Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Clement-Jones
Main Page: Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Clement-Jones's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(9 months, 3 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I strongly support Amendment 80 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which I have signed. She spoke powerfully about the power of big tech and its impact on democracy. My concerns, and those of many news organisations such as the Public Interest News Foundation, the News Media Association and the Professional Publishers Association, are consistent with that: we are all concerned to ensure the plurality of media as far as possible, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, mentioned. She also helpfully reminded us of the duty of Ofcom, in Section 3 of the Communications Act, to
“further the interests of citizens”.
It seems to me that the CMA should be subject to exactly the same duty.
Local, specialist and national publishers are an essential part of the fabric of our society. On these Benches, we may have arguments, post Leveson, with some of the mainstream media about the appropriate legislation that should impact on it, but the media play a key role in promoting democracy, by scrutinising the Government with public interest journalism. Additionally, publishers provide vital support to industries, which often rely on the trade press to inform sectoral decision-making and provide what are described as workflow tools. A duty to further the interests of citizens as well as consumers would allow the CMA much better to prioritise media sustainability and more explicitly target anticompetitive conduct that harms media plurality.
It could be argued—I expect that the Minister is going to marshal his arguments—that the current pure consumer focus still allows the CMA to implement solutions that will help to level the playing field between platforms and publishers, but the concern of many of us is that the absence of an interest-of-citizens duty may mean that the remedies that could support a sustainable and plural media and in turn our democracy will be used less effectively than they could be, or not used at all. The argument is powerfully made that we need to include that duty. We have a precedent and there is absolutely no reason why we should not include that in the duties of the CMA.
Turning to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, Amendment 83A, I feel that this is perhaps something that he expresses throughout the Bill: he has the scars on his back of being the chair of a regulator. It is a surprising omission that these principles are not included. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, like the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, has done her homework and found that the CMA is exceptional in this respect. They both made an extremely good case.
Beyond those principles, how do the Government impose such things as the Better Regulation Framework on the CMA? After all, that is part of the operational standards, if you like, that are expected of a regulator such as the CMA. Not only do I support what the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, is putting forward, but I also ask how we make sure that the regulator performs its duties in line with what is a relatively new piece of guidance, the Better Regulation Framework, going forward.
As ever, let me start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, for drawing attention to and initiating this fascinating debate on the objectives of the digital markets regime with these amendments. Most speakers have anticipated many of my arguments in advance, but I hope none the less to persuade noble Lords of their value.
Clear objectives shape the work of the CMA, ensuring that its focus is on promoting competitive markets that drive better services, greater choice and lower prices for individuals and businesses. It is essential, in the Government’s view, that the objectives of the new regime are equally clear and support a coherent and effective regime. Amendment 80 proposes a duty for the CMA to further the interests of citizens, as well as consumers, in its digital markets work. As the UK’s competition regulator, the CMA’s existing statutory duty is to promote competition for the benefit of consumers. Consumer benefits are broad, as has been observed; they can include economic growth, innovation, media plurality and data privacy. An additional citizens’ duty that goes beyond the scope of the tools and the remit of the digital markets regime would reduce the clarity of the CMA’s role, create inconsistency with the CMA’s wider competition and consumer functions and overlap with the remit of other regulators. It is essential that the duties of the regime match the scope of its tools.
Noble Lords can all agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the absolute, non-negotiable importance of supporting the sustainability of the press in the UK. There can be no doubt about the vital contribution of independent journalism to producing informed citizens and, therefore, democracy in this country. However, it would further confuse the regulatory landscape to require the CMA to consider issues already overseen by other expert regulators, such as online safety and data protection. Instead, the CMA will have a duty to consult other key regulators of digital markets, such as Ofcom and the FCA, where proposed interventions in digital markets impact their regulatory interests. This will ensure that the regime forms part of a coherent regulatory landscape that considers broader policy and societal concerns across digital markets.
I want to reassure noble Lords that the Government considered the advice of the CMA’s Digital Markets Taskforce and its recommendation for a citizens’ objective extensively, before consulting on it in 2021. Those we consulted were generally opposed to a role for the CMA that looks beyond its tried and tested duty to promote competition for the benefit of consumers, since this provides the greatest clarity for the digital markets regime. The CMA has testified in front of the House that it benefits from having a single, clear statutory duty. I again thank the noble Baroness for her amendment and for highlighting these important issues. However, for the reasons that I have set out, I hope that she will feel reassured and comfortable in withdrawing it.
I now turn to Amendment 83A from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. It would create a new requirement for the CMA to have regard to the principles of best regulatory practice when carrying out its digital markets functions under Part 1 of the Bill. Let me say at the outset that the Government agree with the spirit of the noble Lord’s amendment. Our 2021 consultation on this regime set out the Government’s principles for the pro-competition regulation of digital markets: that it should be transparent, accountable, targeted and coherent. These principles have informed how the regime is designed in legislation, from the high thresholds that we establish for SMS designation to the targeted and iterative nature of conduct requirements and pro-competition measures. Indeed, we have discussed previously in Committee the wide range of accountability mechanisms for the regime.
Earlier this month, the CMA set out its provisional approach to implementing the new digital markets regime, which aligns with our policy intent. The publication committed to the new regime being targeted, proportionate and transparent. It also included a set of operating principles that reflect the noble Lord’s concerns.
The Government’s strategic steer to the CMA sets out our expectation that the CMA should take a proportionate approach to interventions and minimise burden through transparent engagement with businesses. The CMA explains how it has taken the steer into account in its reporting to Parliament. The CMA’s prioritisation principles and annual plan set out that the CMA will target its work to that which provides the most impact for business and consumers. The proportionality amendments that the Government introduced at Commons Report stage are statutory duties narrowly targeted at conduct requirements and PCIs as the decisions that have the greatest impact on SMS firms. This amendment would introduce a very broad duty for the CMA to have regard to the principles of regulatory best practice for all its digital markets functions. An explicit requirement for the CMA to follow best regulatory practice when carrying out its digital market functions is not necessary.
My Lords, I feel that the first cracks in government certainty are beginning to appear. We live in hope that they will increase as time goes on, with the strength of the amendments being put forward today. I will move Amendment 85 and speak to Amendments 86 and 87. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her support for my Amendment 85.
Clause 125 provides for exemplary damages, but explicitly states that they are not to be available for collective proceedings. The usual category of damages for competition law is breach of statutory duty and compensation for harm done and loss incurred. Where, for instance, a platform illegally harms 1,000 businesses, it harms competition but pays out only to those that plead, prove that their harm was caused by the action of the platform and prove their losses in each case. Abuse of dominance by digital platforms affects thousands of businesses; while platforms make multiple billions in profits, abuse may be identified and fines imposed, but competitive markets are damaged and those harmed are often not compensated. This makes the incentive to breach very high and the incentive for compliance very low.
The purpose of exemplary damages, which strip the wrongdoer of their gains, is to incentivise compliance with the law. They are available only where deliberate breach of the law can be proved. This is more likely where breaking the law makes economic sense for the defendants, such as where it has a major impact on a lot of small players that cannot each afford to take a case. Where many are harmed by deliberate illegal action, there is in fact an even greater case for exemplary damages being available. Government recognition that they should be available should be extended to all cases, including collective proceedings.
Exemplary damages are awarded where the defendant will have known in advance that their actions are likely to break the law but decides to go ahead anyway, as they will make more money from breach of the law than from compliance. This is often the case where a calculation is made about the income generated from many and the risk of claim from only a few. The famous Ford Pinto case, where exemplary damages were awarded, was such a case. Ford’s Pinto had a petrol tank that was prone to catching fire when in a crash. Ford calculated the personal injury costs and claims and, rather than recalling the cars and fixing the problem—which would have cost a lot—decided to leave the car in circulation. The risk of claims and payout was calculated to be less than the cost of fixing it. Ford did a cost-benefit analysis and carried on with production. The US courts awarded exemplary damages to ensure that the law was observed. The idea of the right of a court to award exemplary damages is to prevent the defendant profiting from its own wrongdoing. As such, it strips the wrongdoer of the profits gained from the breach and incentivises the defendant to comply and uphold the rule of law.
Failure to be available in collective proceedings looks to be inconsistent with the principle of incentivising defendants to comply and promote the rule of law. Where exemplary damages are claimed in the case, the claimant can seek disclosure of relevant documents from the defendant. As such, the availability of the prospect of exemplary damages will help to uncover deliberate breach. Any proceeding—including collective proceedings—is equally likely to uncover deliberate breaches. The only difference between collective and other proceedings is that collective proceedings affect a category of claimants.
These amendments would ensure that these damages are available in collective proceedings, which are much more likely to uncover deliberate breaches affecting many people. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say, but it seems extraordinary that they have been excluded by Clause 125.
I will not steal any of the thunder of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, as regards Amendment 128ZA, but I have a terrible feeling that this is another of his Trojan horses being wheeled into proceedings. I very much look forward to what he has to say and thank him in advance for the copy of his letter to the Prime Minister, which rather gives the game away as regards the consumer duty. I beg to move.
My Lords, I must inform the Committee that if Amendment 85 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendments 86 and 87 by reason of pre-emption.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply. Nevertheless, I found it extremely disappointing in respect of my Amendments 85, 86 and 87. There was clearly a period between 2015 and 2017 when exemplary damages were available in collective proceedings. He did not adduce any evidence that an undue litigation culture, as he described it, suddenly arose in that two-year period. His use of pejorative language about an undue litigation culture is pretty unhelpful when we are talking about groups of consumers. Other than saying that this would all lead to an undue litigation culture, he really did not deal with the substance of the reasons for having exemplary damages in these cases: to disincentivise the big tech companies simply carrying on, knowing that they were in breach, with impunity. He did not address that at all.
I do not need to tackle the other amendments as we probably need to move on fairly swiftly, but the Minister was more on point when he talked about Amendment 106, because there is a difficulty with it. We should be more sympathetic to Amendment 107A from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, but I agree with him that it concerns a big issue. It would be extremely helpful not just to read Hansard but to bring together some of the information about the reviews of the CAT that have been conducted. I am afraid that one of the phrases we have to take away from today is “the CAT has strayed” —any innocent observer passing by would not know what the hell we were talking about; indeed, I think the other phrase was “hypertrophic”. Anyway, we live and learn throughout this but we need reassurance about the fact that the CAT is under review, that its rules are being changed and that it is fit for purpose. The noble Lord brought that up exactly.
I was also not entirely convinced about where the accountabilities are between the Lord Chancellor, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Business and Trade. There is more to be discussed there.
Finally, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, is a big fan of consistency, but I am in favour of the status quo here: I do not agree with his amendment. I liked the Minister’s “unintended consequences” phrase because, if we took this seriously, in terms of paramount interests of consumers, we could be talking about short-term interests of consumers; that could be used by those who want to predatory price—to offer low prices for a while and eliminate competition, only to raise the prices later. We have seen behaviour like that. It is a favourite game of, especially, the big players, to exclude competitors only to re-emerge and raise prices. There are dangers in this “paramount” language, but the Minister has answered that question. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.