Welfare Reform and Work Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Blencathra
Main Page: Lord Blencathra (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Blencathra's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 74 and 93. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, for his support for both, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for his support for Amendment 93. The aim here is to ensure that we debate the human rights implications of the cap, particularly regarding children and women. I am grateful to CPAG for its help with these amendments, and I declare an interest as its honorary president. I also support the other amendments in this group.
Amendment 74 would require the exemption of households from the benefit cap where necessary to avoid a breach of convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. It would send a clear message that Parliament intends a cap to be implemented in a human rights-compliant way. It would enable tribunals and courts to exempt families from the operation from the cap so as to avoid a breach of human rights without having to make a declaration of incompatibility. This is necessary because by incorporating the list of benefits included in the cap in primary legislation in Clause 7, which was not the case before, rather than leaving them in regulations as now, it appears that the Government are trying to avoid legal challenge under the Human Rights Act other than by way of such a declaration.
Amendment 93 would require the Secretary of State’s review of the cap to take into account the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. The phraseology echoes that in Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 and Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. In ZH (Tanzania) the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, found that this effectively incorporated Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires the welfare of the child to be treated as “a primary consideration”.
The noble Baroness quoted the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, which I presume was from the Supreme Court case which ruled just a few months ago. However, the noble Baroness will be aware that the Government were taken to court on this very point of not implementing the UNCRC, the court ruled by three to two against Lady Hale and the judgment was that the Government were perfectly correct. The court went on to say, quoting some other distinguished noble Lords in this House, that it would be quite inconceivable for an unincorporated charter like the UNCRC to be given force in English law.
I am grateful to the noble Lord. I will come on to that case; I was talking about an earlier case that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, was involved in. I am quite aware of the outcome of the case heard earlier this year, but I thank the noble Lord for providing a trailer for what I will say later.
These amendments are prompted in part by the inadequacy of the Government’s own assessment of the human rights implication of the cap and in part by the judgment in the Supreme Court case that the noble Lord mentioned on the cap earlier this year. Both the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I was then a member, and the Office of the Children’s Commissioner have emphasised that child poverty is a human rights/children’s rights issue. Lowering the benefit cap clearly has implications for the number of children living in poverty. An internal assessment leaked to the Guardian in May suggested that if parents are unable to avoid the cap through paid work, it could plunge a further 40,000 children into poverty.
The impact assessment says nothing on the subject of child poverty, yet when I tabled a Written Question to ask what the impact on the number of children in poverty would be, I was referred to that impact assessment. As I said in our first session, I consider that rather insulting, as the implication was that I had not read it. I remind the Minister that the Companion makes it clear that Ministers should be as,
“‘open as possible’ in answering questions”,
as this is,
“inherent in ministerial accountability to Parliament”.
I therefore ask the Minister now, what is the department’s estimate of the impact on child poverty of reducing the cap, given that we know from the Guardian that such an estimate exists? I am quite happy to accept any provisos about possible behavioural responses but this is not a good enough reason for refusing to provide Parliament with such a crucial piece of information. Also, can the Minister tell us how the Government responded to the questions from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on whether a proper child rights impact assessment had been conducted and,
“the measures being taken to mitigate negative impact on the enjoyment of the rights of children, particularly those in vulnerable situations”?
The impact assessment has a section entitled “What are we doing in mitigation?”. I could summarise the contents by saying, “Not very much”. It says nothing at all about mitigation of the negative impact on the rights of children, despite the request from the UN committee. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, too, has criticised the impact assessments and the human rights memorandum which accompany the Bill for failing fully to assess the impact on equality and human rights. It warns that there is a risk to the UK’s compliance with its obligations under national and international human rights law, particularly with reference to children, women and disabled people, and therefore it gives its firm support to these amendments.
The impact assessment does at least acknowledge that women are more likely to be affected than men, as 64% of claimants who have their benefit reduced are likely to be single females—mainly lone parents. Sixty-three per cent of households capped to date have contained a child under five, and in total more than twice as many children as adults have been hit by the cap.
In the human rights memorandum, the Government note the Supreme Court’s decision, which I shall come to now. They assert that they have fully considered their obligations under the UNCRC—in particular, Article 3, which concerns the duty to treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration. However, their analysis of the best interests of the child seems to rest on the proposition that it is in the best interests of children overall to have parents in work and that work remains the surest route out of poverty.
That would be laughably inadequate if it were not for what is at stake. As the EHRC observes, it betrays a particular lack of understanding regarding compliance with the UNCRC. It may well be in the best interests of many children for parents to find work but it will depend on the work available and on the circumstances—as has already been discussed on earlier amendments, work can represent a cul-de-sac rather than a route out of poverty. Moreover, this bald statement ignores the fact that, as my noble friend said, the great majority of those who were already subject to the cap did not find work as a result. Is it really in the best interests of children to have their standard of living reduced even further when a survey, reported in the first-year review of the operation of the cap, found that more than a third of those affected had already had to cut back on household essentials and many had incurred debt?
In fact, the Government’s position pretty much ignores the judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale—echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr— that it,
“misunderstand[s] what article 3(1) of the UNCRC requires”.
The final decision does not alter that fact. She continues:
“It requires that first consideration be given to the best interests, not only of children in general, but also of the particular child or children directly affected by the decision in question. It cannot possibly be in the best interests of the children affected by the cap to deprive them of the means to provide them with adequate food, clothing, warmth and housing, the basic necessities of life. It is not enough that children in general, now or in the future, may benefit by a shift in welfare culture if these are also the consequences. Insofar as the Secretary of State relies upon this as an answer to article 3(1), he has misdirected himself”.
She also pointed out that the children affected suffer from a situation which is none of their making and which they themselves can do nothing about. Can the Minister now give a more convincing response to the weighty charge that the cap, and therefore these clauses, are not in the best interests of children? As it is, the failure to give proper consideration to the best interests of the child could leave this measure vulnerable to a further future legal challenge.
In his judgment, Lord Carnwath referred to a point—mentioned by my noble friend—made during the passage through this House of the Welfare Reform Bill, which became an Act in 2012. That point was that most of the savings from the cap resulted from the inclusion of child benefits and child tax credits, even though these will be received by the great majority of those on median earnings. I shall return to this when I speak to Amendments 76 and 77. Although ultimately, Lord Carnwath sided with the judges who did not allow the appeal, he still considered that the cap did not comply with the UNCRC, and he expressed the hope that the Government would address the implications of this when it came to reviewing the cap. Even Lord Reed, who spoke for the majority in disallowing the appeal, linked the proportionality assessment to the fact that the cap was set at median earnings. Now that, as my noble friend has made clear, there is no clear rationale for the level of the cap, as it is pushed to be below median earnings, that proportionality judgment might start to look rather different.
I have focused mainly on the implications for children’s human rights, but, as I said, the human rights of women and disabled people are also at issue. I am sure we will hear more about the more recent High Court case that found indirect discrimination against disabled people through the impact on carers, but I will not go into that now. These wider implications are another reason for my amendment to Clause 7, which requires general human rights compatibility.
I believe that these amendments should be uncontroversial. After all, if the Government are so confident that the cap is compliant with human rights instruments, they have nothing to fear from them. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will be willing to take them away and consider them.
The point I was answering was in relation to people in work, so that is a slightly different point. In relation to that point, too, as the noble Baroness has brought it up, the structure of the benefit cap is designed to ensure that people who are in a support group under the employment and support allowance, those in receipt of personal independence payments, and so on—there are number of exceptions—are not covered by the benefit cap. Those households are not covered by the benefit cap. We are focused, to a large extent, on those who have a capability for work even if that capability may be restricted in some ways.
I did not complete the point I was making in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. Many years ago I was deputy director-general of the British Chambers of Commerce— and I do not think it has changed in the slightest—and I know that what matters to employers is that people have been in work and have all the attributes of somebody who has been in work. The longer one is out of work the less likely one is, as we know, to have those attributes. Therefore, the entry into work, even if it might not necessarily be the right job or be regarded as suitable or appropriate, will by its very nature make someone more likely to have those attributes necessary for work.
That is just one of the reasons why the benefit cap is needed. It is also needed because of a sense of the fairness between those who are in work and those who are not. The noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, said there was a relationship with average earnings. That was true when the benefit cap was introduced, but to assert that it is some kind of mechanistic or scientific relationship is misleading. It is a judgment. A judgment was made, when there was previously no benefit cap to try and establish a benefit cap at a level that was regarded as fair.
I have to tell noble Lords—again coming from recent experience of fighting elections and being in the other place—that the public support the benefit cap. They regard it as still generous—too generous in many respects. When one looks at the relationship with those who are in work—the four in 10 households, broadly speaking, as was mentioned—who are not earning any more from their work than would be available through the benefit cap by the accumulation of benefits, they do not regard it as fair or reasonable for people to accumulate more by way of benefits than they are able to access by work.
My noble friend has just said that from his recent experience in the other place he found that large numbers of the public supported the benefits cap. Can he tell us what Members of the Labour Front Bench in the other place were saying about the benefit cap, until quite recently?
Until recently—I do not know what the most recent experience is, but certainly until September this year—the Opposition Front Bench in the other place said that they supported the principle of the cap. I suppose they would say that they support the principle of the cap but at the level that it is currently set.
That brings me to the third reason why we have a benefit cap—namely, that we have to decide our priorities for distributing any given level of public expenditure. Of course, we know that Parliament has supported an overall cap on the welfare budget. Frankly, it is better for it to be distributed in relation to specific need than for some households to accumulate it to a greater extent.
If one were to seek to sustain the benefit cap at the level at which it currently applies, rather than apply it at the level proposed in the Bill—I hope that this House would not go down that path—that begs the question of where that money is to come from. Where else in the welfare budget can that saving be made because this step is still part of a necessary process of reducing the deficit over this Parliament? Where there is public support for this measure, where jobs are available in the economy and where there is scope to deliver an additional step towards reducing the deficit and heightening incentives for work while at the same time focusing the available resources on giving support—as we debated earlier in Committee—to those who we want to assist into work, and giving specific targeted support to the maximum extent we can where people have identified specific needs, Ministers are right to say that we should be doing that rather than allowing this benefit to be accumulated by some households to a greater extent.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis. She said at one point that the public do not understand how social security works. That is very true; I spent many years as a Member of Parliament and understood only a fraction of it, and I believe that very few people understand the details of the 70,000 regulations. However, what the public do understand is that when they have to move to another part of the country and cannot afford a mortgage on £26,000, or if they have to live in a house which they would ideally like to be bigger, better or different, or in a better street, and they cannot afford that, but then they see someone else or a family getting £26,000 or more in benefits, they feel it is unfair. You do not have to know how the regulations work to have that instinctive feeling. That is why all parties strongly supported the benefits cap when it was introduced by the previous Government. I appreciate that the Labour Party now has some reservations about it and I will comment on that later.
I had intended to talk only about the level of the cap and how it was fair. However, in view of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on the UNCRC, which I thought I would be dealing with on another amendment, perhaps I could make those comments in this speech in answer to her and I will not speak again on UNCRC matters. On the level of the benefits cap, as politicians we have different views but this was part of a case before the Supreme Court last year. It was just decided a few months ago and five of the noble judges ruled in the Government’s favour that the benefits cap was not contrary to the rights of the child and not in breach of the ECHR.
In looking at the level of the cap, Lord Reed for the court said that:
“In relation to the related criticism that children in households affected by the cap are deprived of the basic necessities of life, that argument was rejected by the courts below, and I see no basis for reaching a different conclusion. As I have explained, the cap for a household with children is equivalent to a gross salary of £35,000 per annum, higher than the earnings of half the working population in the UK, almost three times the national minimum wage, and not far below the point at which higher rate tax becomes payable”.
That was of course in relation to the level of the cap then and we are now talking about a reduction of 12.5%—but, based on the strong views of the court, I can see no reason why it would come to a different conclusion if the cap were lowered by 12.5%.
In looking at how families had been forced to move, the learned judge went on to say:
“In relation to the argument that households with children cannot reasonably be expected to move house … Millions of parents in this country have moved house with their children, for a variety of reasons, including economic reasons. It is, in particular, not uncommon for working households to move out of London in order to find more affordable property elsewhere. It is also necessary to recognise that transitional financial assistance is available for households affected by the cap who cannot move until suitable arrangements have been made in relation to the children, as I have explained”.
Those views were taken from a 95-page report of the Supreme Court, having heard days and days of argument.
I may have misheard, but I think that I heard the noble Lord say that all five judges said that the cap complied with the UNCRC on the rights of the child. Is that right or did I mishear?
If I said that, I misspoke. It was three out of five: a majority verdict of the Supreme Court.
So some of the five said that it did not comply but the fact is that the UNCRC is not incorporated into UK law, and therefore that was not sufficient for the appeal to be allowed.
I take the noble Baroness’s point but that was not the view of Lord Reed, which I read. I can see nowhere in his judgment where he said that we did not comply with the UNCRC but that nevertheless, because it was not incorporated, he was going to find in the Government’s favour. That is not my interpretation of reading those pages whatever.
Let me move on to the UNCRC, since we have got there. First, the judge made the point:
“As an unincorporated international treaty, the UNCRC is not part of the law of the United Kingdom (nor, it is scarcely necessary to add, are the comments upon it of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child)”.
Then comes the crucial point:
“‘The spirit, if not the precise language’, of article 3(1) has been translated into our law in particular contexts through section 11(2) of the Children Act 2004 and section 55 of the Citizenship, Borders and Immigration Act 2009”.
The judge was making it very clear that although the exact wording of the UNCRC was not applicable in the UK, the Government, through legislation, had incorporated the principles of it and were therefore complicit.
The judge went on to say that,
“it is therefore inappropriate for the courts to purport to decide whether or not the Executive has correctly understood an unincorporated treaty obligation”.
He then quoted Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s comments from a famous judgment, which I will leave aside, before noting:
“Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood expressed himself more emphatically … ‘It simply cannot be the law that, provided only a public officer asserts that his decision accords with the state’s international obligations, the courts will entertain a challenge to the decision based upon his arguable misunderstanding of that obligation and then itself decide the point of international law at issue’”.
The noble Baroness, who I greatly respect and who is very knowledgeable in this matter, quoted extensively I think from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who took a rather more fundamentalist view of incorporating the UNCRC into English law. She has held that position for some time, but it was not the view that the court collectively took.
I will conclude taking extracts from these turgid 95 pages shortly. The judge went on to say:
“Finally, it has been explained many times that the Human Rights Act entails some adjustment of the respective constitutional roles of the courts, the executive and the legislature, but does not eliminate the differences between them: differences, for example, in relation to their composition, their expertise, their accountability and their legitimacy. It therefore does not alter the fact that certain matters are by their nature more suitable for determination by Government or Parliament than by the courts. In so far as matters of that nature have to be considered by the courts when deciding whether executive action or legislation is compatible with Convention rights, that is something which the courts can and do properly take into account, by giving weight to the determination of those matters by the primary decision-maker”.
That decision is,
“relevant to these appeals, since the question of proportionality involves controversial issues of social and economic policy, with major implications for public expenditure. The determination of those issues is pre-eminently the function of democratically elected institutions. It is therefore necessary for the court to give due weight to the considered assessment made by those institutions. Unless manifestly without reasonable foundation, their assessment should be respected”.
In conclusion, the judge says:
“Many of the issues discussed in this appeal were considered by Parliament prior to its approving the Regulations … Furthermore, that consideration followed detailed consideration of clause 93 of the Bill, which became section 96 of the 2012 Act. It is true that the details of the cap scheme were not contained in the Bill which Parliament was debating, but the Government’s proposals had been made clear, they were challenged by means of proposed amendments to the Bill, and they were the subject of full and intense democratic debate. That is an important consideration. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed in R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General … ‘The democratic process is liable to be subverted if, on a question of moral and political judgment, opponents of the Act achieve through the courts what they could not achieve in Parliament’”.
He went on to say:
“The same is true of questions of economic and political judgment”.
I apologise for quoting extensively from those bits of the judgment. I shall not speak again on UNCRC issues, but the noble Baroness provoked me in the sense that she relied heavily on the UNCRC to somehow suggest that the Government were acting improperly or illegally and had something to fear from the Human Rights Act. That was not the view of the majority of the court.
I do not want to provoke the noble Lord any further, but would he not accept that Lord Carnwath, in accepting that the appeal was unfounded—whatever the legal term is—and that the issue was one for Parliament, specifically asked the Government when they reviewed the benefit cap to consider what the judges had said about Article 3.1 of the UNCRC? That was my point—the Government have reviewed the benefit cap, and it will be even less in the interests of children than it was at the higher level.
I thank the noble Baroness. I think that the comments of Lord Justice Carnwath are what the lawyers would call obiter dicta—they did not go to the heart of the judgment. He was making an observation that it might be nice if the Government considered it, but there was no suggestion that the Government’s action in imposing the benefits cap was somehow contrary to the European Human Rights Act because we had failed to look after the interests of the child, as set down in the UNCRC.
The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, prayed in aid the state of public opinion about the benefits system. My noble friend Lady Hollis rightly corrected that. In addition to opinion polls, which have proved less than infallible in recent times, we should have a fact poll. We could then gauge what people really know about the issues that the country and individuals face. As my noble friend pointed out, there is a wide misapprehension about this issue as well as many others affecting the benefits system.
We are moving from a position in which the cap was related to average earnings to a different system. By sheer coincidence, perhaps, that move is taking place at a time when, after a long period in which average earnings have not risen, they have at last begun to rise. I suspect that this overdue rise in incomes, which would otherwise have affected benefits, has triggered the change that the Government are proposing. As other noble Lords have pointed out, and as we shall no doubt hear again during the Bill’s proceedings, one of the principal problems that families face is the very high level of rents in the private sector and the difficulty of obtaining alternative accommodation at a reasonable rent. So these incomes are very much under pressure, with or without benefits. We are not talking about excessive amounts of money; £20,000 for couples and lone parents outside London is not the kind of money that enables people to live a life of luxury—far from it.
These amendments do not destroy the system but try to impose some criteria by which the benefits cap should be assessed. What on earth can be wrong with the suggestion in Amendment 92 that the Secretary of State must take into account,
“the relationship between the level of benefit cap and median household income”,
the impact of the cap on households, local and public authorities and registered social landlords? What is there to object to in that proposal being a matter for consideration?
I rise briefly to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, because her amendment would remove the ESA part in Clause 7(4)(e). I do not think that removing it will serve people with disabilities well. To be fair, when the Labour Government introduced the ESA back in 2008, they had a noble aim: to help support many people with disabilities into work. I commend them on that. The work-related activity group—WRAG—within ESA was originally intended to act as an incentive to encourage people to participate in work-related activity and therefore return to work quicker.
Previously in Committee, noble Lords suggested that people in the WRAG have been declared not fit for work, but that is not the case. They have been declared to have “limited capacity for work”, which is not the same thing, as most noble Lords will understand. That is an important distinction, for the purpose of this group is to encourage people into work. Indeed, when the Labour Government introduced the benefit White Paper, Raising Expectations and Increasing Support: Reforming Welfare for the Future, published in 2008, they stated that they aimed to reduce the number of people on incapacity benefits by 1 million by 2015. I am making no criticism or political comment. It was a wise and noble aim, yet the reality is that we have failed and only 1% of people in the WRAG leave the benefits system each month.
It is good that the Department for Work and Pensions is currently looking to reform this area and I look forward to seeing my noble friend’s White Paper in the new year. It would be a backward step to remove the ESA. We have already discussed this, and my noble friend has already stated today the tremendous success that the cap has in getting people into work. Removing the ESA would be slightly counterproductive.
Very quickly, I just want to raise the question of whether the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, thinks that there is a problem with the work capability assessment or with the ESA WRAG. I am aware that people with Parkinson’s are already assessed as having limited capacity for work. The idea that their capacity will grow is frankly inconceivable.
The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. We addressed the capacity for work test at an earlier stage. There are concerns and it may not be perfect. It is very difficult to assess. We can have 100,000 people with MS and every single one is different, so it is very difficult to come to a firm conclusion. I know that the Government are continually improving it. Labour improved it. The coalition improved it and the current Government are trying to improve that test. I hope that my noble friend will continue with that.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 87 to 90 in our name, and to comment briefly on the other amendments in the group. Ours are probing amendments designed to encourage the Minister to talk to the Committee a bit more openly than he has been able to do so far. What behavioural responses are being sought from some of the groups of people affected by the cap?
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for talking about kinship carers so powerfully. I shall be listening very carefully to what the Minister says at the end, and I hope to hear him engage rather more substantially with the issue than I feel he did when this came up in earlier stages, particularly in relation to the two-child policy.
Amendment 87 would exclude from the cap anyone claiming carer’s allowance. I am very happy to press pause on that and come back to it on Report. The Minister should be aware that expectations are now running exceedingly high in this House. I am sure that what he has to say when he comes back will be a delight to all of us, and I very much look forward to that.
There are two things from the judgment that he might still take, even if the Government decide to accede to the very small number of people who were there. The first goes to a point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. At the opening part of the judgment Mr Justice Collins said that,
“to describe a household where care was being provided for at least 35 hours a week as ‘workless’ was somewhat offensive”.
That was a very good point and one we could all do well to remember.
The other point that Mr Justice Collins made, which is of wider relevance, was that what often seemed small capped sums for the DWP could be such a loss to these families as to “tip them into destitution”. One of the cases he gave as an example was of somebody who was losing £11 a week. These may seem small sums to the department but they can make the difference in Dickensian terms between happiness and misery to individual families. I hope that we will all bear that in mind.
Amendment 88 would exempt from the cap those who are claiming universal credit and are not subject to all work-related requirements. Amendment 89 would exempt people in receipt of ESA in the WRAG group, which was just addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. Amendment 90 would exempt claimants of income support. In the impact assessment, the Government talk about reducing the levels of the cap for those not making a “behavioural response” by an average of £63 a week. That is a lot of money.
These amendments require the Government to explain what behavioural responses are being sought. The Minister says that this is hugely successful in getting people into work. In fact, as we have already heard from the IFS, the majority of people affected are not responding by either moving house or moving into work because 85% of them are not required to work as a condition of receiving benefits. Therefore, the cap will try to push into work certain people who would otherwise not be required to do so because they are on ESA, or they are the parents of very young children, or they are carers—a point made very strongly by my noble friend Lady Hollis on an earlier amendment.
The only ways to escape the cap are to move into work of at least 16 hours a week—to open a working tax credit claim, or be on the minimum wage while on UC—or move home. In the case of people on ESA—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, notwithstanding—does the Minister accept that some people in the ESA WRAG group will either not be capable of working at the moment, or will not be able to sustain 16 hours’ work a week, or will not be able to work consistently because of the nature or their illness or disability? If that is the case, can he explain to the Committee what behavioural responses he wants from them and, if they are not capable of making any of the available responses—working or moving house—does he think it fair that they should simply have their income cut because they are incapable of doing the thing he wants them to do?
In the case of parents who are capped, the normal work requirements do not apply, so a single parent or main carer could have two children, including a very young baby, and be expected to work if the cap means that they could not otherwise afford to pay their rent. Whenever we talk about single parents or parents working, the Minister tells the House that the Government are putting lots of extra money into childcare and that parents of three and four year-olds will have extra childcare, as will disadvantaged parents of two year-olds, but here we are talking about children who could be one or two years old. There is no free entitlement to childcare when a child is under two. Even the provision of childcare for disadvantaged two year-olds is for only 15 hours in term time, which would not match the requirements of someone moving into a job for 16 hours a week throughout the year to escape the benefit cap.
Research undertaken by the Family and Childcare Trust found significant gaps in provision for young children in 136 local authorities surveyed in England and Wales. The evidence bears this out. It shows that single parents with younger children are already less likely to move off the cap than other groups, presumably because they are struggling to find suitable flexible jobs and suitable childcare while combining them with minding very young children.
The impact assessment also talks about the aim being to improve work incentives, but I wonder whether the Minister has read the report from the Child Poverty Action Group, which showed just how strong work incentives were, even for families who might be getting significant amounts of benefit. It gives the example of a very rare occurrence of a lone parent with four children, who would be better off by £105 a week working just 16 hours a week on the minimum wage. Therefore, work incentives already exist so, if parents are not working, something else may be going on.
When the Minister responds, I hope that he will address these probing amendments by talking about individual cases. He has talked a lot about how he wants to move to a much more personalised situation so that advisers can engage with individuals and understand that their circumstances differ, yet this measure feels like a very blunt tool, indeed. Therefore, could he tell us a little more about what it might mean in practice?