Operation Conifer

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I can only repeat that I have said that I shall ask officials to look into the possibility or viability of this—I cannot possibly prejudge what they may come back to me with, but I shall come back to the House in due course.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, and the House take a little encouragement from what the Minister said today. When the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, had his last debate, I entered the debate thinking that it was not worth having the expense of a public inquiry into reports that nobody believed, and I was persuaded by the debate that we could not leave this injustice on the table. This suggestion seems to me to be an economical way of disposing of it—a report by a distinguished lawyer. Could the Minister please encourage the Home Secretary to look very carefully at that and allow it to happen?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot honestly say whether it would be economic or not, for obvious reasons—I do not know yet. But I shall certainly make the strength of feeling known once again to the Home Secretary.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to add to what has been said about the content of the Bill but want to make one or two observations on the role of your Lordships’ House in dealing with it.

As has been said, this is not a manifesto Bill, so it is not covered by the Salisbury/Addison convention and there is no constitutional bar to the House’s refusing to give it a Second Reading. On the other hand, when the elected House, having heard the arguments, has passed the Bill, even under the duress of the majority, and without amendment, I agree respectfully with the convenor that that gives it some of the aspects of a Bill covered by the Salisbury/Addison convention. I think the House would be wrong to refuse to give the Bill a Second Reading and wrong, therefore, to vote for the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord German.

The role left for this House to exercise is as a revising Chamber—to amend the Bill and send it back for further consideration. However, we need to be realistic about what, in these circumstances, is meant by a revising Chamber. I do not believe that amendments are possible which would make the Bill unobjectionable and yet meet the Government’s objectives. Amendments passed by this House are likely to be regarded by the Government as wrecking amendments, and I have no doubt that, as the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, said, the Government will use their majority to reverse them in the House of Commons.

Will we be wasting our time in debating and amending this Bill? In one sense, we will. Debates will take place and amendments will be passed, and in the end we will surrender after ping-pong and the Bill will go through. However, in another sense I believe that we will not be wasting our time. In our democracy, political parties and Members in this House have a right and a duty to assert their positions, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. If we did not do so, we would be adding to the damage that will be done to our democracy by the Bill itself.

In my view, the No. 10 spokesman was profoundly wrong in saying that this unelected House has no right to pass amendments removing what we regard as objectionable and dangerous features of the Bill. This House has a right and a duty to do so, even though we must recognise that such amendments will in practice be no more than a kamikaze operation.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot say whether or not that someone will be the Prime Minister at the moment.

As I said, the Government are clear that the MoU review is the correct forum to discuss relevant potential changes to the agreement between the Prime Minister and the ISC. But the Government do not believe a report of this kind is appropriate or necessary and do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has already answered the question from the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and all I can say from the Dispatch Box is that I will try again.

I turn to the second of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, Amendment 47, which would require the Government to publish a report assessing the potential impact of this legislation on the EU’s data adequacy decision. The Government are committed to maintaining their data adequacy decisions from the EU, which play a pivotal role in enabling trade and fighting crime. The Home Office worked closely with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology when developing the proposals within this Bill to ensure that they would not adversely impact on the UK’s EU data adequacy decisions. As the European Commission has made clear, a third country is not required to have the same rules as the EU to be considered adequate. We maintain regular engagement with the European Commission on the Bill to ensure that our reforms are understood. Ultimately, the EU adequacy assessment of the UK is for the EU to decide, so the Government cannot support this amendment.

I turn to the amendments retabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on urgency provisions for individual authorisations under Part 7A and third party dataset warrants under Part 7B. The Government remain opposed to these iterations of the amendments for the following reasons. Urgency provisions are found throughout the IPA and the Government’s approach is to mirror those provisions in the regimes in new Part 7A and new Part 7B. Making the proposed amendment solely for these parts would reduce consistency—as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, predicted—and ultimately risk operational confusion where there is no good reason to do so.

It will always be in the interests of the relevant intelligence service—as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham- Buller, said; I add my comments to those of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about a speedy recovery—to notify a judicial commissioner of the granting of an urgent authorisation or the issuing of an urgent warrant as soon as is reasonably practicable. These urgent instruments are valid only for five working days. A judicial commissioner must review and decide whether to approve the decision to issue or grant the instrument within three working days. If the judicial commissioner refuses to approve the decision within that time, then the instrument will cease to have effect. It would be counter- intuitive for an intelligence service to make untimely notifications, as this increases the risk of the urgent authorisation or warrant timing out because the judicial commissioner is left without sufficient time to make a decision.

In an operational scenario where the urgency provisions are required, such as a threat to life or risk of serious harm, or an urgent intelligence-gathering opportunity, it may not be practical or possible for the intelligence services to ensure completion of paperwork within a 24-hour period, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham- Buller, explained rather more eloquently than I have done.

The intelligence services work closely with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office to ensure that the processes for reviewing decisions are timely and work for judicial commissioners. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, does not press his amendments.

This group also includes the two modest but worthwhile government amendments, Amendments 8 and 9. These make it clear beyond doubt that the new third party BPD regime will fall under the oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The robust oversight that IPCO brings will ensure compliance, ensuring that robust safeguards are in place when information is examined by the intelligence services on third parties’ systems. I hope that noble Lords will welcome these amendments and support them.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, as a former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, perhaps I may say how much I endorse what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Murphy, and welcome many elements in the—

[Lord Fox (LD)]

We have had the speeches on this group and are moving to a vote. I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord.

I thank the Minister for his comments and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. My interpretation—perhaps I am wrong—of the nature of this Bill was that it was to introduce a new class of data and to deal with it. It was not to reach back into existing law and change it. The noble Baroness raised some important points about why I should have been concerned about the other data, which I did not reach back into. I am happy to advise my colleagues in the Commons and perhaps they can do that, too. However, taking on face value the nature of what we were seeking to achieve today, we looked at this data and came up with this conclusion. We have heard the arguments, but I am afraid that I am not persuaded by them and I would like to test the will of the House.

Sir Edward Heath: Operation Conifer

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Wednesday 17th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lexden for securing this debate. I recognise that this is an issue of long-standing interest for him and all other noble Lords who have contributed. I thank them particularly for their many personal experiences of Sir Edward Heath, the great statesman, especially those reminiscences from my noble friend Lord Waldegrave, and the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Birt. While I commend my noble friend Lord Lexden for his tenacity, I am afraid that my response will not differ greatly from that which I have given in the past. Nevertheless, I will again set out for the House the Government’s position.

The first point to make is that it is unfortunate that Operation Conifer was not able to resolve conclusively the position in respect of all the allegations made against Sir Edward. I appreciate the strength of feeling from Sir Edward’s friends and former colleagues that this traduces his memory, but I must, once again, make very clear the point that it does not. The Operation Conifer summary closure report emphasised that no inference of guilt should be drawn from the fact that Sir Edward would have been interviewed under caution had he been alive.

I think we can all agree that it is deeply unfortunate for all concerned that these allegations did not come to light until after Sir Edward’s death. We can certainly agree that the manner in which the then chief constable of Wiltshire Police, Mike Veale, chose to publicise those allegations deserves the censure it has rightly received. Indeed, Mr Veale has admitted that his actions in that respect were inappropriate. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, and I agree, it was, in fact, a new low.

However, we must separate the understandable opprobrium for Mr Veale’s mistakes from a clear-sighted, objective and fair assessment of the investigation and its outcomes. Of course emotions run high in this case—indeed, it is laudable that noble Lords show their loyalty and long-term commitment to the cause of their friend and, as my noble friend Lord Cormack noted, a great statesman—but the Government cannot and should not be guided by emotion, nor by the status of individuals. It is certainly not a unique situation that a deceased individual has allegations made against them to which they are unable to respond, and there can be no justification for treating that individual differently because he or she was a former Prime Minister. There are important principles at stake. It is a fundamental tenet of our legal system that anyone accused of a crime is innocent until they are proven guilty. To maintain that Sir Edward’s reputation is besmirched by the fact that unproven allegations have been made about him is to undermine that precept.

Another critically important principle is at stake, however uncomfortable, and it certainly is in this instance: we must continue to uphold the right of the individual to challenge the holders of power in this country, be they institutions or those occupying high office. I can do no better than echo the words of the 2017 Guardian editorial referenced in the briefing note on Operation Conifer, which was published last Friday by the House’s Library. It said:

“Yet there is a good defence of the decision to investigate, and it must be heard. It rests on the Human Rights Act, which exists to protect individuals in their dealings with official power. The supreme court is due to rule whether the police are always obliged to investigate allegations of serious crime, after the appeal court upheld the argument that the greater the power of the agency of the state, the stronger the duty to investigate allegations made against it. So the police investigation into allegations against Edward Heath was not a futile attempt to bring a dead man to justice, but an important exercise in upholding the right of the citizen. This may be scant comfort to Heath’s friends. But it is an important principle”.


That was written in 2017, of course, but it remains pertinent. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that upholding the rights of the citizen is paramount. Indeed, even this week we have seen many instances of the consequences of the failure to do that.

Of course, it was subsequently proved that the allegations were those of a deranged fantasist, and he is rightfully serving a very long sentence for his crimes, but we also must acknowledge—and not one speaker has mentioned this—that significant political cover was afforded to that individual by some senior politicians, including Members of your Lordships’ House. That is also regrettable and deserves to be on the record.

We cannot lose sight of our duty to uphold the rights of the citizen, whatever our personal views about the merits of the citizen’s case. In line with that principle, I reiterate that the Government have given this matter careful consideration and concluded that there are still no grounds to justify a review or intervention by the Government. The Government do not have plans to commission a review of either the conduct of the investigation into allegations made against Sir Edward or the findings of that investigation.

I know this will disappoint noble Lords, but I must underline again that the investigation has already been subject to considerable external scrutiny by an independent scrutiny panel, two reviews by Operation Hydrant in September 2016 and May 2017, and a review in January 2017 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, as it was then. These reviews concluded that the investigation was legitimate and proportionate. Furthermore, questions about the national guidance that the force was following in conducting the investigation have already been picked up by the College of Policing.

I have explained in considerable detail at various other outings on this subject the scrutiny that the original investigation has been subjected to, so I will not repeat all that, but some noble Lords have proposed a more limited review of the allegations in respect of which Wiltshire Police has said that it would have interviewed Sir Edward had he been alive. Such a review, it is proposed, might consider whether any of those allegations would have justified a decision by the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute, but the ability of a review to do this would, of course, depend on the evidence itself. But it is not for the Government to commission reviews of evidence in respect of individuals. This would be a matter for the local force if it considered it to be appropriate.

I have to a large degree retraced—

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, may I just contest the point the Minister has just made? This is not a local issue; it is a national issue. That has been made perfectly clear by the points that have been made. While I am on my feet, I will just say that when I came to this debate, my view was—and it followed a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Parekh—that there were pros and cons for an inquiry but that the case against one was that we were just reviving charges against Sir Edward Heath that nobody now believes and that that served no purpose. I want to say, having heard the debate tonight, that I have changed my mind.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. I did not say that it was a local matter; I said that it was for the local force to decide whether they considered that to be appropriate. I think that is an important distinction. I accept that—

Sir Edward Heath: Operation Conifer

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, with hindsight of course we can call them “patent rubbish” but, at the time, all these allegations had to be investigated; I do not think there is any doubt about that.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, while all friends and admirers of Sir Edward Heath must be very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, and others for the way they have pursued this, is it not the case that with the jailing of the man who first made these allegations and the conviction of the former chief constable for gross misconduct we can take comfort in the fact that the allegations against Sir Edward have been effectively resolved and disposed of?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it would be unwise of me to get too much into the weeds of what the original investigation looked at and the various aspects of it, but I should stress that in the two weeks after Wiltshire police made a media appeal for anyone with information to come forward, 118 people contacted them. It is definitely more than just one man’s word.

Healthcare: Controlled Drugs

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Thursday 14th September 2023 Grand Committee

Asked by

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Sharpe of Epsom on 24 July (HL9391), when they plan to introduce legislation to enable prescribing of controlled drugs by paramedic independent prescribers, as well as other changes to the use of controlled drugs in healthcare.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I want to thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for having raced from business in the Chamber in order to answer this short debate.

I start by saying that I need to declare no personal interest in the subject of the debate—my only interest is to try to do the world a bit of good. I should also declare that I have no difference of policy with the Government. The issue is this: the Government have said that, following the approval of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, they will extend the list of drugs which paramedic independent prescribers and therapeutic radiographer equivalents may prescribe and administer to patients. These drugs include morphine, morphine sulphate and four other drugs.

This process has taken a considerable time. The advisory council submitted its approval in relation to paramedics in 2019—four years ago—and in relation to radiographers in 2020, three years ago. More than two years later, on 30 September 2022—nearly a year ago—the Minister of State in the Home Office wrote to the secretary of the advisory council and said that he had asked Home Office officials to commence the process for making these regulatory changes.

My purpose today is to ask the Minister to give us a date by which this will be done. I put two Written Questions to the Home Office, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has courteously answered. He has confirmed that the changes are capable of being made by statutory instrument, which the Government will bring forward

“as soon as possible, but this will remain subject to Parliamentary procedure”.

What is this parliamentary procedure? I am advised that it is a statutory instrument under the negative procedure, which means that the instrument comes into law without any parliamentary procedure unless someone dissents, which in this case is effectively unthinkable. So, the statutory instrument simply has to be drafted and laid.

The delay does not seem to be parliamentary procedure but the Home Office’s order of priorities. We know that Home Office lawyers have been very busy, but it is very difficult to understand why they have not been able to find time for this very simple instrument. I understand that the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs approved the wording as long ago as 2019—four years ago. Home Office lawyers could simply take it out of their drawer. Equivalent amendments were required with respect to physiotherapists and podiatrists when these groups were given prescribing rights 10 years ago. They were made by the Home Office in a little over 18 months. Today, by comparison, paramedic independent prescribers have been waiting over five years for the necessary amendments to be made, and therapeutic radiographers have been held in limbo since April 2016—over seven years.

I said at the outset that I had no personal interest to declare, but that is not quite true. We all have a personal interest in this issue. I could describe to your Lordships a case study in which, in the absence of the changes we are discussing today, an advanced paramedic practitioner could not prescribe oral morphine to deal with an acute onset of pain without the patient having to have a further appointment with a GP, prescribing nurse or pharmacist. Following this statutory instrument, that paramedic would be able to prescribe oral morphine for the continuing treatment of pain. If I may make this personal, I do not welcome the prospect some time in the future of unnecessarily lying in acute pain which could be relieved by this simple statutory instrument. Nor do I want others to have to do so.

The statutory instrument offers a double whammy. It will both remove some unnecessary pressure on general practitioners, which the Government and all of us must surely welcome, and make available more immediate treatment for patients. If the Department of Health were responsible for this statutory instrument, I wonder whether it would have been made with more dispatch.

I am too long in the tooth to be fobbed off by statements saying that the Government will make the statutory instrument

“as soon as possible, but this will remain subject to Parliamentary procedure”.

I repeat that it is simple for the Home Office to make and lay this statutory instrument. It effectively requires no parliamentary procedure whatever. I hope the Minister will be able to clearly answer my question and say that the statutory instrument will be made forthwith, I hope by the end of the current Session.

Police and Crime Commissioners

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Monday 20th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I will make what I hope is a helpful suggestion. Could the Minister not give a briefing to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and perhaps to the Leader of the Opposition on a privy counsellor basis? If there is some good reason, they could then reassure those who are understandably indignant about this delay.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to reassure the House on that point. I am seeing my noble friend Lord Lexden this Wednesday. He chose not to mention it, but I will.

National Security Bill

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I support on behalf of the ISC Amendment 193 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker. This amendment would update the ISC’s remit to ensure it has the power effectively to scrutinise intelligence and security activity that will be taking place across government under the new national security regime.

The ISC already has the power to oversee much of the intelligence and security activity that will take place. However, as my noble friend Lord Coaker outlined very persuasively, the ISC’s oversight has generally been eroded due to intelligence and security activities often now being undertaken by policy departments which do not generally carry out national security-related activity. He mentioned a list of them and there are many. They were not included in the ISC’s remit and they can—I have to say, they have often—excluded the ISC from looking at the material that we think we should look at. If the Government establish new teams as part of this Bill which sit outside our remit, this amendment will make sure that the memorandum of understanding is updated, and we will be able to have access to do our job for Parliament scrutinising this highly classified material.

Updating the ISC’s MoU is vital, as effective oversight of intelligence and security can be undertaken effectively only by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Unlike Select Committees, the ISC’s purpose is to oversee these highly classified matters which relate to national security on behalf of Parliament. It is therefore the only parliamentary body with the necessary security infrastructure to scrutinise the material that often underpins national security decisions. This issue of having the right material affects the staff. For example, civil servants, who are working with regular access to “top secret” have to have DV. If one looks across government at the moment, I am not sure that that is the case in some departments. They also, including Ministers, have to be read into the STRAP material, and then there is the extra physical security to store “top secret” and STRAP material. It is considerable, and I am not convinced that this is the case across government.

As my noble friend Lord Coaker mentioned, the Government understandably provided a very clear commitment to Parliament, during the passage of the Justice and Security Act 2013, that the ISC’s MoU would be kept updated. Unfortunately—we noted this in our last annual report—this has not been done. They have not stood by this commitment. I cannot understand what difficulty the Government have with this, because I would have thought it was in the interests of the Government to ensure that Parliament has an ability to do this.

I can only repeat the words of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker:

“Each piece of new legislation devolving national security matters away from bodies already overseen by the ISC should come with commensurate expansion of the ISC’s MoU”.


This has been promised by the Government and it should be done. This amendment will seek to do that if, as a result of this Bill, the Government do indeed establish new teams outside the ISC’s current remit. However, as this amendment is linked to this Bill only, it understandably has limited scope; it will not fix the lack of effective oversight in other national security legislation, such as the Telecommunications (Security) Act, where, again pretty much across this House, people argued that the ISC should have the ability to scrutinise that. But it will be a very useful start to help embed the oversight provisions, and for that reason I support this amendment.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I want to support Amendment 193, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. He said that he felt the memorandum of understanding had not been renewed and brought up to date for no good reason. I believe it is worse than that. I think it has not been revised for a bad reason: because the Government have taken a dislike to the Intelligence and Security Committee. They have tried to restrict its activities, I believe for two reasons. First, the Government were piqued when there was pressure to publish the Russia report before the 2019 election and they did not want that. I suspect the reason they did not want it was that they did not want the discussion which the report introduced about the involvement of Russian apparatchiks in London politics. Secondly, I believe the Government were piqued because the committee did not elect as its chairman the person whom the Government wanted. It seems extraordinary that one could say of a responsible Government that these were their motives; they are childish motives. But the consequence is that in recent times the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has not been used for the purpose for which it was set up.

If the Government are not going to use the Intelligence and Security Committee properly, they should save money and abolish it. But, of course, they will not do that because Parliament set it up, Parliament thinks it is important that this House and the House of Commons should have some insight into intelligence operations, and it would be unacceptable for the Government to abolish it. But they must choose either to abolish it or to use it properly. If they are to use it properly, they must update the memorandum of understanding and, as the noble Lord, Lord West, said, use it for the purpose for which Parliament intended: to give oversight by people who are fully screened within the ring of secrecy to report to Parliament. I think this is a much more important amendment than the face of it suggests.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, again I thank all those who have spoken on this group of amendments, and in particular I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his generous remarks.

In terms of the Russia report, it is simply not true that we have not implemented the report’s recommendations. As I said in my opening remarks, the Government published a full and comprehensive response to the ISC report in July 2020, which is available online and which addressed all the committee’s key themes and recommendations point by point. The Government have responded to all the recommendations that could be identified within the report. The majority of the committee’s recommendations were already being implemented by the Government before the report was published: for example, those covering co-ordination of HMG Russia’s work, close working with international partners, and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity.

I would say also that, as noted in HMG’s response to the Russia report, an assessment was produced and is available at a higher classification. Noble Lords will appreciate the difficulties of producing intelligence assessments for the wider public, given the risks of putting sensitive material, including information about our capabilities and methods, into the public domain.

National Security Bill

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I have great respect for any new clause proposed by the noble Lord, and with the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It is therefore with some trepidation that I may strike a discordant note. I am almost intimidated by the compelling ad majorem argument which the noble Lord used, and some of the names he referred to in support of his proposal. I read the Policy Exchange document at the time, which seemed to me both ambitious and, to an extent, misguided. I will give four or five reasons why I am of that view.

First, what is described as treason in this proposed new clause is in every instance already prosecutable under existing offences. In my view, duplication of conduct under different headings is a disadvantage to the courts and creates potential difficulties with juries, which are sensitive to the labels that would be placed by conviction upon those prosecuted.

Secondly, the clause refers generally to an “attack”. Does that include cyberattacks, which are now being conducted on a very large scale by countries which have hostile intent towards the United Kingdom? Is it proportionate that a cyberattack should be punishable as treason as opposed to under the available existing legislation?

My third argument is about symbolism in criminal justice legislation. I know that some of us sat in this building in another place during the content of the Westland affair, as a result of which the jury failed to convict somebody who in law had been held by the judge to be guilty of the offence as charged. That is a result we would all wish to avoid. Others here were in very senior official positions during what proved to be a very uncomfortable episode. I look in particular at my noble friend Lord Butler, to whom I give way with pleasure.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

I think my noble friend is referring to Ponting, not Westland.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Butler of Brockwell Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, appears next on the list by mistake—he has already spoken—so I call the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in supporting the new clause in Amendment 33 and its consequentials, I am riding pillion to my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich. When I heard his speech at Second Reading, I immediately felt that his approach struck the most practical balance in controlling the activities of intelligence agencies embedded in groups carrying out criminal activities. Following the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, I rather suspect that the scale of this is both at a lower level and in a larger quantity than previous speeches have suggested. One has to see the practicality of that in those terms.

My experience, both when I was in government and when I was on the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, leads me to believe that control of these operations requires three things. First, it requires better precision than there has been so far in the definition of how far agents can be authorised to go in participation in criminal activities. That is fair to them, and it is fair to the authorities. Ever since the case of Brian Nelson, the Northern Irish loyalist informer, to which I referred in Committee, I have felt that it is unsatisfactory that judgments on these matters should be left open and to the discretion of prosecuting authorities after the event, although I have no doubt that the decision to prosecute Nelson—indeed, he confessed—was correct.

Secondly, there is a need for close contact and immediacy in the control exercised. These situations in which covert intelligence agents are involved are often fast-moving. Communication between agent and controller may need to be rapid, and control needs to be agile. I do not believe that that can practicably be provided by a judge or a Secretary of State.

Thirdly, independent oversight is needed in as close to real time as possible. Controllers cannot be the judge and jury in these matters—certainly not the sole judge and jury—since there is an obvious temptation to cross lines in the interests of achieving what are often laudable objectives. I am persuaded that oversight is likely to be best achieved by giving the independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner a more active and immediate role. It seems to me that the provision proposed by my noble friend in the proposed new clause achieves these objectives in a practical way, and I am glad to hear that the Minister is inclined to agree that this is a fair and effective way forward.

The Liberal Democrats’ Amendment 17 takes a similar approach and, to that extent, I am sympathetic to it, but I am sceptical about whether the requirement for “prior approval” by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, even with a get-out clause in circumstances of urgency, would meet the requirement for operational agility—so I will stick with my support for my noble friend’s amendment.