to “vexatious or excessive”. This is an inappropriately low threshold, given the nature of a data subject access request—namely, a request by an individual for their own data.

Secondly, Clause 9 would insert a new mandatory list of considerations for deciding whether the request is vexatious or excessive. This includes vague considerations, such as

“the relationship between the person making the request (the ‘sender’) and the person receiving it (the ‘recipient’)”.

The very fact that the recipient holds data relating to the sender means that there is already some form of relationship between them.

Thirdly, the weakening of an individual’s right to obtain information about how their data is being collected, used or shared is particularly troubling given the simultaneous effect of the provisions in Clause 10, which means that data subjects are less likely to be informed about how their data is being used for additional purposes other than those for which it was originally collected, in cases where the additional purposes are for scientific or historical research, archiving in the public interest or statistical purposes. Together, the two clauses mean that an individual is less likely to be proactively told how their data is being used, while it is harder to access information about their data when requested.

In the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons, the Minister, Sir John Whittingdale, claimed that:

“The new parameters are not intended to be reasons for refusal”,


but rather to give

“greater clarity than there has previously been”.—[Official Report, Commons, Data Protection and Digital Information Bill Committee, 16/5/23; cols. 113-14.]

But it was pointed out by Dr Jeni Tennison of Connected by Data in her oral evidence to the committee that the impact assessment for the Bill indicates that a significant proportion of the savings predicted would come from lighter burdens on organisations dealing with subject access requests as a result of this clause. This suggests that, while the Government claim that this clause is a clarification, it is intended to weaken obligations on controllers and, correspondingly, the rights of data subjects. Is that where the Secretary of State’s £10 billion of benefit from this Bill comes from? On these grounds alone, Clause 9 should be removed from the Bill.

We also oppose the question that Clause 12 stand part of the Bill. Clause 12 provides that, in responding to subject access requests, controllers are required only to undertake a

“reasonable and proportionate search for the personal data and other information”.

This clause also appears designed to weaken the right of subject access and will lead to confusion for organisations about what constitutes a reasonable and proportionate search in a particular circumstance. The right of subject access is central to individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, because it is a gateway to exercising other rights, either within the data subject rights regime or in relation to other legal rights, such as the rights to equality and non-discrimination. Again, the lowering of rights compared with the EU creates obvious risks, and this is a continuing theme of data adequacy.

Clause 12 does not provide a definition for reasonable and proportionate searches, but when introducing the amendment, Sir John Whittingdale suggested that a search for information may become unreasonable or disproportionate

“when the information is of low importance or of low relevance to the data subject”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/11/23; col. 873.]

Those considerations diverge from those provided in the Information Commissioner’s guidance on the rights of access, which states that when determining whether searches may be unreasonable or disproportionate, the data controller must consider the circumstances of the request, any difficulties involved in finding the information and the fundamental nature of the right of access.

We also continue to be concerned about the impact assessment for the Bill and the Government’s claims that the new provisions in relation to subject access requests are for clarification only. Again, Clause 12 appears to have the same impact as Clause 9 in the kinds of savings that the Government seem to imagine will emerge from the lowering of subject access rights. This is a clear dilution of subject access rights, and this clause should also be removed from the Bill.

We always allow for belt and braces and if our urging does not lead to the Minister agreeing to remove Clauses 9 and 12, at the very least we should have the new provisions set out either in Amendment 26, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, or in Amendment 25, which proposes that a data controller who refuses a subject access request must give reasons for their refusal and tell the subject about their right to seek a remedy. That is absolutely the bare minimum, but I would far prefer to see the deletion of Clauses 9 and 12 from the Bill.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As ever, I thank noble Lords for raising and speaking to these amendments. I start with the stand part notices on Clauses 9 and 36, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Clauses 9 and 36 clarify the new threshold to refuse or charge a reasonable fee for a request that is “vexatious or excessive”. Clause 36 also clarifies that the Information Commissioner may charge a fee for dealing with, or refuse to deal with, a vexatious or excessive request made by any persons and not just data subjects, providing necessary certainty.

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Lord Bassam of Brighton Portrait Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
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From looking at the wording of the Members’ explanatory statements for wishing to leave out Clauses 9 and 36, I do not think that the Minister has addressed this, but does he accept that the Bill now provides a more lax approach? Is this a reduction of the standard expected? To me, “vexatious or excessive” sounds very different from “manifestly unfounded or excessive”. Does he accept that basic premise? That is really the core of the debate; if it is not, we have to look again at the issue of resources, which seems to be the argument to make this change.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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If that is the case and this is a dilution, is this where the Government think they will get the savings identified in the impact assessment? It was alleged in the Public Bill Committee that this is where a lot of the savings would come from—we all have rather different views. My first information was that every SME might save about £80 a year then, suddenly, the Secretary of State started talking about £10 billion of benefit from the Bill. Clarification of that would be extremely helpful. There seems to be a dichotomy between the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, saying that this is a way to reduce the burdens on business and the Minister saying that it is all about confident refusal and confidence. He has used that word twice, which is worrying.

Lord Sikka Portrait Lord Sikka (Lab)
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I apologise for intervening, but the Minister referred to resources. By that, he means the resources for the controller but, as I said earlier, there is no consideration of what the social cost may be. If this Bill had already become law, how would the victims of the Post Office scandal have been able to secure any information? Under this Bill, the threshold for providing information will be much lower than it is under the current legislation. Can the Minister say something about how the controllers will take social cost into account or how the Government have taken that into account?

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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The actual application of the terms will be set out in guidance by the ICO but the intention is to filter out the more disruptive and cynical ones. Designing these words is never an easy thing but there has been considerable consultation on this in order to achieve that intention.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords—sorry; it may be that the Minister was just about to answer my question. I will let him do so.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I will have to go back to the impact assessment but I would be astonished if that was a significant part of the savings promised. By the way, the £10.6 billion—or whatever it is—in savings was given a green rating by the body that assesses these things; its name eludes me. It is a robust calculation. I will check and write to the noble Lord, but I do not believe that a significant part of that calculation leans on the difference between “vexatious” and “manifestly unfounded”.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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It would be very useful to have the Minister respond on that but, of course, as far as the impact assessment is concerned, a lot of this depends on the Government’s own estimates of what this Bill will produce—some of which are somewhat optimistic.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, can we join in with the request to see that information in a letter? We would like to see where these savings will be made and how much will, as noble Lords have said, be affected by the clauses that we are debating today.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has given me an idea: if an impact assessment has been made, clause by clause, it would be extremely interesting to know just where the Government believe the golden goose is.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am not quite sure what is being requested because the impact assessment has been not only made but published.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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Yes, but it is a very broad impact assessment.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I see—so noble Lords would like an analysis of the different components of the impact assessment. It has been green-rated by the independent Regulatory Policy Committee. I have just been informed by the Box that the savings from these reforms to the wording of SARs are valued at less than 1% of the benefit of more than £10 billion that this Bill will bring.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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That begs the question of where on earth the rest is coming from.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Which I will be delighted to answer. With this interesting exchange, I have lost in my mind the specific questions that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, asked but I am coming on to some of his other ones; if I do not give satisfactory answers, no doubt he will intervene and ask again.

I appreciate the further comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, about the Freedom of Information Act. I hope he will be relieved to know that this Bill does nothing to amend that Act. On his accounting questions, he will be aware that most SARs are made by private individuals to private companies. The Government are therefore not involved in that process and do not collect the kind of information that he described.

Following the DPDI Bill, the Government will work with the ICO to update guidance on subject access requests. Guidance plays an important role in clarifying what a controller should consider when relying on the new “vexatious or excessive” provision. The Government are also exploring whether a code of practice on subject access requests can best address the needs of controllers and data subjects.

On whether Clause 12 should stand part of the Bill, Clause 12 is only putting on a statutory footing what has already been established—

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Lord Black of Brentwood Portrait Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
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My Lords, I support Amendments 27 to 34, tabled variously by my noble friend Lady Harding, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to which I have added my name. As this is the first time I have spoken in Committee, I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and president of the Institute of Promotional Marketing and note my other declarations in the register.

The direct marketing industry is right at the heart of the data-driven economy, which is crucial not just to the future of the media and communications industries but to the whole basis of the creative economy, which will power economic growth into the future. The industry has quite rightly welcomed the Bill, which provides a long-term framework for economic growth as well as protecting customers.

However, there is one area of great significance, as my noble friend Lady Harding has just eloquently set out, on which this Bill needs to provide clarity and certainty going forward, namely, the use of the open electoral register. That register is an essential resource for a huge number of businesses and brands, as well as many public services, as they try to build new audiences. As we have heard, it is now in doubt because of a recent legal ruling that could, as my noble friend said, lead to people being bombarded with letters telling them that their data on the OER has been used. That is wholly disproportionate and is not in the interests of the marketing and communications industry or customers.

These sensible amendments would simply confirm the status quo that has worked well for so long. They address the issue by providing legal certainty around the use of the OER. I believe they do so in a proportionate manner that does not in any way compromise any aspect of the data privacy of UK citizens. I urge the Minister carefully to consider these amendments. As my noble friend said, there are considerable consequences of not acting for the creative economy, jobs in direct marketing, consumers, the environment and small businesses.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and the noble Lord, Lord Black, for doing all the heavy lifting on these amendments. I of course support them having put forward my own amendments. It is just the luck of the draw that the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, put forward her amendment along with all the others. I have very little to say in this case, and just echo what the noble Lord, Lord Black, said about the fact that the open electoral register has played an important part in the direct marketing, data-driven economy, as it is described. It is particularly interesting that he mentioned the creative industries as well.

The First-tier Tribunal precedent could impact on other public sources of data, including the register of companies, the register of judgments, orders and fines, the land register and the food standards agency register. It could have quite far-reaching implications unless we manage to resolve the issue. There is a very tight timescale. The First-tier Tribunal’s ruling means that companies must notify those on the electoral register by 20 May or be at risk of breaching the law. This is really the best route for trying to resolve the issue. Secondly, the First-tier Tribunal’s ruling states that costs cannot be considered as disproportionate effort. That is why these amendments explicitly refer to that. This is no trivial matter. It is a serious area that needs curing by this Bill, which is a good opportunity to do so.

I shall speak briefly to Clause 11 as a whole standing part. That may seem a bit paradoxical, but it is designed to address issues arising in Article 13, not Article 14. Article 13 of the UK GDPR requires controllers, where they intend to process data that was collected directly from data subjects—as opposed to Article 14 obligations, which apply to personal data not obtained from the data subject—for a new purpose, to inform data subjects of various matters to the extent necessary,

“to ensure fair and transparent processing”.

Clause 11(1) removes this obligation for certain purposes where it would require disproportionate effort. The obligation is already qualified to what is necessary to make processing fair and transparent, the fundamental requirements of the GDPR. If, in these circumstances, processing cannot be made fair and transparent without disproportionate effort, then it should not take place. Clause 11(1) would sidestep the requirement and allow unfair, untransparent processing to go ahead for personal data that the data controllers had themselves collected. Perhaps I should have tabled a rather more targeted amendment, but I hope that noble Lords get the point of the difference between this in terms of Article 13 and Article 14.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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On the first point, I used the words carefully because the Government cannot instruct the ICO specifically on how to act in any of these cases. The question about the May deadline is important. With the best will in the world, none of the provisions in the Bill are likely to be in effect by the time of that deadline in any case. That being the case, I would feel slightly uneasy about advising the ICO on how to act.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I am not quite getting from the Minister whether he has an understanding of and sympathy with the case that is being made or whether he is standing on ceremony on its legalities. Is he saying, “No, we think that would be going too far”, or that there is a good case and that guidance or some action by the ICO would be more appropriate? I do not get the feeling that somebody has made a decision about the policy on this. It may be that conversations with the Minister between Committee and Report would be useful, and it may be early days yet until he hears the arguments made in Committee; I do not know, but it would be useful to get an indication from him.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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Yes. I repeat that I very much recognise the seriousness of the case. There is a balance to be drawn here. In my view, the best way to identify the most appropriate balancing point is to continue to work closely with the ICO, because I strongly suspect that, at least at this stage, it may be very difficult to draw a legislative dividing line that balances the conflicting needs. That said, I am happy to continue to engage with noble Lords on this really important issue between Committee and Report, and I commit to doing so.

On the question of whether Clause 11 should stand part of the Bill, Clause 11 extends the existing disproportionate effort exemption to cases where the controller collected the personal data directly from the data subject and intends to carry out further processing for research purposes, subject to the research safeguards outlined in Clause 26. This exemption is important to ensure that life-saving research can continue unimpeded.

Research holds a privileged position in the data protection framework because, by its nature, it is viewed as generally being in the public interest. The framework has various exemptions in place to facilitate and encourage research in the UK. During the consultation, we were informed of various longitudinal studies, such as those into degenerative neurological conditions, where it is impossible or nearly impossible to recontact data subjects. To ensure that this vital research can continue unimpeded, Clause 11 provides a limited exemption that applies only to researchers who are complying with the safeguards set out in Clause 26.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns that Clause 11 would allow unfair processing. I assure him that this is not the case, as any processing that uses the disproportionate effort exemption in Article 13 must comply with the overarching data protection principles, including lawfulness, fairness and transparency, so that even if data controllers rely on this exemption they should consider other ways to make the processing they undertake as fair and transparent as possible.

Finally, returning to EU data adequacy, the Government recognise its importance and, as I said earlier, are confident that the proposals in Clause 11 are complemented by robust safeguards, which reinforces our view that they are compatible with EU adequacy. For the reasons that I have set out, I am unable to accept these amendments, and I hope that noble Lords will not press them.

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Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, the number of amendments proposed to Clause 14 reflects the Committee’s very real concern about the impact of automated decision-making on the privacy, safety and prospects of UK data subjects. I have specific amendments in groups 7 and 8, so I will speak to the impact of Clause 14 on children later. I will again be making arguments about the vulnerability of these systems in relation to the Government’s proposals on the DWP.

Without repeating the arguments made, I associate myself with most the proposals and the intention behind them—the need to safeguard the prospects of a fair outcome when algorithms hold sway over a person’s future. It seems entirely logical that, if the definition of solely automated decision-making requires “no meaningful human involvement”, we should be clear, as Amendment 40 proposes, about what is considered “meaningful”, so that the system cannot be gamed by providing human involvement that provides an ineffective safeguard and is therefore not meaningful.

I have sympathy with many of these amendments—Amendments 38A, 39, 47, 62, 64 and 109—and ultimately believe, as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that it is a matter of trust. I refer briefly to the parliamentary briefing from the BMA, which boldly says that:

“Clause 14 risks eroding trust in AI”.


That would be a very sad outcome.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, we have heard some powerful concerns on this group already. This clause is in one of the most significant parts of the Bill for the future. The Government’s AI policy is of long standing. They started it many years ago, then had a National AI Strategy in 2021, followed by a road map, a White Paper and a consultation response to the White Paper. Yet this part of the Bill, which is overtly about artificial intelligence and automated decision-making, does not seem to be woven into their thinking at all.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As ever, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their detailed consideration of Clause 14, and all other noble Lord who spoke so well. I carefully note the references to the DWP’s measure on fraud and error. For now, I reassure noble Lords that a human will always be involved in all decision-making relating to that measure, but I note that this Committee will have a further debate specifically on that measure later.

The Government recognise the importance of solely automated decision-making to the UK’s future success and productivity. These reforms ensure that it can be responsibly implemented, while any such decisions with legal or similarly significant effects have the appropriate safeguards in place, including the rights to request a review and to request one from a human. These reforms clarify and simplify the rules related to solely automated decision-making without watering down any of the protections for data subjects or the fundamental data protection principles. In doing so, they will provide confidence to organisations looking to use these technologies in a responsible way while driving economic growth and innovation.

The Government also recognise that AI presents huge opportunities for the public sector. It is important that AI is used responsibly and transparently in the public sector; we are already taking steps to build trust and transparency. Following a successful pilot, we are making the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard—the ATRS—a requirement for all government departments, with plans to expand this across the broader public sector over time. This will ensure that there is a standardised way for government departments proactively to publish information about how and why they are using algorithms in their decision-making. In addition, the Central Digital and Data Office—the CDDO—has already published guidance on the procurement and use of generative AI for the UK Government and, later this year, DSIT will launch the AI management essentials scheme, setting a minimum good practice standard for companies selling AI products and services.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, could I just interrupt the Minister? It may be that he can get an answer from the Box to my question. One intriguing aspect is that, as the Minister said, the pledge is to bring the algorithmic recording standard into each government department and there will be an obligation to use that standard. However, what compliance mechanism will there be to ensure that that is happening? Does the accountable Permanent Secretary have a duty to make sure that that is embedded in the department? Who has the responsibility for that?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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That is a fair question. I must confess that I do not know the answer. There will be mechanisms in place, department by department, I imagine, but one would also need to report on it across government. Either it will magically appear in my answer or I will write to the Committee.

The CDDO has already published guidance on the procurement and use of generative AI for the Government. We will consult on introducing this as a mandatory requirement for public sector procurement, using purchasing power to drive responsible innovation in the broader economy.

I turn to the amendments in relation to meaningful involvement. I will first take together Amendments 36 and 37, which aim to clarify that the safeguards mentioned under Clause 14 are applicable to profiling operations. New Article 22A(2) already clearly sets out that, in cases where profiling activity has formed part of the decision-making process, controllers have to consider the extent to which a decision about an individual has been taken by means of profiling when establishing whether human involvement has been meaningful. Clause 14 makes clear that a solely automated significant decision is one without meaningful human involvement and that, in these cases, controllers are required to provide the safeguards in new Article 22C. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary; I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press them.

Turning to Amendment 38, the Government are confident that the existing reference to “data subject” already captures the intent of this amendment. The existing definition of “personal data” makes it clear that a data subject is a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, whether he would be willing not to press it.

Amendments 38A and 40 seek to clarify that, for human involvement to be considered meaningful, the review must be carried out by a competent person. We feel that these amendments are unnecessary as meaningful human involvement may vary depending on the use case and context. The reformed clause already introduces a power for the Secretary of State to provide legal clarity on what is or is not to be taken as meaningful human involvement. This power is subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament and allows the provision to be future-proofed in the wake of technological advances. As such, I ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bennett, not to press their amendments.

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I shall return briefly to the rollout of the Algorithmic Transparency Reporting Standard. To date, we have taken a deliberatively iterative and agile approach on ATRS development and rollout with the intention of generating buy-in from departments, gathering feedback, informing the evidence base, and improving and adapting the standard.
Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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That means no compliance mechanism.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I am not sure I agree with that characterisation. The ATRS is a relatively new development. It needs time to bed in and needs to be bedded in on an agile basis in order to ensure not only quality but speed of implementation. That said, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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The Minister has taken us through what Clause 14 does and rebutted the need for anything other than “solely”. He has gone through the sensitive data and the special category data aspects, and so on, but is he reiterating his view that this clause is purely for clarification; or is he saying that it allows greater use of automated decision-making, in particular in public services, so that greater efficiencies can be found and therefore it is freeing up the public sector at the expense of the rights of the individual? Where does he sit in all this?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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As I said, the intent of the Government is: yes to more automated data processing to take advantage of emerging technologies, but also yes to maintaining appropriate safeguards. The safeguards in the present system consist—if I may characterise it in a slightly blunt way—of providing quite a lot of uncertainty, so that people do not take the decision to positively embrace the technology in a safe way. By bringing in this clarity, we will see an increase not only in the safety of their applications but in their use, driving up productivity in both the public and private sectors.

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Baroness Kidron Portrait Baroness Kidron (CB)
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My Lords, the amendments in this group highlight that Clause 14 lacks the necessary checks and balances to uphold equality legislation, individual rights and freedoms, data protection rights, access to services, fairness in the exercise of public functions and workers’ rights. I add my voice to that of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in his attempt to make Clause 14 not stand part, which he will speak to in the next group.

I note, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has, that all the current frameworks have fundamental rights at their heart, whether it is the White House blueprint, the UN Secretary-General’s advisory body on AI, with which I am currently involved, or the EU’s AI Act. I am concerned that the UK does not want to work within this consensus.

With that in mind, I particularly note the importance of Amendment 41. As the noble Lord said, we are all supposed to adhere to the Equality Act 2010. I support Amendments 48 and 49, which are virtually inter-changeable in wanting to ensure that the standard of decisions being “solely” based on automated decision-making cannot be gamed by adding a trivial human element to avoid that designation.

Again, I suggest that the Government cannot have it both ways—with nothing diminished but everything liberated and changed—so I find myself in agreement with Amendment 52A and Amendment 59A, which is in the next group, from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who is not in his place. These seek clarity from the Information Commissioner.

I turn to my Amendment 46. My sole concern is to minimise the impact of Clause 14 on children’s safety, privacy and life chances. The amendment provides that a significant decision about a data subject must not be based solely on automated processing if

“the data subject is a child or may be a child unless the provider is satisfied that the decision is in, and compatible with, the best interests of a child”,

taking into account the full gamut of their rights and development stage. Children have enhanced rights under the UNCRC, to which the UK is a signatory. Due to their evolving capacities as they make the journey from infancy to adulthood, they need special protections. If their rights are diminished in the digital world, their rights are diminished full stop. Algorithms determine almost every aspect of a child’s digital experience, from the videos they watch to their social network and from the sums they are asked to do in their maths homework to the team they are assigned when gaming. We have seen young boys wrongly profiled as criminal and girls wrongly associated with gangs.

In a later group, I will speak to a proposal for a code of practice on children and AI, which would codify standards and expectations for the use of AI in all aspects of children’s lives, but for now, I hope the Minister will see that, without these amendments to automated decision-making, children’s data protection will be clearly weakened. I hope he will agree to act to make true his earlier assertion that nothing in the Bill will undermine child protection. The Minister is the Minister for AI. He knows the impact this will have. I understand that, right now, he will probably stick to the brief, but I ask him to go away, consider this from the perspective of children and parents, and ask, “Is it okay for children’s life chances to be automated in this fashion?”

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 48. By some quirk of fate, I failed to sign up to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, so cogently introduced. I would have signed up if I had realised that I had not, so to speak.

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. She has a track record of being extremely persuasive, so I hope the Minister pays heed in what happens between Committee and Report. I very much hope that there will be some room for manoeuvre and that there is not just permanent push-back, with the Minister saying that everything is about clarifying and us saying that everything is about dilution. There comes a point when we have to find some accommodation on some of these areas.

Amendments 48 and 49 are very similar—I was going to say, “Great minds think alike”, but I am not sure that my brain feels like much of a great mind at the moment. “Partly” or “predominantly” rather than “solely”, if you look at it the other way round, is really the crux of what I think many of us are concerned about. It is easy to avoid the terms of Article 22 just by slipping in some sort of token human involvement. Defining “meaningful” is so difficult in these circumstances. I am concerned that we are opening the door to something that could be avoided. Even then, the terms of the new clause—we will have a clause stand part debate on Wednesday, obviously—put all the onus on the data subject, whereas that was not the case previously under Article 22. The Minister has not really explained why that change has been made.

I conclude by saying that I very much support Amendment 41. This whole suite of amendments is well drafted. The point about the Equality Act is extremely well made. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, also has a very good amendment here. It seems to me that involving the ICO right in the middle of this will be absolutely crucial—and we are back to public trust again. If nothing else, I would like explicitly to include that under Clause 14 in relation to Article 22 by the time this Bill goes through.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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I thank noble Lords and the noble Baroness for their further detailed consideration of Clause 14.

Let me take first the amendments that deal with restrictions on and safeguards for ADM and degree of ADM. Amendment 41 aims to make clear that solely automated decisions that contravene any part of the Equality Act 2010 are prohibited. We feel that this amendment is unnecessary for two reasons. First, this is already the case under the Equality Act, which is reinforced by the lawfulness principle under the present data protection framework, meaning that controllers are already required to adhere to the Equality Act 2010. Secondly, explicitly stating in the legislation that contravening one type of legislation is prohibited—in this case, the Equality Act 2010—and not referring to other legislation that is also prohibited will lead to an inconsistent approach. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, to withdraw it.

Amendment 44 seeks to limit the conditions for special category data processing for this type of automated decision-making. Again, we feel that this is not needed given that a set of conditions already provides enhanced levels of protection for the processing of special category data, as set out in Article 9 of the UK GDPR. In order to lawfully process special category data, you must identify both a lawful basis under Article 6 of the UK GDPR and a separate condition for processing under Article 9. Furthermore, where an organisation seeks to process special category data under solely automated decision-making on the basis that it is necessary for contract, in addition to the Articles 6 and 9 lawful bases, they would also have to demonstrate that the processing was necessary for substantial public interest.

Similarly, Amendment 45 seeks to apply safeguards when processing special category data; however, these are not needed as the safeguards in new Article 22C already apply to all forms of processing, including the processing of special category data, by providing sufficient safeguards for data subjects’ rights, freedoms and legitimate interests. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary; I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press them.

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Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
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It may be either the controller or the processor but for any legal or similarly significant decision right now—today—there is a requirement before the Bill comes into effect. That requirement is retained by the Bill.

In line with ICO guidance, children need particular protection when organisations collect and process their personal data because they may be less aware of the risks involved. If organisations process children’s personal data they should think about the need to protect them from the outset and should design their systems and processes with this in mind. This is the case for organisations processing children’s data during solely automated decision-making, just as it is for all processing of children’s data.

Building on this, the Government’s view is that automated decision-making has an important role to play in protecting children online, for example with online content moderation. The current provisions in the Bill will help online service providers understand how they can use these technologies and strike the right balance between enabling the best use of automated decision-making technology while continuing to protect the rights of data subjects, including children. As such, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Baroness if she would be willing not to press it.

Amendments 48 and 49 seek to extend the Article 22 provisions to “predominantly” and “partly” automated decision-making. These types of processing already involve meaningful human involvement. In such instances, other data protection requirements, including transparency and fairness, continue to apply and offer relevant protections. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary; I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, if they would be willing not to press them.

Amendment 50 seeks to ensure that the Article 22C safeguards will apply alongside, rather than instead of, the transparency obligations in the UK GDPR. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that the general transparency obligations in Articles 12 to 15 will continue to apply and thus will operate alongside the safeguards in the reformed Article 22. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary; I ask the noble Baroness if she would be willing not to press it.

The changes proposed by Amendment 52A are unnecessary as Clause 50 already provides for an overarching requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the ICO and other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making regulations under the UK GDPR, including for the measures within Article 22. Also, any changes to the regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure so must be approved by both Houses of Parliament. As with other provisions of the Bill, the ICO will seek to provide organisations with timely guidance and support to assist them in interpreting and applying the legislation. As such, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary and, if he were here, I would ask my noble friend Lord Holmes if he would be willing not to press it.

Amendments 98A and 104A are related to workplace rights. Existing data protection legislation and our proposed reforms provide sufficient safeguards for automated decision making where personal data is being processed, including in workplaces. The UK’s human rights law, and existing employment and equality laws, also ensure that employees are informed and consulted about any workplace developments, which means that surveillance of employees is regulated. As such, we do not believe that these amendments are necessary and I ask the noble Baroness not to move them.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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I hear what the Minister said about the workplace algorithmic assessment. However, if the Government believe it is right to have something like an algorithmic recording standard in the public sector, why is it not appropriate to have something equivalent in the private sector?

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I would not say it is not right, but if we want to make the ATRS a standard, we should make it a standard in the public sector first and then allow it to be adopted as a means for all private organisations using ADM and AI to meet the transparency principles that they are required to adopt.

Lord Clement-Jones Portrait Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
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So would the Minister not be averse to it? It is merely so that the public sector is ahead of the game, allowing it to show the way and then there may be a little bit of regulation for the private sector.

Viscount Camrose Portrait Viscount Camrose (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am not philosophically averse to such regulation. As to implementing it in the immediate future, however, I have my doubts about that possibility.